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\begin{document}

\title{Religion and Philosophy}
\author{R. G. Collingwood, 1916}
\date{Edited by David Pierce\\
March 21, 2015\\
July 20, 2015\\
February 15, 2016}
\publishers{Mathematics Department\\
Mimar Sinan G\"uzel Sanat \"Universitesi\\
Istanbul\\
\url{http://math.msgsu.edu.tr/~dpierce/}}

\maketitle

\begin{dummy}
\relscale{0.9}
\chapter*{Editor\apo s Preface}
\mychead{Editor\apo s Preface} % This does not seem to work 
                         % unless there is a \newpage command
                         % before the next such header command below

Here is the text of Collingwood{\apo}s \emph{Religion and Philosophy}
\cite{Collingwood-RP},
typeset by \LaTeX.
I have augmented the text in two ways:
\begin{inparaenum}[(1)]
  \item
by \hlt{underlining} significant passages, and
\item
by commenting in footnotes.
\end{inparaenum}
A lot of Collingwood\apo s later work is prefigured in this, his first book.
This is a reason why I have felt it worthwhile to edit the book as I have done.

My own footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the text\cln\
there are currently \ref{lastfootnote} of them.
I am likely to continue to add notes as I revisit and rethink the book.

I have signified Collingwood{\apo}s thirteen own footnotes by asterisk and dagger
($*$ and $\dag$).
In the original text (the \enquote{copy-text}),
these footnotes were all numbered 1,
except on page 40 (starting on the current page \pageref{40}),
where there were two footnotes, numbered 1 and 2.

I have also made a few notes on notes (Collingwood\apo s or mine),
as for example on pages \pageref{Priest} and \pageref{gfs}.
signified by minuscule Latin letters.
The use of three series of footnotes
is made possible by the \url{bigfoot} package for \LaTeX.
Unfortunately some footnotes break across pages
when there would seem to be no need;
I do not know why this happens.

The copy-text is
a \url{pdf} image of a printing of the original work.
The particular print volume apparently belongs to the library of the University of California, 
Los Angeles{\smc} I obtained its image from the website \url{archive.org}.
In 2011, I printed out the \url{pdf} file
in order to read and study the book (and mark it up with a pencil).

At the same time,
I obtained a text file of the book, 
evidently created by Google through optical character recognition (OCR)
with no further editing.
This text file is what I have actually used for the present edition.
I have corrected the file mainly just by reading it\cln\
I have not compared it line by line with the copy-text.

Before reaching the stage of correcting the text by reading it, 
I had some routine tasks as follows.

\begin{asparaenum}
\item
I removed the original page headers,
but indicated each original page break by a bracketed boldface number.
This number applies to the \emph{following} text.
The Index having been originally, as now, in two columns, 
I indicated its original column breaks along with its page breaks.
I have not given the original numbers of first pages of chapters, 
although these numbers are given in the copy-text, centered at the foot.

\item
The Index originally began on page 215{\smc} now, page \pageref{index}.
The title page for Part I was originally page 1{\smc}
the preceding page, where the introduction ended,
was page xviii.
Now there are no roman-numbered pages,
but page 1 is the title page of the whole document,
encompassing my Preface and Bibliography along with Collingwood\apo s book.
Chapter I of Part I now begins on page \pageref{part:1}.

\item
I have arranged for \LaTeX\ (through the KOMA-Script bundle)
to automatically \emph{foot} the pages of the present text as in the copy-text they are \emph{headed}:
with page number on the outside, part and chapter number on the inside,
and title of part or chapter in the middle.
I have not followed the original practice of setting these titles in all-caps,
or of setting them larger than the numbers.

\item
In the main body of the copy-text, only the parts and chapters have names{\smc}
further divisions into sections, subsections, and subsubsections
are indicated only by arabic numerals, minuscule Latin letters,
and minuscule Roman numerals, respectively, at the beginnings of paragraphs.
However, these smaller divisions are given verbal descriptions in the table of contents,
and in the present text, 
these descriptions are also incorporated as titles into the main body.

\item
At the end of the index and thus the entire book, 
on page 219 (now page \pageref{printed}), 
the copy-text says,\label{printers}
\begin{quote}\centering
  \emph{Printed by \textsc{R. \&\ R. Clark, Limited,} Edinburgh.}
\end{quote}
If this means that R. \&\ R. Clark were also the typesetters,
then it is they who used more space than is used by \TeX,
both in front of semicolons, 
colons, question marks, and exclamation points, 
and between quotation marks and the text they delimit.
I have tried to imitate the original spacing
by replacing each of the punctuation marks in question 
with an appropriately defined command.
A problem with doing this is that \TeX\ 
does not automatically hyphenate words that are followed by such commands.
For that matter, underlined words are not automatically hyphenated either.
This leads to a lot of what in \TeX\ lingo are \url{overfull} \url{hbox}es.
Manual hyphenation is needed to remove these.

\item
\begin{sloppypar} 
Collingwood\apo s typesetter also makes inter-sentence spaces wider
than inter-word spaces.
\LaTeX\ normally does the same.
The KOMA-Script bundle
seems to bring the difference down to a barely perceptible mini\-mum{\smc}
nonetheless, I have tried to ensure that, as in the copy-text, 
a colon, question mark, or exclamation point
that is not the end of a sentence 
is not followed by an end-of-sentence space.
(There seems to be only one exclamation point in the copy-text,
now on page \pageref{expt}, and it is not the end of a sentence.)
\end{sloppypar}
\item
Linewidth in the present document is almost as small as in the copy-text.
This leads to many \url{overfull} \url{hbox}es, regardless of hyphenation.
To solve this problem,
I have put the offending paragraphs into the \url{sloppypar} environment.

\item
The original text file obtained by OCR
is missing Collingwood{\apo}s Introduction.
I have therefore taken the introduction from the \url{pdf} image.
This image allows cutting and pasting,
and thus some OCR work must have been done on it{\smc}
but in the cutting and pasting,
the words are often out of order and must be rearranged.

\item
The index in the original text file ends after the first line of the entry for 
\enquote{Relations.}
More precisely, the index does not end, but proceeds with Chinese characters.
I have typed up what is missing.
I have tried to maintain the original pattern of hanging indentation.
Page numbers referred to are still as in the copy-text.
\end{asparaenum}

A way to become especially intimate with Collingwood\apo s book
would be to make the index conform to the current pagination.
This would involve identifying 
the precise passages referred to in the copy-text index,
and labelling them appropriately in the \url{tex} file.
This activity might be especially meaningful
if it was Collingwood himself who made the index.
Evidence that he made his own indices 
is found in \emph{The Principles of Art,} 
in a passage
\cite[pp.\ 94--5]{Collingwood-PA}
that I quote at length, because I like it
as being illustrative of Collingwood\apo s habits\cln
\begin{quote}
  Amuse\-%
ment is not the same thing as enjoyment{\smc} it is enjoyment which
is had without paying for it. Or rather, without paying for it
in cash. It is put down in the bill and has to be paid for later
on. For example, I get a certain amount of fun out of writing
this book. But I pay for it as I get it, in wretched drudgery
when the book goes badly, in seeing the long summer days
vanish one by one past my window unused, in knowing that
\hlt{there will be proofs to correct and index to make}, and at the
end black looks from the people whose toes I am treading on.
If I knock off and lie in the garden for a day and read Dorothy
Sayers, I get fun out of that too{\smc} but there is nothing to pay.
There is only a bill run up, which is handed in next day when
I get back to my book with that Monday-morning feeling.
Of course, there may be no Monday-morning feeling{\cln} I may
get back to the book feeling fresh and energetic, with my
staleness gone. In that case my day off turned out to be not
amusement but recreation. The difference between them
consists in the debit or credit effect they produce on the
emotional energy available for practical life.
\end{quote}
It sounds here as if Collingwood expected 
to make the index of the book himself{\smc}
otherwise he could have referred to the \enquote{index to have made.}

In any case, I have not performed the contemplated activity.
The page-numbers in the index are those of the copy-text.
(The OCR program seems usually to have got them right,
but not always.)

\begin{sloppypar}
One could also put the copy-text page-numbers in the new headers{\smc}
but I have not done this either.
\end{sloppypar}

\begin{sloppypar}
The Bibliography consists of all works referred to
(with bracketed numbers)
in this Preface or in my notes.
\end{sloppypar}

\bibliographystyle{plain}
%\bibliography{../Mathematics/references}
%{\relscale{0.9}\bibliography{../references}}
{\relscale{0.9}%\bibliography{../../references}
\begin{thebibliography}{10}

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Barbara Aland et~al., editors.
\newblock {\em The {G}reek {N}ew {T}estament}.
\newblock Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Stuttgart, fourth revised edition, 2006.

\bibitem{Harpers-prison-reform}
Michael Ames.
\newblock Captive market: {W}hy we won't get prison reform.
\newblock {\em Harper's}, pages 34--42, February 2015.

\bibitem{Prayer}
{Author of `Pro Christo et Ecclesia'}, Harold Anson, Edwyn Bevan, R.~G.
  Collingwood, Leonard Hodgson, Rufus~M. Jones, W.~F. Lofthouse, C.~H.~S.
  Matthews, N.~Micklem, A.~C. Turner, and B.~H. Streeter.
\newblock {\em Concerning Prayer: {I}ts Nature, Its Difficulties and Its
  Value}.
\newblock Macmillan and Co., Limited, St.\ Martin's Street, London, May 1916.
\newblock Reprinted June and November 1916.

\bibitem{Bates-Brain}
Karl Bates.
\newblock Brain scans explain quickness to blame.
\newblock {\em Duke Today}, December 2015.
\newblock \url{http://today.duke.edu/2015/12/intentionality}, accessed February
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  \url{http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/brain-scans-explain-why-we-are-quick-to-blame-others}.
  Based on \cite{Ngo}.

\bibitem{Blake}
William Blake.
\newblock {\em The Marriage of Heaven and Hell}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, 1985.
\newblock Facsimile edition, first published in 1975, with introduction and
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\bibitem{Burnaby}
Frederick Burnaby.
\newblock {\em On Horseback Through {A}sia {M}inor}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.
\newblock First published 1898. With an introduction by Peter Hopkirk. Reissued
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\bibitem{Chantraine}
Pierre Chantraine.
\newblock {\em Dictionnaire {\'e}tymologique de la langue grecque. {H}istoire
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\newblock Klincksieck, Paris, 1968--1980.
\newblock In four volumes.

\bibitem{Collingwood-Devil}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock The {D}evil.
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\newblock Reprinted June and November 1916.

\bibitem{Collingwood-RP}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em Religion and Philosophy}.
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\bibitem{Collingwood-SM}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em Speculum Mentis or {T}he Map of Knowledge}.
\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924.
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\bibitem{Collingwood-PA}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em The Principles of Art}.
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\newblock First published 1938.

\bibitem{Collingwood-IN}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em The Idea of Nature}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, and New York, paperback
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\newblock First published 1945.

\bibitem{Collingwood-Auto}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em An Autobiography}.
\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978.
\newblock First published 1939. With a new introduction by Stephen Toulmin.
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\bibitem{Collingwood-EM}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em An Essay on Metaphysics}.
\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, revised edition, 1998.
\newblock With an Introduction and additional material edited by Rex Martin.
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\bibitem{Collingwood-NL}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em The New {L}eviathan, or {M}an, Society, Civilization, and
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\newblock Clarendon Press, revised edition, 2000.
\newblock With an Introduction and additional material edited by David Boucher.
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\bibitem{Collingwood-PH}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em The Principles of History and other writings in philosophy of
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\newblock Oxford, 2001.
\newblock Edited and with an introduction by W. H. Dray and W. J. van der
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\bibitem{Collingwood-EPM}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em An Essay on Philosophical Method}.
\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, new edition, 2005.
\newblock With an Introduction and additional material edited by James Connelly
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\bibitem{Collingwood-PE}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em The Philosophy of Enchantment: {S}tudies in Folklore, Cultural
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\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005.
\newblock Edited by David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood. Paperback
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\bibitem{Collingwood-OPA-Tr}
R.~G. Collingwood.
\newblock {\em K{\i}saca Sanat Felsefesi}.
\newblock BilgeSu, Ankara, 2011.
\newblock Turkish translation by Talip Kabaday{\i} of \emph{Outlines of a
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James Davies.
\newblock {\em Cracked: {W}hy Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than Good}.
\newblock Icon, London, 2014.

\bibitem{Densmore}
Dana Densmore.
\newblock {\em {N}ewton's {\em {{P}rincipia}}: The Central Argument}.
\newblock Green Lion Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico, third edition, 2003.
\newblock Translations and Diagrams by William H. Donahue. Completely revised
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\bibitem{Cress}
Ren{\'e} Descartes.
\newblock {\em Meditations on First Philosophy}.
\newblock Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, Indiana, USA, 1979.
\newblock Translated from the Latin by Donald A. Cress.

\bibitem{Descartes-Eng}
Ren{\'e} Descartes.
\newblock {\em The Philosophical Writings of Descartes}, volume~I.
\newblock Cambridge University Press, 1985.
\newblock translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch.

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Ren{\'e} Descartes.
\newblock {\em Y{\"o}ntem {\"U}zerine S{\"o}ylem [{D}iscourse on Method],
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\newblock {\.I}dea, {\.I}stanbul, 1996.
\newblock translated by Aziz Yard{\i}ml{\i}, with parallel original text.

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Rosalind English.
\newblock Guilty, but not responsible?
\newblock {\em The Guardian}, 29 May 2012.
\newblock ``Monsters are born, not made: the latest round in the debate about
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  Last modified 18 June 2014.

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Richard~P. Feynman.
\newblock {\em {``}{S}urely You're Joking, {M}r.\ {F}eynman!{''}}.
\newblock W.W. Norton \&\ Company, New York and London, 1985.
\newblock Adventures of a Curious Character; as told to Ralph Leighton; edited
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Goethe.
\newblock {\em Faust}.
\newblock Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1961.
\newblock Translated by Walter Kaufmann. Anchor Books edition 1963.

\bibitem{Haidt}
Jonathan Haidt.
\newblock {\em The Happiness Hypothesis: {P}utting Ancient Wisdom and
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\newblock Arrow Books, Random House, London, 2006.

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\newblock Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,
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\newblock Translation by A. D. Godley; first published 1920; revised, 1926.

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Homer~C House and Susan~Emolyn Harman.
\newblock {\em Descriptive English Grammar}.
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\newblock Revised by Susan Emolyn Harman. Twelfth printing, 1962.

\bibitem{LSJ}
Henry~George Liddell and Robert Scott.
\newblock {\em A {G}reek-{E}nglish Lexicon}.
\newblock Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
\newblock Revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, with the
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James A.~H. Murray et~al., editors.
\newblock {\em The Compact Edition of the {O}xford {E}nglish {D}ictionary}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, 1971.
\newblock Complete text reproduced micrographically. Two volumes. Original
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\newblock {\em The \emph{{P}rincipia}: {M}athematical Principles of Natural
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\newblock University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1999.
\newblock A new translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by
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L.~Ngo et~al.
\newblock Two distinct moral mechanisms for ascribing and denying
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\bibitem{7Plays}
Whitney~J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., editors.
\newblock {\em Seven Famous {G}reek Plays}.
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\newblock {\em The Sheen on the Silk}.
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\newblock Number~36 in Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press and
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Graham Priest.
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\bibitem{Priest-Aeon}
Graham Priest.
\newblock Beyond true and false.
\newblock {\em Aeon}, May 5 2014.
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Bonnell {Spencer, O.H.C.}
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Della Thompson, editor.
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\bibitem{Watters}
Ethan Watters.
\newblock The {A}mericanization of mental illness.
\newblock {\em The New York Times Magazine}, January 8 2010.

\end{thebibliography}
}

\end{dummy}

\newpage
\mycehead{Religion and Philosophy}
\mycohead{Contents}
%\raggedright % doesn't work for table of contents
{\sloppy\relscale{0.9}
\tableofcontents
}
\addchap{Introduction}
%\mycehead{Religion and Philosophy}
\mycohead{Introduction}

\hlt{\textsc{This} book is the result of an attempt to treat the
Christian creed not as dogma but as a critical solution 
of a philosophical problem}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\emph A problem or \emph{the} problem\cln\
the problem of how to live\qmk}
%%%%%%%  
Christianity, in other
words, is approached as a philosophy, and its various
doctrines are regarded as varying aspects of a single
idea%%%%%
\footnoteB{This single idea would seem to be the
\enquote{taking-up of humanity into God}{\smc} 
see page \pageref{central}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
which, according to the language in which it is
expressed, may be called a metaphysic, an ethic, or a
theology.

This attempt has been made so often already that no
apology is needed for making it again.  Every modern
philosophy has found in Christianity, consciously or
unconsciously, the touchstone by which to test its power
of explanation. And conversely, Christian theology has
always required the help of current philosophy in stating
and expounding its doctrines. It is only when philosophy
is at a standstill that the rewriting of theology can, for
a time, cease.

But before embarking on the main argument it
seemed desirable to ask whether such an argument is
really necessary\cln\ whether it is right to treat Christianity
as a philosophy at all, or whether such a treatment, so
far from being the right one, really misses the centre
and heart of the matter.  \hlt{Is religion really a philosophy}{\qmk}
May it not be that the philosophy which we find
associated with Christianity (and the same applies to
Buddhism or Mohammedanism) is not Christianity itself
but an alien growth, the projection into religion of the
philosophy of those who have tried to understand it{\qmk}
[\textbf{xiv}]

According to this view, religion is itself no function
of the intellect, and has nothing to do with philosophy.
It is a matter of temperament, of imagination, of emotion,
of conduct, of anything but thought.  If this view is
right, religion will still be a fit and necessary object of
philosophic study{\smc} but that study will be placed on
quite a different footing.  For if Christianity is a
philosophy, every Christian must be, within the limits
of his power, a philosopher\cln\ by trying to understand
he advances in religion, and by intellectual sloth his
religion loses force and freshness.  Above all, if
Christianity is a philosophy, it makes a vital difference
whether it is true{\smc} whether it is a philosophy which will
stand criticism and can face other philosophies on the
field of controversy.

On the other hand, \hlt{if religion is a matter of tempera\-%
ment}, then there are no Christian truths to state or to
criticise\cln\ \hlt{what the religious man must cultivate is not
intellectual clearness, but simply his idio\-syn\-crasy of
temperament}{\smc} and what he must avoid is not looseness
of thought and carelessness of the truth, but anything
which may dispel the charmed atmosphere of his
devotions.  If Christianity is a dream, the philosopher
may indeed study it, but he must tread lightly and
forbear to publish the results of his inquiry, lest he
destroy the very thing he is studying.  And for the
plain religious man to philosophise on his own religion
is suicide.  How can the subtleties of temperament and
atmosphere survive the white light of philosophical
criticism{\qmk}

\begin{sloppypar}
\hlt{It is clearly of the utmost importance to answer this
question}.  If religion already partakes of the nature of
philosophy, then to philosophise upon it is to advance
in it, even if, as often happens, philosophy brings doubt
in its train.  He knows little of his own religion who
fears losing his soul in order to find it.  But if religion
is not concerned with truth, then to learn the truth
about religion, to philosophise upon it, is no part of a
[\textbf{xv}]
religious man{\apo}s duties.  It is a purely professional task,
the work of the theologian or the philosopher.
\end{sloppypar}

These issues have been raised in the First Part of
this book,%%%%%
\footnoteB{The chapters of that Part being
\enquote{Religion and Philosophy,} 
\enquote{Religion and Morality,} and
\enquote{Religion and History,}
corresponding to the next three paragraphs.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
and it may be well to anticipate in outline
the conclusions there advanced.

In the first place, \hlt{religion is undoubtedly an affair of
the intellect}, a philosophical activity.  Its very centre
and foundation is creed, and every creed is a view of
the universe, a theory of man and the world, a theory
of God.  If we examine primitive religions, we shall
find, as we should expect, that their views of the universe
are primitive{\smc} but none the less they \emph{are} views of the
universe.  They may be rudimentary philosophies, but
they are philosophies.

Secondly, \hlt{religion} is not, as philosophy is generally
supposed to be, an activity of the \enquote{mere} intellect. It
\hlt{involves not only belief but conduct}, and conduct
\hlt{governed by ideals or moral conduct}. Religion is a
system of morality just as much as a system of philo\-%
sophical doctrines.  Here, again, systems vary\cln\ the
savage expresses a savage morality in his religion, but it
is a morality{\smc} the civilised man{\apo}s religion, as he becomes
more civilised, purges itself of savage elements and
expresses ideals which are not yet revealed to the savage.

Thirdly, the creed of religion finds utterance not
only in philosophy but in history.  \hlt{The beliefs of a
Christian concern not only the eternal nature of God
and man, but certain definite events in the past and the
future}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{One may question, as I think Collingwood will,
what sense it makes to speak of an \enquote{eternal nature,}
be it of God or man.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
Are these a true part of religion at all{\qmk} could
not a man deny all the historical clauses in the Creed
and still be in the deepest sense a perfect Christian{\qmk} or
be a true Moslem while denying that Mohammed ever
lived{\qmk}  The answer given in Chapter III.~is that no such
distinction can be drawn.  Philosophy and history, the
eternal and the temporal, are not irrelevant to one
another.  It may be that certain historical beliefs have
in the past been, or are now, considered essential to
orthodoxy when in fact they are not, and are even
[\textbf{xvi}]
untrue{\smc} but we cannot jump from this fact to the
statement that history is irrelevant to religion,
any more than we can jump from the fact that certain
metaphysical errors may have been taught as orthodox,
to the statement that metaphysics and religion have
nothing in common.

A fourth question that ought to be raised concerns
the relation between religion and art.  The metaphorical
or poetical form which is so universal a characteristic of
literature seems at first sight worlds removed
from theology{\apo}s prose or the \enquote{grey in grey} of
philosophy.  \hlt{Is the distinction between religion and
theology really that between poetry and prose, meta\-%
phorical and literal expression}{\qmk}  And if so, which is the
higher form and the most adequately expressive of the
truth{\qmk}

To deal with these questions we must enter at length
into the nature of poetry and prose, literal and meta\-%
phorical expression, and the general philosophy of
language.  And having raised the problem, I must ask
the reader{\apo}s pardon for failing to deal with it.%%%%%
\footnoteB{And yet Collingwood will identify theology and religion in Chapter I,
albeit with qualification.  See note \ref{SM}, page \pageref{SM}.
Under \enquote{Theology,} the Index has \enquote{Theology = philosophy = religion, 16-19,}
though I think the reference could be broader.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
The
existence of the problem must be noticed{\smc} but its
complexity and difficulty are so great that it was found
impossible to treat it within the limits of a single chapter.
I have accordingly omitted any detailed treatment of
these questions, and can only add that I hope to make
good the deficiency in a future volume.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Apparently just after writing \emph{Speculum Mentis,}
Collingwood took up art as such in 
\emph{Outlines of a Philosophy of Art,}
which at the moment I have only in Turkish translation
\cite{Collingwood-OPA-Tr}.
A kind of abbreviated rough draft of this work
is published in 
\emph{The Philosophy of Enchantment} \cite[p.\ 49]{Collingwood-PE}.
In the latter, 
Collingwood begins by saying 
that there are three questions to be asked about art\cln\
what is it, \enquote{How is it articulated or differentiated,}
and
\begin{quote}
\emph{What is its place in life as a whole\qmk}
(That is, how is it related in general to other activities in general, for example religion, science, morality\qmk)
\end{quote}
\afterquote He began the Preface 
(dated 22 September 1937)
of \emph{The Principles of Art} \cite{Collingwood-PA} by saying,
\begin{quote}
\textsc{Thirteen} years ago I wrote, at the request of the Clarendon Press, a small book called \emph{Outlines of a Philosophy of Art.} When that book went out of print early in the present year, I was asked either to revise it for a new edition or to replace it with another. I chose the latter course, not only because I have changed my mind on some things in the meantime, but also because the situation both of art and of aesthetic theory in this country has changed as well. There has been at any rate the beginning of what may prove an important revival in the arts themselves.
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%

Philosophy, morality, art and history do not exhaust
all the sides of human life, because \hlt{no list of faculties
or activities can ever, in the nature of the case, be
exhaustive}.  They are taken as typical{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Collingwood leaves out science here,
though he will take it up at the end of Chapter I.
Compare \emph{Speculum Mentis} \cite[p.\ 38]{Collingwood-SM}\cln
\begin{quotation}
\textsc{Our} task, then, is the construction of a map of knowledge.

We have already seen, in our preliminary survey,
how the field of human experience seems to be divided into provinces
which we call art, religion, science, and so forth\lips
here we beg leave to make certain assumptions\lips
First, we shall distinguish the provinces of art, religion, science, history, and philosophy\lips

The first assumption is of little importance\cln\
the number of provinces may be augmented or decreased 
without affecting our fundamental questions\lips
 \end{quotation}} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and if each is
found to be necessary to religion, it is perhaps not very
rash to conclude that whatever others exist are equally
essential.  Thus religion is not the activity of one
faculty alone, but a combined activity of all elements in
the mind.  Is it, then, a true unity{\qmk}  Must we not say,
\enquote{Philosophy I know, and history I know, but religion
seems to be merely a confused name for a combination of
[\textbf{xvii}]
activities, each of which is really distinct and separate}{\qmk}
Does not religion dissolve into its component elements
and disappear{\qmk}

No{\smc} because the elements will not dissolve.  They
contain in themselves the power of natural attraction
which forbids us ever to effect the separation. Or
rather, each by its own internal necessity generates all
the others, and cannot exist as a concrete thing till that
necessity has run its course.  And \hlt{religion is a concrete
thing, a life, an activity, not a mere faculty{\smc} and there\-%
fore it must consist of all at once}.  So far from religion
decomposing into its elements, every individual element
expands into a concrete fulness in which it becomes
religion.

\enquote{Then is there no other life than religion{\qmk}}  So
it would appear.  Just as every man has some work\-%
ing theory of the world which is his philosophy, some
system of ideals which rule his conduct, so \hlt{every one has
to some degree that unified life of all the faculties which
is a religion.  He may be unconscious of it}, just as
man is unconscious of having a philosophy before
he understands what the word means, and takes the
trouble to discover it{\smc} and it may be a good or a bad
religion, just as a man{\apo}s system of conduct may be a
good or bad morality. But the thing, in some form, is
necessarily and always there{\smc} and even the psychological
accompaniments of religion---though they must never
be mistaken for religion itself---the feeling of awe and
devotion, of trust in powers greater than oneself, of
loyalty to an invisible world, are by no means confined
to persons gifted with the \enquote{religious temperament.}

\enquote{But at least,} it will be replied, \enquote{that is not the
way we use the word{\smc} and you can{\apo}t alter the usage of
words to suit your own conveni\-ence.} I am afraid we
cannot escape the difficulty by any method so simple as
recourse to the dictionary.  \hlt{The question is not what\label{mean}
words we use, but what we mean by them}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Compare page \pageref{mean2}{\cln}
\enquote{the true task of historical theology is to find out not only what 
was said, but what was meant.}}
%%%%%%%  
We apply
the term religion to certain types of consciousness, and
[\textbf{xviii}]
not to others, because we see in the one type certain
characteristics which in the others we suppose to be
absent.  Further investigation shows that the character\-%
istic marks of religion, the marks in virtue of which we
applied the term, are really present in the others also,
though in a form which at first evaded recognition.
To refuse to extend the term on the ground that you
have never done so before is as if one should say, \enquote{I\label{swan}
mean by a swan a bird that is white{\smc} to describe this
black bird as a swan is merely abusing language.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{See note \ref{swan2}, page \pageref{swan2}
on the swan example.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

We must make up our minds what we really do
mean by religion{\smc} and if we choose to define it super\-%
ficially, by the colour of its feathers instead of by its
comparative anatomy, we must renounce the attempt to
philosophize about it, or to preach it, or to put our
whole trust in it{\smc} because none of these things can
decently apply to superficialities.  But if we really try
to discover what is the inward heart and essence of the
thing we call religion, we must not be alarmed if
our practised vision sees it in places where, till
now, we had not expected to find it.

\mypart{I}{General Nature of Religion}\label{part:1}

\mychap{I}{Religion and Philosophy}

\textsc{To} determine the relation in which religion stands to 
the other activities of the mind, philosophy, conduct, 
and so on, might seem impossible without previously 
defining both religion itself and the other activities or 
forms of consciousness. But we cannot frame a defini\-%
tion until we have investigated these relations{\smc} and to 
offer it dogmatically at the outset would be to beg the 
very question we wish to solve. This is a difficulty 
common to all philosophical, and indeed in the last 
resort to all other investigations. \hlt{No science is really 
in a position to define its subject-matter until it has 
brought its discoveries to a close.}

Consequently we offer no definition of religion at 
the beginning, but hope to arrive at one in the course 
of our inquiry. In fact, these introductory chapters 
are intended to lead to a general conception of religion{\smc} 
abstract indeed, because its content will only be examined 
in the latter part of this book, but sufficient for the 
purpose of preliminary definition. \hlt{We start here with 
only one presupposition\cln\ namely, that the form of con\-%
sciousness called religion really does exist.} What it is, 
and of what it is the consciousness, are questions we 
shall try to answer in the course of our inquiry. 

\addsec{1. The intellectual element in all Religion (creed).
Anti-intellectual theories of Religion{\cln}---}

The first relation to be examined is that between 
religion and the intellect, that activity of the mind by 
which we think and know. The question before us is 
whether religion involves this activity or not{\smc} whether 
[\textbf 4] 
or not the intellect has a part in the religious life. At 
present we do not ask whether it constitutes the whole 
of religion, and whether religion contains also non\-%
intellectual elements. We only wish to determine 
whether it has an intellectual element{\smc} and if so, what 
is the general nature of this element. 

This question naturally leads us to investigate certain 
views of religion which place its essence in something 
other than thought, and exclude that faculty from the 
definition of the religious consciousness. It has, for 
instance, been held that religion consists in the per\-%
formance of ritual acts, and that all else is secondary 
and irrelevant{\smc} or that it is neither more nor less than 
a system of practice or morals{\smc} or again that it is a 
function of a mental faculty neither intellectual nor 
moral, known as feeling. We shall examine these 
views as mere types, in the abstract, not criticising 
any particular exposition of them, but rather treating 
them on general grounds as alternative possible theories. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Religion as Ritual.}

The view that religion consists in ritual alone 
does not result from a study of the more highly 
developed religions. In these ritual may be very im\-%
portant and have a prominent place{\smc} but no one, 
probably, would maintain that they ever make ritual 
their sole content to the exclusion of creed. The 
theory springs rather from an examination of the 
religions of the lower culture\cln\ the evidence for it is 
\enquote{anthropological} in the common sense of that word. 
Anthropologists sometimes lay down the principle that 
the beliefs of primitive peoples are less worth studying 
than their practices. All ceremonial, whether of primi\-%
tive or advanced religion, is definite and instructive{\smc} 
but to question a savage as to his creed is at best a 
waste of time, since his powers alike of self-analysis 
and of self-expression are rudimentary, and at worst, 
for the same reasons, positively misleading. How 
valuable this principle is every one must recognise who 
has compared its practical results with those of the old-
[\textbf 5]
fashioned catechising method. But in order to explain 
its value, anthropologists have sometimes been led to 
assert that religion primarily consists in ritual alone, 
and that dogma or creed is at first non-existent, and 
only arises later through the invention of \enquote{{\ae}tiological 
myth.} The important thing, we are told, is that a 
savage does such and such actions at such and such 
times{\smc} the story he tells, when pressed by an inquiring 
neophyte or a privileged stranger to explain why he 
does them, is a subsequent accretion and no part of 
the real religious impulse. Now this explanatory story 
or {\ae}tiological myth is supposed to be the germ which 
develops into creed{\smc} and therefore it follows that creed, 
with all its theological and philosophical developments, 
is not an integral part of any religion at all. 

Such a position, however plausible it may seem at 
first sight, involves a host of difficulties. To begin 
with, it is at least unsafe to assume that religion in us 
is essentially the same as religion in the savage. No 
proof of this is forthcoming. It may well be the case 
that the emphasis we lay on creed has quite transformed 
religion, so that it is to us a different thing, incapable 
of explanation by analogy with that of the savage. 
Thus anthropologists tell us that the purpose of cloth\-%
ing, in the most primitive culture, is to attract the eye, 
evil or otherwise, of the spectator{\smc} not to keep out 
the weather. Am I therefore to resist the inclination 
to wear a greatcoat when I go to the post on a wet 
night, on the ground that it is a mere freak of vanity, 
and useless because no one will see me{\qmk} 

Even if the account of savage religion is true, it 
does not follow that it is a true account of the religion 
of other cultures. It is useless to appeal to the principle, 
if principle it is, that to understand a thing we must 
know its history and origin{\smc} for if religion has really 
undergone a radical change, that principle is a mere 
cloak for giving irrelevant information\cln\ the history 
offered is the history of something else. 
[\textbf 6]

Secondly, such an account of savage religion itself 
seems to be incomplete. It fails to give any reason 
why the savage practises his ritual, for \emph{ex hypothesi} the 
{\ae}tiological myth only gives a fictitious reason. No 
doubt it is possible to say that there is no reason at 
all, that he has no motive, no special feelings, impelling 
him to these ceremonies. And it may be true that the 
accounts given by savages of their motive in ritual are 
unsatisfactory and inconsistent. But ritual is not mere 
motiveless play. \hlt{If it is ritual at all, some definite im\-%
portance is attached to it}{\smc} it is felt to have a value 
and to be obligatory or necessary. What is the nature 
of this importance which the savage attaches to his 
ritual{\qmk} \hlt{It cannot be a mere \enquote{feeling of importance}%%%%%
\label{importance} 
in the abstract}{\smc} such a feeling is not a possibility. 
However difficult it may be to explain why we feel 
something to be important, \hlt{there must be an expressible 
reason for our feeling}{\smc} for instance, the belief that this 
ritual averts evil consequences of actions done, or en\-%
sures benefits of some kind. It is not necessary that 
the conception be very sharply defined{\smc} but some such 
conception necessarily underlies every ritual action, and 
indeed every other action that is not regarded as an end 
in itself. Ritual is not in this sense an end in itself{\smc} 
it is not performed as a pleasure but as a necessity{\smc} 
often as practised by savages a most painful and ex\-%
pensive necessity. 

If we could get at the savage{\apo}s real mind, he would 
surely reply, when we asked him why he performed 
certain ceremonies, that otherwise crops would fail, rain 
would not fall, the spirits which surrround his path and 
his bed would turn against him. These fears constitute, 
or rather imply and express, the savage{\apo}s creed. They, 
and not {\ae}tiological myth, are the germ which develops 
into creed as we know it. They differ from {\ae}tiological 
myth precisely in this, that whereas they are the real 
motive of ritual, the latter expresses not the real motive 
but a fanciful motive, invented when the self-analysis 
[\textbf{7}]
of the primitive mind has failed to discover the real 
one. That it should try to discover its motive is in\-%
evitable{\smc} that it should fail to do so is not surprising. 
\hlt{Nothing is more difficult than to give a reasonable 
answer to the question why we behave as we do}. And 
the anthropologist is right in refusing to take such 
myths as really accounting for ritual{\smc} he is only wrong 
if his dissatisfaction with fanciful accounts makes him 
doubt the possibility of a true and adequate account. 

The point, then, which is independent of any view 
as to the relation of magic and religion, because it applies 
to both alike, is that ceremonial is based on creed. It 
is not the foundation of creed{\smc} it depends upon it. 
The word creed is here used in a quite rudimentary 
sense, as indicating any theory of the nature of the 
power which governs the universe. You perform a 
ritual act \emph{because} you believe that it pleases that power 
and induces it to make rain, or compels it to make rain, 
or simply makes rain come automatically{\smc} whatever 
particular form your creed takes, it is always creed and 
nothing but creed that impels you to ritual. 

The principle of the centrality of ritual and the 
secondary nature of belief seems thus to be a result of 
insufficient analysis{\smc} and though we have examined it 
only in its relation to savage religion, it is equally true 
of all religion that ritual is explicable by, and founded 
in, positive creed{\smc} and that apart from creed ritual 
would always be meaningless and unmotived. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Religion as Conduct.} 

The second anti-intellectual view of religion 
asserts that\label{exclusive} it is exclusively a matter of conduct, and 
that doctrine, so far as it does not immediately bear 
upon conduct, is no true part of religion at all. Now 
we may grant at once that religion has much to do with 
conduct{\smc} we may even say that no part of it is irrelevant 
to conduct{\smc} and yet we may be right in refusing to 
expel the intellectual element from it. For truth and 
conduct are not absolutely unrelated. \hlt{Every piece of 
conduct depends on the realisation of some truth}, since 
[\textbf{8}]
we could not act efficiently, or indeed at all, without 
some knowledge of the situation with which we are 
dealing. The problem \enquote{How am I to act{\qmk}} is only 
soluble in the light of knowledge. And \hlt{conversely 
there is no piece of knowledge which has not some 
practical corollary}{\smc} either it supplies us with the solu\-%
tion of a practical problem, or it suggests a new problem 
for future solution. There is no such thing as conduct 
divorced from knowledge or knowledge divorced from 
conduct. 

\hlt{The view we are considering seems to depend upon 
a form of scep\-ticism}. It admits (and we should agree) 
that one action is better than another and that there is 
a duty to promote good actions{\smc} and it asserts that the 
best religion is that which promotes the best life. But 
\hlt{it goes on to maintain that the doctrines of religion 
have no other value except their moral value}{\smc} that to 
describe one religion as true and another as false is 
meaningless. This implies that the intellectual problems 
of religion are insoluble and that no one answer to them 
is truer than any other{\smc} whereas the practical difficulties 
of the moral life are real and can be overcome or 
alleviated by religious means. Or if it is not main\-%
tained that the problems are insoluble, it is denied that 
religions solve them{\smc} it is perhaps supposed that they 
are soluble by means of another kind of thinking{\smc} by 
science or philosophy. 

Empirical difficulties against this purely moral view 
of religion arise from the fact that \hlt{atheists and persons 
who differ from their neighbours in religion do not 
necessarily differ in morality}. If a man living in a 
Christian society rejects Christianity, on this theory 
the only possible meaning of his action is that he 
rejects the Christian morality, for Christianity is defined 
as being precisely the Christian morality. But in 
practice this does not necessarily follow{\smc} his morality 
may remain what it was before. The theory can only 
deal with such a case in two ways. Either it must say 
[\textbf{9}] 
that he rejects Christianity in name only, while un\-%
willing to uproot it out of his heart{\smc} or else it must 
maintain that he rejects not the real Christianity (the 
morality) but Christianity falsely so called, the in\-%
tellectual system which is arbitrarily annexed to it. 
Both these are unsatisfactory{\smc} the first, because it 
makes a virtuous atheist into a mere hypocrite, and the 
second because the \enquote{arbitrary} connexion of an in\-%
tellectual system with a moral one is precisely the fact 
that requires explanation. 

If the intellectual system (though false) is really 
necessary as a psychological basis for morals,%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
\enquote{It is necessary to most people, but not to every one} is a useless answer, not 
only because it implies that different people{\apo}s minds may be constructed on absolutely 
and radically divergent lines---an assumption which any one is at liberty to make if 
he likes, and if he will take the trouble to see where it leads him---but because it 
begs the question. Necessary for some people but not for others, as regular exercise, 
or a nap after lunch, or a thousand a year, means, as we are using terms, not 
necessary.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%
how can 
the former be rejected and the latter kept{\qmk} If not, 
why should the two ever be united at all{\qmk} The moral\-%
istic theory of religion comes to grief over the fact that 
there is such a thing as creed. On the theory, there 
ought not to be{\smc} but, nevertheless, it is there. Why 
is it there{\qmk} Because---we cannot evade the answer---it 
is believed to be true. \hlt{Creed may be, among other 
things, a means to morality{\smc} but it cannot be a means 
to anything unless it is first held as true}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The origin of action is internal.
The idea persists in \emph{The Principles of History}
\cite[p.~31]{Collingwood-PH}\cln
\begin{quote}
  A statement to which an historian listens, or one which he reads, is
to him a ready-made statement. But the statement that such a
statement is being made is not a ready-made statement. If he says to
himself \senquote{I am now reading or hearing a statement to such and such
effect}, he is himself making a statement{\smc} but it is not a second-hand
statement, it is autonomous. He makes it on his own authority. And
it is this autonomous statement that is the scientific historian{\apo}s
starting-point. 
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
For a belief 
that no one believes can have no influence on any one{\apo}s 
conduct. A morality assisted by creed is a morality 
founded upon the intellect{\smc} for to judge something as 
true is the characteristic function of the intellect. 

Further, if the action induced by a belief is to be 
really good as well as really due to the belief, then 
the belief must be true.%%%%%
\footnoteB{By the previous paragraph,
I do not act on a statement as such,
but on my belief that the statement is true.
I do not think 
Collingwood is really saying anything new in the present paragraph{\smc}
but the opening sentence suggests that,
if somebody else judges my action as good,
that person must also agree with the belief on which my action is based.
I may agree with that,
if we allow that actions based on false beliefs might be 
\emph{accidentally} true.
In any case, I do not think Collingwood is really concerned here
with how others judge our actions.
But then see his next paragraph.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
We may stimulate our moral 
consciousness by fictions, as that this day is our last on 
earth{\smc} but the resulting action, so far as it is good, is 
due not to the belief but to the reawakened moral con\-%
sciousness. Any action really due to the belief, such 
as taking farewell of our families and making arrange-
[\textbf{10}]
ments for the funeral next day, would be merely silly. 
So, if our creeds are not truths but only means to good 
action, those actions which are good are not really due 
to them, and those which are due to them are a waste 
of labour. That is to say, they are a hindrance, rather 
than a help, to right conduct. 

\hlt{This form of scepticism, like most other forms of 
the same thing, is in fact less a philosophy than a pro\-%
paganda}. It is not a theory of what religion is{\smc} it is 
a proposal to reconstitute it on the principle of leaving 
out the creed and only keeping the commandments. 
There might, perhaps, be such a thing as non-religious 
moral teaching. We will not at present deny that. 
But it would not be religion. And we are not 
asking what improvements might be made in religion, 
or what better thing might be substituted for it{\smc} 
we only want to discover what it is. This humbler 
inquiry may possibly be of value even to those who, 
without asking what it is, have decided to abolish or 
reform it.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Is Collingwood addressing people 
who are anything like today{\apo}s New Atheists{\qmk}
I used to see a church signboard that read,
\enquote{God calls us to fight racism.}
I thought the churchgoers should really be fighting racism 
because they were convinced that it was wrong,
and not because some supernatural power told them to.
Thus I was indeed proposing to discard the creed,
but keep the commandment.
So it might indeed be of value first to understand the creed
and its relation to the commandment that springs from it.} 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) Religion as Feeling.} 

The recognition of religion as having an intel\-%
lectual content throws it open to intellectual criticism{\smc} 
and in order to withdraw it from such criticism it has 
sometimes been placed in that faculty of the mind 
whose function is feeling. 

The term feeling seems to be distinctively applied 
by psychologists to pleasure, pain and emotions in 
general. But \hlt{emo\-tion is not a totally separate function 
of the mind, independent of thinking and willing{\smc} it 
includes both these at once}. If I feel pleasure, that is 
will in that it involves an appetition towards the 
pleasant thing{\smc} and it is also knowledge of the pleasant 
thing and of my own state. There is no emotion which 
does not entail the activity of the other so-called 
faculties of the mind. Religion is doubtless an emotion, 
or rather involves emotions{\smc} but it is not emotion in 
the abstract apart from other activities. It involves, for 
instance, the love of God. But the love of God implies 
[\textbf{11}]
knowing God on the one hand and doing his will on 
the other. 

Moreover the term itself is ambiguous. The word 
feeling as we use it in ordinary speech generally denotes 
not a particular kind of activity, but any state of mind 
of a somewhat vague, indefinite or indistinct character. 
Thus we have a feeling of the truth of something when 
we hardly say yet that we are convinced of its truth{\smc} 
a feeling of the right treatment of a recalcitrant picture 
or sonnet, when we are not quite convinced of the right 
treatment{\smc} a feeling that we ought to do something 
when we are not really sure. In this sense religion 
is decidedly not a matter of feeling. Some people{\apo}s 
religion is doubtless very nebulous{\smc} but religion as a 
whole is not distinguished from other things by its 
vagueness and indefiniteness. Religion is sometimes 
said to be a \enquote{low} degree of thought in the sense that 
it contains half-truths only, which are in time super\-%
seded by the complete truths of philosophy or science{\smc} 
but in the meantime it errs (if the description is true) 
not by being vague but by being much more definite 
than it has any right to be. To define religion as mere 
feeling in this sense would amount to complaining that 
it is not sufficiently dogmatic. 

In another commonly-used sense of the word, feeling 
implies absolute and positive conviction coupled with 
inability to offer proof or explanation of the conviction. 
In that case, to \enquote{feel} the truth of a statement would 
merely mean the same as to know it{\smc} and this use 
of the word therefore already asserts the intellectual 
content of religion. The problem of the relation of this 
conviction to proof is noticed below (Part II. Ch.~I.). 

\addsec{2. Identity of creed with Theology.}

These types of theory all seem to fail through 
the same fault{\smc} namely, their common denial of the 
necessity of creed in religion. They describe character\-%
istics which religion does undoubtedly often or always 
possess{\smc} but they try to explain it as consisting chiefly 
or only of these characteristics, and to avoid admitting 
[\textbf{12}]
its basis in positive creed. Without examining further 
theories of the same kind, therefore, we may venture 
to assert that religion cannot exist without a definite 
belief as to the nature of God. This contention would 
probably be borne out by any careful investigation of 
actual religions{\smc} every religion claims to present as 
true and intellectually sound a doctrine which may be 
described as a theory of God. 

This statement of belief as to the nature of God, 
which of course includes beliefs as to the relations of 
God and the world, God and man, and so forth, is the 
intellectual content of religion{\smc} and it is not a thing 
outside or different from the religion itself. It may be 
only one aspect or element of religion{\smc} but at least it 
is an element, and an indispensable element. I call it 
intellectual, even if it has not been reached by 
\enquote{scientific} processes, because the intellect is the name 
of that activity by which we think, know, hold con\-%
victions or draw inferences{\smc} and a non-intellectual 
conviction would be a contradiction in terms.%%%%%%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
The word intellect it sometimes used to distinguish one type of cognition from 
other types called reason, intuition and so on. Such distinctions are, in my belief, 
based on mistaken psychology{\smc} and accordingly I use the various words indiscrimin\-% 
ately to cover the whole of the facts of knowing.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


Now the Doctrine of God is of course theology{\smc} it 
is in fact the translation of that word. Accordingly, a 
creed is a theology, and \hlt{there is no distinction whatever 
between Theology and Religion, so far as the intel\-%
lectual aspect of religion is concerned}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{SM}%
Collingwood seems to correct this point in \emph{Speculum Mentis}
\cite[p.~108, n.~1]{Collingwood-SM}\cln
  \begin{quote}
With much of what [\emph{Religion and Philosophy}] contains
I am still in agreement{\smc} 
but there are certain principles which I then overlooked or denied,
in the light of which many of its faults can be corrected.
The chief of these principles is the distinction between implicit and explicit.
I contended throughout that religion, theology, and philosophy were identical,
and this I should now not so much withdraw as qualify
by pointing out that the \senquote{empirical} (i.e.~real but unexplained)
difference between them is that theology makes explicit
what in religion as such is always implicit,
and so with philosophy and theology.
This error led me into a too intellectualistic or abstract attitude 
towards religion, of which many critics rightly accused me\lips
  \end{quote}
\afterquote But it seems to me he is already making the required qualification in
\emph{Religion and Philosophy}\cln\
theology and religion are the same,
\emph{as far as the intellect is concerned.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
My theology 
is the beliefs I hold about God, that is to say, my creed, 
the intellectual element of my religion. 

This identification is often controverted. In the 
first place, a distinction is sometimes made between 
religion and theology with a view to reconciling the 
claims of criticism with those of ecclesiastical authority. 
Criticism (it is supposed) merely affects theology{\smc} 
orthodoxy is a matter of religion and is untouched by 
critical arguments. Such a distinction enables us to 
make two promises\cln\ first, to believe whatever the 
[\textbf{13}]
church believes{\smc} and secondly, to accept whatever 
criticism proves. But the two spheres cannot be 
separated in this way. There is an abstract possibility 
that criticism should prove the Gospel a forgery and 
that philosophy should demonstrate God to be an 
illusion{\smc} and the second promise involves readiness to 
accept these results as promptly as any others. But 
this implication already denies any weight to the 
authority of the church{\smc} for no church would allow its 
members to accept such conclusions. The proposed 
\emph{modus vivendi} is as valueless in practice as it is 
indefensible in theory. 

Some writers, again, distinguish theology, as the 
thought which takes religion as its starting-point and 
builds a superstructure upon it, from the religion upon 
which it builds. But this is no distinction at all{\smc} for 
if religion supplies the premisses from which theology 
infers other new truths, the two are only related as 
premisses and conclusion in one syllogism, and one and 
the same syllogism cannot be split up into two distinct 
kinds of thought. Rather, this argument would prove 
the identity of the two{\smc} for there is no difference 
between putting together the premisses and drawing the 
conclusion. It is only in the abstractions of formal 
logic that they are separated. The distinction therefore 
would be an entirely abstract one{\smc} we could never 
point to two different concrete things and say \enquote{this is 
religion and that theology.}

The same objection would apply to the opposite 
distinction, according to which theology, instead of 
using religion as its starting-point, takes its pronounce\-%
ments as conclusions, and endeavours to provide proofs 
for them. This does seem to be a way in which the 
word theology is sometimes used{\smc} thus the conviction 
of the existence of God might be described as religion, 
and the proofs of his existence as theology. But in 
that case theology would include the whole intellectual 
side of religion in itself, and religion would be merely 
[\textbf{14}]
the name for an incomplete and mutilated fragment of 
theology---the conclusion without the evidence---which 
when its deficiencies were made good would coincide 
with theology. 

A somewhat similar distinction is that between 
religion as the personal experience of the individual and 
theology as the systematic statement of religious experi\-%
ence as a whole. If religion means \enquote{that fragment of 
theology, of whose truth I have had personal experience,}
the distinction between the two can never be made at 
all. Theology is the whole{\smc} religion my particular 
part of it. \emph{For me}---within my knowledge---the two 
are in every way identical. Whatever theology I know 
is to me religion{\smc} and the rest I do not know. 

There is certainly a kind of thought which takes 
religious dogmas and tries to discover their logical 
result{\smc} and one which tries to prove their truth{\smc} and 
one which arranges and expresses them all in a systematic 
way. And if we like to call any or all of these 
theology, we have no doubt a right to do so. But we 
must remember, if we use the term, that theology so 
described is not different from religion. A religious 
truth does not cease to be religious truth and turn into 
theological truth because it is proved, or arranged in a 
system, or reflected upon. 

In general, then, it does not seem that we can 
distinguish religion as creed from theology at all. 
Each of the above distinctions, as we have said, does 
correspond to a real difference in the way in which 
we use the words{\smc} and they may be summed up by 
saying that \hlt{in ordinary language religion means some\-%
thing less deliberate, less consciously logical, than 
theology}. Religious experience gives us a number of 
truths arranged anyhow, just as they come to the 
surface{\smc} all is knowledge, all the fruit of intellectual 
activity, since intellect means nothing but the attain\-%
ment of knowledge{\smc} but it is knowledge unsystematised. 
Theology then, according to this view, arranges and 
[\textbf{15}]
classifies the truths already given in religion{\smc} it creates 
nothing new, but rather, so to speak, tidies up the 
workshop where religion has finished work for the 
day. But even this simile overstates the difference{\smc} 
for \hlt{in the apparent chaos of the unsystematised 
experience, system is in fact already present}. The 
work of co-ordination which we have ascribed to 
theology is already characteristic of religion itself{\smc} it 
supplies us not with a number of disconnected con\-%
ceptions of the nature of God, but with a conception. 

\addsec{3. Identity of creed with Philosophy{\cln}---} 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Negation of a special Philosophy of Religion.}

If religion as creed is identical with theology, 
it remains to consider the further conception of the 
philosophy of religion. \hlt{The philosophy of any subject 
means careful reflexion upon that subject}{\smc} thus we 
have the philosophy of art, of conduct, of science and 
so on. To do a thing, and to understand what one 
is doing and how one does it, seem to be different 
things{\smc} and this distinction, it is thought, can be 
applied to intellectual as well as practical processes. 
To commit a crime is action{\smc} to reflect upon one{\apo}s 
crime is ethics. Similarly, to conduct an argument is 
science, to reflect upon it is logic{\smc} \hlt{to be conscious of 
God is religion, to analyse that consciousness is the 
philosophy of religion. Such is the common doctrine}{\smc} 
but it does not seem to provide us with a basis for 
distinguishing the philosophy of religion from other 
philosophies. Consciousness of truths is common to 
religion and all other kinds of thought{\smc} the only 
distinction between religious and other knowledge 
would be that they were concerned with different 
objects.  But the theory of knowledge or logic does 
not consider differences of the object, but only pro\-%
cesses of the subject{\smc} and therefore there is no dis\-%
tinction between the philosophy of religion (as theory 
of religious knowledge) and the theory of knowledge 
in general. \hlt{If there is a general philosophy of know\-%
ing, it includes religious knowledge}
as well as all 
other kinds{\smc} no separate philosophy is required.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\emph{If,} as in the \enquote{common doctrine},
there is a distinction between 
the philosophy of a subject and the subject itself,
then there must be some general theory of knowledge,
which will include religious knowledge.
However, Collingwood does not commit himself to the \enquote{common doctrine}.
As there is no \enquote{mere \senquote{feeling of importance} in the abstract}
(page \pageref{importance}),
but there may be a feeling of the importance of this or that ritual
for this or that reason,
so it would seem there is no knowledge in the abstract.
You will not have a one-size-fits-all epistemology,
explaining indifferently religion, history, and chemistry.
Collingwood will spell this out in \emph{The Principles of History}
\cite[p.~8]{Collingwood-PH}\cln
\begin{quote}
  Different kinds of science are organized in different ways{\smc} and it
should follow (indeed, this would seem to be only the same thing in
other words) that different kinds of science are characterized by
different kinds of inference. The way in which knowledge is related
to the grounds upon which it is based is in fact not one and the same
for all kinds of knowledge. That this is so, and that therefore a
person who has studied the nature of inference as such---let us call him
a logician---can correctly judge the validity of an inference purely by
attending to its form, although he has no special knowledge of its
subject-matter, is a doctrine of Aristotle{\smc} but it is a delusion,
although it is still believed by many very able persons who have
been trained too exclusively in
the Aristotelian logic and the logics that depend upon it for their
chief doctrines.
\end{quote}
\afterquote Philosophy will be different though, having
\enquote{no methods of its own at all} (page \pageref{own})
and being \enquote{applicable to any problem which thought can raise}
(page \pageref{any}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
[\textbf{16}]

Similarly, \hlt{if religion involves certain types of 
conduct, the whole theory of conduct in general is 
treated by ethics}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{And yet religion is not
\enquote{exclusively a matter of conduct} (page \pageref{exclusive}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
That side of the philosophy of 
religion merges in ethics precisely as the intellectual side 
merges in the general theory of knowledge or logic. 
There can only be a distinct philosophy of religion 
if religion is a quite separate function of the mind 
involving neither knowledge, volition, or any other 
specifiable activity. But unless this hypothesis can be 
maintained (and we know already that it cannot), we 
must give up the idea of a special departmental 
philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and hand over 
the study of religion to philosophy in general. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Identity of Religion and Philosophy.} 

If the philosophy of religion is indistinguish\-%
able from philosophy as a whole, what is the relation 
of philosophy as a whole to religion or theology{\qmk} 
\hlt{Philosophy is the theory of existence{\smc} not of existence 
in the abstract, but of existence in the con\-crete}{\smc} the 
theory of all that exists{\smc} the theory of the universe. 
This is frequently denied{\smc} it is said that philosophy 
has problems of its own, and science has problems of 
its own{\smc} that they progress by attending each to its 
own business and using its methods where they are 
suitable, and that when philosophy tries to answer the 
questions proper to science the result is chaos. The 
example of natural science under the domination of 
Aristotelian philosophy in the later middle ages is 
quoted as a warning to philosophy to confine its 
activities within its own province.---Such a view seems 
to depend on a misconception as to the nature of 
philosophy. \hlt{Sciences live by the discovery and em\-%
ployment of methods which facilitate their particular 
operations} and are inapplicable to other kinds of 
research. Differentiation of problems and methods is 
the very essence of the natural sciences. It is 
important to realise that \hlt{philosophy has in this sense\label{own} 
no methods of its own at all}{\smc} that it is through and 
through homogeneous, straightforward thinking where 
[\textbf{17}] 
formul{\ae} and labour-saving devices are not used. This 
absence of definite and ready-made method is at once 
the strength and the weakness of philosophy{\smc} its 
weakness, because it makes philosophy much more 
difficult than any of the sciences{\smc} its strength, because 
failure through defects in the apparatus is avoided, and 
there is no limitation to one particular subject such 
as is necessarily entailed by a fixed method. \hlt{Philosophy\label{any}
is the free activity of critical thought, and is applicable 
to any problem which thought can raise}. The chaos 
of which the scientist complains is partly his own 
feeling of helplessness when confronted by philosophical 
questions to which his methods supply no answer, and 
partly real blunders like those of medi{\ae}val science, 
whose cause he imagines to be the invasion of science 
by Aristotelian philosophy{\smc} whereas they are really due 
not to the overbearingness of Aristotelian philosophy 
but to the defects of Aristotelian science.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Collingwood will say in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}
\cite{Collingwood-EM}
that the \enquote{absolute presuppositions} of a science
are not true or false, since they answer no questions.
In \emph{The Idea of Nature} \cite{Collingwood-IN},
he will examine the presuppositions of ancient times, the Renaissance,
and today.
The ancient presuppositions are defective
in the sense that we no longer make them or are even able to make them.} 

Now if philosophy is the theory of the universe, 
what is religion{\qmk} We have said that it was the 
theory%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
It is possibly worth while to guard against a verbal pitfall. \enquote{Philosophy is 
theory, but religion is not{\smc} it is Fact.} This common---and wrong---use of the 
word seems to imply that a theory ceases to be a theory when it is true, or when it 
is a matter of vital interest or strong conviction. It was Mephistopheles who said, 
\enquote{Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, und gr\"un des Lebens goldner Baum.}\footnoteB{\enquote{Gray, my dear friend, is every theory,
and green alone life{\apo}s golden tree} \cite[pt one, l.~2038]{Faust}{\smc}
\emph{theurer} is also spelled \emph{teurer.}
Mephistopheles is not whom we should follow.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
of God, and of God{\apo}s relations to the world 
and man. But the latter is surely nothing more nor 
less than a view of the universe. Indeed \hlt{religion is 
quite as comprehensive as philosophy}. For the 
religious consciousness in its true and complete form 
nothing is irrelevant, nothing is without its own unique 
and individual value. Religion and philosophy alike 
are views of the whole universe. 

But are they therefore (it may be asked) identical{\qmk} 
May they not be views, but conflicting views\qmk\ or 
views from different points of view{\qmk} Not the latter, 
because it is the aim of each alike to transcend par\-%
ticular points of view, to overcome the limitations of 
individual interest. And to ask whether religion and 
[\textbf{18}]
philosophy may not disagree is to assume a general 
agreement among religions, which certainly does not 
exist, and the same among philosophies, which exists 
if possible even less. No doubt this or that philosophy 
would conflict with this or that religion. The religion 
of Homer is inconsistent with the philosophy of 
Auguste Comte{\smc} but Comte{\apo}s own religion and his 
philosophy are fully consistent with one another{\smc} they 
are indeed identical. If religion and philosophy are 
views of the same thing---the ultimate nature of the 
universe---then \hlt{the true religion and the true philosophy 
must coincide, though they may differ in the vocabulary 
which they use to express the same facts}. 

\begin{sloppypar}
But, it may be insisted, we have at least by this 
enforced agreement condemned unheard all philosophies 
but those which believe in a God{\smc} for we have defined 
religion as the theory of God, and many philosophies 
deny or doubt or never mention God. This difficulty 
may perhaps be cleared up by recollecting that we 
have not assumed the \enquote{existence of God} hitherto in 
any definite and concrete sense{\smc} we have not, for 
instance, assumed a personal God. \hlt{The God of whom 
we have been speaking was a purely abstract one, a 
mere name for the philosophical Absolute},\label{absolute}%%%%%
\footnoteB{The Absolute is what Anselm proves the existence of,
as Collingwood will describe it in \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method.}
Anselm
\begin{quotation}
\noindent was deliberately referring to the
absolute of neo-Platonic metaphysics{\smc} and in effect
his argument amounts to this, that in the special
case of metaphysical thinking the distinction between
conceiving something and thinking it to exist is a
distinction without a difference\lips

Students of philosophy, when once they have
learnt that the Proof is not to be dismissed as a
quibble, generally realize that it proves something,
but find themselves perplexed to say what exactly
this is. Clearly it does not prove the existence of
whatever God happens to be believed in by the per\-%
son who appeals to it. Between it and the articles
of a particular positive creed there is no connexion,
unless these articles can be deduced \emph{a priori} from the
idea of an \emph{ens realissimum}. What it does prove is
that essence involves existence, not always, but in one
special case, the case of God in the metaphysical
sense\cln\ the \emph{Deus sive natura} of Spinoza, the Good
of Plato, the Being of Aristotle\cln\ the object of meta-
physical thought. But this means the object of philo\-%
sophical thought in general\lips
\cite[pp.~125--7]{Collingwood-EPM}
\end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
the solution 
of the cosmological problem.  Thus we said that 
savage ritual (religious or magical) implies a creed{\smc} 
but it may not imply anything we should call a theistic 
creed. The savage may believe that his ritual operates 
directly on the rain without any intervention on the 
part of a single supreme will. This is his \enquote{theory of 
God}{\smc} his \enquote{God} is not a person but a principle. 
The Buddhist believes in no personal God at all, but 
he has a definite scheme of the universe and doctrine 
of salvation{\smc} he believes in certain eternal principles{\smc} 
that is his \enquote{theory of God.} \hlt{Atheism itself, if it is a 
positive theory and not mere scepticism, is in this 
abstract sense a \enquote{theory of God}{\smc} the only thing that 
is not a theory of God is scepticism}, that is to say, the 
[\textbf{19}] 
refusal to deal with the problem at all. God, so far 
as our conception has travelled, is merely at present a 
name for the unifying principle of the world, however 
that principle is regarded. Every philosophy has a 
God in this sense, just in so far as it is a philosophy 
and not a mere collocation of disconnected doctrines{\smc} 
in which case it has a number of different Gods whose 
relations it has not yet determined.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{Is \enquote{polytheism} 
then just a name for an insufficiently worked-out philosophy\qmk}
%%%%%
And this is the 
only sense in which some religions (such as Buddhism) 
have a God. In the sense, then, in which all religions 
require a God, one is equally required by all philosophy. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph c) The supposed irreligious elements in Science.} 

Since religion, on its intellectual side, is a 
theory of the world as a whole, it is the same thing as 
philosophy{\smc} the ultimate questions of philosophy are 
those of religion too. But can we say the same of 
science{\qmk} Is not science, at least as interpreted by many 
of its exponents, anti-religious in its materialism and its 
frequent atheism{\smc} and even if these characteristics 
were not present, does it not differ necessarily from both 
religion and philosophy in being a view of the universe 
not as a whole but in minute particular details only{\qmk} 

To the first question it must be replied that, para\-%
doxical though it may seem, \hlt{materialism and atheism 
are not neces\-sarily irreligious}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{And yet psychology of religion is not a religion
(page \pageref{psychology}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Philosophy, as well as 
science, may be both materialist and atheist{\smc} indeed 
there may be, as we have said, religions which show 
the same features. We may even be so bold as to 
assert that atheism and materialism are necessarily 
religions of a kind{\smc} for not only do they spring from 
the impulse to solve the intellectual problem of the 
universe, but they owe their form to an essentially 
religious dissatisfaction with existing solutions. Thus 
an atheist may well be an atheist because he has a 
conception of God which he cannot reconcile with the 
creeds of other people{\smc} because he feels that the 
ground of the universe is too mysterious, too august 
to be described in terms of human personality and 
encumbered with mythological impertinences. The 
[\textbf{20}]
materialist, again, may find in matter a real object of 
worship, a thing more worthy of admiration than the 
God of popular religion. The materialist Lucretius 
adores not the careless gods of the interstellar space, 
but the \enquote{alma Venus,} the immanent principle of 
nature itself. And can we deny that such materialism 
or atheism is more truly religious, does more honour 
to the true God,%%%%%
\footnoteB{Is the true God the Absolute (page \pageref{absolute}){\qmk}
Or perhaps it must have attributes, like the Christian God.
This subsection, even the whole section,
is a foretaste of the \enquote{overlap of classes}
to be developed in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}.
But you cannot just say that science and religion are really the same thing.
The next book, \emph{Speculum Mentis,}
will be inspired by the observation that they are \emph{not.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
than many theistic superstitions{\qmk} 

\begin{sloppypar}
The materialism and atheism of modern science---if 
indeed these qualities are rightly ascribed to it, which 
is very doubtful---may or may not be preferable, 
considered as a view of the universe, to that offered by 
traditional Christianity. But whichever is right, each 
alike is a religion, and it is only because of this fact 
that they can ever come into conflict. 
\end{sloppypar}

In reply to the second question, the suggestion that 
science, as the knowledge of detail, is irrelevant to 
philosophy the knowledge of the whole, and therefore 
not itself religious in character, it must be remembered 
that we cannot have a whole which is not a whole of 
parts, nor parts which are not parts of a whole. 
Philosophy, as well as science, is concerned with detail{\smc} 
it does not exist in the rarefied atmosphere of a world 
aloof from facts. Nor does science take its facts in 
absolute isolation one from another and from a general 
scheme of the world{\smc} it is essential to science that the 
facts should be related to one another and should find each 
its place in the scientist{\apo}s view of the whole. And any 
religion must take account of detail{\smc} for it is only in 
the details that the nature of the whole is manifested. 

It is no doubt possible to forget the whole in laying 
stress on isolated parts, as it is possible to forget details 
in the general view of a whole. But each of these is 
a false abstraction{\smc} we cannot identify the former with 
science and the latter with religion or philosophy. 
\hlt{The ideal, alike for philosophy and science, is to see 
the part in its place in the whole, and the whole 
perfectly exemplified in the part}.

\mychap{II}{Religion and Morality}

\textsc{We} have arrived at the conclusion that all religion has 
an intellectual element%%%%%
\footnoteB{Words like \enquote{element,} and \enquote{aspect} in the next paragraph{\cln}
how can we do without them{\qmk}  And yet how can we say what they mean, 
without just pointing at examples{\qmk}}%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} that this element is a creed or 
theology and at the same time a cosmology or philo\-%
sophical theory of the world{\smc} and that therefore religion 
is so far identical with philosophy. But we have still 
to determine what other elements it contains, and how 
these elements are related to one another. 

Religion, we are told again and again, is more than 
mere intellect, more than mere thought, more than 
philosophy. It may indeed find room within itself for 
an intellectual element, but that is not the whole 
of religion{\smc} there are other elements of equal value. 
Indeed, intellect is only one single aspect of life{\smc} and 
if philosophers sometimes treat it as if nothing else 
existed, that is only because philosophers are human 
enough to magnify their office. Granting freely that 
religion has its intellectual side, it has also a practical 
side which is no less important. 

If this language is justified, \hlt{religion is not merely 
a theory of the world{\smc} it is also a system of conduct.} 
Just as any definite religion prescribes to its adherents 
certain definite convictions, so it inculcates certain 
definite modes of action. \hlt{We have to ask whether 
this is true}{\smc} and if we find that religion does really 
contain these two distinct elements, we shall be com\-%
pelled to determine so far as possible the nature of their 
connexion.
[\textbf{22}]

\addsec{1. The existence of a practical content in all Religion.
Contradictory views{\cln}---}

\begin{sloppypar}
Parallel to the anti-intellectual theories examined 
in the preceding chapter are certain anti-moral theories 
of religion. These are directed to proving that religion 
does not dictate definite actions at all, or that if it does, 
this is not because these actions are moral but for some 
other reason. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph a) An historical argument.}

As a matter of common experience, it is often 
said, religion sometimes inculcates actions which are 
flagrantly at variance with the principles of a sound 
morality. \hlt{Can we} look back on all the crimes done 
in the name of religion, the human sacrifices, the per\-%
secutions, the horrors of religious warfare, the corrupt 
connivance at wickedness, the torture inflicted on simple 
minds by the fear of hell---\emph{tantum relligio potuit suadere 
malorum}---and still \hlt{maintain that religion stands for 
morality{\qmk}} Undoubtedly we can. The argument is a 
rhetorical jump from half-understood instances to an 
unfounded generalisation. We might equally well 
quote the absurdities of ancient and the errors of 
modern scientists as proof that science does not aim 
at truth. \hlt{If a great scientist makes a mistake}, the 
importance of that mistake, its widespread effect, is due 
to the very fact that the man who makes it is a high 
intellectual authority{\smc} \hlt{it is the exception which proves 
the rule} that you can generally believe what he says. 
Religious persecution may be a crime, but it happens 
only because the persecutor believes it to be a duty.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Most crimes are committed for personal gain{\smc}
religious persecution, as such, is not.
There may be another kind of persecution, masquerading as religious.
Religion can certainly be misused for personal gain{\smc}
but then, to say that religion is \emph{mis}used in this way
is to grant the point that religion \emph{per se} stands for morality.}
%%%%%
The crimes of the Church are a testimony to the fact 
that religion does dictate duties, and is believed to do 
so, for the most part, in a worthy manner.%%%%%
\footnoteB{At this early stage in his career,
Collingwood has not worked out the theory of the \emph{New Leviathan}
\cite{Collingwood-NL},
whereby expediency, right, and duty are three explanations of behavior,
and only duty provides a complete explanation.
Expediency is contingent on an ulterior purpose,
which is \emph{not} merely expedient.
The \emph{right} can be dictated,
because it is just that which is according to rule{\smc}
but rules never exactly fit the situations to which they are supposed to apply.
Strictly speaking, \emph{duty} cannot be dictated,
since it is entirely particular.
Duty is what is to be done at \emph{this} moment,
in \emph{this} situation.
And yet Collingwood will acknowledge as much on page \pageref{duty}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

Nor can we draw a distinction between the two cases 
on the ground that religious crimes are sometimes 
already condemned by their contemporaries and are 
therefore doubly unjustifiable, whereas the mistakes of 
a great scientist represent a point in the progress of 
thought as yet unattained by any one, and are therefore 
pardonable. This would be to reduce the argument 
to a mutual recrimination between Church and State,
[\textbf{23}]
each trying to fasten upon the other the odium of 
being the worse sinner. Into such a discussion we can 
hardly be expected to enter. Our distinction is 
between right and wrong, truth and falsehood%%%%%
\footnoteB{The right can be the true{\smc}
or it can be the morally right.}%%%%%
{\smc} and 
if science teaches error or religion inculcates crime, 
extenuating circumstances are beside the mark.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Both science and religion can go wrong{\smc}
for present purposes, 
it does not matter whether one of them can go \emph{more} wrong.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

If the argument were successful, it would prove not 
that religion was irrelevant to conduct (for the cases 
quoted prove the reverse{\smc} they are cases of religion 
definitely dictating conduct), but that it devoted its 
energies to the positive pursuit of immoral ends. And 
this would be to admit our main contention, that 
religion has a practical side{\smc} while maintaining that 
this practical side was the apotheosis not of good but of 
evil. But this fantastic notion would be advanced by 
no serious student of the facts, and we need not trouble 
to refute it.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{Such rhetoric always arouses my suspicion.
If nobody would advance the \enquote{fantastic notion}
that religion as such seeks evil,
then there would be no reason to mention the possibility.
I think plenty of people today would argue that religion as such is evil.
The argument breaks down, because there is no such thing as \emph{pure} evil,
as Collingwood argues in \enquote{The Devil} 
\cite{Collingwood-Devil}\nocite{Prayer}.
If in every situation you try both to identify the good and to do the opposite,
this very perseverence is a kind of good.
As Blake says, 
\enquote{If the fool would persist in his folly,
he would become wise} \cite{Blake}.}
%%%%%
We are not concerned to prove that every 
particular mouthpiece of every particular religion is 
morally infallible{\smc} just as we do not assume it to be 
intellectually infallible. We tried to show in the last 
chapter that it was an essential note of religion to lay 
down certain statements, and to say, \enquote{Believe these}{\smc} 
and that could only mean, \enquote{Believe these, for they are 
true.} Truth is the governing conception, even if the 
dogmas propounded fail of reaching it. Similarly, 
religion always lays down certain courses of action and 
says, \enquote{Do these,} that is to say, \enquote{Do these, because they 
are right.} Not \emph{merely} \enquote{because they are God{\apo}s will,} 
for God is a righteous God{\smc} nor \emph{merely} \enquote{for fear he 
should punish you,} for his punishments are just.%%%%%
\footnoteB{According to Burnaby{\apo}s account in 
\emph{On Horseback Through Asia Minor} \cite{Burnaby},
the \enquote{Yezeeds} believe in worshipping the spirit of evil,
simply because he can harm us,
unlike the spirit of good.
It does not matter whether Burnaby is correct,
but whether he describes a \emph{possible} religion.
I suppose it is as possible as polytheism.}
%%%%% 

Historically, religions may have been guilty of 
infinite crimes{\smc} but this condemnation is a proof, not 
a disproof, that their fundamental aim is moral. They 
represent a continual attempt to conform to the good 
will of God, and the fact that they err in determining 
or in obeying that will does not alter the fact that the 
standard by which they test actions is a moral standard. 
But is the will of God always conceived as good{\qmk} May 
[\textbf{24}]
it not be conceived as simply arbitrary{\qmk} One phase of 
this question is considered in the next section. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) An anthropological argument.}

A second argument, of a type somewhat akin 
to the last, is drawn from anthropology. It appears 
that in primitive societies the morality of the tribe 
develops on lines independent of its religion. It is 
therefore supposed that morality and religion are two 
quite different things, which only in course of time 
come to be united in what is called the \enquote{moralisation 
of religion.} This argument takes it for granted---and 
indeed it can hardly be questioned---that the higher 
religions \emph{are} moralised{\smc} that they conceive God{\apo}s will 
as necessarily good. 

As in the last chapter, we may dismiss this argument 
by showing that it is irrelevant. For us religion is 
already moral\-ised, and we must accept it as it is and 
not pretend that religion as known to us is still the 
same thing that (on the theory) it is to the savage. 

But as in the case of the anti-intellectual argument 
from anthropology we were not content with dis\-%
missing it as irrelevant, but found it necessary to 
inquire more carefully into its own statements, so here 
it is desirable not simply to dismiss but to examine 
the argument. The word \enquote{moralisation} is the real 
difficulty. If a thing has at the outset nothing to do 
with morality, no jugglery or alchemy will bring it 
into relation with the moral consciousness. You 
cannot arbitrarily impose a category on a thing which 
is unfitted to receive it. And to suggest that \enquote{social 
evolution} can confer a moral value on a type of 
activity which has as yet no moral bearings whatever, is 
calling in a \emph{deus ex machina} to perform feats which 
involve a contradiction in terms. 

The moralisation of religion---the bringing of it 
into conformity with our moral standards---is certainly 
a real thing. But it is not a single event, once for all 
accomplished, in which religion leaves behind its old 
indifference to morality and learns to take cognisance 
[\textbf{25}]
of moral values. It is a continual process in which 
old standards are left behind and better ones adopted. 
If we look at the conduct of a class or nation or culture 
very different from our own, we are apt to imagine 
for a moment that it has no morality at all. But what 
we mistake for an absence of morality is really the 
presence of a different morality. Primitive religion 
does not inculcate civilised morality{\smc} why should it{\qmk} 
It inculcates primitive morality{\smc} and as the one grows 
the other grows too. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) Religious determinism.} 

We now pass to a group of theories which arise 
not from the external, historical or psychological, 
investigation of the religious consciousness, but within 
that consciousness itself. These are determinist, 
antinomian, and quietist respectively. 

\begin{sloppypar}
Religious determinism results from a conviction of 
the omnipotence and universality of God, so inter\-%
preted that no power of initiation whatever is left to 
the human will. All that is done is done by God{\smc} 
God{\apo}s plans are not conditional upon man{\apo}s co-operation 
or overthrown by his rebellion, because God knew 
these things before, and indeed was himself the cause 
of them. This creed lays upon its adherent no 
commands in the ordinary sense of the word, for it 
does not hold him free to execute them. On the 
other hand, it does issue commands in the only sense 
in which it allows itself to do so{\smc} it teaches that one 
type of conduct is pleasing to God and another 
unpleasing, so that, if a man were free to choose, it 
would not hesitate to point out the kind of behaviour 
that ought to be chosen.%%%%%
\footnoteB{If we can even conceive of choosing how to act,
it must be possible to choose.
Determinism as such does not teach what we ought to choose if we could{\smc}
\emph{religious} determinism does.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
And indeed those who hold 
views of this kind often surpass all others in the 
rigorism and puritanism of their actual lives. This 
theory therefore does not really banish conduct from 
religion. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph d) Antinomianism.}

Antinomianism springs from the same con\-%
ception, as to the relation between God{\apo}s will and 
man{\apo}s, which underlies determinism. It causes, there-
[\textbf{26}]
fore, no fresh difficulty. But it is perhaps desirable 
to point out the element of truth which it contains. 
If morality is conceived as what St.~Paul calls a \enquote{law 
of works,} an external and apparently unreasonable 
code of imperatives, then such a morality is certainly, 
as the antinomian believes, superseded and done away 
by religion. The external, compulsive law has been 
replaced by an inner spring of life. If a man is 
perfectly religious it is true that it does not matter 
what he does{\smc} not in the sense that he may commit 
crimes with impunity, but in the sense that he will not 
commit them, even if you forget to tell him not to. 
Thus religion appears as a release from the servitude of 
morality. 

But this view depends on a false description of 
morality. The man to whose mind a moral law is a 
mere external command, grudgingly obeyed under 
compulsion, falls short not merely or religion but of 
morality. He is not really moral at all. He is in a 
state of heteronomy{\smc} it is not his own will, freely 
acting, that produces the result but the imposition 
upon his will of alien force. \hlt{The very nature of the 
moral law is this, that it is not imposed upon us from 
without.} We do not merely obey it{\smc} we make it. 
The member of the \enquote{kingdom of ends,} the truly 
moral society, is not a mere subject{\smc} he is a sovereign. 
Thus the moral law has already that character of 
spontaneity, that absence of compulsion, which is 
typical of religion. The transition from heteronomy 
to autonomy which for St.~Paul is marked by the 
passage from Judaism to Christianity---from the law of 
works to the law of faith---is not a transition from 
morality to religion, but a transition into morality 
from some infra-moral state. 

What, then, is this infra-moral state{\qmk} We might be 
tempted to describe it as the stage of positive law, of 
civil law. But this would be equally unsatisfactory. 
Just as the really moral consciousness makes its own 
[\textbf{27}]
laws, and does not merely obey them blindly, so the 
really social will finds in the law of its society its own 
self-expression, and is sovereign as well as subject in 
the state in which it lives. This is an ideal, doubtless, 
to which few societies attain{\smc} but it is the ideal, none 
the less, of civil life as such. And, therefore, we 
cannot distinguish civil from moral law as characterised 
by heteronomy and autonomy respectively. 

The difference is not between two types of law but 
between differences of attitude to one and the same law. 
The law may be divine, moral, or civil{\smc} in each case 
there are two ways of obeying it, either from within, 
when the law becomes the free self-expression of the 
acting will, or from without, the law appearing as a 
tyrannical force blindly and grudgingly obeyed. This 
is the distinction which the antinomian has in mind. 

Antinomianism in the commonest sense, however, 
makes the mistake of supposing that the transition to 
autonomy cancels the duties which heteronomy enforced. 
Even this is in one sense true, for any \enquote{law of works} 
contains numbers of superfluous commands, presenting 
as duties actions which the autonomous will rightly sees 
to be valueless. But in so far as the external law enjoins 
real duties, the internal law comes not to destroy but to 
fulfil. Thus whatever in morality is really moral is taken 
up into religion{\smc} and the state of mind which marks it 
as religious, the free and joyful acceptance of it, is not 
peculiar to religion as distinct from morality. It is 
essential to morality as such. 

\addsubsec{(\emph e) Quietism.} 

It remains to examine the view known as 
quietism. This view may be analysed as a development 
from certain types of expression very common in all 
religion{\smc} for instance, that religion is not self-assertion 
but self-surrender{\smc} that in the religious life we wait 
upon God and accept his good will instead of imposing 
ours upon him{\smc} that the individual is lost in union 
with God, and is no longer an independent will. Such 
language is often called mysticism, and the word may 
[\textbf{28}]
be usefully employed in this sense. It is, however, 
well to remember that the experience to which this 
language refers is an experience not peculiar to certain 
people called mystics, but common to every religious 
mind. Subject to this caution, we may use the word 
mystical as a description of that aspect of the religious 
life which consists in the fusion of the individual with 
God.

This question is one which we shall treat at length 
in a later chapter{\smc} and we shall there see reason to 
believe that this mystical language, so far from being 
a fanciful or confused description of the facts, gives a 
perfectly accurate account of that relation to God which 
is the essence of personal religion. At present we are 
concerned not with mysticism but with its offshoot, 
or rather perversion, quietism. Mysticism asserts the 
union of my will with the will of God, the total and 
complete fusion of the two into one. Quietism asserts 
that my will is negated, that it has simply disappeared 
and the will of God has taken its place. I am utterly 
lost in the infinity of God. The two things are really 
quite distinct{\smc} the former asserts a union of two wills 
in one person, the latter asserts that the person has only 
one will, and that not his own but God{\apo}s. Theologians 
will recall the relation of the Monothelite heresy%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
Consisting in the assertion that Christ had not (as laid down at Chalcedon) two 
wills, one human and one divine, but one only, the divine, and no human will at 
all. This was heretical as destroying the humanity of Christ. The subject is 
treated below in Part III. Ch. I.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
to 
the orthodox Christology of the Church{\smc} and indeed we 
may suggest that quietism was only a revival in another 
context of the essential doctrine of Monothelitism, 
whereas mysticism exactly expresses the orthodox view 
as to the relation of the divine and human wills. 

Quietism thus denies that conduct is a part of 
religion, because it believes that in religion the individual 
will disappears{\smc} religion is a state of complete passivity. 
This doctrine is due to the assumption (which we shall 
criticise later) that two wills cannot be fused into one, 
[\textbf{29}]
and therefore, feeling bound to preserve the unity of 
the individual, the quietist denies the human and keeps 
the divine. Pending our inquiry into the underlying 
principle, it is enough to point out certain objections.
(i.) The act of self-abnegation is definitely an act of 
will, and is represented as a duty, and a religious duty{\smc} 
therefore the practical content of religion is not in 
point of fact denied. (ii.) This act is not done once 
for all{\smc} it is a continual attitude of the self to God, 
an attitude capable of being discontinued by an act of 
will, and therefore itself maintained by an act of will.
(iii.) The union with God thus attained does not 
deprive the individual of all activity. Rather it directs 
and makes more fruitful and potent this activity. It 
affords a solution of all his practical difficulties, and 
gives him the strength to carry out the solution{\smc} but 
it does not remove them from his consciousness and 
place him in a simply inactive sphere of life. In a 
word, the self-dedication of the will to God is not the 
end of the individual life, but the beginning of a new 
and indeed of a more active life. The union with God 
is a real union, not the annihilation of the self. 

\addsec{2. The mutual dependence of thought and action{\cln}---} 

We have perhaps sufficiently shown that religion 
never exists apart from conduct. Just as all religion 
involves thought, as every religion teaches doctrine and 
a true religion teaches true doctrine, so all religion in\-%
volves conduct{\smc} and whereas a good religion teaches 
good conduct, a bad religion teaches bad. And further, 
just as we found that all knowledge was already in 
essence religious, so we must now say that all morality 
is already religious{\smc} for, as we have seen, morality 
properly understood already shows in itself the freedom, 
the autonomy and devotion, of religion. It seems, there\-%
fore, that religion is not a simple but a complex thing, 
containing two (or, for all we yet know, more) different 
elements. It is necessary that we should do something 
towards determining the relation of these elements to 
one another. If they are really separate ingredients of 
[\textbf{30}]
a compound, then religion is merely the name for a life 
which contains both thought and action side by side{\smc} 
it is no third thing over and above these, but simply 
the one \emph{plus} the other. Such a conclusion really negates 
the conception of religion altogether{\smc} for the different 
independent elements of which it is composed are 
capable of complete analysis and description each by 
itself, and there is no whole (religion) but only parts 
(thought, action). 

As a means of approach to this difficulty, it would 
be well to ask whether it is necessary that the two 
elements should always coexist{\smc} or whether they are 
alternative modes of operation which can only exist one 
at a time, so that to speak of a kind of consciousness 
which unites the two, as we maintain that religion does, 
is meaningless. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Action always presupposes thought.}

\hlt{In any case of action, it is easy to see that some 
thought must be present.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{The presence of thought is what \emph{makes} it an action,
and not just an occurrence.}
%%%%% 
When we discussed the 
ritualistic theory of religion we found that unless ritual 
was simply meaningless and unmotived play it must be 
based on some definite creed. We may extend this 
principle further. Unless action is based on some 
knowledge it cannot take place at all. The most that 
can happen is some automatism of which the person, 
whose action we call it, is unconscious. An action is 
necessarily based on a large number of judgments, of 
which some must be true or the action could not be 
carried out{\smc} while others may be true or false but must 
at least be believed. If, for instance, a man wants to 
drown himself, he must know \enquote{here lies the water\cln\ 
good\cln\ here stands the man\cln\ good}\cln\ otherwise he is 
not able to do it{\smc} and also he must believe rightly or 
wrongly that he will improve his circumstances and get 
rid of his present miseries by putting an end to his 
life{\smc} otherwise he will not desire to do it.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Is it quite true that we can desire
only what we perceive to be good{\qmk}
By choosing the example of suicide,
Collingwood seems to suggest that it is.
But we are not unitary creatures.
Some people seem to choose what is \emph{not} good for them,
and they know it.
We can do an analysis of the psyche in this case,
saying one part chose what was best for \emph{it,}
though not for the other parts.}
%%%%%
Thus every 
act depends for its conception and execution upon 
thought. It is not merely that first we think and then 
we act{\smc} \hlt{the thinking goes on all through the act}. And 
[\textbf{31}]
therefore, in general, the conception of any activity as 
practical alone, and containing no elements of knowing 
or thinking, is indefensible. Our actions depend on our 
knowledge. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Thought always presupposes will.}

The converse is equally true. If we can only 
do what we know how to do, \hlt{we only know what we 
wish to know}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This would seem to be obviously false.
The expression TMI indicates 
that there are things that we can be made unwillingly to know.}
%%%%%
Knowing is an activity just as walking is, 
and, like walking, requires to be set in motion by the 
operation of the will. To think requires effort{\smc} it can 
be described as harder or easier{\smc} it is the outcome of 
a choice which deliberately determines to think and 
selects a subject of thought. There can be no activity 
of thought apart from activity of the will.%%%%%
\footnoteB{On the contrary, we can think without meaning to.}
%%%%%

If this is so, it is no longer possible to uphold the 
familiar distinction between a life of thought and a life 
of action. The man of action, the statesman or the 
soldier, would never be able to act at all but for his 
intellectual grip on the problems of his profession. The 
best man of action is not simply the man of iron will, 
dear to the popular imagination, but the man who has 
the clearest insight into the necessities and peculiarities 
of the given situation. Indeed the notion of a strong 
will in itself, apart from strength of intellect, and still 
more the worship of an abstract \enquote{will to power} or 
\enquote{blind will,} are mere absurdities. A will to power 
must know what kinds of power there are to have, and 
which kind it wants{\smc} and a blind will that did not know 
what it was doing or what there was to be done would 
never do anything at all. The student or man of con\-%
templation, on the other hand, does not simply know 
without willing. He wills to know{\smc} and his knowledge 
is the result of positive hard labour. No moment of 
thought is conceivable which is not also a volition, and 
no moment of will is possible which is not also an act 
of knowledge. 

Thus if there is such a thing as the religious life, it 
must be one which, like any other, involves both think\-%
ing and acting{\smc} and the religious life, so conceived, is 
[\textbf{32}]
not, any more than a philosopher{\apo}s life or a states\-%
man{\apo}s, the mere sum of two different lives. For of 
the two ingredients neither can ever exist by itself. It 
must exist in union with the other or not at all. Any 
real life must contain both elements, each playing as 
important a part as the other. 

\addsec{3. The identity of thought and action{\cln}---}

But although the duality, of which religion now 
seems to consist, cannot be broken up, in the concrete, 
into two separable elements, it is still a duality.
Thought and action remain simply side by side and 
absolutely distinct, though each is necessary to the 
other. Religion, it appears, is simply a compound of 
philosophy and morality, though philosophy always in\-%
volves morality and morality can never exist without 
philosophy{\smc} and therefore all life, as such, shows the 
composite character which is the mark of religion. It 
is not simply religion, but all the life of the mind, that 
is now subject to the dualism{\smc} and therefore there is 
the greater need of understanding it. What is this 
dualism between thought and action{\qmk} We have seen 
that the two things mutually depend upon one another, 
but we have not inquired very minutely into the nature 
of this dependence. 

\addsubsec%
{(\emph a) Religious expression of this identity in the term \enquote{love.}}

In the theory of the religious life offered by 
religion itself, there is no dualism at all between know\-%
ing and acting. The two things are united, for instance 
by the author of the fourth Gospel, in such a way that 
they are absolutely indistinguishable. The term used 
to express their unity is \enquote{love,} an activity which in 
its perfect manifestation is represented as the perfection 
of the religious life. The whole of the great final 
discourse in John is an exposition of this conception{\smc} 
nothing can be clearer than the way in which the spirit 
of love is identified on the one hand with that of truth, 
and on the other with that of morality or obedience. 
And the two elements are not connected merely ex\-%
ternally{\smc} knowledge is the way of obedience and 
obedience the approach to truth. The connexion 
[\textbf{33}]
between the two is the most intimate conceivable{\smc} 
just as the perfect life involves the denial of all distinction 
between man and man, so it involves the denial of all 
distinction between man{\apo}s two faculties of thought and 
will. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Criticisms of the ordinary distinction.} 

Such denials of our ordinary distinction, even if 
they cannot in themselves be taken as conclusive, serve 
at least to arouse doubts as to its sufficiency. And if 
we ask how thought and action are actually distinguished, 
the answer is not very satisfying. They are not the 
operations of two different parts of the mind{\smc} that is 
admitted on all hands. The whole self wills, and the 
whole self thinks. Then are they alternative activities, 
like sleeping and waking{\qmk} No{\smc} we have already seen 
that they are necessarily and always simultaneous. The 
only thing we can say seems to be that thinking is not 
willing and willing is not thinking. And this is simply 
to assert the existence of a distinction without explaining 
wherein the distinction consists. We cannot say that 
in willing we do not think, or that in thinking we 
do not will, for both these, as we have seen, we 
certainly do. 

If I will to think, there are not two elements in this 
act but one. When I will to walk, I do not separately 
experience an internal resolve on the one hand, and a 
movement of my legs on the other{\smc} the act of will is 
the voluntary moving of the legs. To say \enquote{I will to 
walk} is the same thing as saying \enquote{I walk of my own 
initiative,} that is, \enquote{I walk.} And so \enquote{I will to 
think} means not two things but one thing\cln\ \enquote{I think.} 
We never simply will in the abstract{\smc} we always will 
to do something{\smc} what we turn into a separate organ 
and call \enquote{the will} is only the fact of free activity, the 
voluntary doing of this thing or that. Walking is 
thus not something distinguishable from willing, a 
result, so to speak, of the operation of \enquote{the will}{\smc} it 
is nothing more nor less than the willing itself, the 
particular form which, on this occasion, free activity 
[\textbf{34}]
takes. Thus walking is a kind of willing, not some\-%
thing else{\smc} and equally, thought is a kind of willing. 

But is there any other kind of willing{\qmk} Walking 
is only one kind{\smc} is thinking only one kind{\qmk} No{\smc} 
for if it were, there would be kinds of willing in which 
thought was not present. This, we have already 
admitted, there cannot be{\smc} and therefore, just as all 
thinking is willing, so all willing is thinking. Or, to 
put it in other words, there is neither consciousness 
nor activity considered as a separate reality, but always 
the activity of consciousness and the consciousness of 
activity. Nor can we say that in this second case there 
is a dualism between the activity of a mind and its own 
consciousness of that activity{\smc} for an activity is already 
by its very nature conscious of itself, and if it were 
not, it would be not an activity but a mechanism. 

We conclude, therefore, not that one and the same 
thing, mind, has two manifestations, consciousness and 
volition, and that these two always exist side by side, 
but that all consciousness is volitional, and that all 
volition is conscious. The distinction between the two 
statements is not merely verbal. The former way of 
putting it suggests that there is such a thing as a mind, 
regarded as a thing in itself{\smc} and that this thing has 
two ways of behaving, which go on at once, as a 
machine might have both a circular and a reciprocating 
motion. This idea of the mind as a thing distinguish\-%
able from its own activities does not seem to be really 
tenable{\smc} the mind \emph{is} what it \emph{does}{\smc} it is not a thing 
that thinks, but a consciousness{\smc} not a thing that wills, 
but an activity. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) The identity does not destroy real differences 
between different kinds of life.} 

This somewhat tedious discussion was necessary 
in order to vindicate the real unity of the religious life 
against the view that it is a falsely conceived juxta\-%
position of heterogeneous functions with no unity and 
no interconnexion. There is, we have argued, only 
one kind of activity{\smc} namely, that which is at the same 
time thought and will, knowledge and action{\smc} and if 
[\textbf{35}]
religion is the name of this activity, then all true life is 
religion. We cannot distinguish three kinds of life, 
the thinking life, the active life, and the religious life 
that unites the two. So far as anybody thinks, he wills 
to think, and is so far already in possession of the 
complete or religious life{\smc} and the same is true of 
any one who wills. 

It may be desirable to remark at this point that to 
say there is only one possible complete life, and that 
the religious, does not in the least abolish the differences 
between different people{\apo}s abilities and ideals, or set 
up one out of a number of lives as the one to which 
all ought to conform. In a sense, it is to do the very 
opposite of this{\smc} for we have pointed out that what\-%
ever life is really livable, whatever is a life at all, is 
already for that very reason religious in its degree{\smc} 
and that no one type of life has any right to claim for 
itself the title of religious at the expense of any other. 

In one sense we do certainly make a restriction in 
the variety of ideals{\smc} not in the number of possible 
lives, but in the ways in which such lives may be 
classified. While fully agreeing that there is a difference 
between the work of a statesman and that of a 
philosopher, for instance, we should not admit that 
this difference is of such a kind that the former can be 
correctly described as a man of action and the latter as 
a man of thought. And in the same way, we should 
not wish to deny the difference between a priest and a 
layman{\smc} but we should deny that the life of the one 
was religious and the life of the other secular. As 
every life includes, and indeed is, both thought and 
action, so every life is essentially religious{\smc} and the 
secular life, if that means a life negatively defined by 
the mere absence of religion, does not exist at all. If, 
however, the \enquote{secular} life is defined positively as 
consisting of interests from which priests are excluded, 
or of interests lying altogether outside the sphere of 
religion, we shall reply that no legitimate interest is 
[\textbf{36}]
foreign to all religious life{\smc} and that the question 
what is and what is not lawful for a priest, though a 
perfectly legitimate question, cannot be decided by 
an appeal to the conception of religion. Every man 
has his own duties, and every class of men has duties 
proper to itself as a class{\smc} but just as the \enquote{man of 
action} is not freed from the obligation to truth, nor 
the \enquote{man of contemplation} from the obligation to 
morality, so the layman is as much bound as the priest 
by the ideals of the religion which in some form or 
other he cannot help professing. 

\mychap{III}{Religion and History}

\textsc{We} have till now, in our treatment of the intellectual 
side of religion, confined our attention to the philosophic 
or theological content{\smc} but if we are right in suppos\-%
ing the religious life to be all-inclusive, it must also 
include the activity of historical thought. Religion, as 
Coleridge says, must contain \enquote{facts} as well as \enquote{ideas.} 

The historical aspect of religion is not likely to 
suffer neglect at the present time. The application to 
religious problems of historical research has been the 
most conspicuous and brilliant feature in the theology 
of the last half-century. Even thirty years ago, so 
little was generally known of the origins and antecedents 
of Christianity that when the Apocalypse of Enoch%%%%%
\footnoteB{The Book of Enoch is quoted in Jude 1\cln14--15.
According to \emph{Wikipedia,}
\enquote{The first English translation of the Bodleian/Ethiopic manuscript
was published in 1821 by Richard Laurence}{\smc}
Robert Henry Charles published in 1893 a translation based on new manuscripts{\smc}
and there was much other work before and since.
A Google search of \enquote{Semitic romance from which Jesus}
turns up only Collingwood{\apo}s own words.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
was first produced in English in 1883, its editor could 
gloat with an almost comic delight over the publication 
of \enquote{the Semitic romance from which Jesus of Nazareth 
borrowed his conceptions of the triumphant return of 
the Son of Man.} To-day no writer, however ignorant 
of recent research, could compose such a sentence. 
Every one knows that Christianity was deeply rooted in 
Judaism, and the relations of the two can be discussed 
without shocking the orthodox or causing malicious 
glee to the critics. 

This great historical movement in theology has 
taken two chief forms. They cannot indeed be sharply 
separated, but they may be broadly distinguished for 
the sake of convenience. One is Comparative Religion, 
[\textbf{38}]
with its anthropological and psychological branches{\smc} 
the other is Historical Theology, concentrating upon 
the antecedents, origin, history, and development of 
Christian doctrine. Each of these has made enormous 
and most valuable contributions to theology{\smc} indeed 
whatever progress has been made in the last fifty years 
has been due almost entirely to their help. 

\addsec{1. One-sided historical views of Religion 
(historical positiv\-ism)\cln---}

The danger at the present time is not so much 
that the religious importance of history may be for\-%
gotten as that it may be overrated. The great successes 
of historical theology and of comparative religion 
sometimes lead theologians to expect more from these 
methods than they ever really supply. \hlt{There is a 
tendency to regard historical methods as the only 
respectable approach to religious truth}{\smc} to suppose 
that the vexed questions of theology are soluble by 
historical means or not at all{\smc} in fact to imagine that 
theology has tried the method of speculation and 
found it wanting, and that it has now at length found 
the right method, a method which properly used will 
yield all the truth that can ever be known. 

\begin{sloppypar}
\hlt{This theory I shall describe as historical positivism}, 
by analogy with Comte{\apo}s view that human thought was 
in his time emerging from a \enquote{metaphysical} stage 
and entering on a \enquote{positive}{\smc} casting aside barren 
\emph{a priori} speculation and waking up at last to the reality 
and all-sufficiency of \emph{a posteriori} science{\smc} passing out 
of the region of ideas into the region of facts. Comte{\apo}s 
forecast, it may be observed in passing, was just. 
Thought did from his time assume for a while a notably 
less metaphysical and more positive character. It had 
been well frightened by its own philosophical daring in 
the previous period. It had jumped in and found 
itself out of its depth{\smc} and Comte was the mouthpiece 
by which it recorded its vow never to try to swim 
again. Who has not made a similar vow\qmk\ and who, 
after making it, has ever kept it{\qmk} 
\end{sloppypar}

As in the case of Comtian positivism, so this 
[\textbf{39}]
historical positivism in theology seems to imply a 
definitely anti-philosophical scepticism{\smc} it is a merely 
negative attitude. It is characteristic of two religious 
types which at first sight seem to have little in common. 
On the one hand, it is expressed by that extreme anti-%
speculative orthodoxy which takes its stand on the bald 
historical fact \enquote{so the Church believes and has believed}{\smc} 
on the other, it is found in the extreme anti-dogmatic 
view of many Liberal Protestants, to whom \enquote{meta\-physic} 
is anathema. These positions we shall not criticise in 
detail. We have already laid down in a former chapter%%%%%
\footnoteB{That is, Chapter I of Part I.
Religion is more than an historical event.
See below on psychology as treating a judgment as an event.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
the necessity to religion of a speculative creed, and 
there is no need to repeat the arguments there used. 
Instead of proving the impossibility of a totally un\-%
philosophical theology, we shall consider two instances 
of unphilosophical representations of religion and try 
to show where and why they break down. These 
instances are abstract or one-sided forms of the two 
sciences mentioned above{\smc} namely, (\emph a) comparative 
religion, and (\emph b) historical theology. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Psychology and Comparative Religion.} 

Comparative religion is the classification and 
comparison of different religions or of different forms 
of the same religion. Its aim is to determine the 
precise beliefs of such and such a people or sect. It is 
therefore on the one hand anthropological, as involving 
the comparison of different human types, and on the 
other psychological, as determining the religious beliefs 
of this or that individual considered as a member of a 
certain class, sect, or nation. Comparative religion or 
religious anthropology is therefore not really to be 
distinguished from the Psychology of Religion. 

\begin{sloppypar}
If we ask what constitutes psychology and dis\-%
tinguishes it from other sciences, we cannot answer 
merely that psychology is the study of the mind or 
soul. \hlt{The philosophical sciences,---logic, ethics, and so
forth,---attempt to study the mind{\smc} and they are not 
psychological}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{psychology2}%
This will be a recurring theme in Collingwood\apo s works.
A note by the editors of \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method}
\cite[p.\ cii--ciii, n.\ 73]{Collingwood-EPM} recognizes this:
\begin{quote}
 For Collingwood\apo s views on the relation between philosophy and psychology, 
see especially \emph{RP} [\emph{Religion and Philosophy}] 39-42; 
\emph{EM} [\emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}], chs.\ IX--XIII, esp.\ 107--8 and 115; 
and \emph A [\emph{An Autobiography}], 92--5.
\end{quote}
\afterquote To this list should be added \emph{The Principles of Art,}
where Collingwood distinguishes logic and ethics from psychology as being 
\emph{criteriological} sciences.
See note \ref{criteriological}, page \pageref{criteriological},
for quotations from and discussion of \emph{PA} and \emph{EM}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Nor can we say (as some psychologists 
say) that this is the reason of their unsatisfactory 
[\textbf{40}]\label{40}
character{\smc} for these sciences exist on their own basis, 
and \hlt{it is no criticism of one science to point out that 
it is not a different one}. Again, we cannot define 
psychology as the study of conduct{\smc} because that title 
is already claimed by ethics. From these philosophical 
sciences psychology is distinguished not by its subject 
but by its method. 
\end{sloppypar}

The method peculiar to psychology may perhaps be 
described as follows. \hlt{The psychology of knowing}
differs from logic or the philosophical theory of know\-%
ledge in that it \hlt{treats a judgment---the act of knowing 
something---as an event in the mind, a historical fact. 
It does not go on to determine the relation of this 
mental event to the \enquote{something} known}, the reality 
beyond the act%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
The description of judgment as a mental event or act which refers to a reality 
beyond the act is borrowed from Mr.~F. H. Bradley{\apo}s \emph{Logic.} I use Mr.~Bradley{\apo}s 
language not because I entirely accept such a description of the judgment, but 
because I believe it to express the view on which psychology is based{\smc} and therefore 
psychology cannot be defined without reference to it.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
which the mind, in that act, apprehends. 
Such a further investigation would be metaphysical in 
character and is therefore avoided by psychology. Now 
this formula can be universalised, and thus gives us the 
definition of psychological method. Take the mental 
activity as a self-contained fact{\smc} refuse, so far as that 
is possible, to treat of its metaphysical aspect, its relations 
with real things other than itself{\smc} and you have 
psychology. Thus in scientific thought as studied by 
logic we have a judgment in which the mind knows 
reality\cln\ psychology, treating the judgment as a mere 
event, omits its reference to reality, that is to say, does 
not raise the question whether it is true.%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
The same omission or abstraction is made by Formal Logic, which I take to 
be a psychological rather than a philosophical science.%%%%%
\footnoteC{\label{Priest}%
And yet today scholars engaged with formal logic are in philosophy departments.
A case in point is Graham Priest \cite{Priest-Aeon},
who says Buddhist logic can be made sense of with the help of 
\enquote{contemporary developments in mathematical logic.}}%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
}
%%%%%%%%%%%
In religion, 
we have people holding definite beliefs as to the nature 
of God. Psychology studies and classifies those beliefs 
without asking how far they correspond with the real 
nature of God. In conduct generally we have certain 
actions, individual or social, designed to attain the ends 
of morality, utility, or the like{\smc} psychology will study 
[\textbf{41}] 
these actions without asking whether they are right or 
wrong, but taking them merely as things done. In 
general, the characteristic of psychology is the refusal 
to raise ultimate questions. And since that is so, it is 
plainly not in a position to offer answers to them\cln\ or 
rather, in so far as it does offer answers these rest on an 
uncritical and quite accidental attitude towards the 
problems. For instance, the psychology of religion, 
consisting as it does in the collection of beliefs about 
God without determining their truth, evidently does 
not aim at discovering what God is and which opinions 
give the best account of his nature. \hlt{The psychology\label{psychology} 
of religion, therefore, unlike the philosophy of religion, 
is not itself a religion}{\smc} that is, it has no answer of its 
own to the question \enquote{What is God{\qmk}} It has, in fact, 
deliberately renounced the investigation of that question 
and substituted the other question, \enquote{What do different 
people say about him{\qmk}} 

Of course a religious psychologist may be willing 
to offer an answer of his own to the first question. 
But in so far as he does that he is abandoning the 
psychology of religion and falling back on religion itself{\smc} 
changing his attitude towards religion from an external 
to an internal one. When I describe the attitude of 
psychology as \enquote{external} my meaning is this. There is 
an air of great concreteness and reality about psychology 
which makes it very attractive. But this concreteness 
is really a delusion and on closer inspection vanishes. 
When a man makes a statement about the nature of 
God (or anything else) he is interested, not in the fact 
that he is making that statement, but in the belief, or 
hope, or fancy that it is true. If then the psychologist 
merely makes a note of the statement and declines to 
join in the question whether it is true, he is cutting 
himself off from any kind of real sympathy or participa\-%
tion in the very thing he is studying---this man{\apo}s mental 
life and experiences. To take an example, a certain 
mystic says, \enquote{God is a circle whose centre is everywhere 
[\textbf{42}]
and whose circumference is nowhere.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Attributed variously on the web,
without clear citation.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The psycho\-%
logist, instead of answering, \enquote{Of course,} or, \enquote{Really\qmk}\ 
or, \enquote{I don{\apo}t quite see what you mean,} replies, \enquote{That 
is an example of what I call the Religious Paradox.}%%%%%
\footnoteA{This instance is not imaginary.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Josiah Royce defined a \enquote{religious paradox}\cln\
that a divine revelation can be recognized as authentic
only by somebody who has already seen God.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%

The mind, regarded in this external way, really 
ceases to be a mind at all.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Quoted in \emph{An Autobiography}
\cite[p.~93]{Collingwood-Auto} as
\enquote{The mind, regarded in this way,
ceases to be a mind at all.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
To study a man{\apo}s conscious\-%
ness without studying the thing of which he is conscious 
is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trifling 
abstraction. It cannot answer ultimate questions, 
because it has renounced the attempt{\smc} it cannot enter 
into the life it studies, because it refuses to look with 
it eye to eye{\smc} and it is left with the cold unreality of 
thought which is the thought of nothing, action with 
no purpose, and fact with no meaning. 

These objections against the ideal of religious psy\-%
chology or of the science of comparative religion only 
hold good so long as, from such collections of opinions, 
the philosophical impulse towards the determination of 
their truth is completely excluded. And the fact that 
this impulse is never really absent is what gives re\-%
ligious value to such studies. Indeed, this impulse alone 
gives them scientific value{\smc} for some degree of critical 
or sympathetic understanding is necessary before the bare 
facts can be correctly reported. It is notorious that 
the unintelligent observer cannot even observe. \hlt{It is 
only owing to surreptitious or unconscious aberrations 
from its ideal of \enquote{objectivity} that psychology ever 
accomplishes anything at all.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{And yet there is a moral ideal known as objectivity{\smc}
or perhaps we should just called it impartiality.}
%%%%%%%%%%%

\addsubsec{(\emph b) History of Dogma or of the Church.} 

\begin{sloppypar}
The ideal of a history of the Church as a 
substitute for philosophical theology is plainly open to 
the same general objections. It profits nothing to 
catalogue the heresies of early Christianity and get 
them off by heart, unless one enters with some degree 
of sympathy into the problems which men wished to 
solve, and tries to comprehend the motives which led 
them to offer their various answers. But this sympathy 
and understanding are purely religious, theological, 
[\textbf{43}]
philosophical{\smc} to understand a heresy one must 
appreciate the difficulty which led to it{\smc} and that 
difficulty, however expressed, is always a philosophical 
difficulty. The merely external history of dogma 
killeth{\smc} it is the internal history---the entering into 
the development of thought---that maketh alive. 
\end{sloppypar}

The same applies, again, to the origins of 
Christianity. The \enquote{histor\-ical Jesus} can never 
solve the problem of Christianity, because there never 
was a \enquote{historical} Jesus pure and simple{\smc} the real 
Jesus held definite beliefs about God and himself and 
the world{\smc} his interest was not historical but theological. 
By considering him as a mere fact in history, instead 
of also an idea in theology, we may be simplifying 
our task, but we are cutting ourselves off from any 
true understanding and sharing of his consciousness. 
Historical theology is always tempted to lose itself in 
the merely external task of showing what formul{\ae} he 
took over from current religion, and what he added 
to them, and what additions and alterations were 
superadded by the early Church{\smc} whereas all this is 
but the outward aspect of the reality, and \hlt{the true\label{mean2}
task of historical theology is to find out not only what 
was said, but what was meant}{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Compare page \pageref{mean}{\cln}
\enquote{The question is not what
words we use, but what we mean by them.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
what current Judaism, 
to begin with, meant by its formul{\ae}, and how far its 
meaning was a satisfactory theology. Then we should 
be in a position to understand from within the new 
doctrines of Jesus, and really to place ourselves at the 
fountain-head of the faith. To speak of studying the 
mind of Jesus from within may seem presumptuous{\smc} 
but no other method is of the slightest value. 

\addsec{2. Anti-historical views\cln---} 

Historical positivism thus fails to give any 
answer to theological questions. It can tell us that 
the Church has anathematised certain doctrines. But 
what those doctrines mean, or why any one ever held 
them, or what the Church meant to assert by con\-%
demning them, or even why it follows that we ought 
to condemn them too, pure history can never tell us. 
[\textbf{44}]
For the solution of these problems we are thrown back 
on speculative thought. 

Hence, through condemnation of the over-emphasis 
laid on historical truth, emerges a contrary theory\cln\ 
namely, that history is useless as a basis for theology. 
This anti-historical view may take two forms\cln\ (\emph a) that 
history is itself too uncertain to bear such an important 
superstructure as theology{\smc} (\emph b) that the two things are 
truths of different orders, so that one cannot have any 
bearing on the other. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Anti-historical scepticism.} 

\hlt{However well attested a historical fact may be},
it is never more than merely attested. \hlt{It is always 
possible that it may be wrong}{\smc} we have no means of 
checking it{\smc} it is always conceivable that evidence 
might turn up sufficient to discredit the best established 
historical belief. And---still worse---the evidence 
might never turn up, and we should simply go on 
believing what was totally untrue. Seeing, then, how 
desperately uncertain history must always be, can we, 
dare we, use it as the foundation for all our creeds{\qmk} 

\hlt{This argument introduces a new form of scepticism},%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{exact}%
In \emph{The Principles of History,}
Collingwood will distinguish the critic from the skeptic
\cite[p.~7]{Collingwood-PH}\cln\
\begin{quote}
  a critic is a person able and willing to go over somebody
else{\apo}s thoughts for himself to see if they have been well done{\smc}
whereas a sceptic is a person who will not do this{\smc} and because you
cannot make a man think, any more than you can make a horse
drink, there is no way of proving to a sceptic that a certain piece of
thinking is sound, and no reason for taking his denials to heart. It is
only by his peers that any claimant to knowledge is judged.
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
which we may describe as anti-historical scepticism. 
It is in essence a statement of the unknowability of 
past fact simply as such, on the abstract ground that 
failure of memory, breach of the tradition, is always 
possible.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{PH-certainty}%
It will be observed in \emph{The Principles of History}
\cite[p.~18]{Collingwood-PH} that for the historian,
certain conclusions \emph{are} possible\cln
  \begin{quotation}
One hears it said that history is \senquote{not an exact science}. The meaning
of this I take to be that no historical argument ever proves its
conclusion with that compulsive force which is characteristic of
exact science. Historical inference, the saying seems to mean, is
never compulsive, it is at best permissive{\smc} or, as people sometimes
rather ambiguously say, it never leads to certainty, only to
probability. Many historians of the present writer{\apo}s generation,
brought up at a time when this proverb was accepted by the general
opinion of intelligent persons (I say nothing of the few who were a
generation ahead of their time), must be able to recollect their
excitement on first discovering that it was wholly untrue, and that
they were actually holding in their hands an historical argument
which left nothing to caprice, and admitted of no alternative
conclusion, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstration
in mathematics.
  \end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
This is entirely parallel to the anti-%
philosophical scepticism which declares that no inference 
is sound because of the unavoidable abstract possi\-%
bility of a logical fallacy. Each is a fantastic and 
hypercritical position, and neither is really tenable. 
If inference as such is to be distrusted, the evidence 
that leads us to distrust it is discredited with the rest. 
If attested fact as such is liable to be misreported, the 
facts on which we base this generalisation are as doubt\-%
ful as any others. Indeed the theory puts a stop to 
every kind of activity{\smc} for if the human memory as 
such is the seat of the supposed fallacy, we cannot 
count upon any continuity whatever in our mental 
[\textbf{45}] 
life{\smc} it may always be the case that my memory of 
five minutes ago is completely misleading. If I may 
not base a theory on facts reported in books of history, 
am I more entitled to trust those recollected by 
myself{\qmk} Plainly there is no difference of kind here. 
But if the sceptic falls back on a question of degree 
and says that some facts are better attested than others, 
then of course one agrees with him and admits that 
one is always bound to ask whether these facts are 
well enough attested to serve as basis for this theory{\smc} 
whether the facts are two thousand years or two 
minutes distant in time makes no real difference. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Dualism of History and Philosophy.} 

The other argument against the use of history 
in theology asserts that there are two categories of fact, 
historical and philosophical{\smc} and that since they are 
totally distinct, theological propositions, which are 
essentially philosophical in character, cannot be proved 
or disproved or in the least affected by historical 
arguments{\smc} just as discussions about the authorship 
of a poem do not in the least affect its beauty. 

\begin{sloppypar}
This argument is plainly right if it merely means 
that you cannot as if by magic extract a philosophical 
conclusion from non-philosophical premisses. If you 
understand history as something entirely excluding 
philosophical elements, then any philosophical con\-%
clusion which you \enquote{prove} by its means will be 
dishonestly gained. But in this sense the statement 
is no more than the tautology that you cannot extract 
from an argument more than its premisses contain{\smc} 
it does not help us to recognise a purely historical or 
philosophical argument when we meet one, or even 
convince us that such things exist. 
\end{sloppypar}

It may, secondly, be interpreted to mean that when 
we cite instances in support of philosophical views the 
philosophical conclusion depends not on the historical 
fact but on the \enquote{construction,} as it is called, which we 
put upon the fact. We look at the fact in the light of 
an idea{\smc} and the philosophical theory which we describe 
[\textbf{46}]
as proved by the fact is due not to the fact but to the 
idea we have read into it. Here again there is a certain 
truth. When A finds his pet theory of human selfish\-%
ness borne out by C{\apo}s action, and B uses the same 
action as an illustration of his own theory of human 
altruism, it seems natural to say that each starts from 
the same fact but with different preconceived ideas\cln\ 
and that the fact is really equally irrelevant to both the 
theories which it is used to prove. But this account of 
the matter is quite inaccurate. A{\apo}s \enquote{idea} is that C{\apo}s 
act was a selfish act{\smc} B{\apo}s \enquote{idea} was that it was altru\-%
istic. But of these ideas neither was a mere \enquote{idea}{\smc} 
one was a historical fact and the other a historical error. 
Thus the distinction between the fact and the construc\-%
tion put upon it is false{\smc} what we call the construction 
is only our attempt to determine further details about 
the fact. And since the question whether C was acting 
selfishly or not is a question of historical fact, \hlt{the 
doctrine that people act in general selfishly or altruistic\-%
ally is based entirely on historical fact, or on something 
erroneously imagined to be historical fact}. The attempt 
to dissociate philosophy and history breaks down because, 
in point of fact, we never do so dissociate them. \hlt{One 
simply cannot make general statements without any 
thought of their instances}. 

\addsec{3. The mutual dependence of Philosophy and History\cln---} 

Positivism and scepticism both break down under 
examination. We cannot, it appears, do without either 
philosophical or historical thought. We seem therefore 
to have here a distinction within the region of the 
intellect parallel to that of intellect and will in the mind 
as a whole{\smc} and consequently we must investigate the 
relation between philosophy and history with a view to 
determining as accurately as possible the nature of the 
distinction. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) History depends upon Philosophy.} 

In the first place, it appears that history cannot 
exist without philosophy. There is no such thing as 
an entirely non-philosophical history. \hlt{History cannot 
proceed without philo\-sophical presuppositions}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Here is the germ of \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics.}} 
of a highly 
[\textbf{47}]
complex character. It deals with evidence, and there\-%
fore makes epistemological assumptions as to the value 
of evidence{\smc} it describes the actions of historical char\-%
acters in terms whose meaning is fixed by ethical 
thought{\smc} it has continually to determine what events 
are possible and what are not possible, and this can 
only be done in virtue of some general metaphysical 
conclusions. 

It is not, of course, implied that no historian is 
qualified for his work without a systematic education 
in academic philosophy. Still less is it to be supposed 
that a philosopher dabbling in history is better able 
than the historians to lay down the law as to the value 
of such and such a historical argument. It must be 
remembered that by philosophy we mean, here as else\-%
where, thought concerned with metaphysical problems\cln\ 
not acquaintance with technical literature and the 
vocabulary of the specialist. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Philosophy depends upon History.} 

\hlt{It is equally certain that philosophy is impossible 
without history{\smc} for any theory must be a theory of 
facts}, and if there were no facts there would be no 
occasion for theory. But in asserting the necessity of 
history to philosophy \hlt{we must guard against certain 
misunderstandings}. 

In the first place, the above statement may be inter\-%
preted to mean that philosophy develops or evolves 
along fixed lines, has a definite history of its own in 
the sense of a movement in which each phase emerges 
necessarily from the preceding phase, and therefore 
philosophy (\emph{i.e.}~the state of philosophical thought now) 
depends absolutely upon history (\emph{i.e.}~its own previous 
history). 

As against such a view it must be pointed out that 
\hlt{philo\-sophy is a human activity, not a mechanical 
process}{\smc} and is therefore free and not in any sense 
necessitated either by its own past or anything else. 
Doubtless every philosopher owes much to his pre\-%
decessors{\smc} thought is a corporate activity, like every 
[\textbf{48}]
other. But the dependence of Hegel upon Kant, say, 
is of quite a different kind from the dependence in\-%
dicated by the above theory. Hegel{\apo}s work is based 
upon Kant, in the sense that many of Kant{\apo}s truths are 
Hegel{\apo}s truths too{\smc} but Kant also makes errors which 
Hegel corrects. The error is not the basis of the truth 
but the opposite of it. It may, and indeed in a sense 
must, lead to it{\smc} because an error cannot be refuted till 
it has been stated. But \hlt{the statement of the error is 
not the cause of its refutation}. The word \enquote{cause} is 
simply inapplicable{\smc} for we are dealing with the free 
activity of the mind, not with a mechanical process.%%%%%
\footnoteB{It would seem here then that Collingwood uses \enquote{cause}
for what happens in a mechanical process.
In \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
he will discover three historical meanings of the word\cln\
\begin{quotation}
Sense I. Here that which is \senquote{caused} is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent, and \senquote{causing} him to do it means affording him a motive for doing it.

Sense II. Here that which is \senquote{caused} is an event in nature, and its \senquote{cause} is an event or state of things by producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be.

Sense III. Here that which is \senquote{caused} is an event or state of things, and its \senquote{cause} is another event or state of things standing to it in a one-one relation of causal priority\cln\ i.e.\ a relation of such a kind that (\emph a) if the cause happens or exists the effect also must happen or exist, even if no further conditions are fulfilled, (\emph b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens or exists, (\emph c) in some sense which remains to be defined, the cause is prior to the effect\lips
\cite[pp.~285--6]{Collingwood-EM}
\end{quotation}
\afterquote Thus it would seem that, by being in error,
one person might indeed cause another person,
in Sense I, to refute the error.
But this is not the sense in which Collingwood is using the word.
See page \pageref{causation} and later.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
And therefore this theory uses the word dependence in 
a misleading sense. 

Secondly, philosophy may be said to depend on 
history in the sense that history, the gradual and 
cumulative experience of facts, is necessary before we 
can frame philosophical theories on a broad enough 
basis. The wider a man{\apo}s experience, the more likely 
his generalisations are to be true. The same applies to 
the human race in general{\smc} we have been accumulating 
facts little by little for centuries now, and consequently 
we are a great deal better equipped for philosophising 
than were, for instance, the Greeks. 

This theory expresses a point of view which is 
always widely held{\smc} it is an attitude towards the world 
whose technical name is empiricism, and of which the 
dominant note is the abstract insistence on mere number 
or size. It reckons wisdom by the quantity of different 
things a man knows, and certainty by the number of 
different times a statement comes true{\smc} it holds that a 
man broadens his views by travelling, and stunts them 
by living at home{\smc} it measures everything in two 
dimensions, and forgets the existence of a third. As 
a matter of fact---one is almost ashamed of having to 
utter such truisms---he who accumulates information 
alone is very likely to accumulate not merely sorrow 
but indigestion of the mind{\smc} if he cannot understand 
[\textbf{49}]
himself, he is not necessarily the wiser for trying to 
understand others{\smc} if he cannot learn truth at home, 
he will certainly not learn it abroad. It is true that 
more facts of some kinds are known to the learned 
world now than in the time of Socrates{\smc} but it does 
not follow that we are all wiser than Socrates. The 
notion of establishing theories on a broad basis is, in 
short, an error{\smc} itself based upon a broad, but ex\-%
tremely superficial, theory of logic. \hlt{What matters in 
the foundations of a theory is not their breadth but 
their depth}{\smc} the thorough understanding of a single 
fact, not the feverish accumulation of a thousand. 

\hlt{History must be regarded} not as a mechanical process, 
nor yet as a gradual accumulation of truths, but \hlt{simply 
as \emph{objec}\-\emph{tivity}{\smc} as the real fact of which we are conscious}. 
History is that which actually exists{\smc} fact, as something 
independent of my own or your knowledge of it. In 
this sense there would be no philosophy without it{\smc} 
for no form of consciousness can exist without an object. 
We are not expelling from history the notion of move\-%
ment{\smc} for if we are asked, what is the nature of this 
reality of which we are conscious\qmk\ we shall reply that 
it is itself activity, growth, development{\smc} but not 
development in any automatic or mechanical sense. 

\addsec{4. The identity of Philosophy and History.} 

We are now able to suggest more fully the 
relation of history to philosophy. Neither can exist 
without the other{\smc} each presupposes the other. That 
is to say, they are interdependent and simultaneous 
activities, like thought and will. The question is 
whether, like thought and will, they are fully identical. 

Each is knowledge{\smc} and if they are different, they 
must be the knowledge of different objects. How can 
we distinguish these objects{\qmk} History, it is sometimes 
said, is knowledge of the particular, philosophy know\-%
ledge of the universal. But the particular is no mere 
particular{\smc} it is a particular of this or that universal{\smc} 
and the universal never can exist at all except in the 
form of this or that particular. \hlt{\enquote{The universal} and} 
[\textbf{50}]
\hlt{\enquote{the particular} considered as separate concrete things 
are fictions}{\smc} and to equate the distinction of philosophy 
and history with such a fictitious distinction is to admit 
at once that it is untenable. 

Nor can we distinguish them as the knowledge of 
the necessary and of the contingent respectively. This 
distinction is due to the fact that a theory explains 
some things but leaves others unexplained{\smc} and this 
remnant, relatively to the theory, appears as \enquote{the 
contingent.} \hlt{Contingent, therefore, is only a synonym 
for unexplained}{\smc} it cannot mean inexplicable, for if 
there is a sense in which anything is explicable, we 
cannot assume that anything is in this sense not 
explicable. In the last resort \hlt{necessary probably means 
no more than real}\cln\ when we say that a thing is 
necessarily so, we mean that we understand it to be 
really so. And therefore whatever is real is neces\-%
sarily real. In point of fact, it is possible that the 
distinction between necessity and contingence is only 
a restatement of that between the universal and the 
particular. 

It would, again, be a repetition of the same idea if 
we tried to distinguish things that happen in time 
(history) from things that are true independently of 
time (philosophy). For there is one sense in which 
every truth is temporal{\smc} as for instance the nature of 
God is historically revealed, and the fact that twice two 
is four is grasped by adding, on a definite occasion, 
two and two{\smc} and there is another sense in which 
every fact is independent of time{\smc} as it is still true and 
always will be true that the battle of Hastings was 
fought in 1066. \hlt{The difference between a temporal 
event and a timeless truth is a difference not between 
two different classes of thing, but between two aspects 
of the same thing}. This attempt to distinguish philo\-%
sophy and history suggests a dualism between two 
complete worlds{\smc} the one unchanging, self-identical, 
and known by philosophy, the other subject to change 
[\textbf{51}]
and development, and known by history. But a world 
of mere self-identity would be as inconceivable as a 
world of mere change{\smc} each quality is the reverse side 
of the other. To separate the two is to destroy each 
alike. 

History, like philosophy, is the knowledge of the 
one real world{\smc} it is historical, that is, subject to the 
limitation of time, because only that is known and 
done which has been known and done{\smc} the future, not 
being mechanically determined, does not yet exist, and 
therefore is no part of the knowable universe. It is 
philosophical, that is, all-embracing, universal, for the 
same reason{\smc} because historical fact is the only thing 
that exists and includes the whole universe. History 
\emph{a parte objecti}---the reality which historical research 
seeks to know---is nothing else than the totality of 
existence{\smc} and this is also the object of philosophy. 
History \emph{a parte subjecti}---the activity of the historian---%
is investigation of all that has happened and is happening{\smc} 
and this is philosophy too. For it is incorrect to say 
that philosophy is theory \emph{based upon} fact{\smc} theory is not 
something else derived, distilled, from facts but simply 
the observation that the facts are what they are. And 
similarly the philosophical presuppositions of history 
are not something different from the history itself\cln\ 
they are philosophical truths which the historian finds 
historically exemplified. 

\begin{sloppypar}
History and philosophy are therefore the same thing. 
It is true, no doubt, that each in turn may be interpreted 
abstractly{\smc} \hlt{abstract history being the mere verbal 
description of events without any attempt at under\-%
standing them, philosophy the dry criticism of formal 
rules of thinking without any attempt at grasping their 
application}. Abstract history in this sense is a failure 
not because it is unphilosophical, but because it is un\-%
historical{\smc} it is not really history at all. And similarly 
abstract philosophy becomes meaningless, because in 
eliminating the historical element it has unawares 
[\textbf{52}]
eliminated the philosophical element too. Each alike 
must also be the other or it cannot be itself{\smc} each in 
being itself is also the other. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsec{5. Application to Religion\cln\
doctrine cannot be severed from its historical setting.} 

The value of historical theology, then, consists 
in the fact that it is already philosophical. It does not 
merely supply philosophical theology with materials{\smc} 
it is itself already grappling with the philosophical 
problems. Religion cannot afford to ignore its historical 
content, nor can it treat this content as something in\-%
essential to the establishment of its speculative doctrines. 
History must bear the weight of speculative super\-%
structure to the best of its ability{\smc} but in return it 
may derive help from philosophical light thrown there\-%
by on its own difficulties. In this way the distinction 
between philosophical and historical theology disappears{\smc} 
there is seen to be only one theology, which is both 
these at once. It may be presented with comparative 
emphasis on constructive doctrine, as in the later 
chapters of this book{\smc} but if so, it does not omit or 
ignore history. It is woven of strands each of which 
is historical in character, and the whole presents itself 
as a historical fact. Similarly, theology may be written 
from a historical point of view, with the emphasis on 
temporal development{\smc} but it is only theology so long 
as it is clear that the thing that is developing is really 
doctrine all the time. 

An illustration may serve to indicate the necessity 
to theology of its historical aspect. In view of the 
criticisms often brought against the records of the life 
of Jesus, many are inclined to take up a sceptical 
attitude and to declare that our tradition is hopelessly 
incorrect. But, they go on to ask, what then{\qmk} We 
learn many valuable lessons from the Good Samaritan, 
though we do not believe him to have existed. We 
learn, too, from Homer, even if Homer never wrote 
what we ascribe to him. We have the tradition in 
black and white{\smc} it bears its credentials on its face{\smc} 
all else is a side-issue. Is there anything we learn from 
[\textbf{53}] 
the Christ-history that we could not equally learn from 
the Christ-myth{\qmk} 

The simple religious mind would, I believe, emphati\-%
cally reject such a suggestion. And this would be 
perfectly right. It is easy to say that the \enquote{Christ-%
myth} embodies facts about God{\apo}s nature which, once 
known, are known whether they are learnt from one 
source or from another. That is by no means the 
whole truth. The life of Christ gives us, conspicuously, 
two other things. It gives us an example of how a 
human life may satisfy the highest possible standards{\smc} 
and it puts us in contact with the personality of 
the man who lived that life. 

\hlt{The whole value of an example is lost unless it is\label{whole-value}
historical}. If an athlete tries to equal the feats of 
Herakles, or an engineer spends his life trying to 
recover the secret of the man who invented a perpetual-%
motion machine, they are merely deluding themselves 
with false hopes if Herakles and the supposed inventor 
never lived. \hlt{The Good Samaritan{\apo}s action is the kind 
of thing that any good man might do}{\smc} it is typical of 
a kind of conduct which we see around us and know 
to be both admirable and possible. But if the life of 
Jesus is a myth, it is more preposterous to ask a man 
to imitate it than to ask him to imitate Herakles. 
Any valid command must guarantee the possibility of 
carrying it out{\smc} and \hlt{the historical life of Jesus is the%%%
\label{Jes-perf}
guarantee that man can be perfect if he will}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{What does Collingwood see as the perfection of Jesus{\qmk}
Jesus accepted death{\smc} but as with the Good Samaritan,
this is the kind of thing we see around us.
See note \ref{perfect}, page \pageref{perfect}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%% 

Further, in that perfection, or the struggle towards 
it, the religious man somehow feels that he is in 
personal touch with a risen Christ. We do not at 
present demand an explanation of this feeling, or ask 
whether there is a real intercourse{\smc} it is enough that 
the feeling exists and is an integral part of the Christian 
consciousness. The presence of Christ is as real to the 
believer as the love of God. But it can hardly be real 
if Christ is a myth. 

It must be observed that we are not arguing to the 
[\textbf{54}]
reality of Christ{\apo}s presence now, or his historicity in 
the past, on the strength of this feeling. Such an 
argument would be extremely hazardous. We are 
merely concerned to show that Christianity would not 
be absolutely unchanged by the demonstration that 
these things were mythical. The belief that Christ 
really lived, whether it is true or false, colours the 
whole consciousness of the believer. 

The same holds good even of purely \enquote{intellectual} 
doctrine. If a doctrine is simple and easy, containing 
nothing very new or paradoxical, a fiction is enough 
to drive it home. But if it is difficult to grasp and 
conflicts with our preconceived notions, our first 
impulse is to challenge the reality of the fact which 
serves as an instance. A scientist propounds some 
new and revolutionary doctrine{\smc} at once we ask 
whether the experiments on which it is based were 
fairly carried out as he describes them. If not, we 
dismiss the doctrine. No doubt to an absolutely 
perfect mind a fiction would be as illuminating as a 
fact, because \emph{ex hypothesi} such a mind would have no 
special difficulty in grasping any truth, however subtle, 
and would stand in no need of, so to speak, forcible 
conviction. \hlt{A person who was the equal or superior 
of Jesus Christ in spiritual insight could give up his 
historicity and not lose by it. But such a description 
only applies to God. And in God, we can no longer 
distinguish between the historical and the imaginary}. 
If, speaking in a Platonic myth, we describe the course 
of history as a story told to himself by God, it makes 
no difference whether we say the story is imaginary 
or true. 

But for us objective fact, history, is necessary. We 
all have something of the spirit of Thomas, and must 
know a thing has happened before we can believe its 
teaching. Is this, perhaps, one reason for the difference 
between the parables that Jesus spoke and the parable 
he acted{\qmk} He knew the limitations of his audience{\smc} 
[\textbf{55}]
he saw what they could understand and what they could 
not. \hlt{Some things about God he could tell them in 
words, and they would believe his words{\smc} but one last 
thing---how could he tell that\qmk}%%%%%
\footnoteB{What is the last thing{\qmk}
That death is an illusion, or can at least be faced with equanimity{\qmk}
Does Collingwood actually believe that the crucified body of Jesus
came back to life{\qmk}
Collingwood will (on p.~\pageref{Christ}) define the Christ
as the \enquote{ideal person, 
in whom Godhead and manhood not only coexist but coincide.}
It would seem then that what Jesus must show 
is that it is possible to \emph{be} the Christ.
This seems to be the idea of Pt III, Ch.~I, \S~3, (\emph c)
\enquote{The historical uniqueness of Christ} (p.~\pageref{unique}).}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\ and if he could find 
words to tell it, who would not mock him for a visionary 
or shrink from him as a blasphemer{\qmk} There was only 
one way{\smc} to act the parable he could not speak. \hlt{We 
are accustomed to think of the death of Jesus as the 
sacrifice for our sins. Was it not also, perhaps, a 
sacrifice for our stupidity{\qmk}}%%%%%
\footnoteB{I think Collingwood{\apo}s preaching falls flat,
because he is not stupid and does not think himself stupid,
and so he seems to call his audience stupid.}

\mypart{II}{Religion and Metaphysics}

\mychap I{On Proving the Existence of God}

\addsec{1. Theology must prove the existence of God\cln---}

\hlt{\textsc{It} might be maintained that the first duty of} a 
philosophical theology, indeed of \hlt{any theology, is to 
prove the existence of} the \hlt{God} whose nature it professes 
to expound. The difficulty of this preliminary task is 
so great that \hlt{theology tries in general to escape it}{\smc} 
pointing out that every science starts from some data, 
some fact taken for granted. The physicist is not 
called upon to prove the existence of matter, nor the 
historian to prove the existence of his documentary 
authorities. Granted that matter exists, the physicist 
will tell you what it is like{\smc} and theology must claim 
to exercise the same freedom in the choice of a starting-% 
point. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Attempts to evade this difficulty
by the analogy of physics.}

This defence is in part justified, and in part, I 
think, mistaken. \hlt{It may be true that no empirical 
science would submit its foundations to such rigorous 
criticism} as is here applied to theology. And if theology 
is to be a merely empirical science, it has a correspond\-%
ing right to make uncriticised assumptions. But the 
sting of the criticism lies in the fact that theology claims 
to be more than this. It presents itself as a philosophy, 
a view of the universe as a whole, the ultimate ground 
of reality{\smc} and \hlt{philosophy can take nothing for granted}. 
A historian may say, \enquote{I give you here a sketch of the 
character of Julius C{\ae}sar. It is based on all the 
available evidence{\smc} but though I have weighed the 
documents as well as I could, and allowed for the 
[\textbf{60}]
partisanship of one writer and the prejudice of another, 
I still feel that the evidence is very slight and scanty, 
and that no high degree of certainty is possible.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{In history generally,
certainty \emph{is} possible\cln\
see note \ref{PH-certainty}, page \pageref{PH-certainty}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We 
have to remember in dealing with remote history that 
no proof of a statement can ever be offered which will 
stand against the objections of a determined scepticism.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{The distinction of the skeptic from the critic 
is in note \ref{exact}, page \pageref{exact}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
If a theologian prefaced his account of the nature of 
God by a statement in terms analogous to these, he 
would doubtless win the approval of many for his 
toleration and breadth of mind{\smc} but all sincerely 
religious people would, I am convinced, feel that his 
detached and judicial attitude was not merely an outrage 
on their feelings but exhibited a certain intellectual 
obtuseness and incapacity to appreciate the point at 
issue. We should have the same feeling if a philosopher 
said, \enquote{Such, in my opinion, is the nature of morality. 
We must not, however, forget that some people deny 
the existence of morality altogether, and it is quite 
possible that they are right.} To such language we 
should reply that a philosopher has no right to construct 
the nature of morality out of his inner consciousness, 
and end in the pious hope that the reality may corre\-%
spond with his \enquote{ideal construction.} His \hlt{business as 
a philosopher is to discover what actually are the ideals 
which govern conduct}, and not to speak until he has 
something to tell us about them.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{criteriological}%
If the ideals were those identified by the philosopher as ideals,
then philosophy---in this case, ethics, the science of morality---% 
would be simply \emph{normative.}
But ethics seeks to discover the ideals recognized \emph{by those whose actions are being judged.}
In a word, ethics is a \emph{criteriological} science.
Collingwood\apo s imaginary failed philosopher 
approaches morality as a psychologist would.
This long note will elaborate on these ideas in words from \emph{The Principles of Art}
and \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics.}
I shall end with an example from today of how psychology fails to understand its job.
\P\
Collingwood introduces the term \enquote{criteriological} in \emph{The Principles of Art.}
Here, at \cite[p.\ 157]{Collingwood-PA}, at the beginning of \S1, \enquote{The Two Contrasted,}
of Chapter VIII, \enquote{Thinking and Feeling},
the first chapter of Book II, \enquote{The Theory of Imagination,}
Collingwood observes that thought is to be distinguished from feeling by being \emph{bipolar}
in the sense that it can be done well or ill\cln
\begin{quotation}
\textsc{Of} all the features which our experience presents when we 
reflect upon it, none is more familiar than the contrast 
between thinking and feeling. I will try to state some of the 
characteristics of this contrast. 

First, there is a special kind of simplicity about feeling, 
in contrast with what may be called the bipolarity of thought. 
Whenever we think we are more or less conscious of a 
distinction between thinking well and thinking ill, doing the 
job of thinking successfully or unsuccessfully. The distinc\-%
tions between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false, 
are special cases of this bipolarity{\smc} it is plain that none of 
them could arise except in the experience of a thinking being. 
This is not merely because they are distinctions{\smc} nor even 
merely because they are oppositions. Distinctions and even 
oppositions can arise in feeling as such: for example the 
distinction between red and blue, the opposition between 
hot and cold or pleasant and painful. The distinction or 
opposition in virtue of which I speak of thought as bipolar 
is of a quite different kind from these. There is nothing in 
the case of feeling to correspond with what, in the case of 
thinking, may be called mis-thinking or thinking wrong\lips
\end{quotation}
\afterquote 
There are more excerpts from this section in note 
\ref{double-barrelled}, page \pageref{double-barrelled}.
Collingwood will discuss different levels of thinking in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
in a passage quoted in note \ref{thought-unbidden},
page \pageref{thought-unbidden}.
In a diary entry quoted in the same note,
Collingwood admits experiencing a low level of thought\cln\
\enquote{Stuff wouldn\apo t flow.}
In such a case of thinking, one may \emph{not} be conscious that the thinking is not going well.
Still, in the end, 
one is going to know whether one has succeeded in solving the problem that one set out to solve.
If a mathematics student must ask her teacher whether she has solved a problem correctly,
she has not yet learned how to think mathematically.
\P\
The business of \emph{The Principles of Art} is \emph{feeling} rather than thought.
More precisely, it is \emph{emotion.}
At \cite[p.\ 164]{Collingwood-PA},
in the same chapter as before,
towards the end of \S2, \enquote{Feeling},
comes a definition of psychology\cln
\begin{quotation}
This level of experience, at which we merely feel, in the 
double sense of that word, i.e.\ experience sensations together 
with their peculiar emotional charges, I propose to call the 
psychical level. In using that name I am alluding to the 
traditional distinction between \senquote{psyche} or \senquote{soul} and \senquote{spirit}, 
taken as corresponding with my own distinction between 
feeling and thinking{\smc} and also to the word psychology, which 
implies a claim that the science so designated has as its proper 
field the study of something properly called psychic\cln\ and 
I hold that the proper business of psychology is to investigate 
this level of experience, and not the level which is character\-%
ized by thought (see p.\ 171). I hope I need not apologize 
for using a word which in some readers\apo\ minds may conjure 
up associations with the Society for Psychical Research. 

I shall in this book use the word \senquote{feeling} only with 
reference to the psychical level of experience, and not as a 
synonym for emotion generally. This level contains indeed 
a vast variety of emotions{\smc} but only those which are the 
emotional charges upon sensa. When thought comes into 
existence (and it is no part of my plan to ask how or why that 
happens) it brings with it new orders of emotions\cln\ emotions 
that can arise only in a thinker, and only because he thinks in 
certain ways\lips
\end{quotation}
\afterquote The remaining sections of the chapter are \S3, \enquote{Thinking,}
and \S4, \enquote{The Problem of Imagination.}
At \cite[p.\ 171]{Collingwood-PA},
at the end of the chapter,
the term \enquote{criteriological} is introduced\cln
\begin{quotation}
\emph{Note to p.\ 164{\cln} Psychology, true and false.}---It follows from the distinction 
stated on p.\ 157 that whereas, in order to study the nature of feeling, it is 
necessary to ascertain what persons who feel are actually doing, in order to 
study the nature of thinking it is necessary to ascertain both what persons who 
think are actually doing and also whether what they are doing is a success or a 
failure. Thus a science of feeling must be \senquote{empirical} (i.e. devoted to ascertain\-%
ing and classifying \senquote{facts} or things susceptible of observation), but a science of 
thought must be \senquote{normative}, or (as I prefer to call it) \senquote{criteriological}, i.e.\ con\-%
cerned not only with the \senquote{facts} of thought but also with the \senquote{criteria} or standards 
which thought imposes on itself. \senquote{Criteriological} sciences, e.g.\ logic, ethics, 
have long been accepted as giving the correct approach to the study of thought. 
In the sixteenth century the name \senquote{psychology} was invented to designate an 
\senquote{empirical} science of feeling. In the nineteenth century the idea got about that 
psychology could not merely supplement the old \senquote{criteriological} sciences by 
providing a valid approach to the study of feeling, but could replace them by 
providing an up-to-date and \senquote{scientific} approach to the study of thought. Owing 
to this misconception there are now in existence two things called \senquote{psychology}\cln\ 
a valid and important \senquote{empirical} science (both theoretical and applied) of 
feeling, and a pseudo-science of thought, falsely professing to deal \senquote{empirically} 
with things which, as forms of thought, can be dealt with only \senquote{criteriologically}. 
Its vast and rapidly-growing literature shows all the familiar marks of a pseudo\-%
science (self-contradiction{\smc} the enunciation of \senquote{discoveries} which are really 
platitudes{\smc} the appeal to facts which are irrelevant to the problems under dis\-%
cussion{\smc} the evasion of criticism on the plea that \senquote{the science is in its infancy}, 
\&c.){\smc} it is completely discredited among those (historians, \&c.)\ whose business 
is to study human thought in its actuality{\smc} and I make no apology for ignoring 
and contradicting, in this book and elsewhere, the errors taught by its exponents.
\end{quotation}
\afterquote It is important here that thought judges \emph{itself.}
Collingwood will spell this out in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
Chapter X, \enquote{Psychology as the Science of Feeling}
\cite[pp.\ 106--7]{Collingwood-EM}\cln
\begin{quotation}
\textsc{Psychology} under that name has been recognized
as a distinct science from the sixteenth century, when
the word was used by Melanchthon, Goclenius, and
others as a new name to designate what was in effect
a new science\lips

Greek thinkers, and the same is true of medieval
and even Renaissance thinkers down to the time of
which I am speaking, did not regard \senquote{trying}, or
aiming at a definite end, as something peculiar to
mind.  They did not believe, as many people believed
in the seventeenth century and later, that bodies
merely functioned mechanically, driven \emph{a tergo} by
the operation of efficient causes, while minds were
drawn onwards from in front, as it were, by the
attraction of ends to be realized\lips
What they
regarded as peculiar to mind was not having ends
but being aware of this and having opinions, in
some cases knowledge, as to what its own ends were.

If a mind is something which has opinions as to
what it is trying to do, its possession of these opinions
will in certain cases complicate its behavior\lips

The sciences of body and mind respectively must
take this difference into account\lips

This demand was recognized by the Greeks{\smc} and
in their attempts at a science of thought they tried to
satisfy it.  They constructed a science of theoretical
thought called logic and a science of practical thought
called ethics.  In each case they paid great attention
to the task of defining the criteria by reference to
which theoretical and practical thought respectively
judge of their own success.  In view of this attention
to the idea of a criterion or standard of judgement,
in Latin \emph{norma,} these sciences have been traditionally
called normative sciences.  But the word \senquote{normative}
may prove misleading.  It conveys by its form the
suggestion that the standard or criterion to which it
refers is a criterion belonging to the practitioner of
the science thus described, and used by him to judge
whether the thinking which he studies has been well
or ill done{\smc} as if it were for the logician to decide
whether a non-logician\apo s thoughts are true or false
and his arguments valid or invalid, and for the student
of ethics to pass judgement on the actions of other
people as having succeeded or failed in their purpose.
This suggestion is incorrect.  The characteristic of
thought in virtue of which a science of thought is
called normative consists not in the possibility that
one man\apo s thoughts may be judged successful or
unsuccessful by another, real though that possibility
is{\smc} but in the necessity that in every act of thought
the thinker himself should judge the success of his
own act.  To avoid that misleading suggestion I pro\-%
pose to substitute for the traditional epithet \senquote{norma\-%
tive} the more accurate term \senquote{criteriological}.
\end{quotation}
\afterquote The next two chapters are \enquote{Psychology as the Pseudo-science of Thought} and \enquote{A Pseudo-science Refutes Itself.}
The latter examines three textbooks of psychology,
first describing pseudo-science in terms close to those of \emph{The Principles of Art}\cln
\begin{quote}
\textsc{Among} the characteristic features of a pseudo-science
are the following.  (1) Red herrings, or the pretence
of discussing a topic belonging to the field with which
it professes to deal, while in fact discussing a different
topic not belonging to that field.  (2) Self-contra\-%
diction, or the betrayal of its inability to establish any
genuine results by asserting concurrently as genuine
fruits of scientific research two propositions which
cancel one another out.  (3) Plagiarism, or presenting
as discoveries of its own what are in fact matters of
common knowledge\lips
\end{quote}
\afterquote Meanwhile, I see a failure to recognize logic and ethics as being criteriological
in a recent article,  
\enquote{Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality}
\cite{Ngo},
which I learned of the report,
\enquote{Brain scans explain quickness to blame}
\cite{Bates-Brain}.  The latter explains\cln
\begin{quotation}
Take this scenario commonly used in the field of experimental philosophy:
\begin{quote}
The CEO knew the plan would harm the environment, but he did not care
at all about the effect the plan would have on the environment. He
started the plan solely to increase profits. Did the CEO intentionally
harm the environment?
\end{quote}
If you said \senquote{yes,} then you align with the majority: In previously
published work, 82\%\ responded that the CEO was deliberate. When the
researchers replaced the single word \enquote{harm} with \enquote{help} in the
scenario, however, only 23\%\ deemed the CEO\apo s actions intentional. The
research team found similar results when they posed numerous similar
situations to study participants.

\enquote{There\apo s no logical reason why we would call something intentional,
just because it causes a bad outcome as opposed to a good outcome,}
said corresponding author Scott Huettel, professor of psychology and
neuroscience and member of the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences.

\enquote{Intentionality implies purpose on the part of the person, and that
should be there for good as much as it is for bad. But it\apo s not,}
Huettel added.
\end{quotation}
\afterquote Scott Huettel is here judging people as being illogical,
without bothering to ask them whether they agree.
Thus he treats logic as normative, \emph{not} criteriological.
As an empirical scientist,
he might just accept the logical as what people seem to think it is. 
Instead the team say people are \enquote{people are biased toward treating negative actions as intentional}
(in the words of Lawrence Ngo, the study's \enquote{lead author}---Huettel is \enquote{corresponding author}).
The supposed reason for this bias is that,
\begin{quote}
If the action produced a negative effect,
participants were more likely to draw on brain areas involved in processing emotion
(in particular, the amygdala\lips).
\end{quote}
\afterquote It is not clear what this observation is supposed to tell us.
If a person\apo s \enquote{bias} were a neurosis,
they might overcome it through psychoanalysis---%
which is something that they must be actively involved in.
Whether seeing a brain scan would help the analysis, I do not know.
According to the report on the original article,
\begin{quotation}
How intentional a crime was often affects the final ruling,
and our broader moral judgments.
But the new study, Huettel said, shows that the arrow can go in both directions.
Moral judgment about whether an action harmed others
can influence judgments about how intentional that action was in the first place.
\end{quotation}
\afterquote I think this is totally confused.
First of all, an \emph{action} as such is intentional{\smc}
otherwise, it is just an event or occurrence.
But let that go.
The judgement of whether an action is immoral
requires prior judgement of whether it is intentional.
So I would say{\smc} but the researchers seem to think they can decide \emph{first}
whether an action is moral, and \emph{then} decide whether it is intentional.
According to their own article\cln
\begin{quotation}
A revised model of intentionality judgment, arising from this and previous interactions between philosophy and empirical studies, can have direct implications for the legal system where questions of intentionality remain foundational. For instance, criminal law implicitly assumes that judges and jurors make independent judgments about a defendant\apo s \emph{actus reus} (\enquote{guilty act}) and \emph{mens rea} (\enquote{guilty mind}). However, it seems that judgments of one may influence the other\cln\ the consideration of a particularly egregious act (e.g., killing) may bias judges and jurors towards ascribing a certain associated mental state (e.g., intentional killing)
\end{quotation}
\afterquote On the contrary, I would say, 
the law does not \emph{assume} that judges and jurors make independent judgments{\smc}
rather, it \emph{tells} them that there is no guilty act without a guilty mind.
Meanwhile, the researchers continue, even more grandiosely:
\begin{quotation}
Beyond the legal system, our findings also have important implications for a central principle in moral theory and practice, the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The doctrine asserts that it is morally wrong to cause harm intentionally in circumstances where it would not be morally wrong to cause harm unintentionally. The DDE thus places intentionality ascriptions at the very foundation of moral reasoning. This principle was suggested by St.\ Augustine and St.\ Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages and since then has remained central to Catholic moral teachings as well as to many secular theories in moral philosophy and moral psychology. In recent years, the DDE has been cited in arguments against terror bombing, against nuclear retaliation on cities during the Cold War, against some forms of contraception and abortion, and against active euthanasia and assisted suicide---all on the grounds that these practices involve causing death intentionally. However, if ascriptions of intentionality already presuppose a prior moral judgment about the value of consequences, as our data demonstrate, then the DDE would be threatened with circularity, showing that it cannot be fundamental in moral theory. The moral mechanisms of the \emph{KE} could thus force reconsideration of core tenets of moral theory in theology and philosophy. 
\end{quotation}
\afterquote \enquote{Presuppose a prior moral judgment about the value of consequences}?
No, judgments of consequences may be used in judgments of consequences, 
but I see no reason to refer to the former as \emph{moral} judgments.
Here \emph{KE} is the \enquote{Knobe Effect,} namely,
\enquote{that actions leading to negative consequences are judged as being more intentional than otherwise similar actions leading to positive consequences.}
The term is named for Joshua Knobe, an \enquote{experimental philosopher} who earned his B.A. in 1996 and his Ph.D. in 2006.
The \enquote{Knobe Effect} was first observed in the \enquote{experiment} of asking people in Central Park the question above about a CEO.
I would say that the \enquote{Knobe Effect} results from our recognition of the importance of \emph{thought.}
If a bad thing happens that you did not intend,, perhaps you should have been more careful.
If a good thing happens that you did not intend, there is no reason to reward you over and above this.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
In the same way, \hlt{the 
theologian{\apo}s business is to understand, at least in some 
degree, the nature of God}{\smc} if he cannot claim to do 
this, he has no claim on our attention.  A hypothetical 
science, one which says, \enquote{These are the characteristics of 
matter, or number, or space, granted that such things 
really exist}---may be incomplete, but it is at any rate 
something{\smc} \hlt{a hypothetical philosophy or theology is 
not merely mutilated but destroyed}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{See Chapter VI,
\enquote{Philosophy as Categorical Thinking,} 
of \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method} \cite{Collingwood-EPM}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%

If we say to a scientist, \enquote{First prove to me that 
matter exists, and then I will hear what you have to say 
about it,} he will answer, \enquote{That is metaphysics, and I 
have nothing to do with it.}  But theology is already 
[\textbf{61}]
metaphysical through and through{\smc} so it would appear 
that when we say to a theologian \enquote{I must have proof 
that God exists before I can be expected to listen to 
your description of him,} the theologian is bound to 
supply the proof, and his science must stand still until 
he has done it. But this is at least not what theologians 
actually do{\smc} and though it may be replied that none 
the less they ought to do it, is the demand quite fair 
either to them or to the scientists{\qmk} 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) 
Physics proves the existence not of matter in the abstract, 
but of this or that kind of matter{\smc} 
this proof, in fact, is physics itself.}

The scorn with which the scientist utters the 
word \enquote{meta\-physics} shows that he does not think the 
worse of physics for refusing to embark upon the argu\-%
ments so entitled. And yet surely the physicist cannot 
suppose that it makes no difference to physics whether 
matter exists or not.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The physicist, or the physician, makes hypotheses\cln\
  \begin{quote}
just as a man, after plotting a number of
observations on squared paper, may summarize
their distribution by drawing a curve which repre\-%
sents their general tendency but need not pass
through a single one of the points actually plotted,
so the writer of a medical text-book may compose
the description of a standard case of a certain disease,
bearing in mind the varieties which cases referred
to that disease exhibit in clinical experience, but
not describing any case that he has ever actually
seen.  \cite[p.~119-20]{Collingwood-EPM}
  \end{quote}
\afterquote And yet the whole point of doing this
is their applicability to the world\cln\
\begin{quote}
  The
accurate observation and record of facts is most
necessary to empirical science{\smc} and the propositions
in which these facts are expressed are categorical\cln\
for example, that the patient{\apo}s temperature has been
this or that at such and such a time. And the appli\-%
cation of scientific knowledge to individual cases
involves another kind of categorical proposition\cln\ for
example, that the patient is suffering from tuber\-%
culosis.
\cite[p.~121]{Collingwood-EPM}
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Nor is it strictly true to say, as 
is often said, that he assumes matter to exist{\smc} that is to 
say, begs the metaphysical question in his own favour. 
His real position is quite different from this. \enquote{How 
can I prove the existence of a thing} (he might say) 
\enquote{whose nature is totally undefined{\qmk} Did Newton first 
prove to a mystified world the existence of fluxions, and 
only afterwards deign to explain what he meant by the 
word{\qmk} If you will listen to me and hear what I have 
got to say about matter, you can then go on to criticise 
it, that is, to ask whether the thing which I call matter 
really exists. But \hlt{this metaphysics, arguing about the 
reality or unreality of a thing you have never tried to 
describe, seems to me a waste of time}.}

\addsubsec{(\emph c) In the same way theology has to prove
not the existence of any and every God,
but of some particular God.}

\hlt{The theologian, I think, ought to put in the same 
plea}. A proof of the existence of God is all very well, 
but there are \enquote{Gods many,} if by God you understand 
whatever this or that man happens to mean by the word. 
Would a proof of the existence of God prove that 
Apollo and Hathor%%%%%
\footnoteB{\enquote{Ancient Egyptian goddess
who personified the principles of joy, feminine love, and motherhood}
(\emph{Wikipedia}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and Krishna and Mumbo Jumbo 
all existed\qmk\ and if so, what becomes of any religion, if 
every other is exactly as true{\qmk} Plainly, if the God of 
one religion exists, the God of a contradictory religion 
cannot exist{\smc} and the proof of one is the disproof of 
[\textbf{62}]
the other. Let us first determine what we mean by 
God, and then and only then we can profitably ask 
whether he exists. 

This second demand is more reasonable than the 
first{\smc} but \hlt{it still has one grave defect}. The determina\-%
tion of what I believe (about God or about anything 
else) is not a different thing from the question whether 
that belief is true. To believe a thing is to regard it 
as true{\smc} and to attach a meaning to a word, to believe 
that this and no other is the right meaning, is to assert 
that the thing which you so name exists, and exists in 
this form and no other. Nor can we escape this con\-%
clusion by quoting the time-honoured instance of the 
dragon, in which, it is supposed, we attach a meaning 
to a word without believing that the thing so named 
really exists{\smc} for \hlt{dragons do exist in Fairyland, and it 
is only in Fairyland that the word has any meaning}. 

To attach a meaning to a word, then, is to claim 
that this meaning is the right one\cln\ that is, that the 
thing whose name it is really exists, and that this is its 
actual nature. To distinguish between the question, 
\enquote{What do I mean by God\qmk}\ and the question, \enquote{Does 
God exist, and if so what is he like\qmk}\ is impossible, for 
the two questions are one and the same. It is, of 
course, possible to distinguish the meaning I attach to 
the word, or my conception of God, from another 
person{\apo}s meaning or conception{\smc} and it may be possible, 
comparing these two, to discover which is the better 
and to adopt it. But in any case, the statement of 
what we mean by God (or anything else) is not the 
mere expression of a \enquote{subjective idea} or of the \enquote{mean\-%
ing of a word} as distinct from the \enquote{nature of a thing.} 
It is already critical, so far as we have the power of 
making it so{\smc} it presupposes that we have reasons for 
believing that idea, that meaning, to be the right one. 

\hlt{Thus the proof of the existence of God is not 
something else without which theology is incomplete{\smc} 
it is theology itself}. The reasoned statement of the 
[\textbf{63}]
attributes of God is at the same time the proof that the 
God who has those attributes is the God who exists. 
Similarly, physics does not require to be supplemented 
by a metaphysical proof that matter exists{\smc} it already 
supplies that proof in the form of an answer to the 
question, \enquote{What conception of matter is the right 
conception{\qmk}} 

It may be objected to this way of putting it that 
the existence of matter in the one case and God in the 
other really has been dogmatically assumed\cln\ and that 
thus we are falling into the very error which we set out 
to avoid. This is not the case. The assumption that 
some form of matter exists is only an assumption if a 
meaning is already attached to the word matter{\smc} and 
since to supply the meaning is the function of physics, 
the word cannot mean anything at the outset. Actually, 
of course, this vacuum of meaning never exists, because 
the science is never at its absolute starting-point{\smc} each 
new scientist begins with the meaning conferred on the 
word by his predecessors. But does he therefore assume 
that matter exists in a form precisely corresponding to 
that meaning{\qmk} If so, it would indeed be a monstrous 
assumption. But he does not. If he did, he would 
not be a scientist. His whole function as a scientist is 
to ask whether the matter conceived by his predecessors 
exists at all. He may discover that their conception 
was radically false, in which case there is no limit to 
the degree of change which the meaning of the word 
\enquote{matter} will undergo in his hands. 

The answer to the question what we mean by the 
word God, then, is identical with that to the question 
whether God exists. \enquote{What do we mean by the word 
God\qmk}\ resolves itself into the question, \enquote{What is the 
right meaning to attach to the word\qmk}\ and that again 
is indistinguishable from the question, \enquote{What sort of 
God exists{\qmk}} To suppose that this doctrine rules out 
atheism is merely to misunderstand it{\smc} for \hlt{it might 
quite well be that the word God, like the word dragon},
[\textbf{64}]
\hlt{means something which exists only in the realm of the 
imagination}. 

It follows that we shall not begin by proving the 
existence of God, nor indeed offer any formal proof at 
all. But this is not because the existence of God 
cannot, in the nature of things, be proved. It is often 
maintained that ultimate truths are incapable of proof, 
and that the existence of God is such an ultimate truth. 
But I venture to suggest that \hlt{the impossibility of proof 
attaches not to ultimate truths as such, but only to the 
truths of \enquote{metaphysics} in the depreciatory sense of 
the word{\smc} to truths, that is, which have no definite 
meaning}. We cannot prove that Reality exists, not 
because the question is too \enquote{ultimate} (that is, because 
too much depends on it), but because it is too empty. 
Tell us what you mean by Reality, and we can offer an 
alternative meaning and try to discover which is the 
right one. No one can prove that God exists, if no 
definite significance is attached to the words{\smc} not 
because---as is doubtless the case---the reality of God 
transcends human knowledge, but because the idea of 
God which we claim to have is as yet entirely inde\-%
terminate. In the same way, we cannot prove or 
disprove the existence of matter until we know what 
sort of matter is meant{\smc} but something can certainly 
be done to prove the existence or non-existence of the 
matter of Democritus or Gassendi or Clerk Maxwell. 

I do not wish to imply that hesitation and diffidence 
are mistaken attitudes in which to approach these 
questions. \hlt{There is a false mys\-tery, which consists in 
the asking of unreasonable and unanswerable questions{\smc} 
but there is also a true mystery, which is to be found 
ev\-erywhere and supremely in that which is the centre 
and sum of all existence}. In approaching these hardest 
of all problems, only the most short-sighted will 
expect to find their full solution, and only the least 
discriminating will think at the end that he has found 
it. Herein lies the real ground for humility{\smc} not that 
[\textbf{65}]
our faculties exhaust themselves in a vain struggle to 
compass the unknowable, but that however well we do 
we have never done all we might or all we could{\smc} and 
are, after all, unprofitable servants of the supreme 
wisdom. 

\addsec{2. The traditional Theistic proofs\cln---}

The common charge of inconclusiveness brought 
against the traditional proofs of God{\apo}s existence is thus 
to a certain extent justified{\smc} for these proofs are, in 
their usual forms, isolated arguments, detached from 
any positive theology and attempting to demonstrate 
the existence of a God whose nature is very vaguely 
conceived. This fact is sometimes expressed by saying 
that they are purely negative. It would be better to 
say that they are highly abstract, and that a full state\-%
ment of any one of them would amount to the con\-%
struction of a complete theological metaphysic. No 
argument can be purely negative, for it is impossible to 
deny one principle except by asserting another, however 
little that other is explicitly developed. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) 
The are not the illicit product of thought in bondage to authority,
but serious philosophical arguments.}

But there is another charge often brought against 
these proofs, which relates less to their positive value 
than to the temper in which they are conceived. It 
is supposed that they are the fruit not of free specula\-%
tion but of an illicit union between dogmatism and 
philosophy, authority and criticism. They are believed 
to be typical of a benighted period when ecclesiastical 
tradition fixed not only the limits but the very con\-%
clusions of metaphysical thought{\smc} when reason was 
so debased as to submit to accepting its results blindly 
at the hands of an unquestioned dogmatism, and to 
demean itself to the task, apologetic in the worst sense, 
of bolstering up by sophistical ingenuity these un\-%
criticised beliefs. 

This view of the traditional proofs, though popular 
at the present time, is neither historical nor fully reason\-%
able. The Middle Ages were undoubtedly a period 
when the authority of the Church counted for much{\smc} 
but these proofs are so far from being typically medi{\ae}val 
[\textbf{66}]
that they run, in one form or another, through the 
whole of philosophy. If the history of speculation 
begins with Socrates, Socrates was the first person 
known to us who definitely formulated the \hlt{Argument 
from Design}{\smc} and Socrates was no blind supporter of 
dogma. The \hlt{Ontological proof}, first I believe clearly 
stated by the sceptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus in 
refutation of the reckless dogmatism of contemporary 
atheists, enters modern philosophy indeed with Anselm 
in the Middle Ages,%%%%%
\footnoteB{In the account of the Ontological Proof
in \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method,}
Collingwood does not mention Sextus, but says\cln\
\begin{quotation}
Plato had long ago laid it down that to be, and to
be knowable, are the same (\emph{Rep.}~476 \textsc e)%%%%%
\footnoteC{The passage in the \emph{Republic} is summed up in 
\cite[477 \textsc a, pp.~520--1]{Shorey-I}\cln\
\begin{quote}\centering
\grneo{<\gracute oti t`o m`en pantel~ws >`on pantel~ws gnwst\gracute on,
m`h >`on d`e mhdam~h| p\gracute anth| >\gracute agnwston}

that that which entirely \senquote{is} is entirely knowable,\\
and that which in no way \senquote{is} is in every way unknowable
\end{quote}
\afterquote---though here Socrates is \emph{asking} Glaucon
whether this has been established.}%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and, in
greater detail, that a thought cannot be a mere
thought, but must be a thought of something, and
of something real (\gr{>\gracute ontos}, \emph{Parm.}~132 \textsc b).%%%%% 
\footnoteC{Parmenides questions Socrates %\emph{Parmenides} 
\cite[132 \textsc{b--c}, p.~218]{Plato-Loeb-IV}\cln\
\begin{quotation}
\grneo{\enquote{T\gracute i o~>un\qmk}\ f\gracute anai, 
\enquote{<`en <\gracute ekast\gracute on >esti t~wn nohm\gracute atwn, n\gracute ohma d`e o>uden\gracute os\qmk}}

\grneo{\enquote{>All{\apo} >ad\gracute unaton,} e>ipe~in.}

\grneo{\enquote{>All`a tin\gracute os\qmk}}

\grneo{\enquote{Na\gracute i.}}

\grneo{\enquote{>\gracute Ontos >`h o>uk >\gracute ontos\qmk}}

\grneo{\enquote{>\gracute Ontos.}}
\end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The neo-%
Platonists had worked out the conception of God in
the metaphysical sense of the word---a being of whom
we can say \emph{est id quod est,} a unity of existence and
essence, a perfect being (\emph{pulcherrimum fortissimumque})
such that \emph{nihil deo melius excogitari queat} (the phrases
are from Boethius, \emph{De Trinitate}).

Anselm, putting these two thoughts together, the
original Platonic principle that when we really
think (but when do we really think, if ever\qmk)\ we
must be thinking of a real object, and the neo-Platonic
idea of a perfect being (something which we can\-%
not help conceiving in our minds{\smc} but does that
guarantee it more than a mere idea\qmk), or rather,
pondering on the latter thought until he rediscovered
the former as latent within it, realized that to think
of this perfect being at all was already to think of
him, or it, as existing.
\cite[p.~124]{Collingwood-EPM}
\end{quotation}
\afterquote Does this represent more advanced sholarship than in 
\emph{Religion and Philosophy}\qmk}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
but was not accepted by the orthodox 
scholastic tradition, and the recognition of its importance 
was left to Descartes in the full tide of the Renaissance. 
Since then it has never lost its place as one of the 
central problems of the theory of knowledge. The 
third traditional \hlt{proof, from the contingency or im\-%
perfection of the world} to some cause outside the 
world, is medi{\ae}val only because it was already Aristo\-%
telian, and Aristotle, whatever his shortcomings, cannot 
any more than Socrates be represented as an example 
of the priest-ridden intellect. 

The objection seems to consist in the notion that 
\hlt{a proof of some belief which is itself held on other 
grounds is illegitimate and insin\-cere}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I have heard reason denigrated with the assertion
that we use it to justify what we already want anyway.
But the fact is that reason can dissuade others and even ourselves
from doing what was originally wanted.
Collingwood will argue more{\cln}
Even if reason never dissuades, it is still worth pursuing.}
%%%%% 
Let us---so the 
notion runs---employ our reason in the discovery of 
new truths, not in the invention of proofs for truths, 
if truths they be, which we learnt from another source 
and shall continue to believe even if the proof breaks 
down. By the latter course we learn nothing new, 
even if it is successful{\smc} we only delude ourselves 
into mistaking the source from which our beliefs are 
derived. 

But \hlt{this objection will not stand examination}. In 
the first place,%%%%%
\footnoteB{The \enquote{second place}
seems to be considered in the next subsection, (\emph b).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
\hlt{it would apply with equal force to} the 
discovery of a proof in the case of, let us say, \hlt{a mathe\-%
matical theorem}{\smc} where we often see the thing to 
be true but cannot offer any proof of it. Here the 
discovery of a proof is subsequent to the existence of 
the belief, and the belief does not disappear if we fail 
[\textbf{67}]
to discover any proof at all. Why then is it desirable 
to prove the theorem{\qmk} 

First, perhaps, in order to make sure that our 
original conviction was not a mere error. If we never 
tested our first impressions by such means, the mistakes 
of which we make quite enough already would be 
indefinitely multiplied. Secondly, in order that by 
means of the proof we may impart our conviction to 
persons less gifted than ourselves with the faculty of 
mathematical intuition. And thirdly, because in dis\-%
covering the proof we really do attain new knowledge. 
Even if we do no more than make explicit the steps 
by which our mind leapt to its first conclusion, 
knowledge of our mental processes is gained{\smc} and, 
moreover, no proof can be constructed without discover\-%
ing new facts about the relation of this theorem to 
other things which we already knew. And the dis\-%
covery that one truth necessitates another is a discovery 
worth making. 

\enquote{The parallel,} it may be said, \enquote{is unfair. The 
discovery of a proof is in this case valuable precisely 
because it is homogeneous with the original intuition. 
Each was an example of mathematical thinking, and 
therefore each bears on and is relevant to the other. 
But the belief in the existence of God is not the fruit 
of the same kind of thought as the formal proof of 
his existence. The one is passively taken on authority, 
the other critically constructed by the reason.} 

\hlt{Authority does enter largely into the formation of 
all our beliefs}, not excluding those of religion. But it 
is not peculiar to religion. \hlt{Even in mathematics}, a 
surveyor, an astronomer, a navigator uses countless 
formul{\ae} which he has never proved and never dreams 
of testing. In science, the learner takes a vast pro\-%
portion of his beliefs on the authority of his teacher or 
the writer of his handbook. It would be strange if in 
religion alone there were no place for authority. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Their method is reasonable and inevitable.}

And it is doubtless true that there is a distinction 
[\textbf{68}]
between believing a thing because one is told it by an 
expert, and believing it because one has been into the 
evidence for oneself. It is precisely the distinction 
between the man in the street and the original investi\-%
gator, philosopher, physicist, mathematician, or whatever 
he may be. But the objection which we are consider\-%
ing puts a peculiar interpretation on this distinction. 
Because a man has once been a learner, it maintains, he 
cannot become an independent investigator unless he 
first forgets what he has learnt. If he attempts to philo\-%
sophise about God, he must first cease to believe in 
his existence. But is this reasonable{\qmk}  Must we cele\-%
brate the beginning of our research into a subject by 
denying all we have been taught about it{\qmk} \enquote{Not 
perhaps by denying, but certainly by questioning.}
Yes, no doubt\cln\ by asking whether we do believe\cln\ 
and, if we find we still do, by asking why we believe. 
Philosophy may start as well from one place as from 
another\cln\ and \hlt{the fact that a man does actually believe 
in the existence of God, or of his fellow-man, or of an 
external material world, is no barrier to his becoming 
a philosopher}. The modern \enquote{broad-minded} critic 
would have him dissimulate these convictions, if he 
cannot get rid of them{\smc} and maintains that to come 
on the field with opinions ready made is to be hopelessly 
prejudiced. But the alternative, to come on the field 
with no opinions at all, is unfortunately impossible. It 
does not matter where you start, but you must start 
somewhere{\smc} and \hlt{to begin by making a clean sweep of 
all your beliefs} is only to deprive yourself of all material 
on which to work. Or rather, since the feat can never 
be really accomplished, it \hlt{is to put yourself at the mercy 
of those surreptitious beliefs and assumptions which your 
broom has left lurking in the darker corners}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{philosophy}%
Are we not \emph{always} at their mercy{\qmk}
Recognizing their existence leaves us less at their mercy.
I wonder how clearly Collingwood now recognizes the principle
that he will state in \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method}\cln
\begin{quote}
[I]n a philo\-%
sophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to
discover something of which until now we have been
ignorant, but to know better something which in
some sense we knew already{\smc} not to know it better
in the sense of coming to know more about it, but
to know it better in the sense of coming to know it
in a different and better way---actually instead of
potentially, or explicitly instead of implicitly, or in
whatever terms the theory of knowledge chooses to
express the difference\cln\ the difference itself has been
a familiar fact ever since Socrates pointed it out.
\cite[p.~11]{Collingwood-EPM}

[T]here is
in philosophy no such thing as a transition from
sheer ignorance to sheer knowledge, but only a pro\-%
gress in which we come to know better what in some
sense we know already. It follows from this that
when we discover a new truth we recognize it as
something which we have always known{\smc} and that
when we are still in pursuit of such a truth we know
already, if we understand the nature of philosophical
thought, that [\emph{sic}] we are only relatively and not abso\-%
lutely ignorant of it.
\cite[pp.~105--6]{Collingwood-EPM}
\end{quote}
\afterquote(See note \ref{bio-eth}, page \pageref{bio-eth}.)
Can a young person embrace this principle{\qmk}
I did not go to St John{\apo}s College to find out what \emph I thought,
but to find out what other people like Plato thought.
In reading there the \emph{Meditations} of Descartes \cite{Cress}, 
I did sense that he was \emph{not} 
proving the existence of God
the way one would prove the existence of the planet Neptune{\smc}
he was proving that we cannot help but believe.
It might have been useful to see this idea made explicit.
I was often mystified 
because my ultimate standard of proof was mathematics.
Aristotle said there were four causes.
Why four{\qmk}  Why not, say, six, or some other number{\qmk}
I should have understood that 
four just happened to be the number that he had collected in his observations,
as one might identify four kinds of conifers on a nature walk.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

We are dealing not with abstract ideals, but with 
the ways and means of ordinary life and everyday 
thinking. No actual man can ever claim that his mind 
is, thanks to his sedulous avoidance of prejudice, a 
[\textbf{69}] 
perfect and absolute blank as regards the matter he 
proposes to investigate. \hlt{There is only one course open 
to any critic\cln\ to discover what he actually does think, 
and then to find out, if he can, whether his first idea 
was just or not{\smc} that is, to prove it or to disprove it}. 
Systematic scepticism is the essence of all philosophy 
and all science{\smc} but scepticism, if it means pretending 
not to entertain convictions which in fact one finds 
inevitable, soon passes over into systematic falsehood. 

Bearing in mind, then, that the preliminary state\-%
ment of belief must be already, to some extent, critical, 
we can see that the method of argument to which ex\-%
ception was taken is not only inevitable in practice, 
but theoretically sound. The kind of thinking which 
accepts truths on authority is not \enquote{passive,} not funda\-%
mentally distinct from that which criticises every step 
in detail. The authority is not accepted without some 
reason, and the fact that it is accepted does not in\-%
capacitate us from analysing the reasons for acceptance 
and from discovering further reasons. 

\addsec{3. Scheme of the remaining Chapters of Part II.}

This may serve to explain the scheme of the re\-%
maining chapters of this book. We shall not formally 
lay down the Christian, or any other, theory of God and 
then attempt to prove it either in itself or against alter\-%
natives. This would be both wearisome and artificial{\smc} 
for the exposition cannot be separated from the criticism. 
Neither shall we attempt a metaphysical construction, 
free from all presuppositions, which should demonstrate 
\emph{a priori} the truth of the Christian theology{\smc} for this 
would entail the same arbitrary separation of the two 
things, even if it were not setting ourselves an initial 
task far beyond our power. 

I intend rather to state as simply as possible certain 
beliefs concerning God and the world which are at 
least central to the Christian theology, and then to 
examine certain alternatives to these, or objections 
alleged against them, which are familiar to modern 
readers. In this way it may be possible to develop in 
[\textbf{70}]
the following three chapters a general view of the 
nature of God{\smc} and in the remaining part I shall apply 
the results so obtained to some problems which, I 
imagine, would be commonly described as belonging 
less to metaphysics than to theology. The distinction 
between these two spheres, however, must not be 
insisted upon. The problem of the Incarnation is 
simply that of the true nature of man and his relation 
to the absolute spirit{\smc} the Atonement presents in theo\-%
logical terms the purely ethical question of the relation 
between the good will and the bad{\smc} and the problem 
of Miracle is not in the last resort to be distinguished 
from that of the freedom of the will. 

The points I wish to examine in this part are as 
follows. Christian theology regards God as spirit, 
exercising creative power, however conceived, over the 
world of matter. This material world is supposed truly 
to exist, that is, to be no mere illusion\cln\ but yet to be 
not self-existent but to depend for its existence and 
nature on will. This view brings it into conflict with 
materialism, which regards matter as self-existent and 
indeed as the only true reality. This antithesis will 
form the subject of the next chapter. 

Secondly, God is conceived as a person{\smc} but a 
person not exclusively related to other persons. His 
spirit---his mind---may enter into, may become an 
element of, indeed the very self of, a given human 
mind. And this is attained without loss of freedom or 
individuality on the part of that human mind. This 
paradox is in conflict with the popular view of person\-%
ality as always exclusive and independent, which makes 
every person absolutely self-contained and autonomous\cln\ 
and the distinction between the Christian and this latter 
or individualistic theory of personality will be discussed 
in Chapter III. 

Thirdly, God is perfectly good and yet, as omnipo\-%
tent, he is the ruler or creator of a universe in which 
good and bad exist side by side. Christianity can give 
[\textbf{71}] 
up neither of these doctrines{\smc} it is equally hostile to a 
theism which restricts God{\apo}s power, that is, makes him 
only one of a number of limited or finite beings, for 
the sake of preserving his goodness, and to a pantheism 
which denies his goodness in the interest of his infini\-%
tude. This dilemma must be faced to the best of our
ability in Chapter IV. 

These three inquiries do not exhaust even the lead\-%
ing points and difficulties in the Christian conception 
of God{\smc} but they are enough to take us into the 
most perilous regions of metaphysics, where the angelic 
doctors fear to tread. The problem of matter has 
hardly yet been settled by the advance of philosophy\cln\ 
that of personality is the subject of continual con\-%
troversy\cln\ and that of evil is often given up as in\-%
soluble. We cannot expect to achieve at best more 
than a partial solution of the infinite questions which 
these problems raise\cln\ and that not only because philo\-%
sophy still has far to go, but because it is the nature 
of truth to present itself under infinite aspects and to 
offer an endless variety of problems where at first only 
one is seen. 

\mychap{II}{Matter}

\hlt{\textsc{Popular} metaphysic distinguishes two categories}%%%%%
\footnoteB{\enquote{Categories} is the \emph{mot juste}
in its etymological sense.
A \grneo{kathgor\gracute ia} is not a class,
but an accusation or predicate\cln\ 
what something is called.
The LSJ lexicon \cite{LSJ} cites Herodotus 6.50{\smc}
here are excerpts from 6.48--50
in the Loeb translation of Godley \cite{Herodotus-Loeb}
(as presented by the Perseus Project)\cln
\begin{quote}
  Then Darius attempted to learn whether the Greeks intended to wage war against him or to surrender themselves\lips
Among the islanders who gave earth and water to Darius were the Aeginetans. 
The Athenians immediately came down upon them for doing this\lips 
they went to Sparta and there \emph{accused} (\grneo{kathg\gracute oreon})
the Aeginetans of acting to betray Hellas. 
Regarding this \emph{accusation} (\grneo{t`hn kathgor\gracute ihn}), 
Cleomenes son of Anaxandrides, king of Sparta, 
crossed over to Aegina intending to arrest the most culpable of its people.
\end{quote}
\afterquote The abstract noun \grneo{kathgor\gracute ia} 
derives from \grneo{kat\gracute hgoros} \enquote{accuser,}
which Chantraine describes as \enquote{le plus usuel}
of compounds whose second element
\foreignlanguage{polutonikogreek}{-\=agoros}%%%%%
\footnoteC{\label{gfs}%
It seems the Greek Font Society fonts
do not allow the macron to be put on the alpha here{\smc}
so I use the default \LaTeX\ Greek font here.
Chantraine observes also that the initial vowel,
whether alpha or eta, is long.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
or \mbox{\grneo{-hgoros}}
seems to come from a masculine version, \grneo{>\gracute agoros}, 
of the usual feminine \grneo{>agor\gracute a}.
These compounds
\enquote{ne se r\aigu ef\aigu erent jamais au sens de rassembler,
mais \`a la valeur secondaire de parler} \cite[Tome I, p.\ 13]{Chantraine}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\hlt{of
reality, mind and matter}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{We say things are mind or matter.
This does not mean that we \emph{classify}
every object in the universe as mind or matter,
the way Linnaeus classified everything as animal, vegetable, or mineral.
We just make distinctions, as in the saying,
\enquote{Sticks and stones may break my bones,
but names can never hurt me.}} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Mind is a reality whose
qualities are thought, will, and so forth{\smc} it is not
extended over space or divisible into parts. Matter,
on the other hand, occupies space, and is homogeneously
subdivisible into smaller parts{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{We may ask how important this homogeneous subdivisibility is to the conception of matter.
Collingwood will address it on page \pageref{atomic}.
Since ultimately the distinction between mind and matter will be untenable{\smc}
we cannot now give them precise definitions.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
it has no consciousness
of itself as mind has,%%%%%
\footnoteB{In high school I wrote a short story in which a rock in space
achieved consciousness by burning up in the Earth\apo s atmosphere,
falling over a field as dust,
being incorporated into a crop of wheat, 
and thus becoming part of some bread eaten by a boy,
who then remembered having seen the meteor.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
nor can it originate any train
of events of its own free will. Mind is active, and
acts according to its volitions{\smc} matter is passive, and
the changes in its condition, all of which are forms of
motion, must be brought about either by the influence
of other portions of matter, or by that of mind.
\hlt{Matter is thus subject to the law of causation},%%%%%
\footnoteB{In \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
Chapter XXXIII, \enquote{Causation in Kantian Philosophy,}
Collingwood will attribute to Kant this law of causation,
saying of Kant, \enquote{he meant to traverse the Newtonian distinction 
between events due to the operation of causes 
and events due to the operation of laws} \cite[pp.\ 328--9]{Collingwood-EM}.
See below \S2, (\emph b), page \pageref{subsect:paradox}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
the\label{causation}
law that whatever happens has a cause, external to
itself, which determines it to happen in this way and
in no other. This law of causation does not apply
to mind, whose changes of state are initiated freely
from within,%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{within}%
One might object that \enquote{from within} refers to space,
which matter occupies, not mind.
One might replace the phrase with \enquote{by itself.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
in the form of acts of will. These acts
of will may influence matter, but they cannot alter or
in any way affect the operation of the laws which
govern the movements of matter.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The whole paragraph has been an elaboration
of the \enquote{popular} view,
not (necessarily) Collingwood\apo s,
though a careless or superficial reader might not notice this.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

The importance of this distinction from our
point of view is that \hlt{most religions, and notably
Christianity}, teach a metaphysic different from this.
They \hlt{hold that whatever happens in the world is
brought about not by automatic causation but by
the free activity of one or more spirits}{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{automatic}%
Why \enquote{automatic}{\qmk}
The word derives from the Greek adjective \gr{a>ut\gracute omatos}
\enquote{self-moved}{\smc} but it comes to mean almost the opposite:
moving, but not of itself.
The \emph{OED} gives four senses of \enquote{automatic,}
the latter three being close to one another,
but quite different from the first or \enquote{literal} sense:
\begin{quote}
  \begin{asparaenum}[\bfseries 1.]
    \item
\emph{lit.} Self-acting, having the power of motion or action within itself.
\item
Self-acting under conditions fixed for it, going of itself.
Applied \emph{esp.}\ to machinery and its movements,
which produce results otherwise done by hand, or which simulate human or animal action, as an \senquote{automatic mouse.}
\item
Of animal actions{\cln}
Like those of mechanical automatons{\smc}
not accompanied by volition or consciousness, \senquote{mechanical.}
\item
Not characterized by active intelligence{\smc}
merely mechanical.
  \end{asparaenum}
\end{quote}
\afterquote The earliest illustrative quotations 
are respectively from 1812, 1802, 1748, and 1843{\smc}
those for the first sense are particularly instructive:
\begin{quote}
  \textbf{1812} \textsc{Sir H. Davy} \emph{Chem.\ Philos.}\ 180
In the universe, nothing can be said to be automatic.
\textbf{1876} \textsc{Foster} \emph{Phys.}\ (1879) Introd.\ 2
We may therefore speak of the am\oe ba as being irritable and automatic.
(\emph{Note} Automatic\lips 
has recently acquired a meaning 
almost exactly opposite to that which it originally bore, 
and an automatic action is now by many understood 
to mean nothing more than an action produced by some machinery or other.  
In this work I use it in the older sense, as denoting an action of a body, 
the causes of which appear to lie in the body itself.
\end{quote}
\afterquote
The first quotation for the third sense does not seem to fit the latter part of that sense:
\begin{quote}
  \textbf{1748} \textsc{Hartley} \emph{Observ.\ Man} \textsc i. Introd., 
The motions are called automatic 
from their Resemblance to the Motions of Automata, or Machines, 
whose Principle of Motion is within themselves.
\end{quote}
\afterquote
Can there be a principle of motion within oneself 
that is not properly described as volition?  
What does \enquote{within oneself} mean?
See note \ref{within}.
Meanwhile, presumably by \enquote{automatic causation}
Collingwood means mechanical causation.
See page \pageref{spontaneous}, note \ref{spontaneous}
for the ambiguity of \enquote{spontaneous.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and conse-
[\textbf{73}]
quently they place mind not side by side with matter
as a co-ordinate reality but above it. On the other
hand, \hlt{materialism reverses this order}, ascribes every\-%
thing to the operation of matter, or causation, and
denies to spirit any arbitrament in the course of the
world{\apo}s history.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{drugs}It would seem to be materialism in this sense
to treat spiritual problems like depression
as bodily diseases, to be treated with drugs.
See for example James Davies, \emph{Cracked{\cln}
Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm than Good} \cite{Davies}.
Thus the considerations of the present chapter
are of the utmost practical importance.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We have thus three hypotheses
before us. Either the world is entirely material, or it
is entirely spiritual, or it is a compound of the two.
When it is said that the world is \enquote{entirely} material
or spiritual it is not meant that the phenomena
commonly described as mind or matter are simply
illusory{\smc} it is of course allowed that they exist, but
they are explained in such a way as to reduce them
to the position of instances of the opposite principle.
Thus materialism will admit the existence of thought,
but will try to explain it as a kind of mechanism{\smc} the
opposite theory (which for the sake of convenience I
shall call idealism)%%%%%%%%%%%
\footnoteA{This sense of the word must be carefully distinguished from Idealism as a
theory of knowledge. The former, concerned with the antithesis between mind and
matter, has no connexion whatever with the latter, which concerns the quite
different antithesis of subject and object, and is opposed not to Materialism but to
Realism.%%%%%
\footnoteC{Here is the Realist-Idealist classification of philosophers
that would become annoying to Collingwood,
as seen in the 1935 correspondence with Ryle
appended to the 1998 edition of \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method} 
\cite[pp.\ 255--6]{Collingwood-EPM}\cln
\begin{quote}
I am afraid that your very first paragraph
gives me some uneasiness. You speak of \senquote{the point
of view which I represent}, and thus attach me
to a certain school of thought. You then say what
this school is{\smc} but, very oddly to my mind, you
qualify your ascription of myself to it by the word
\senquote{presumably}. You say I am \senquote{presumably to be clas\-%
sified, for what such labels are worth, as an
Idealist}. This puzzles me completely. \senquote{For what
such labels are worth.} If not worth much, why use
them? If worth a good deal, why this apology?
Then, \senquote{presumably}. Why make any presumptions
at all? Why not see what a man\apo s views \emph{are}, before
deciding to what class (if for some obscure reason
you \emph{must} classify them) you shall refer them? And
if (though I don\apo t understand the need) you feel
this urge strong upon you, why presume me an
Idealist? I have nowhere in this essay or any other
publication or lecture so described myself, and I do
not see why you should attach the label to me
without giving some reason. I am afraid I resent
both the label and the irresponsible manner of
attaching it. In point of fact, I was brought up as
a Cook--Wilsonian Realist (we \emph{did} use \emph{that} label,
freely, before the war) and since rebelling against
that creed I have been working towards a position
based on what is, for me, almost an axiom (evidently
not for you), that the old dichotomy of Idealist-%
Realist is as out of date in philosophy as the
Gilbertian Liberal-Conservative in politics.
\end{quote}
}%%%
%%%%%%%
}
will admit the existence of
mechanism, but will try to describe it in such a way
that its operation is seen to be a form of spiritual
activity.


\addsec{1. The dualism of Matter and Mind{\cln}---}\label{mm}

Of these three alternatives we shall begin by
examining the most popu\-lar{\smc} that is to say, the
\hlt{dualism}%%%%%
\footnoteB{The term \enquote{dualism}
for \enquote{popular metaphysic}
(presently to be called \enquote{plain man\apo s metaphysic})
was not used in the introductory paragraph.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
which regards the world as composed of two
different and clearly-distinguishable things, mind and
matter. This theory, or some theory of the kind,
may be described as the \hlt{plain man{\apo}s metaphysic}. And
as such, it \hlt{has all the strength and all the weakness
of an uncritical view}. It is not led by a desire for
unity, illegitimately satisfied, to neglect or deny one
class of fact because it seems irreconcilable with
another.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The treatment of spiritual problems as bodily problems,
mentioned in note \ref{drugs},
might be seen as the illegitimate result of a desire for unity.
Compare Ethan Watters,
\enquote{The Americanization of Mental Illness}
\cite{Watters}:
\begin{quotation}
\noindent All cultures struggle with intractable mental illnesses with varying degrees of
compassion and cruelty, equanimity and fear. Looking at ourselves through the eyes of those
living in places where madness and psychological trauma are still embedded in complex
religious and cultural narratives, however, we get a glimpse of ourselves as an increasingly
insecure and fearful people. Some philosophers and psychiatrists have suggested that we are
investing our great wealth in researching and treating mental illness---medicalizing ever
larger swaths of human experience---because we have rather suddenly lost older belief
systems that once gave meaning and context to mental suffering.

If our rising need for mental-health services does indeed spring from a breakdown of
meaning, our insistence that the rest of the world think like us may be all the more
problematic. 
\end{quotation}
\afterquote
Those \enquote{lost older belief systems} 
might represent the strength of the \enquote{plain man\apo s metaphysic.}
James Davies \cite[p.\ 273]{Davies} quotes Sue Bailey,
president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists,
on the desire for a treatment of mental problems
that is unified with the treatment of bodily problems\cln
\begin{quote}
The risk [of challenging the medical model]
is that we end up without a voice for mental health\lips
mental disorder is still not recognized by the United Nations
and World Health Organization as a non-communicable disease
[i.e.\ as a serious medical illness like heart disease,
diabetes, or cancer].
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The temper which gives every fact its full
weight is necessary to any one who pretends to scientific
thought{\smc} but it is one-sided and dangerous to the
[\textbf{74}]
truth unless balanced by its apparent opposite, the
determination to draw the right conclusions from
premisses even if these conclusions seem to contradict
the facts. \hlt{Faith in facts}---the belief that every fact,
if correctly observed, has its own unique value%%%%%
\footnoteB{Facts are not just \enquote{there}{\smc}
to mean anything, they must be \emph{observed} as being there,
and they must be \emph{believed in} as having value.}%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
---\hlt{is not
really antithetical, but rather identical, with} the \hlt{faith
in reason} which believes that any rightly-drawn in\-%
ference is as true, as much knowledge of reality, as the
observed fact from which it started. It is a common
mistake to imagine that the philosopher who says,
\enquote{This fact is incompatible with my theory, and there\-%
fore my theory is probably wrong,} is superior in
intellectual honesty to him who says, \enquote{This fact is
incompatible with my theory, and therefore I must
ask whether it \emph{is} a fact.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{swan2}%
See note \ref{NL:sci-per}, page \pageref{NL:sci-per},
for similar examples from \emph{New Leviathan.}
Or just consider the notion that a theory can only be disproved,
as for example the theory that all swans are white is disproved by the fact of a black swan.
Collingwood mentioned the swan example on page \pageref{swan}.
I note it too in the \emph{Wikipedia} article \enquote{Falsifiability,}
for which a key reference is Karl Popper, \emph{The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (1934).

In the summer of 1986, before my senior year at St John\apo s College in Santa Fe,
I worked with Hans von Briesen, Director of Laboratories, to edit the Junior Laboratory Manual,
and at some point we inserted
(or Hans inserted, and I approved) a statement like, 
\enquote{observation can only disprove an hypothesis.}
This was questioned by Peter Pesic, the original author of the manual.
Hans then realized that an observation \enquote{disproving} a long-held theory
would probably be questioned before the theory itself.
I do not recall his example, if any{\smc}
but I think of the Millikan Oil Drop Experiment, which the seniors would be performing.
If we could not find the accepted value of the charge on an electron,
we would never think the accepted value was wrong, much less that the atomic theory was wrong\cln\
we would question the care, and the equipment, with which we had performed the experiment.

In \enquote{Cargo Cult Science,}
a commencement address at Caltech in 1974,
Richard Feynman complains that researchers after Millikan had too much faith in Millikan\apo s own work,
and did not trust their own values for the electronic charge unless they were close to Millikan\apo s{\smc}
and this is why it took longer than necessary to find the correct value, 
since Millikan \enquote{had the incorrect value for the viscosity of air} \cite[p.\ 342]{Feynman-Joking}.
But if you find a value for the electronic charge that is far from Millikan\apo s,
and then you redo the experiment with what you think is more care,
and you find a value closer to Millikan\apo s,
it seems reasonable that you should publish the latter.
Perhaps you should also mention the former too, 
if only as being obtained from sloppy work{\smc}
but you will not publish your whole life story, 
just in case it provides a clue about the trustworthiness of your work.

\enquote{We\apo ve learned those tricks nowadays,} says Feynman,
\begin{quotation}
\noindent and now do don\apo t have that kind of disease.

But this long history of learning how to not fool ourselves---%
of having utter scientific integrity---is, I\apo m sorry to say, something
that we haven\apo t specifically included in any particular course that
I know of.  We just hope you\apo ve caught on by osmosis.

The first principle is that you must not fool yourself---and you
are the easiest person to fool.  So you have to be very careful
about that.  After you\apo ve not fooled yourself, it\apo s easy not to fool
other scientists.  You just have to be honest in a conventional way
after that.
\end{quotation}
\afterquote Feynman\apo s example has warned of the danger of fooling yourself into thinking your observations are wrong
and do \emph{not} disprove theory{\smc} 
but the complementary kind of fooling is also possible (observes Collingwood)
and must also be guarded against.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The only true intellectual
honesty would lie in putting both these points of
view at once. This may seem a truism{\smc} but \hlt{there
is a real danger of treating \enquote{facts} with so much
respect that we fail to inquire} into their credentials,
and \hlt{into the fine distinction between observed fact
and inferred or imagined implication}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Collingwood is at pains to establish a delicate balance{\smc}
and this must be because something is out of balance.
Apparently he sees that \enquote{facts} are given too much respect\cln\
to show this, the very word is put in quotes,
as if to say that facts improperly understood
in relation to their implications are not really facts.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

The plain man{\apo}s dualism, then, seems to be an
example of one half of this attitude without the other.
It shows a genuine desire to do justice to all the facts,
but fails to supply them with that interrelation apart
from which it is hardly yet a theory at all. In other
words, \hlt{the plain man{\apo}s dualism is always conscious of
an unsolved problem}, the problem of \hlt{the relation of
mind and matter}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Why must dualism be \emph{conscious} of this problem?}%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and this problem is not a mere
by-product of the theory, not a detail whose final
settlement is of comparatively small importance{\smc} it \emph{is}
the theory itself. \hlt{Until some solution of the problem
has been suggested, the dualistic theory has never been
formulated}. For that theory cannot be the mere
statement that there are two things, mind and matter{\smc}
to be a theory, it must offer some account of the way
in which they are related{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Here Collingwood appeals to the 
\enquote{fundamental axiom of all thinking,} 
stated in the last chapter of the book
(p.\ \pageref{fund-ax}):
\enquote{whatever exists stands in some 
definite relation to the other things that exist.}
But to say that there are \emph{two} things is to say that,
insofar as they are two, they are unrelated\cln\
is this not a theory{\qmk}
Perhaps it does not matter, 
since mind and matter are obviously related,
as Collingwood will observe in (\emph b), page \pageref{(b)inter},
and so they are \emph{not} two in the absolute sense just suggested.
In any case, Collingwood will presently acknowledge, 
in (\emph a), page \pageref{(a)use},
that an incomplete theory
can still be useful.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
and that is just what it
seldom if ever does.
[\textbf{75}]

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Not satisfactory as a working hypothesis.}\label{(a)use}

But a theory which has not solved all its
difficulties---even one which has not solved the most
elementary and conspicuous of them---may still be
practically useful,%%%%% 
\footnoteB{I take this observation 
to be the reason for the development of so-called paraconsistent logic.
Infinitesimal calculus was useful from the beginning,
though it had not solved the difficulty of explaining what an infinitesimal was.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and may indeed contain a certain
amount of philosophical truth. It remains to be seen,
therefore, whether dualism has these advantages. In
the first place, it may be represented as a working
hypothesis, if no more{\smc} a method of classifying the
sciences and of distinguishing two broad types---%
sciences of matter and sciences of mind. Such a
distinction is a matter of convenience, whether it does
or does not represent a metaphysical truth{\smc} and we
must ask whether from this point of view the dis\-%
tinction is of value.

Considered as a working hypothesis, it is almost
painfully evident that the distinction between matter
and mind does not work. \hlt{The division of sciences
into those of mind and those of matter does not give
satisfaction to the practical scientist}{\smc} it baulks and
hinders, rather than helps, his actual work.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This may indeed be correct for the \enquote{practical scientist,}
as Collingwood presently shows.
However, in \emph{New Leviathan} \cite{Collingwood-NL},
he himself will distinguish between sciences of \emph{body} 
and sciences of mind (see also note \ref{NL:def},
page \pageref{NL:def}{\smc} Collingwood will mention the body
on pages \pageref{body} and \pageref{body2})\cln
\begin{quotation}
\textbf{1.\ 3.}
Man\apo s body is made of \emph{matter}
and the study of man\apo s body belongs to that group of studies
which are concerned with \enquote{the material world}\cln\
what are called the natural sciences.

\textbf{1.\ 31.}
To say that, separately considered,
the several parts of man\apo s body are \enquote{matter}
is to say that they behave according to laws
investigated by physicists and scientists\lips

\textbf{2.\ 43.}
For man\apo s body and man\apo s mind are not two different things.
They are one and the same thing,
man himself, as known in two different ways.

\textbf{2.\ 44.}
Not a part of man, but the whole of man,
is body in so far as he approaches the problem of self-knowledge
by the methods of natural science.

\textbf{2.\ 45.}
Not a part of man, but the whole of man,
is mind in so far as he approaches the problem of self-knowledge
by expanding and clarifying the data of reflection.
\end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
A few
examples will perhaps make this clear.

If we take the case of biology, we find a remarkable
instance of an entire province of knowledge claimed on
the one hand by mechanists in the name of the material
sciences, and on the other by vitalists old and new in
the interest of the sciences of mind. The former point
out that the essence of all vital functions is contained in
the facts studied by bio-physics and bio-chemistry, and
they further maintain that there is no ultimate distinc\-%
tion between bio-physics or bio-chemistry and physics
or chemistry in general{\smc} material substances are not
absolved from the operation of their normal laws
because for the time being they happen to be parts of
an organism. The vitalists, on the other hand, assert
that no kind of machine whose operation was limited
by the nexus of cause and effect could possibly behave
as a living body\label{body} behaves. We are not concerned to
ask which side is in the right{\smc} the point is merely that
[\textbf{76}]
to the question \enquote{Is an organism mind or matter{\qmk}}
biologists have no unanimous answer ready. And this
is enough to show that the methods actually used in
biology, the existence and progress of the science, do
not absolutely depend on an answer being given. That
is to say, the practical scientist so far from finding
dualism a help to his work finds that it creates new
difficulties, and therefore he simply ignores it.

A still more curious case is that of empirical psycho\-%
logy, where the functions of the mind itself are treated
by methods which have been developed in connexion
with the sciences of matter. Mind, according to these
methods, is treated exactly as if it were matter{\smc} and
psychologists claim that by these methods they have
solved or can solve problems with which the philosophy
of mind has for ages grappled in vain.

\begin{sloppypar}
We need not ask whether these claims are justified{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{See page \pageref{psychology2} and note \ref{psychology2}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
whether psychology is, as some believe, a new and
brilliantly successful method of determining the true
nature of mind, or whether as others maintain it is only
an old fallacy in a new guise. It is enough for our
present purpose to point out that it exists%%%%%
\footnoteB{That is, empirical psychology exists.}%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} that the
distinction proposed by dualism as a working hypothesis
is not actually accepted as helpful by the scientific men
for whose benefit it is propounded.
\end{sloppypar}

Nor is it possible for dualism to step in and prevent
these things, by compelling each method to keep to its
own side of the line and prosecute trespassers. The
difficulty is that \hlt{the distinction between mind and
matter}, which seems so clear to the plain man, \hlt{vanishes
precisely according to his increase of knowledge about
either}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{NL:def}%
This is echoed in \emph{New Leviathan}\cln
  \begin{quotation}
\textbf{1.\ 4.}
Some reader may think it strange to define matter in terms of physics and chemistry (1.\ 31)
and life in terms of physiology (1.\ 35){\smc}
and may think it better to define physics and chemistry in terms of matter,
and physiology in terms of life.

\textbf{1.\ 41.}
\senquote{Physics and chemistry}, he may say,
\senquote{is the Science of Matter{\smc}
and everyone knows what matter is.
Physiology is the Science of Life{\smc}
and everyone knows what life is.}

\textbf{1.\ 42.}
Egregious blunder{\expt}
A beginner in physics and chemistry does not know what matter is,
and if thinks he does it is the duty of his teacher to disabuse him{\smc}
but he knows what physics or chemistry is{\smc}
it is the stuff in this red text-book,
or the stuff old So-and-so teaches,
or the stuff we have on Tuesday mornings.
  \end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Until he has studied physics, physiology, psycho\-%
logy, he thinks he knows the difference{\smc} but as soon
as he comes to grips with the thing, he is compelled to
alter his opinion. The plain man in fact bases his
dualism on a claim to knowledge far more sweeping
than that made by any scientist, and indeed the know\-%
ledge which the plain man claims seems actually to
[\textbf{77}]
contradict the scientist{\apo}s most careful and mature
judgment.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{NL:sci-per}The plain man\apo s claim to knowledge
may lead to the \enquote{scientific persecution}
discussed in \emph{New Leviathan}\cln
\begin{quotation}
\textbf{1.\ 5.}
To think that physics or chemistry ought to be defined in terms of matter
or physiology in terms of life
is more than an egregious blunder{\smc}
it is a threat to the existence of science\lips

\textbf{1.\  53.}
It implies that,
if anything scientists imagine themselves to have discovered about matter or life
or what not is inconsistent with anything contained or implied in this non-scientific and pre-scientific knowledge,
the scientists have made a mistake.

\textbf{1.\ 54.}
It implies that, if they have made the mistake by using
(for example) experimental methods,
it is experimental methods that are at fault
and must be abandoned\lips

\textbf{1.\ 57.}
At one blow, by enunciating the apparently harmless proposition
that physics or chemistry is the science of matter,
physiology the science of life, or the like,
we have evoked the whole apparatus of \emph{scientific persecution}{\smc}
I mean the persecution of scientists for daring to be scientists.

\textbf{1.\ 58.}
In whose interest is such a persecution carried on{\qmk}\lips
The actual beneficiary has always been \emph{obsolete science.}
\end{quotation}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Interaction between the two is impossible.}\label{(b)inter}

Nor can we entirely pass over the difficulty of the
relations between mind and matter, even though we
have been warned in advance that the theory does not
undertake to solve this problem. For it does, as
commonly held, make certain statements about their
relations. It holds that mind can know matter, that it
can move matter by an act of will, and that it is some\-%
how connected with a piece of matter known as the
body\label{body2} of that particular mind{\smc} also that matter by its
motions can produce certain effects in mind, for instance,
pleasure and pain, derangement and death. These are
merely examples{\smc} it matters little what examples we
choose.

But is it really so easy to conceive how two things,
defined in the way in which we have defined matter
and mind, can act on each other{\qmk} \hlt{Matter can only
operate in one way, namely, by moving}{\smc} and all motion
in matter is caused either by impact or by attraction or
repulsion{\smc} influences exerted in either case by another
piece of matter.%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
Attempts have been made to reduce the cause of all motion to impact{\smc} but
these have, I believe, never been entirely successful, and are quite foreign to modern
physics. Nor are they of much value as a simplification{\smc} for if the origin of motion
by gravitation and by the attraction and repulsion of electric charges is hard to
understand, its communication by impact is, properly considered, no less so{\smc} though
we have no space here%%%%%
\footnoteC{\enquote{We have no space here}\cln\
it is a lame excuse{\expt}
What is meant is that \emph I cannot be bothered to say more.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
to develop in detail the obscurities involved in the conception.}
%%%%%%%%%%%
If therefore mind influences matter,
that is to say, moves it, it can only do so by impinging
on it or attracting it.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This seems to be begging the question.
Since mind \emph{does} move matter,
but not by impinging or attracting,
then obviously matter can be moved in other ways than these.
But this leads to the next subsection.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
But we do not associate these
powers with mind as ordinarily conceived. They can
(we should say) only belong to a thing which is spacial,
possesses mass, and is capable of motion. Therefore
mind cannot affect matter in any way in which matter
can be affected, unless mind has properties characteristic
of matter itself. That is to say, only matter can affect
matter\cln\ \hlt{mind can only affect matter if mind is itself
material}.

Can matter then influence mind{\qmk} clearly not{\smc} for
its influence consists in causing motion, and this it can
[\textbf{78}]
only do in something capable of motion, something
spacial{\smc} that is, in matter. The two halves of the
universe go each its own way, each alike uninfluenced
by the other. Mind cannot, by an act of will, move a
piece of matter as I imagine that I am moving my pen{\smc}
and no change in the position of a material body can
disturb, still less annihilate, the activity of a mind.
The difficulty is not merely that the dualistic theory
omits to explain how these things happen, or that it
offers an unsatisfactory account of them{\smc} it definitely
implies that they cannot happen at all.


\addsubsec{(\emph c) They cannot be distinguished.}

There is still a third difficulty in connexion with
the dualistic theory{\smc} namely, the question how matter
and mind are to be distinguished. At first sight this
question is ridiculous{\smc} for the whole theory consists of
nothing but the clear and sharp distinction between
the two. But it does not follow that this distinction is
satisfactory. Matter is conceived as having one group
of qualities, position and motion\cln\ mind as having a
different group, thought and will. Now we distinguish
two different pieces of matter by their having different
positions{\smc} and we distinguish mind from matter as a
whole, presumably, by its having no position at all.
But has mind really no position{\qmk}%%%%%
\footnoteB{If mind has position, then it can be moved,
and so the previous subsection is wrong.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
If that were the
case, position would be irrelevant to consciousness as it
is, for instance, to time{\smc} and my consciousness would
be all over the universe precisely as 11.15 \textsc{a.m.}\
Greenwich time is all over the universe. But my
consciousness is not all over the universe, if that means
that I am equally conscious of all the universe at once%%%%%
\footnoteB{Right{\smc}
and in the same way, it is not 5h59 Paris time
all over the universe.
It seems I can define a frame of reference for myself
with three spatial dimensions and one time dimension{\smc}
but fitting the whole universe into this frame
is just like extending my consciousness all over the universe.}%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc}
when I look out of the window, I see only Wetherlam,
not Mont Blanc or the satellites of Sirius. There may
be, and doubtless is, a sense in which the mind rises
above the limitations of space{\smc} but that is not to say
that space is irrelevant to the mind.

It would appear, in fact, that things can only be
distinguished when they are in some way homogeneous.
We can distinguish two things of the same class or
[\textbf{79}]
type without difficulty\cln\ we can point out that the
difference lies in the fact that one weighs a pound and
the other two pounds, or that one is red and the other
blue. Differentiating things implies comparing them{\cln}
and if we are to compare things they must be compar\-%
able. \hlt{If two things have no point of contact}, they are
not comparable, and therefore, paradoxical as it may
seem, \hlt{they cannot be distinguished}. Now in our
original definitions of mind and matter, there was no
such community, no point of contact. Each was de\-%
fined as having unique properties of its own, quite
different in kind from the properties of the other\cln\ and
if this is really so, to compare and distinguish them
becomes impossible.

But in practice the dualistic view is more lenient
than this. It is not at all uncommon to hear mind
described as if it were a kind of matter{\smc} for instance,
as a very subtle or refined matter\cln\ and it is equally
common to hear matter spoken of as if it had that
self-consciousness and power of volition which are
characteristic of mind. These are dismissed as con\-%
fusions of thought, mythological and unscientific{\smc} but
even if they cannot be defended they may be used as
illustrations of the difficulty which mankind finds in
keeping the ideas of matter and mind really separated.
Once grant that mind is a kind of matter, and it
becomes for the first time possible to distinguish them{\smc}
you have only to say what kind of matter mind is.

But, strictly interpreted, it seems that we can hardly
accept the dualistic view whether as a metaphysic or as
a hypothesis of science. It seems more hopeful to
examine the other alternatives, materialism and idealism.


\addsec{2. Materialism{\cln}---}

Materialism has been for many centuries, if not
the most popular of all philosophies, at least among the
most popular. Its popularity in all ages seems to be
due very largely to the simplicity of the theory which
it offers. Simplicity and clearness, the conspicuous
characteristics of most materialistic theories, are very
[\textbf{80}]
high merits in a philosophy, and \hlt{no view which is not
simple and clear is likely to be true{\smc} but the search
after these qualities may easily lead to the false sim\-%
plicity of abstraction and the false clearness of arbitrary
dogma}.

The most familiar criticism of materialism is that
which points out its failure to account for certain facts
in the world, and demonstrates the inadequacy of all
materialistic explanations of such things as \hlt{thought,
action, {\ae}sthetic and moral values}. Such a criticism
emphasises not the fact that no materialistic explanation
of these things has ever yet proved satis\-factory{\smc} for
that would be a superficial and unfair method of attack,
seeing that no theory can claim to account for every\-%
thing{\smc} but rather the fact---for it does seem to be a
fact---that \hlt{the very method and presuppositions of
materialism prevent it from ever coming any nearer to
an adequate description of these things}. To take one
case only, that of action\cln\ the peculiarity of action is
that it is free and self-creative, not determined by any
external circumstance{\smc} but according to the materialistic
presupposition, action must be a kind of motion in
matter, and therefore, like all other motion, cannot be
free and must be causally determined by external
circumstances. This is not to explain action, but to
deny its existence. And therefore materialism seems
to be an instance of the opposite error to dualism{\smc} the
error of denying the existence of a fact because it will
not fit into a system. But it must not be forgotten
that this error too is half a virtue{\smc} and the respect
with which philosophers such as Hegel treat materialism
is due to the recognition that the materialist has the
courage of his convictions and faith in his logic.

We shall not develop this criticism at length. It
has been often and brilliantly done by abler hands.
We shall confine our attention to certain difficulties
which arise not from the deficiencies of materialism in
its relation to the facts of life, but from its own internal
[\textbf{81}]
obscurities. The theory itself, in its simplest terms,
seems to consist of two assertions\cln\ first, that all
existence is composed of a substance called matter, and
secondly, that all change is due to and controlled by a
principle known as causation. The simplicity and
clearness of the theory, therefore, depend upon the
simplicity and clearness of these two conceptions, matter
and causation{\smc} and we shall try to find out whether
they are really as simple and as clear as they appear
to be.\\


\addsubsec{(\emph a) Materialism derives no support whatever from physics.}

Materialism offers us a philosophy, an explana\-%
tion of the real world. It aims at showing the under\-%
lying unity of things by demonstrating that everything
alike is derived from the one ultimate matter{\smc} that
everything is one form or another of this same universal
principle. Now \hlt{to explain a thing by reference to a
principle implies that the principle itself is clear and
needs no explanation}\cln\ or at least that it needs so little
explanation that it is more readily comprehensible than
the things which it is called in to explain. If it were
no more comprehensible than these, it would not serve
to explain them, and the explanation would take us no
further.

At first sight, matter does seem to be perfectly
simple and easy to conceive. If it is regarded as a
homogeneous substance, always divisible into portions
which, however small, are still matter---divisible, that is,
in imagination, even if not physically separable---we
can no doubt imagine such a thing, and its simplicity
makes it very well fitted to serve as a metaphysical
first principle. And this conception of matter was
certainly held at one time by physicists. According to
the ancient atomic theory, matter was in this sense
homogeneous and infinitely divisible, in thought if not
in fact{\smc} that is to say, you could not actually cut an
atom in half, but it had halves, and each half was still
a piece of matter. But this is not, I believe, held by
scientists at the present time. The whole subject of\label{atomic}
[\textbf{82}]
the composition or structure of matter is one of extreme
difficulty{\smc} but if, for the sake of argument, we accept
the view most widely held, we shall be compelled to
say that \hlt{matter is not, so far as we know, homogeneous},
but is differentiated into a large number of distinct
elements{\smc} that these elements do seem to be made of
the same stuff, that is to say, they are all composed of
similar electrons arranged in groups of different types{\smc}
but that the way in which these different arrangements
give rise to the different characteristics of the elements
is a profound mystery. Further, the electron does not
seem to be itself a minute mass of matter, like the old-%
fashioned atom{\smc} it has none of the properties of matter,
which are produced only (if I understand the theory
rightly) by the collocation of electrons. Thus matter
is a complex of parts which are not in themselves
material. If we are pressed to describe these smallest
parts, we shall perhaps have to say that they consist of
energy. At any rate, they do not consist of matter.

The tendency of modern physics, then, if a layman{\apo}s
reading of it is to be trusted, seems to lie in the
direction of abandoning matter as a first principle and
substituting energy. This at least may be said without
fear of contradiction\cln\ that matter is for physics not a
self-evident principle of supreme simplicity, but some\-%
thing itself highly complex and as yet very imperfectly
understood.

The simplicity of matter as conceived by ordinary
materialism seems to be merely the simplicity of ignor\-%
ance. Matter was supposed to be the simplest and
least puzzling thing in the universe at a time when
physics was in its infancy, when the real problems that
surround the nature and composition of matter had
not yet arisen. To-day, as Mr.\ Balfour says in a
characteristic epigram, we know too much about matter
to be materialists.


\addsubsec{(\emph b) The paradox of causation{\cln}---}\label{subsect:paradox}

But though the composition or structure of
matter is thus too obscure a problem to serve as a
[\textbf{83}]
support for materialism---so that even if everything is
made of matter we are, metaphysically or in the search
for comprehension, no further advanced, since we cannot
say what matter is---\hlt{it may still seem that the operation
of matter is comprehensible and clear}. The behaviour
proper to matter is that controlled by causality{\smc} its
motions are due not to its own spontaneous initiation%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{spontaneous}%
As is \enquote{automatic} (page \pageref{automatic}, note \ref{automatic}),
so is \enquote{spontaneous} ambiguous, if not in the \emph{OED},
where the first meaning is, briefly, \enquote{voluntary,}
then in the ninth edition of the \emph{Concise Oxford Dictionary} \cite{COD},
where an additional meaning is 
\enquote{(of sudden movement etc.)\ involuntary,
not due to conscious volition.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
but to external compulsive causes. Matter, if we
cannot define it by its structure, can at least be defined
as the field in which efficient causes are operative, in
which we find the nexus of cause and effect universally
maintained. We must turn therefore to this concep\-%
tion of causality, to see how far it will serve as an
ultimate principle of explanation.


\addsubsubsec{i. Nothing is a cause or an effect except a total state
of the universe.}

\hlt{Causation} is not merely a general principle of
connexion between events{\smc} it \hlt{is particular, not general,
concrete, not ab\-stract}. That is to say, \hlt{it does not
simply account for the fact of change, but for the fact
that this particular change is what takes place}. One
of the objections brought by the Renaissance scientists
against the \enquote{final causes} or teleological explanations
of Aristotelian science was that they supplied only
general explanations, and gave no reason why the
particular fact should be what it is{\smc} whereas according
to the conception of efficient causes each particular fact
has its own particular cause, and there is a definite
reason why every single thing should be exactly what
it is.

If we search for the particular cause of a given
particular effect, we shall find this cause to be invariably
complex, even when it is often described as simple.
Thus, the gale last night blew down a tree in the
garden. But it would not have done so except for
many other circumstances. We must take into account
the strength of the tree{\apo}s roots, its own weight, the
direction of the wind, and so on. If some one asks,
\enquote{why did the tree fall{\qmk}} we cannot give as the right
and sufficient answer, \enquote{because of the wind.} We
[\textbf{84}]
might equally well give a whole series of other answers{\cln}
\enquote{because the wind was in the north-west}{\smc} \enquote{because
the tree had its leaves on}{\smc} \enquote{because I had not
propped it}{\smc} and so on. Each of these answers is a
real answer to the question, but none of them is the
only answer or the most right answer. No one of them
can claim to give the cause in a sense in which the
others do not give the cause.%%%%%
\footnoteB{As Collingwood will show in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
it can: the cause is something that \emph{we} can do (or could have done) something about:
that we had not propped the tree, or pruned it,
or cut it down because it was getting old and weak.
In this sense, if there was nothing we could have done, 
then there was no cause for the tree\apo s falling.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Is there then, we may
ask, such a thing as \emph{the} cause at all{\qmk} is there not simply
a number of causes{\qmk} No, there does seem to be one
cause and no more{\smc} but that cause is not one simple
event but a large, indeed an infinitely large, number
of events and conditions all converging to the one
result.

If we really wish to know the whole truth when we
ask for the cause of an event, then, it seems that we
shall have to enumerate all the conditions present in
the world at the time{\smc} for we cannot assume any of
them to be irrelevant. \hlt{The only real cause seems to
be a total state of the universe}.

Further, if the whole present state of the universe
causes the fall of the tree, \hlt{it also for the same reason
causes everything else that happens at the same time}.
That is to say, the cause of the fall of my tree is also
the cause of an earthquake in Japan and a fine day in
British Columbia. But if one and the same cause
accounts for all these things, we can no longer suppose
that one particular event or set of events causes another
particular event, as such. Just as the only true cause
is a total state of the universe, so the only true effect
is a total state of the universe. To say that this gale
causes this tree to fall is doubly inadequate{\smc} we should
say that the total state of the universe of which this
gale is a part causes the total state of which the fall
of this tree is a part. The nature of the connexion
between the gale and the fall of the tree in particular
has receded into impenetrable mystery. The only sense
in which causation explains the fall of the tree is that
[\textbf{85}]
we accept that event as part of the effect-complex and
the gale as part of the cause-complex{\smc} though why this
should be so is quite unintelligible.


\addsubsubsec{ii. The explanation given by causal methods is either
a tautology or an infinite regress.}

Instead of many chains of cause and effect
running as it were parallel, there is now only one such
chain. But here again a very difficult problem arises.
We generally think of the cause as preceding the effect{\smc}
the chain is a temporal chain, spread out over time.
Indeed, this is the only possible way of regarding the
matter{\smc} for if we regarded the cause as simultaneous
with the effect, since each is a total state of the
universe, each must be the same state{\smc} and therefore
the cause and the effect are not two different things but
absolutely identical, and the law of causation would
merely mean that the state of the universe at any given
moment is what it is because it is what it is.

To avoid such a tautology \hlt{we must define the cause as
pre\-ceding the effect}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{If time is continuous, 
then the cause of the world at time $t_0$ 
can be understood as the world at \emph{all} times $t$
such that $t<t_0$.
If time is discrete, then the cause can be the world at the previous moment{\smc}
but then how can two discrete moments have any connection?
Here Zeno\apo s arrow paradox may come into play.
Collingwood will discuss it in \emph{The Idea of Nature} \cite[pp.\ 20--1]{Collingwood-IN}\cln
\begin{quote}
At any given instant, said Zeno, a flying arrow is not in motion{\smc} it is at rest, occupying the space equal to itself in which it is situated{\smc} so that if time is nothing but a sum of instants the arrow is never in motion at all. Aristotle\lips points out that a determi nate kind of motion requires for its occurrence a determinate lapse of time{\smc} which leaves the reader free to answer Zeno, if he will, by saying \senquote{How long exactly it takes for an arrow to be in motion I do not know{\smc} but some lapse of time is required. Let an instant be defined as any lapse of time shorter than that{\smc} then no contradiction is involved between saying that in a given instant the arrow is at rest and that time is made up of instants, and saying that during a longer period of time the arrow moves.}
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
This certainly involves difficulties{\smc}
for of the causes we could enumerate, not all are events,
and therefore it does not seem that they could precede
the effect. The weight of the tree, for instance, does
not in the ordinary sense of the word precede its
fall. We speak of permanent causes, meaning such
things as gravitation, which are never conceived as
events.

But if we dismiss these difficulties and regard the
cause as an event preceding the effect, we are equally
far from explaining the effect. Admitting it to be
comprehensible how the total state A causes the total
state B, and B, C, we have merely explained C as the
effect of A{\smc} and this is only an explanation if we
understand, and do not need an explanation of, A.
And yet if C is a total state of the universe and A is
another such state, why should one need an explanation
and the other not{\qmk} We have, it seems, avoided the
absurdity of tautology at the expense of falling into the
equal absurdity of infinite regress. It is important,
though at first sight not easy, to realise that this is an
[\textbf{86}]
equal absurdity. \hlt{There is a tendency to which we are
all subject, to imagine that by deferring a problem we
have made some progress towards solving it}{\smc} that if
we are asked what made C, it is more scientific to
answer \enquote{B made C, and A made B, but I don{\apo}t know
what made A,} than to reply, \enquote{It made itself.} One
answer may be true, and the other false\cln%%%%%
\footnoteB{One answer \emph{may} be true{\smc}
but Collingwood is not committing himself
to saying that one of them \emph{is} true.}%
%%%%%%%%%%%%
\ but if we
are in search of an explanation, there is no \emph{a priori}
superiority in either. Possibly the latter is slightly
preferable, as it is better to give up a question one
cannot answer than to answer it with an empty
phrase.


\addsubsubsec{iii. Nothing is ever explained at all unless it is first
assumed that the universe, though material, can
cause its own states, \emph{i.e.}\ is not subject to the law
of causation.}

The view of causation as successive, then, does
not seem really superior to that which regards it as
simultaneous. The latter interpretation would make C
its own cause, which contradicts the very definition of
causality{\smc} the former makes it the effect of something
equally unexplained. That is to say, the causal view
of the universe only accounts for the present state of
things if it is allowed to take for granted, without ex\-%
planation, the state of things in the past. Allow it to
assume the universe as a going concern, and it can
deduce you its successive states. The assumption is no
doubt enormous{\smc} but, after all, a theory is judged not
by what it assumes but by what it does with its assump\-%
tions{\smc} and if materialism really shows the connexion
between different successive states of the universe, it
has good reason to be proud of its achievement. But
on closer inspection it appears that this result is only
attained by means inconsistent with the materialistic
assumptions.

Whether causation be regarded as simultaneous or
as successive, the ultimate result is the same. The
universe considered as a whole---whether a simultaneous
or a successive whole---is conceived as causing its own
states. There is in fact one supreme cause, which is
the cause of everything, namely, the total universe.
Now on the principles of materialism, on the principle,
[\textbf{87}]
that is to say, that everything is caused by something
else, we must go on to ask what causes the universe.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In \emph{Logic: A Very Short Introduction} \cite[p.\ 21--2]{Priest-Logic},
Graham Priest (see note \ref{Priest}, page \pageref{Priest})
suggests that Collingwood has committed here a logical fallacy.
The assumption is that everything has a cause,
in the sense that $\forall x\;\exists y\;x\mathrel Cy$,
where $x\mathrel Cy$ means $x$ is caused by $y$.
But Collingwood has turned this into $\exists y\;\forall x\;x\mathrel Cy$,
that is, something causes everything.
This conversion is invalid, and therefore, says Priest,
the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God is invalid.
Collingwood is at present not arguing \emph{for} God,
but \emph{against} materialism{\smc}
still, there may ultimately be little difference.
In any case, I think the fallacy is not the one given by Priest,
but the assuming that the universe is a thing\cln\
an individual in the domain of discourse, as it were.
The universe \emph{cannot} be considered as a whole in this way.
In a sense, perhaps, Collingwood acknowledges this in the next subsection, (\emph c).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Plainly nothing can do this{\smc} for there is nothing out\-%
side the universe to cause it. It seems, then, that in
order to make any progress at all, materialism has to
conceive the universe as an exception to its own funda\-%
mental laws. The first law of matter is that it cannot
originate states in itself. But the universe as a whole,
if it has any states, must originate them itself{\smc} and yet
if it does so it breaks the first law of matter{\smc} for it is
itself a material thing. But the universe only means
all that exists{\smc} so if the universe is an exception to the
law of causation, everything is an exception to it, and
it never holds good at all.

It is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that
materialism only succeeds as far as it does by implicitly
abandoning its own principles. If it were rigidly held
down to the axiom that everything must be accounted
for by reference to something else, it could never make
headway. As it is, it tacitly assumes that self-creation,
self-determination, is real and omnipresent{\smc} and this
assumption underlies all its progress.


\addsubsec{(\emph c) [no title]}

The materialist is not unconscious of this diffi\-%
culty{\smc} he tries to evade it by pointing out that the series
of causes is infinite, and that therefore the problem of
ultimate causation does not arise{\smc} because there is no
such thing as \enquote{the universe as a whole.} This argu\-%
ment does not really remove the difficulty. There are
certainly very famous and very difficult problems in\-%
volved in the conception of an infinite series whether
of causes and effects or of anything else. And it is
true that these problems are not solved by breaking the
series and interpolating a \enquote{first cause.} That would be
simply to lose patience with the problem and to upset
the chess-board. But if I understand the argument,
its purport is that we cannot really ever supply an
explanation at all{\smc} that we have presented to our gaze
a mere fragment of a reality which stretches away into
[\textbf{88}]
darkness on either side of it{\smc} the fragment being in
itself, in the isolated condition in which we know it,
necessarily incomprehensible because depending for its
meaning on data which are concealed from us.

\hlt{This sceptical turn} to an argument which has, till
now, erred rather on the side of confidence in its own
simplicity need not greatly surprise us{\smc} but it would
perhaps be ungracious to acclaim it as marking the
conscious bankruptcy of materialism and to pass on
without further thought. It is doubtless true that all
our knowledge is partial, and that unless we to some
degree know everything we do not know anything fully.
This is a difficulty which no theory can entirely avoid,
and no theory, perhaps, can entirely solve. But in
spite of its universality, it \hlt{is, I cannot help thinking,
more fatal to materialism than to other theories}.
Materialism presents us with a whole formed by the
mere addition of parts which remain absolutely external
to one another\cln\ and if this is so, it certainly seems that
the infinite whole is unknowable, never really attained
and therefore really non-existent. And the incompre\-%
hensibility or non-existence of the whole destroys the
intelligibility and reality of the parts. If, on the other
hand, it is possible to conceive a whole which is some\-%
how not a mere sum of an infinite number of parts, but
implicit in each single part while each part is implied in
the rest, then such a whole would be knowable in spite
of this sceptical argument{\smc} for to the dilemma \enquote{either
know the whole or do not pretend to know even this
one part} we could reply that the knowledge of this
single part is already knowledge of the whole. If we
ask the time-honoured question, \enquote{How is knowledge
possible{\qmk}} we can, I think, reply that if the universe
were as the materialist depicts it, an infinite whole of
finite parts in endless series, then knowledge of it
would be impossible{\smc} and that \hlt{if the universe is to be
knowable at all, it must be a different kind of whole,
one of which we could say that each part by itself was}
[\textbf{89}]
\hlt{already in some sense the whole}. But a whole of this
kind cannot be a merely material body.

\addsec{3. Materialism and Idealism (or Immaterialism)\cln---}\label{sect:mat-id}

\begin{sloppypar}
It seems that \hlt{the term matter is highly ambiguous}.
In one sense, it means merely something objective, some\-%
thing real, something which one handles or thinks about
or uses, as we speak of the subject-matter of a book or
the raw material of an industry{\smc} these things may be
either \enquote{material} or \enquote{spiritual.} Secondly, it means
the reality studied by physics in particular{\smc} the
chemical elements and their structure and relations.
Thirdly, it means a homogeneous, inert and passive
substance, whose changes are mechanically caused.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In its etymology for \enquote{matter,}
the \emph{OED} divides the senses of the word\apo s Latin etymon
into three groups.
The second is an offshoot of the first,
but different from the one that Collingwood gives.  
Specifically, according to the \emph{OED},
the meanings are as follows
(with numbering by me):
\begin{quote}
L. \emph{m\=ateria} (also \emph{m\=ateri\=es}),
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
building material, timber, hence
\item
stuff of which a thing is made, subject of discourse or consideration, also
\item
(in philosophical use) \senquote{matter} in contradistinction to \senquote{mind} or to \senquote{form}.
\end{compactenum}
\end{quote}
\afterquote For \enquote{matter} itself,
the \emph{OED} finds 26 meanings, in four groups:
\begin{quote}
\begin{compactenum}[I.]
\item
In purely physical applications.
\item
\emph{Metaph., Logic,} etc.\cln\ contrasted with \emph{form.}
\item
Material of thought, speech, or action.
\item
A thing, affair, concern{\smc}
corresponding to L.\ \emph{res,}
which it is often employed to render.
\end{compactenum}
\end{quote}
\afterquote Matter as opposed to mind falls in group I.
But the fact that the \enquote{mental} senses of group III also exist
would seem to show that there is no watertight distinction between mind and matter.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\end{sloppypar}

\hlt{In the first sense}, a colloquial rather than a philo\-%
sophical sense, \hlt{matter means merely reality. It is not
opposed to mind}{\smc} mind is one class of it. Everything
is matter in this sense.

\hlt{In the second sense, the scientific sense, matter is
equally real} and perhaps equally universal. \hlt{The third
sense alone is philosophical{\smc} and in this sense it would
appear that matter does not exist at all}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{What is a \enquote{philosophical} sense of a word?
Perhaps it is best understood as arising in metaphysics,
considered as the \emph{historical} science described in
\emph{An Essay on Metaphysics.}
This science observes, or supposes, 
that the \enquote{common man} distinguishes the world
into mind and matter,
and it is inferred that matter has the properties
here described as \enquote{philosophical.}
More precisely though, 
these properties are those assumed by \emph{obsolete} science.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
If, therefore,
we deny the existence of matter, it must not be sup\-%
posed that we wish to deny the reality of this chair and
this table{\smc} nor yet that we are casting doubt on the
truth of physics. The view to which we seem to be
led is that these things exist, but are not in the philo\-%
sophical sense material{\smc} that is to say, they are not
composed of that homogeneous matter whose existence
has been disproved by physics, and their behaviour is
not dictated by the mechanical causation which we have
criticised.


\addsubsec{(\emph a) The scientist{\apo}s objection to Idealism\cln\ uniformity.}

This last point may create difficulty. It may
be said that the whole work of the scientist consists
of determining causes{\smc} how then can we maintain
that there are no causes, and not imply that his work
is valueless{\qmk}

But \hlt{it seems to be very doubtful whether science is
really the search for causes, or even whether scientists
themselves so conceive it}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{It will be brought out in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}
that scientists have jettisoned the notion of cause.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
They would, perhaps,
[\textbf{90}]
say that they were more concerned with the \enquote{how}
of things than with their \enquote{why}\cln\ that they would
be satisfied with accurately describing observed
sequences, and rather suspect than welcome attempts
to explain the underlying causes. Such attempts
smack not of true scientific method but of the \enquote{occult
qualities} of an unscientific age. In a word, science is
the study of behaviour, the behaviour of men, plants,
animals, or metals\cln\ and in no case need it advance
any hypothesis as to why the behaviour of a certain
thing should be what it is. It is difficult, perhaps
impossible, to avoid framing such hypotheses{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{An allusion to Newton{\apo}s
\enquote{Hypotheses non fingo}
in the \enquote{General Scholium}
of the \emph{Principia}{\qmk}
This was translated by Motte as
\enquote{I frame no hypotheses,}
possibly with pejorative sense{\smc}
Cohen and Whitman phrase it, \enquote{I feign no hypotheses,}
\cite[p.\ 943, n.\ oo]{MR1965137},
but Donahue,
\enquote{I do not contrive hypotheses}
\cite{Densmore}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
but the
hypothesis itself is not science but philosophy. Modern
science is generally associated in practice with a
materialistic philosophy{\smc} but \hlt{there is nothing in
physics incompatible with the hypothesis that the
complex of behaviour which the physicist calls matter
is the outcome of a will or society of wills}{\smc} that the
personality which directs our own bodily movements
is present to some degree in each material atom, and
that every event in the universe is willed.

It cannot be denied that at the present time
scientists are very reluctant to accept such a hypo\-%
thesis. It may be (they say) that some such view is
widely held among philosophers{\smc} or, at least, that
few philosophers will accept a plain and sensible
materialism. So much the worse for the philosophers.%
---The position is a curious one, and perhaps worth
brief consideration. \hlt{The scientist} does not regard
the philosopher as an expert in his own line, whose
opinion on a metaphysical point can be accepted
without question, just as an astronomer{\apo}s would be
accepted by a chemist. He \hlt{regards philosophy as a
subject on which he is entitled to an opinion of his
own}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Thus the scientist may engage in Progressive Anti-Metaphysics
in the sense of \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics.}}%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\cln\ and he expresses that opinion with perfect
confidence, in defiance of the expert.

Such an attitude is really rather gratifying to the
philosopher, who is always maintaining that philosophy
[\textbf{91}]
is everybody{\apo}s interest, and not the private preserve of
academic specialists. Most philosophers, however, are
ungrateful enough to turn a deaf ear to the scientist{\apo}s
overtures, and recommend him to mind his own
business. But the scientist genuinely regards philo\-%
sophy as vital to his own science{\smc} though he may
not use the word, which he tends to reserve as a term
of opprobrium for other people{\apo}s philosophy. More
especially, he seems to regard materialism as the very
foundation of his methods. Now if this were so,
science would be in a highly precarious position{\smc} for
its methods would be founded on a theory which
criticism has long ago discredited. For that materialism
is discredited no student of philosophy can doubt.

On the other hand, materialism would never have
arisen at all, unless it had to some extent satisfied the
need for a theory. It may be wrong, but \hlt{no theory
is wrong from end to end}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Another theme developed in later books,
as \emph{Speculum Mentis} or \emph{An Essay on Philosophical Method.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
And this particular theory
does rightly emphasise certain truths which are of
great importance to the scientist. If it is asserted
that all events are due to free volition, the scientist
will very likely object to such a view because it seems
to destroy the order and regularity of the universe.
Make everything a matter of free choice, he would say,
and you get chaos. Now this is not really true. \hlt{A free
will is not inherently chaotic}{\smc} to suppose that it is so
is to confuse freedom with caprice and the absence of
compulsion for the absence of rationality. But it is
true that \hlt{a free will may lapse into chaos}, and that
freedom may degenerate into caprice. A science, then,
which is concerned primarily with regularities and
generalisations depends for its very existence on the
fact that the object it studies does not exhibit caprice{\cln}
and this fact might be expressed by saying, \enquote{these
things may be free, and act in this way because they
choose to, but they act as uniformly and regularly as if
they could not help it.}

\hlt{Science, however, does not remain permanently in}
[\textbf{92}]
\hlt{this stage of observing uniformities only}. In its
higher developments it comes to deal less with the
general and more with the particular{\smc} less with
abstract classes and more with concrete individuals.
This does not force it to abandon the hypothesis of
mechanical causation{\smc} for such a hypothesis is quite
compatible with recognising that every individual is
unique and must react in a unique way to the causes
which move it. And in this uniqueness different
individuals may still show resemblances. All this is
true whether the changes that take place are willed
or caused{\smc} for \hlt{as mechanism does not exclude unique\-%
ness, so liberty is not incompatible with resemblance}.
The recognition that this is so removes the most
reasonable and deeply rooted of all the prejudices in
favour of materialism.



\addsubsec{(\emph b) The plain man{\apo}s objection\cln\ objectivity.}

Another merit of materialism is its insistence
on fact, on reality as something beyond the power of
the individual mind to create or alter. Matter is
supremely objective. And when it is said that mind
is the only reality, the suggestion at once arises that
the world is less solid, less satisfying, less \enquote{real} than
we believed. Not that we do not think of mind as
real{\smc} the plain man knows that his sorrows are mental,
but does not think them any the less real for that.
But he feels that to call his boots mental would be
ridiculous. Some things, he supposes, are states of
mind, and others not. And the attempt to define
a non-mental thing (or \enquote{thing} \emph{par excellence}) as a
state of mind can only lead to the conception of some\-%
thing like it which is a state of mind---namely, the
\enquote{mental picture} or imagination of a boot.

This consequence, the dissolution of the objective
world into mere images or illusions, is one of the
dangers against which materialism is very properly
concerned to protest. But we have already argued
that the distinction between two categories of reality,
mind and matter, is no real help. And the danger
[\textbf{93}]
against which the protest is made may perhaps be
removed or diminished by pointing out that a con\-%
fusion is implied between \hlt{two senses in which we\label{2senses}
commonly use the word \enquote{thinking.}} In the first
place, we use the word of real knowing, actual con\-%
sciousness of some real thing{\smc} in the second, of
imagination, fancy, dreaming, or the mere play of
opinion as opposed to knowledge. Now the imaginary
boot belongs to the category of thinking only in the
second, the inferior, sense of the word{\smc} it is not
thought at all as the term is used in philosophy. The
\enquote{real} boot alone is in this sense fully worthy of the
name thought{\smc} it is the embodiment of the boot-%
maker{\apo}s mind{\smc} \hlt{the \enquote{imaginary} boot is not a thought,
only a fancy. What is wrong with it is not that it is
only mental, but that, so to speak, it is not mental
enough}{\smc} just as a cheap and superficial argument fails
not because it is mere logic, but because it is not logical
enough.

In the case of human products, indeed, we get
nearer to their reality, not further away, by describing
them as mental. A boot is more adequately described
in terms of mind---by saying who made it and what he
made it for---than in terms of matter. And in the case
of all realities alike, it seems that the materialistic
insistence on their objectivity is too strong{\smc} for it is
not true that we are unable to alter or create facts,
or even that we cannot affect the course of purely
\enquote{inanimate} nature. Materialism, in short, is right
as against those theories which make the world an
illusion or a dream of my own individual mind{\smc} but
while it is right to insist on objectivity, it goes too far
in describing the objective world not only as something
different from, and incapable of being created or
destroyed by, my own mind, but as something different
and aloof from mind in general.



\addsubsec{(\emph c) Idealism and the higher Materialism.}

It appears, then, that we cannot conceive matter
without ascribing to it some qualities of mind, nor
[\textbf{94}]
mind without ascribing to it some qualities of matter.
Matter cannot be subject to the law of causation,
because that law itself, if our analysis can be trusted,
breaks down under examination. Causation is pure
passivity, and therefore cannot exist except relatively
to some activity. If matter exists, mind must exist
too. But we cannot conceive them as existing side by
side{\smc} we have already tried and failed to do so. We
must think of matter as active as well as passive, and
mind as passive as well as active. In one sense, then,
everything is mind, for everything has in some degree
the consciousness and volition which we described as
mental. In another sense everything is material\cln\ for
the real world does show that orderliness and objectivity
for which materialism is fighting. But can we say that
everything is matter with the same confidence with
which we can say that everything is mind{\qmk}

Only if we bear in mind the ambiguity of the word.
We distinguished three senses.%%%%%
\footnoteB{At the head of this section, page \pageref{sect:mat-id}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
In the first, the
colloquial sense, all is certainly matter, for all is real
and the possible object of knowledge. In the second
or scientific sense, it may be true that everything is
ultimately resolvable into the chemical elements, and
that nothing exists except the matter of physics{\smc} but
we cannot (I think) assert this at the present stage of
our knowledge. To ask whether mind is a form of
matter or matter a form of mind is very largely a
question of words. \hlt{The important thing is that we
should be able to bring the two into relation at all}{\smc}
that we should hold such a conception of matter as
does not prevent us from admitting truth, morality,
and life as a whole to be real facts, and that we should
hold such a conception of mind as does not reduce the
world to an illusion and experience to a dream.

The first of these errors is that of crude materialism,
and the second that of an equally crude idealism. The
view for which we are contending would claim the
title of idealism rather than materialism, but only
[\textbf{95}]
because the current conception of mind seems a more
adequate description of the world than the current
conception of matter. \hlt{We are laying stress on the fact
that the world is the place of freedom and consciousness,
not of blind determinism{\smc} and at present this can best
be conveyed by saying that mind is the one reality}.
On the other hand, we do not wish to exclude, and
should indeed warmly welcome, a higher materialism
which could proceed on the understanding that the
world while fully material was a conscious will or
society of wills, and that its changes were not caused
but chosen. Such a view would place matter neither
above mind nor below it, would make it neither the
eternal background nor the transitory instrument of
spirit. It would regard matter as nothing else than
mind itself in its concrete existence, and mind as the
life and operation of matter.

The realisation of this higher materialism must wait
till physics has advanced to a fuller conception of the
nature of matter. No one, of course, can claim to
possess now the knowledge which that fuller conception
would bring{\smc} but it may be possible to discern the
direction in which progress is likely to come, and this
we have attempted to do. The principle that all
matter is in its degree a form of life seems to be
continually suggesting itself as the solution of many
problems in modern science, and appears in the most
varied forms{\smc} underlying both the assertion that
nothing exists but matter and the counter-assertion
that reality as we know it is not material at all.

\mychap{III}{Personality}\label{Personality}

\textsc{We} found in the last chapter that the issue lay less 
between materialism and idealism, in the sense of 
theories describing the world as matter and mind 
respectively, than between the passivity which we found 
to be falsely associated with the idea of nature, and the 
conscious freedom of mind. The former we found 
unsatisfactory as an account of the world, whether 
regarded from the side of science or that of philosophy{\smc} 
physics, as well as metaphysics, seeming only possible if 
the notion of blind causality were abandoned. 

But if the universe is a whole of consciousness, of 
activity, of something that is at least better described 
as mind than as matter, in what relation does each part 
of it stand to the other parts and the whole{\qmk} Is every 
part an independent and entirely individual mind (or 
piece of matter, if we prefer to call it so), or is there 
only one mind, of which every separate thing in the 
universe is a fragment and no more{\qmk} 

These two alternatives are generally known as 
pluralism and monism respectively. A thorough-going 
pluralism is intended to preserve at all costs the freedom 
and reality of the indi\-vidual\cln\ but it does not tell us in 
what relation the individual stands to other individuals{\smc} 
indeed, it does not tell us what in the first place 
constitutes individuality. For if the human being is an 
individual, what of the atoms of which his body is com\-%
posed, or the many acts which make up the history of 
[\textbf{97}] 
his mind{\qmk} Are they not individuals also{\qmk} And if so, 
how can he be at once a single individual and a group 
of individuals{\qmk} 

It is equally easy for a thorough-going monism to 
assert the reality of the whole at the expense of the 
parts{\smc} to deprive the human being of all true freedom 
and self-existence, and to reduce him to the position of 
a mere incident in the life of the universe. Of these 
extreme theories neither is satisfactory{\smc} and in the 
present chapter we shall attempt to reach a less one-sided 
view of the nature of personality. 

What constitutes the self-identity of a person{\qmk} 
What is it that makes him one{\qmk} And what, on the 
other hand, is the bond which makes a society one{\qmk} 
Are these two bonds at bottom the same{\smc} that is, can 
a mind be at the same time one person and many 
persons, or is the self-identity of a person one thing and 
that of a society something totally different{\qmk} 

\addsec{I. The identity of persons with each other\cln---}

In order to answer these questions we shall not 
inquire into the abstract meaning or the word personality. 
Many people maintain that personality, in its very 
meaning, implies limitation, finitude, imperfection, 
distinction from other persons, and the like{\smc} and to 
make or to reject such assumptions at the outset would 
be to beg the question which we wish to answer. \hlt{We 
shall begin by examining the relations which subsist 
between different persons as we know them}, in the hope 
of thereby throwing some light on the nature of 
personality itself{\smc} and these relations are the facts which 
we describe, on the side of thought, as communication, 
and on the side of will, as co-operation. For this 
purpose we can define a personality as this, if nothing 
more\cln\ the unity of a single consciousness{\smc} while a 
society might be defined as the unity of different and 
co-operating consciousnesses. These definitions are 
only provisional{\smc} but more than this we cannot say at 
the present stage of the inquiry. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) In communication.}

The fact of communication seems to be that \hlt{two} 
[\textbf{98}]
\hlt{or more persons can actually share the same knowledge}. 
The condition is not satisfied by supposing that the one 
has a piece of knowledge merely resembling, however 
closely, the knowledge possessed by the other{\smc} the two 
pieces of knowledge must be the same. There is a 
theory of knowledge which maintains that what I know 
is always peculiar to my mind, an \enquote{idea,} as it is some\-%
times called, not an \enquote{object}{\smc} a state of my own 
consciousness, not an independently existing thing. If 
this were the case, no two people could have the same 
knowledge, any more than two objects can have the same 
weight{\smc} their weights might be equal, but the weight of 
each would be its own weight and not the other{\apo}s.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{Thus Collingwood notes the distinction in Euclid\cln\
two different straight lines can be \emph{equal,}
but two ratios are never described as equal, only the \emph{same.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
One 
thing cannot communicate its weight to another{\smc} but 
one mind can, as we believe, communicate its thoughts 
to another. If this belief is true, knowledge is not a 
state or attribute of my mind in the sense in which 
weight is an attribute of objects. 

But is the belief really true{\qmk} Is there such a thing 
as this communication at all{\qmk} Is it not rather the case 
that no two people ever quite understand one another, 
or ever see eye to eye{\qmk} Do not the facts rather favour 
the view that every one is sealed up in a world of his 
own ideas from which there is no egress and no channel 
of communication into the mind of any one else{\qmk} There 
is much truth in these contentions{\smc} and we may grant% 
---at least for the sake of argument---that no two people 
ever quite understand one another, that A never thinks 
in exactly the same way as B. But is the inference 
just, that communication is impossible{\qmk} We may not 
succeed in conveying our deepest thoughts to each other, 
but we continue to try{\smc} and if the thing were an 
axiomatic and self-evident impossibility, how shall we 
account for the continuance of the attempt{\qmk} After all, 
a theory of knowledge must accept the fact of know\-%
ledge as a starting-point{\smc} and it cannot be denied that 
partial, if not complete, communication is a fact. Nor\label{Nor-can} 
can it be argued that this partial communication, which 
[\textbf{99}]
is all we can attain, is satisfied by the theory that my 
knowledge may resemble yours without being identical 
with it. For \hlt{however incomplete our communication 
may be, we have before us the ideal of complete com\-%
munication}{\smc} and the very imperfection of our attainment, 
our consciousness of its imperfection, proves that this 
ideal is really our constant aim. 

We are justified, then, in dismissing these sceptical 
objections with the remark that, if they were true, they 
would falsify not only all else but themselves{\smc} for \hlt{the 
sceptic cannot seriously believe his own contentions so 
long as he tries to communicate his scepticism to us}. 

The unity of an individual was defined as the unity 
of a single consciousness. But if two people are 
conscious of the same object, have they not thereby the 
same consciousness{\qmk} We may be answered, no{\smc} 
because there is more in any act of knowing than the 
mere object. The knowing mind (says the objector) 
does not, so to speak, lose itself in the thing it contem\-%
plates. If it did, then there would be no difference 
between my mind and yours so far as we were conscious 
of the same thing{\smc} but as it is, knowing is a relation 
between two things, the subject and the object, the 
knowing mind and the thing known. \hlt{To forget the 
object makes communication impossible{\smc} but to forget 
the subject makes all knowledge impossible}. 

\hlt{This objection brings up one of the most difficult 
problems in phi\-losophy}, and one which it may seem 
both indiscreet to raise and presumptuous even to attempt 
to answer in brief. But the attempt must be made, if 
we cannot hope to give a very satisfactory solution. 
To say that the mind is one thing and the object another 
is doubtless true{\smc} but we cannot rest content with the 
statement. It is true also that the relation between 
them is unique, and that \hlt{attempts to describe it by 
analogy with other relations must always be} as \hlt{misleading}
as they have been in the past. But it does not follow 
that, because it cannot be described by analogy, therefore 
[\textbf{100}]
it cannot be described at all{\smc} still less that because it is 
unique therefore it cannot be understood. 

\hlt{Even to say that the mind is one thing and the object 
an\-other may mislead}. The mind is specifically that 
which knows the object{\smc} and to call it a \enquote{thing} 
already suggests conceiving it as an object one of whose 
qualities is that it knows other objects---as this table is 
an object one of whose qualities is that it holds my 
paper---or, still worse, as a machine which turns out a 
kind of work called thinking, as a typewriter or a 
dynamo turns out its own peculiar product. The mind\label{thinking}
seems to be not so much that which thinks as the 
thinking itself{\smc} it is not an active thing so much as an 
activity. Its \emph{esse} is \emph{cogitare.}

Again, just as the mind is not a self-identical thing 
persisting whether or no it performs its functions, but 
rather is those functions{\smc} so the consciousness in which 
it consists is not an abstract power of thought which 
may be turned to this object or that, as the current from 
a dynamo may be put to various uses. All conscious\-%
ness is the consciousness of something definite, the 
thought of this thing or of that thing{\smc} there is no 
thought in general but only particular thoughts about 
particular things. The \emph{esse} of mind is not \emph{cogitare} 
simply, but \emph{de hac re cogitare.} 

I hardly think that any one will deny all this{\smc} but it 
may still be said that though A{\apo}s mind is nothing but 
his consciousness of $x$, and B{\apo}s mind nothing but his, 
yet A{\apo}s mind and B{\apo}s remain absolutely different and 
individual{\smc} since, though the object is the same and 
each admittedly knows the object, A{\apo}s thought of it is 
distinct from the object itself and therefore from B{\apo}s 
thought of the same object. It has already been 
admitted that each knows the same thing, but it is now 
argued that each knows it by having a \enquote{thought about 
it} which is peculiar to himself. \hlt{I suspect this dis\-%
tinction between the object and the thought about it 
to be an instance of} the \hlt{confusion} noted in the last 
[\textbf{101}]
chapter%%%%%
\footnoteB{On page \pageref{2senses}.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
between thinking in the sense of knowing and 
thinking in the sense of imagining. My imagination 
of a table is certainly a different thing from the table 
itself, and to identify the two would be to mistake 
fancy for fact{\smc} but my knowledge of the table, my 
thought of it in that sense, is simply the table as known 
to me, as much of the table{\apo}s nature as I have discovered. 
In this sense, my \enquote{thought about} the table---what I 
think the table to be---only differs from the table itself 
if and in so far as I am ignorant of the table{\apo}s real 
nature. \hlt{My thought of the table is certainly not 
something \enquote{like} the table{\smc} it is the table as I know 
it}.  Similarly, your thought of the table is what you 
know of the table, the table as known to you{\smc} and if 
we both have real knowledge of the table, it seems to 
follow that our thoughts are the same, not merely 
similar{\smc}%%%%% 
\footnoteB{\label{double-barrelled}%
In the third paragraph of \S1 of Chapter VIII of \emph{The Principles of Art}
(the first two having been quoted in note \ref{criteriological}, page \pageref{criteriological}),
the identity of the the known table and the thought of it
is suggested by the \emph{distinction} between the thought and the thinking of it:
\begin{quotation}
Secondly, there is a special kind of privacy about feelings, 
in contrast with what may be called the publicity of thoughts. 
A hundred people in the street may all feel cold, but each
person\apo s feeling is private to himself. But if they all think
that the thermometer reads 22${}^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit, they are all 
thinking the same thought: this thought is public to them 
all. The act of thinking it may or may not be an entirely 
private act{\smc} but a thought in the sense of what we think is 
not the act of thinking it, and a feeling in the sense of what 
we feel is not the act of feeling it. In the last paragraph I 
pointed to a distinction between the act of feeling and the 
act of thought{\smc} in this I am pointing to a distinction between
what we feel and what we think\lips
But the \senquote{fact} or \senquote{proposition} or \senquote{thought} 
that there are ten degrees of frost is not a hundred different 
\senquote{facts} or \senquote{propositions} or \senquote{thoughts}{\smc} it is one \senquote{fact} or \senquote{pro\-%
position} or \senquote{thought} which a hundred different people 
\senquote{apprehend} or \senquote{assent to} or \senquote{think}\lips
\end{quotation}
\afterquote Because of the bipolarity and the sharing of thought,
\enquote{thoughts can
corroborate or contradict each other}
(though feelings cannot).
This is the key point.
The seventh and last paragraph of the section has a warning about the linquistic feature in play:
\begin{quote}
\lips Words like thought, feeling, 
knowledge, experience, have notoriously a double-barrelled 
significance. They refer both to the activity of thinking and 
to what we think{\smc} the activity of feeling and what we feel; 
the activity of knowing and what we know{\smc} the activity of 
experiencing and what we experience. When such words are 
used, it is important not to confuse these two halves of their 
meaning. My warning is this\cln\ it is important, also, to 
remember that the relation between the two things referred 
to is not the same in all these various cases\lips
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and further, if the mind is its thoughts, we 
seem to have, for this moment at least, actually one 
mind{\smc} we share between us that unity of consciousness 
which was said to be the mark of the individual.%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
I believe that the argument I have tried to express contains little if anything 
which contradicts the principles of either Realism or Idealism in their more 
satisfactory forms. There is an idealism with which I feel little sympathy, and 
there is a so-called realism which seems to me only distinguishable from that 
idealism by its attempt to evade its own necessary conclusions. But I do not wish 
to appear as a combatant in the battle between what I believe to be the better forms 
of the theories. Indeed, if they are to be judged by such works as Joachim{\apo}s 
\emph{Nature of Truth} on the one hand and Prichard{\apo}s \emph{Kant{\apo}s Theory of Knowledge} and 
Carritt{\apo}s \emph{Theory of Beauty} on the other, I hope I have said nothing with which both 
sides would not to some extent agree{\smc} though I can hardly expect to avoid offending 
one or other---or both---by the way in which I put it.

The reader who has not studied the latter works should be warned that the 
\enquote{New Realism} criticised in, \emph{e.g.,} Professor Watson{\apo}s \emph{Philosophical Basis of Religion,} 
pp.~113-135, has no connexion with the realism which they defend. }
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

If it is said that the mark of the individual is not so 
much consciousness of an object as self-consciousness, 
and that each person{\apo}s self-consciousness is unique, this 
is in one way, I think, true. It is true in the sense 
that in all knowing I am conscious of myself as knowing, 
and also in the sense that I am aware of my own 
history as an active and conscious being. But I am 
not aware simply of my own awareness in general, but 
[\textbf{102}]
of this object as a thing I am thinking about{\smc} I may 
know that I am thinking, but not that I am thinking 
in the abstract{\smc} only that I am thinking about this 
thing. \hlt{Self-consciousness is not} in this sense, so far as 
I can see, \hlt{distinguishable from consciousness of reality 
in general}. In the other sense, self-consciousness 
being taken as knowledge of myself as a historical 
person, this knowledge is by no means confined to 
myself{\smc} others may in this sense know me better than 
I know myself. 

Another possible objection depends on distinguishing 
two elements in knowledge, or two senses in the word 
knowing. There is, first, knowledge in the sense of 
what I know, the object{\smc} and secondly, there is the 
activity of knowing, the effort which is involved as 
much in knowing as in anything else. Knowledge as 
a possession---the things we know---may be common to 
different minds, but, it may be said, knowledge in the 
sense of the activity of knowing is peculiar to the 
individual mind. It may perhaps be replied that since 
knowledge is admittedly an activity, an effort of the 
will, \hlt{there is no difference between thinking and 
willing to think}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{thought-unbidden}%
What of the thoughts that come to mind unbidden{\qmk}
How often does not somebody say, 
\enquote{I can{\apo}t stop thinking about $X$}{\qmk}
Perhaps one can appeal to the distinction 
recalled two paragraphs earlier
between thinking and imagining.
Of course imagining is commonly considered as an act of will too.
\enquote{Imagine,} commanded John Lennon.
In \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
Collingwood acknowledges the unbidden thought,
though it is not a troubling thought\cln
\begin{quotation}
I write these words sitting on the deck of a ship.
I lift my eyes and see a piece of string---%
a line, I must call it at sea---%
stretched more or less horizontally above me.
I find myself thinking,
\senquote{that is a clothes-line},
meaning that it was put there to hang washing on.
When I decide that it was put there for that purpose
I am presupposing that it was put there for some purpose\lips

The priority affirmed in the word presupposition is logical priority\lips

Nor did I mean that my thoughts about the clothes-line moved from
\senquote{that line is meant for something} to
\senquote{that line is meant to hang washing on}.
They might have moved in that way,
and if I had been thinking about the line in an orderly or scientific manner
I should have seen to it that they did move in that way{\smc}
but as a matter of fact they did not.
The thought \senquote{that is a clothes-line} came plump into my mind,
so far as I am aware, all at once and unheralded.
Only by a kind of analysis, when I reflect on it,
do I come to see that this was a presupposition I was making,
however little I was aware of it at the time.

Here lies the difference between the desultory and casual thinking
of our unscientific consciousness
and the orderly and systematic thinking we call science\lips
\cite[pp.~21--2]{Collingwood-EM}
\end{quotation}
\afterquote There are different grades of thinking.
There are also different grades of willing in general.
Some things we try hard to do{\smc} others, we do idly.
There is also \enquote{flow,} which Collingwood recognizes.
The editors of \emph{The Principles of History}
\cite[p.~lxi]{Collingwood-PH}
quote from his diary in the following part 
of their account of his trip to the Dutch East Indies\cln
  \begin{quote}
After receiving
the proofs of his \emph{Autobiography} on 22 February 1939, he worked the
following two days not only on that book, but also again on \emph{An
Essay on Metaphysics.} From then on, he worked almost daily on the
latter, both in Batavia and on the return voyage, apparently revising
substantial parts of it (when published, it bore the notation\cln\ \senquote{off
Cape St. Vincent, 2 April 1939}). The diary makes it clear, too, that,
through this period, Collingwood was also making his
\emph{Autobiography} ready for the press, and on 19 March he rewrote its
last chapter. \senquote{The Principles of History} is mentioned only twice. On
26 March we read{\cln} \senquote{Playing with \emph{Principles of History}}{\smc} and on the
following day{\cln} \senquote{Tried to begin ch.~IV of \emph{Principles of History} in the
morning---stuff wouldn{\apo}t flow. Stomach worse, in fact worse than it
has been yet. Very idle and uncomfortable all afternoon.} The next
day{\apo}s entry reads{\cln} \senquote{Spent day in bed nursing my stomach and
starving.} And that was the last time he worked on \senquote{The Principles of
History}.
  \end{quote}
\afterquote On March 12, Collingwood and other passengers had become sick,
apparently from the lobster mayonnaise \cite[p.~xvii]{Collingwood-EM}.}
%%%%%%%%%% 
And if two minds are identical in 
thinking the same thing, they are equally and for the 
same reason identical in willing to think the same thing. 
All knowing is the act of knowing, and therefore 
whatever is true of thinking \emph{sans phrase} is true of the 
act or volition of thinking. 

But the objection leads on to the second part of our 
subject. To distinguish thought as the consciousness 
of an object from thought as an act of the will is to 
appeal, as basis for the absolute plurality between 
persons, from the conception of knowledge to that of 
action{\smc} and with this point we must proceed to deal. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) In co-operation.} 

Every person, like every other fact in the world, 
is unique and has its own contribution to make to the 
whole{\smc} a contribution which cannot be made by any 
other. This need not be emphasised, and certainly 
[\textbf{103}]
cannot be questioned. It is as true of the intellect as of 
the will{\smc} and yet we found that the statement \enquote{my 
knowledge is my knowledge} must not be so inter\-%
preted as to exclude the complementary statement that 
my knowledge may also be yours. This fact, the fact 
of communication, led us to the conclusion that if and 
when knowledge became in this way common property, 
the minds concerned became the same mind. But \hlt{if 
two people can by communication share their know\-%
ledge, it seems equally certain that they may by co-%
operation share their aims and volitions}. My actions 
are my actions{\smc} but yet they are not exclusively mine. 

Just as our intellectual life consists very largely of 
the acquisition of knowledge from one person and the 
passing it on, when we have added what we can, to 
others, so our active life consists very largely of working 
at ideals which are the common property, if not of all 
mankind, at least of our particular society. Man does 
not struggle with either his intellectual or his moral 
problems in solitude. He receives each alike from his 
environment, and in solving them he is doing other 
people{\apo}s work as well as his own. 

Now if there is in this sense co-operation of wills, if 
two or more wills are bent on the same object, what is 
the conse\-quence{\qmk}

\hlt{A will is not, any more than an intellect, an engine\label{will-engine}
which produces certain results}. We are sometimes 
tempted to think of the will as a central power-installa\-%
tion somewhere in the depths of our personality, which 
can be connected up with a pump or a saw or any 
other machine we may desire to use. In this sense we 
distinguish the will from the faculties, the one as the 
motive power and the other as the machine which it 
operates. But the will is not simply crude energy, 
indifferently applicable to this end or to that. Will is 
not only the power of doing work but the power of 
choosing what work to do. \hlt{It is not in need of another 
faculty to direct and apply its energy}. Will is, in short, 
[\textbf{104}]
always the will to do this or that\cln\ it is always particular, 
never merely general. The distinction between the 
will and the things which it does is a quite abstract 
distinction, like that between human nature and men. 
Human nature simply means the various kinds of men{\smc} 
and my will is nothing more nor less than the things 
I do. 

We seem therefore to be led to the same conclusion 
here as in the case of thought. If two people will the 
same thing, the personal distinction between them has 
given way to an identity, in virtue of which the two can 
be described as one mind. 

\addsec{2. Identity and difference\cln---} 

It may be asked, if this identity were ever really 
established would it not be in fact self-destructive{\qmk} If 
the distinction between the two persons was absolutely 
cancelled, of what elements would the unity be com\-%
posed{\qmk} For a unity that is composed of no elements 
at all cannot be anything. Not only does it like Saturn 
devour its own children but like the Kilkenny cats it 
devours itself. In short, the stress laid on the com\-%
pleteness of the unity is fatal to the theory{\smc} for it 
turns the communion of different minds into a mere 
blank identity which is indistinguishable from a blank 
nothingness. 

There are, I think, two answers to this question. 
We have already admitted elsewhere that every whole 
must be a whole of parts, and that all identity must 
therefore be an identity of differences. But if we look 
for the differences in this identity, they appear in two 
different ways, one from the side of the subject and one 
from that of the object. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) This identity rests on,
does not destroy,
the freedom of the various wills concerned.}\label{already} 

It must not be forgotten that the unity we have 
described is a unity of minds. Its very existence 
depends on the harmony between the minds{\smc} and if 
by means of the unity one mind ceased to exist, the 
possibility of the union would vanish with it. For 
this reason the \hlt{identity of wills} does not result in a 
Spinozistic determinism of the one substance{\smc} for the 
[\textbf{105}]
identity \emph{consists in the fact that each wills the same thing}{\smc} 
it \hlt{is an identity} not existing as a fixed unchangeable 
fact but \emph{\hlt{depending for its existence on the continued harmony 
of the two persons}}. It does not unite them in spite of 
themselves, but because they choose to be united. 

---Then the distinction is not absolutely cancelled, 
if the parties are free to dissolve it{\smc} and if so, they 
retain their exclusive individuality all the time.---This 
looks unanswerable at first sight{\smc} but I think that it is 
really a quibble. The argument involved is, that \hlt{if a
mind or society is capable of becoming something, that 
proves that it really is that something all the time. 
This seems to me to imply principles and consequences 
which I cannot accept}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{And yet perhaps he has accepted such principles so far 
as to identify religion, theology, and philosophy.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Because a good man may some 
day forget himself and commit a crime, that proves 
(says the argument) that he was not really good at all\cln\ 
it shows that he had in him the germ of the crime. 
Undoubtedly he had, if by the germ is meant the 
freedom of will which makes crime possible{\smc} but to 
describe that as a germ of crime is most misleading, 
since the same thing is equally the germ of virtue. If 
by \enquote{germ} is meant any more than this---if it means 
a tendency which irresistibly grows into crime---then 
one must boldly reply that minds are not made like 
that{\smc} what they do, they do not in virtue of irresistible 
\enquote{tendencies} but because they choose to do it. 

So we should admit that \hlt{because of its freedom a 
mind may forfeit the unity, whether with itself or 
another, to which it has attained. But that does not 
mean that it never attained it}. For all the conquests 
of mind are made and held by its own freedom, held no 
longer than it has the strength to hold them{\smc} and it 
can only lose this strength by its own self-betrayal. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Nor does it destroy 
the infinite differences of truths and aims.} 

The identity also includes differences from the 
side of the object. If the object of the two minds 
was an abstract, undifferentiated one, then the two 
minds would also be a blank unity without difference. 
But this is not the case, for such an undifferentiated 
[\textbf{106}]
unity nowhere exists. In a sense, no two people ever 
do, or ever could, think or will exactly the same thing. 
This is not because unity is impossible{\smc} it is not 
because under the conditions of this imperfect world 
we can never get more than an approximation to it. 
\hlt{If an ideal were not fully attainable by us here and now 
it would not be a valid ideal for us here and now}. 
There is never an obligation to achieve the impossible. 

Any truth or ideal of conduct expresses itself under 
infinitely various aspects. A single truth never means 
quite the same thing to different minds{\smc} each person 
invests it with an emphasis, an application, peculiar to 
himself. This does not mean that it is not the same 
truth{\smc} the difference does not destroy the identity any 
more than identity destroys difference. It is only in 
the identity that the differences arise. 

The same is true of conduct. \hlt{My own duties are\label{duty} 
the duties dictated by my situation{\smc} no one else is 
in precisely my situa\-tion and therefore no one else can 
have the same duties. And for the same reason no one 
else can have exactly my desires}. But there is a com\-%
munity of aims{\smc} and this community is not the barren 
transmission of unchanging ideals, good or bad, in 
which social life is sometimes thought to consist, nor 
yet the equally abstract identity of the categorical 
imperative, which only applies to everybody and every 
situation because it abstracts from all the intricacies of real 
life. \hlt{The community of aims consists in the fact that 
what I want is something which I cannot have except 
with your help and that of every one else}. The object 
of my desire is one part of a whole which can only 
exist if the other parts exist\cln\ or, if that way of putting 
it is preferred, I desire the existence of a whole to 
which I can only contribute one among many parts. 
The other parts must be contributed by other people{\smc} 
and therefore in willing my part I will theirs also. 


\addsec{3. Abstract and concrete identity\cln---}\label{unity}

The unity whose possibility we are concerned 
to prove is the fully concrete identification, by their 
[\textbf{107}]
own free activity, of two or more personalities. This 
is not a universal condition, but an ideal{\smc} it is the 
goal, not the starting-point, of human endeavour. 
But \hlt{every real advance is like the spiral tunnel of 
an Alpine railway{\smc} it ends, if not where it began, at 
least immediately above it}. The end is not the 
antithesis of the beginning, but the same thing raised 
to a higher power. The end is a unity, and the 
beginning is also a unity{\smc} but they are not the same 
unity. There is one perfectly concrete identity which 
consists in the highest degree of co-operation and the 
freest interchange of activities, and is destroyed when 
these fail\cln\ and there is another, an abstract, irreducible 
and indefeasible identity or union which subsists 
between any two parts of the same whole, and must 
continue to subsist as long as they remain parts. The 
whole, in each case alike, may equally be a society or a 
single person. We cannot maintain that a person is 
simply a necessary, indefeasible unity of those things 
which constitute his character, while a society is entirely 
dependent for its unity on the positive and conscious 
co-operation of its members, failing which it is no 
longer a society at all. A person is undoubtedly him\-%
self, and can never help being himself, whatever he 
does{\smc} but this merely abstract unity, this bare 
minimum of self-identity, is much less than what we 
usually call his character or personality. That is rather 
constituted by the definite and concrete system of his 
various activities or habits. When we say, \enquote{I know 
his character, I am sure he will do this and not that,} 
we mean that there is this systematic relation%%%%%
\footnoteA{%
Not deterministic, because dependent for its very existence, as we said above, 
on his will{\smc} and therefore capable of being infringed by his will.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
between 
the different things he does, so that we can argue from 
one of them to the others{\smc} that the connexion between 
his various actions is not the purely abstract connexion 
that they happen all to have been done by the same 
person. If there were no more than this abstract 
[\textbf{108}]
unity, we could not say that a man had any positive 
\enquote{character} at all. To say \enquote{he is not himself to-day} 
appears, if we hold to the purely abstract sense of 
\enquote{self,} merely ridiculous{\smc} but in the concrete sense 
of \enquote{self,} the sense in which the self is conceived as a 
co-operating unity of purpose, it has a perfectly real 
meaning. 

The same distinction applies to the unity of a 
society. In one sense, any kind of relation between 
two people produces a kind of social union and 
identification{\smc} in another sense, only the right kind of 
relation unifies them, and a different relation would 
destroy the unity. In the first case, their union is 
what I call the purely abstract unity{\smc} in the latter, it 
is the concrete unity that has to be maintained by 
positive and harmonious activity. We cannot there\-%
fore say that, of these two kinds of unity, one is the 
kind proper to a person, and the other the kind 
proper to a society{\smc} for each alike may apply to 
either. But, having examined the nature of the con\-%
crete unity, it is necessary that we should also examine, 
and indeed demonstrate the existence of, this abstract 
unity. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The necessary identity of parts in a whole,
distinct as abstract identity from the concrete (contingent)
identity above described.}

But is unity the same as identity{\qmk} There seems 
at first sight to be a very decided difference between 
saying that two things are part of the same whole, 
and saying that they are the same thing{\smc} the parts of 
one thing seem to be themselves quite separate and 
self-existent things, possibly depending on each other, 
but each being what it is itself, and not the others{\smc} 
while the whole is simply their sum. 

We have already expressed doubts as to the strict 
truth of this conception. We said in the last chapter 
that if a whole was to be knowable, it must be of 
such a kind that the parts are not simply added in 
series to one another, but interconnected in such a way 
that we can somehow say that each part is the whole. 
In that case each part would also be in a sense the 
[\textbf{109}]
others. At the time this may have seemed highly 
fanciful, if not a counsel of despair. What right, it 
will be asked, have we to lay down \emph{a priori} what must 
be the nature of reality merely on the ground that 
if it is not thus, it is not knowable{\qmk} \hlt{How do we 
know that reality is knowable}{\qmk} And even if we are 
assured on that point, and legitimately assured, is it 
not a monstrous inversion of the true order to argue 
from knowability to reality{\qmk} 

I am not sure that it is. Knowledge is as much a 
fact as any other{\smc} and if the business of a sound 
theory is to account for the facts, a theory which does 
not admit of the world{\apo}s being completely known is, 
to say the least of it, incomplete. The modern 
impatience with such forms of argument may be 
partly based on their connexion with false theories 
of what knowability means, but it is certainly due in 
part to the \hlt{prejudice that the facts of the external 
world are certain, while the nature of knowledge and 
the processes of mind are unknown}{\smc} so that to argue 
to the nature of the real world from the nature of the 
mind is arguing from the unknown to the known, 
attempting to lay down by insecure deductions from 
a discredited metaphysic things which could be easily 
ascertained by appealing to the natural sciences. This 
\enquote{positivistic} attitude is lamentably self-contradictory{\smc} 
for if we are not to believe in the full knowability of 
the world, what becomes of the facts of science{\qmk} And 
if we are, why should we hush the matter up{\qmk} We 
cannot pretend ignorance of the nature of knowing 
while we claim that science gives us real knowledge 
and philosophy only a sham. 

I think therefore that we need not retract the 
argument. But as it stood it was incomplete{\smc} for 
it merely sketched the conditions of a satisfactory 
view of the relation of the whole to its parts, without 
explaining how they can be fulfilled. 

Let us take as an instance any whole consisting of 
[\textbf{110}]
three parts, $x$, $y$, $z$. It makes no difference whether 
it is a machine with three working parts, a society of 
three members, a stanza of three lines, or a syllogism 
containing three propositions. Each part has its own 
nature, its own individuality, which is in the strictest 
sense unique{\smc} and apart from the contribution made 
by each several element the whole would not exist. 
Change one part, and the whole becomes a different 
whole. Not only does the whole change, but the 
apparently unchanged parts change too. Substitute, 
in a tragic stanza, a grotesque last word, and the 
opening lines become suddenly instinct with ridiculous 
possibilities. Substitute in the society a new third 
man, and not only is it now a different society but the 
social value and function of the unchanged members is 
altered. 

On the other hand, the part that is removed is no 
longer what it was. A man may resign his place in 
a society because he feels that he is no longer what the 
society requires him to be{\smc} and in that case his 
resignation gives him a new freedom. If he leaves 
it with no such reason, his personality is mutilated by 
the separation{\smc} one side of his character is cut off 
and frustrated. The separation of the part from the 
whole destroys part and whole alike. The part survives 
only as something different from what it was{\smc} it has 
to readjust itself, if it can, and become something else. 
If it cannot do this, it dies outright. The whole must 
in the same way readjust itself to the new conditions 
and become a different whole\cln\ otherwise it also dies. 

It follows from this closeness of interconnexion 
between the whole and its parts that the question 
\enquote{what is $x$\qmk}\ cannot be answered merely by saying 
\enquote{$x$ is $x$.} $X$ only exists as $x$ in relation to $y$ and $z$. 
If $y$ or $z$ were removed, $x$ would no longer be what 
it was\cln\ it would have to become something else, or 
failing that, cease to exist at all. Consequently if we 
ask for a definition or description of $x$ the only true 
[\textbf{111}]
reply is to describe it in its full relations with $y$ and $z$. 
That is to say, a definition of $x$ can only take the 
form of a definition of the whole system $xyz$. To 
explain the nature of the part we have to explain the 
nature of the whole{\smc} there seems to be no distinction 
between the part and the whole, except that the part 
is the whole under one particular aspect, seen as it 
were from one point of view. In the same way and in 
the same sense $y$ and $z$ are identical each with the 
whole and with each other and $x$. Each part is the 
whole, and each part is all the other parts. 

A distinction is sometimes drawn which avoids this 
conclusion. There is, we are told, a difference between 
what a thing is in itself and what it is in relation to its 
context or to the whole of which it is a part. $X$ as a 
thing in itself remains (it is said) the same\cln\ it is only 
its relations with other things that change, and these 
are merely external, and do not affect its real nature. 
It is true that nothing is really destroyed by depriving 
it of its context. But this is only because we cannot 
deprive it of all context. A lintel taken out of its 
place in a house and laid on the ground has a context, 
though not an architectural context{\smc} and Robinson 
Crusoe in his solitude has a perfectly definite environ\-%
ment, though not a human environment. However 
much we try to remove all context from a thing, we 
can do no more than to invest the thing with a 
different context. Indeed, there is a sense in which we 
may still call the stone a lintel and Robinson Crusoe 
the member of a human society{\smc} for the history of a 
thing in the past and its capabilities for the future are 
as real as its present situation, though in a different 
way. The isolated stone lying on the ground may 
still be called a lintel{\smc} but this is so only on account 
of the house from which it came (strictly, it \emph{is} a 
stone that \emph{was} a lintel), or into which it will be 
built (it is a stone that \emph{will be} a lintel), or even be\-%
cause of the imaginary house which we can, so to speak, 
[\textbf{112}]
construct round it now (it is a stone that \emph{might be} a 
lintel). 

The character or self of a thing, what it is, cannot 
be distinguished from its relations. Architecturally, the 
stone \emph{is} a lintel{\smc} that is its own character. But this 
character only consists in the fact that it stands in a 
certain relation to other stones which together with it 
make up the doorway. Geologically, the description of 
the stone is identical with the description of its place in 
the geological series. Every characteristic of the thing 
turns out to consist in a relation in which it stands to 
something else{\smc} and similarly, if we began at the other 
end we should find that every relation consists in a 
quality of the thing itself. This double movement is 
only not a vicious circle because, of the two things 
which thus turn into one another, each is already 
identical with the other. 

The inner nature of the part $x$ then, is entirely con\-%
stituted by its relations to $y$ and $z$. And therefore $x$ 
is simply one way of looking at the whole $xyz${\smc} and 
$y$ and $z$ are other aspects of the same whole. The 
part is not added to other parts in order to make 
the whole\cln\ it is already in itself the whole, and the 
whole has other parts only in the sense that it can 
be looked at from other points of view, seen in other 
aspects. But in each aspect the whole is entirely 
present. 

If we take the case of a musical duet, we have a 
whole which is analysable into two parts. At first 
sight, we might be tempted to describe the relation 
between them in some such way as this\cln\ there are two 
separate things, two musical compositions, one called the 
treble and the other the bass. Each is an independent 
reality, has a tune of its own, and can be played 
separately. On the other hand, they are so arranged 
that they can also be played both at once{\smc} and when 
this happens, they produce an {\ae}sthetic value greater 
than either can produce by itself. The whole is the 
[\textbf{113}] 
sum of its parts{\smc} and the parts in combination remain 
exactly what they were before. 

This description seems at first sight reasonable{\smc} and 
it is familiar as underlying, for instance, the Wagnerian 
view of opera. If you take two arts and add them 
together---so that view runs---you produce a new art 
twice as great as either.

But is the {\ae}sthetic value of a duet really equal to 
the sum of the values of its parts played separately{\qmk} 
No such thing. The query of one instrument may 
indeed be in itself a beautiful phrase, independently of 
the answer given by the other{\smc} but as seen in relation 
to that answer it acquires a totally different emphasis, 
a meaning which we never suspected. The accompani\-%
ment part, or even the solo part, played by itself, is 
simply not the same thing that it is when played in its 
proper relation to the other. It is this relation between 
the two that constitutes the duet. The performers arc 
not doing two different things, which combine as if 
by magic to make a harmonious whole{\smc} they are co-%
operating to produce one and the same thing, a thing 
not in any sense divisible into parts{\smc} for the \enquote{thing}
itself is only a relation, an interchange, a \emph{balance between}
the elements which at first we mistook for its parts. 
The notes played by the piano are not the same notes 
as those played by the violin{\smc} and if the duet was a 
merely physical fact, we could divide it into these two 
elements. But the duet is an {\ae}sthetic, not a physical 
whole. It consists not of atmospheric disturbances, 
which could be divided, but of a harmony between 
sounds, and a harmony cannot be divided into the 
sounds between which it subsists. 

The same is true of any really organic whole. A 
scene of Shakspere can be regarded as so much \enquote{words, 
words, words,} and, when so regarded, it can be divided 
into what Hamlet says and what Polonius says. But 
the real scene is not mere words{\smc} it is the interplay 
of two characters. It is one thing, not two. To sub-
[\textbf{114}]
divide it would be not to halve but to destroy its value. 
\hlt{Even a baby can be cut in two, if it is regarded as a 
mere piece of flesh{\smc} but the resulting portions would 
be the halves not of a baby but of a corpse}. 

\hlt{A unity of this kind exists} not only in harmonious 
and fully co-operative wholes, but \hlt{equally in everything 
that can be called a whole at all}. Whatever the par\-%
ticular relation in which $x$ stands to $y$ and $z$, it is still 
true that each part is but an aspect of the whole and\label{each-part}
identical with the other parts. $X$, $y$, and $z$ may be 
parties to a quarrel{\smc} but they are in that case just as 
much parts of the same whole, just as closely identified 
with one another, as if they were allies in a common 
cause. \hlt{This kind of identity, therefore, is to be sharply 
distinguished from} the \hlt{contingent unity, the unity of 
co-operation}, which we described at the beginning of 
this chapter. \hlt{Upon this distinction turns the whole 
argument of this and the succeeding chapters}. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Importance of this distinction in philosophy or religion.
An \enquote{Absolute,} or a God, must be concrete.}

The universal and necessary identity, the abstract 
identity of mere co-existence, is often taken as supplying 
the key to all the difficulties with which the religious 
or philosophical mind feels itself beset when it deals 
with the problem of personality. All personalities are 
components of a whole, the universe{\smc} and therefore, by 
the above argument, they are all necessarily identified 
with each other and the whole, that is, with the 
universe considered as homogeneous with them, an 
absolute mind, God. The line of thought seems to be 
simple and impossible to refute\cln\ and if this is really 
so, it establishes at a blow the existence of God and his 
perfect immanence in humanity, and leaves nothing 
more to be achieved or desired. 

To reject such an argument altogether would 
certainly be a mistake. It is true that, whether we like 
it or not, whether we live up to our position or deny 
our responsibilities, we are so intimately connected with 
each other and the divine mind that no act concerns the 
doer alone. This assumption is fundamental. But the 
[\textbf{115}] 
error lies in mistaking this fundamental assumption for 
the final conclusion{\smc} in assuming that this elementary, 
abstract unity is the only one which concerns us. In 
point of fact, it concerns us, if at all, certainly in the 
very lowest possible degree. In practical matters, a 
constant which is always present and can never be 
altered is best ignored{\smc} and indeed this purely abstract 
identity is so shadowy a thing that it is hard to see 
what else to do. To call this formless and empty 
abstraction \enquote{the Absolute} is merely to abuse language{\smc} 
and to suppose that this is all philosophy has to offer 
in place of the concrete God of religion is completely 
to misunderstand the nature and aim of philosophy. 
There have been and no doubt still are people who 
claim the title of philosophers on the ground that they 
habitually amuse themselves with abstractions of this 
kind. But it is a pity that their claims have been and 
still are taken seriously. 

The Absolute, as that word is used by any philo\-%
sophy worthy of the name, is not a label for the bare 
residuum, blank existence, which is left when all dis\-%
crepancies have been ignored and all irregularities planed 
away. An arbitrary smoothing-down of the world{\apo}s 
wrinkled crust is not philosophy, but the vice against 
which all philosophy wages an unceasing war. \hlt{A real 
philosophy builds its Absolute (for every philosophy 
has an Absolute) out of the differences of the world as 
it finds them}, dealing individually with all contradictions 
and preserving every detail that can lend character to 
the whole. 

Here as elsewhere \hlt{the instinct of religion is the 
deliberate procedure of philosophy at its best}. When 
religion demands a personal God, a God who has a 
definite character of his own and can, as the phrase 
goes, take sides in the battles of the world, it is really 
asserting the necessity for this concrete characterised 
Absolute, as against a sham \enquote{philosophy,} the philo\-%
sophy of abstractions, which assures it that since God 
[\textbf{116}]
is all, he cannot have any one attribute rather than its 
opposite{\smc} that since he is infinite, he cannot be a 
person{\smc} that since he is the strength of both sides, the 
slayer and the slain, he cannot himself fight on either 
side. In the Absolute, we are told, all contradictions 
are resolved, and therefore all distinctions vanish{\smc} good 
and evil are no more, for that of which each is a 
manifestation cannot itself be either. A personal God, 
creating the world and sustaining it by the might of 
his will, is a mythological fiction. A God who is in 
any sense transcendent and not purely immanent is 
inconceivable, and even imaginable only to the half-%
savage mind which anthropomorphises everything it 
does not immediately understand. 

So \enquote{philosophy} browbeats common sense till the 
latter for very shame yields the point{\smc} tries to recast 
its religion,, if it still ventures to have one, on lines of 
pure immanence, and if it cannot make the immanent 
God seem as real and vivid as the transcendent, humbly 
puts the failure down to its own philosophical short\-%
comings. For \enquote{philosophy} has assured it that Reality, 
properly faced and understood, will more than console 
it for its lost fairyland. There is little ground for 
surprise if after such experiences religion hates and 
despises the very name of philosophy. The formless 
and empty Absolute of this abstract metaphysic perished 
long ago in the fire of Hegel{\apo}s sarcasm{\smc} and it is curious 
to find the very same pseudo-Absolute, the \enquote{night in 
which all cows are black,} still regarded as being for 
good or evil the essence of philosophical thought. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) A perfectly good and wise God is conceivable,
but it seems necessary to conceive him as finite,
i.e. \emph{qua} God non-existent.
This is the Problem of Evil.}

It is time to leave these abstractions and turn to 
the other kind of identity, the concrete identity of 
activity. A mind is self-identical in this sense if it 
thinks and wills the same things constantly{\smc} it is identical 
with another, if it thinks and wills the same things as 
that other. This might seem to imply that in the first 
case there was no possibility of change or process within 
the limits of the self-identity{\smc} and in the second case 
[\textbf{117}]
that the personal distinction between the two minds was 
reduced to a mere illusion. But, (i.)\ so far is it from 
being true that a thing to be self-identical must not 
change, the very fact of change proves its continued 
identity{\smc} for only a thing which is still itself can be said 
to have changed. This however is abstract identity only, 
and it might be imagined that concrete identity was not 
compatible with change. But this is a mistake. It is 
the property of truth to present itself under the aspect 
of innumerable differences{\smc} and yet within these differ\-%
ences it is still one. If we reflect upon some particular 
fact, we can see it take under our eyes a hundred different 
forms, emphases, shades of meaning. In following out 
this process, it does in a quite concrete sense change{\smc} 
and the thinking of this change is a real mental process, 
in the only sense in which any thought can bear that 
name. (ii.)\ The identity of two minds which think the 
same thing does, as we have already seen, in one sense 
abolish the difference between them{\smc} but this very 
abolition is only possible through the free and independent 
activity of each separate mind. Difference is not simply 
absent{\smc} it is overcome. 

Now these two cases are typical first of the self-%
identity of God, and secondly of his identity with the 
human mind. God is not a mere abstract unity{\smc} he is 
a mind, and as such he can possess the higher unity of 
self-consistency. This attribute must necessarily belong 
to him if we are right in regarding him as omniscient 
and perfectly good. An omniscient mind is one whose 
beliefs are never false, and whose field of knowledge is 
not limited by any ignorance. This is the only type of 
mind which can be described as entirely consistent with 
itself. Any false belief, introduced into a system of 
judgments otherwise true, must breed contradiction{\smc} for 
its implications cannot be developed to infinity without 
coming into conflict with some other belief. Again, 
any limitation, any gap in one{\apo}s knowledge, may have 
the same result{\smc} for different truths often seem to 
[\textbf{118}]
conflict until new knowledge explains them both and 
shows them to be harmonious. But two truths can never 
in reality contradict one another, and therefore a mind 
which believed all truths would have within itself no 
contradiction at all. 

In the same way, we can conceive a mind which 
willed, not indeed all the actions, but all the good actions 
in existence. Of the different actions in the world, 
some are in antagonism to others, and therefore it is 
impossible for a mind to will both except at the cost of 
losing its concrete unity, its own positive nature, and 
becoming a formless something indistinguishable from 
nothing. A mind which willed all the good in existence 
would display this concrete unity to the full{\smc} for two 
duties, two good things, can no more conflict than two 
true things. 

Each of these conflicts does often seem to take place. 
Two statements which contradict each other do very 
often seem to be, each from its own point of view and 
within its own limitations, true. And two people who 
are supporting opposed causes may seem to be both in 
the right. But in the former case we know that the 
conflict is only apparent{\smc} that if each disputant under\-%
stood the other, it would in so far as each is right 
disappear. And similarly in the other case, though the 
fact is not such a universally recognised axiom in ethics 
as the \enquote{law of contradiction} is in logic, it is true that 
of the two opponents one, or possibly both, must be in 
the wrong{\smc} or, if that is not the case, the opposition 
between them must be illusory. Good is self-consistent 
just as truth is{\smc} and Just as a mind which believes all 
truth is supremely self-consistent and self-identical, so 
it is with a mind which wills all good. 

Further, this divine mind will become one with all 
other minds so far as they share its thought and volition{\smc} 
so far, that is, as they know any truth or will any good. 
And this unity between the two is not the merely 
abstract identity of co-existence, but the concrete identity 
[\textbf{119}]
of co-operation. The abstract unity would remain even 
in the case of a mind which (if that be possible) knew 
nothing true and did nothing right. There is a sense 
in which whether we will it or not we are indissolubly, 
by our very existence, one with God{\smc} that bond it is 
not in our power to break. But the highest and most 
real identity with him we can only possess in the know\-%
ledge of truth and the pursuit of goodness. 

Thus God is at once immanent and transcendent{\smc} 
and man can be regarded as, on the one hand, a part of 
the universal divine spirit, and on the other, as a person 
separate from God and capable of opposition to him. 
God is immanent because all human knowledge and 
goodness are the very indwelling of his spirit in the 
mind of man{\smc} transcendent because, whether or not 
man attains to these things, God has attained to them{\smc} 
his being does not depend upon the success of human 
endeavour. 

Such a mind as this, omniscient and perfectly good, 
is con\-ceivable{\smc} but the conception may be called a mere 
hypothesis. I think it is more than this. Every good 
man, and every seeker after truth, is really, even if 
unconsciously, co-operating with every other in the ideal 
of a complete science or a perfect world{\smc} and if co-%
operating, then identified with the other and with an 
all-embracing purpose of perfection. There really is 
such a purpose, which lives in the lives of all good men 
wherever they are found, and unifies them all into a life 
of its own. This is God immanent{\smc} and it is no mere 
hypothesis. Is it equally certain that he also exists as 
transcendent, or does that remain a hypothesis, incapable 
of proof{\qmk} Is God only existent as a spirit in our hearts, 
or is he also a real person with a life of his own, whether 
we know him or not{\qmk} 

The difficulty of answering this question is bound up 
with a well-known philosophical puzzle, the puzzle of 
how to prove the existence of anything except as present 
to the mind. If it is true that things cease to exist when 
[\textbf{120}]
we are not thinking of them, and that the people whom 
we generally suppose to be real independendy of our 
dealings with them exist only as and when we are con\-%
scious of them, then it follows by the same argument 
that God is immanent only, and exists nowhere but in 
the minds of men. But we cannot really believe that 
these things are so. And \hlt{to suppose that the spirit of 
goodness of which we are conscious in our hearts has its 
being there and there alone is no less fantastic than to 
suppose that the friends with whom we converse are only 
the projection upon nothingness of our own imagination}. 
The arguments for pure immanence are at bottom 
identical with the philosophical creed of subjective ideal\-%
ism, and with that creed they stand or fall. 

This conception of God as perfectly wise and good 
avoids at least the faults of an indefinite and empty 
abstraction. But is it any more than the other horn of 
an inevitable dilemma{\qmk} God, as we have conceived his 
nature, is good indeed, but not omnipotent{\smc} wise, but 
unable entirely to control the world which he knows. 
He is the totality of truth and goodness, the Absolute 
of all the good there is{\smc} but the world{\apo}s evil remains 
outside this totality, recalcitrant to the power of God 
and superior to his jurisdiction. 

Here, it is sometimes said, lies the parting of the 
ways between religion and philosophy. Religion must 
at all costs have a God with a definite character of his 
own{\smc} philosophy must have an all-embracing totality, 
a rounded and complete universe. And \hlt{when it is found 
that God, to be good, cannot be all, then religion and 
philosophy accept different horns of the dilemma}, and 
from this point travel in different directions. 

\begin{sloppypar}
\hlt{But such a solution really annihilates both philosophy 
and religion}. The \enquote{universe} which philosophy is 
supposed to choose is again the empty abstraction of a 
something which is nothing definite{\smc} it is not an Ab\-%
solute, but only the indication of an unsolved problem. 
And for religion too the problem is unsolved{\smc} for it 
[\textbf{121}]
refuses, and rightly refuses, to believe that a limited 
God is its last word. It cannot accept the antithesis 
between God and the world as final. Either it declares 
its faith in his ultimate omnipotence, in the final identi\-%
fication of the seemingly opposed terms, or it relapses 
into the pessimism of a forlorn hope which can do no 
more than hurl defiance at a world of evil which it 
cannot conquer. Of these alternatives, the highest re\-%
ligious faith unhesitatingly chooses the first, at the risk 
or being accused of a sentimental optimism. But the 
attitude so chosen is the only consistent one{\smc} for the 
pessimist{\apo}s defiance of the world already achieves in some 
degree that very victory which he pronounces impossible. 
\end{sloppypar}

Each solution, then, the undefined Absolute and the 
limited God, is provisional only, a working hypothesis 
and no more. An undefined Absolute is not an Ab\-%
solute, and a limited God is not a God. Each alike can 
only be made satisfactory by acquiring the character 
of the other{\smc} and hence the problems of religion and 
philosophy are one and the same. 

This brings us face to face with the question of evil. 
How can a world whose elements are at variance with 
one another be, except in a merely abstract sense, one 
world at all{\qmk} How can the existence of a perfectly 
good God be reconciled with the reality of minds whose 
will is the very antithesis of his own{\qmk} 

\mychap{IV}{Evil}

\addsec{1.  Statement of the problem\cln---}

\textsc{The} difficulty with which we have to deal is 
expressed by the simple religious mind in the form of the 
question, \enquote{Why does God, being good, allow the existence 
of evil in his world{\qmk}} And, in the absence of any im\-%
mediate answer, the solution is suggested with almost 
irresistible force that God, if omnipotent, cannot be 
really good. We have indicated in outline the conception 
of a God who united in himself all goodness{\smc} but the 
existence of evil seems to prove that if he exists he is no 
more than one among many limited minds, good so far 
as he goes but not able to expel all evil from the universe. 
If it persists in the refusal to exchange a real God for a 
colourless Absolute, religion seems forced to accept a 
God who is hardly more than another good man. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The problem not peculiar to religion{\smc}
it is a philosophical problem, and therefore not insoluble.}

We are apt to suppose that this is the nemesis 
of a peculiar weakness in religion. If it had adopted 
the more rigorous and thoughtful methods of philosophy, 
we imagine, it would have avoided these dilemmas and 
perplexities. It has committed itself to a mythological 
and fanciful procedure, half-way between thinking and 
dreaming, and this is the result. I think such an ex\-%
planation is entirely superficial and untrue. The prob\-%
lem expressed above in religious language can be readily 
translated into terms of philosophy, and constitutes for 
philosophy as serious a difficulty as it does for religion. 
It may be roughly sketched from this point of view as 
follows{\cln} 
[\textbf{123}]

If the world is will, it must be a will of some definite 
kind{\smc} a good will, for instance, or a bad will. But 
things are done in the universe which fall under each of 
these classes. If one part is bad, how can we call the 
whole good, or \emph{vice versa}{\qmk} We may try to evade the 
difficulty by replying that the world is not one will but 
many wills{\smc} or (which comes to the same thing) a single 
will fluctuating between good and bad. This is no 
doubt true{\smc} but is it a society of wills\qmk\ and if so, why 
is its behaviour not social{\qmk} Again, we may reply that 
it is not really will at all in the ordinary sense, but mere 
matter or a \enquote{blind will,} which does not know what it 
is doing, or a \enquote{super-moral will,} which does not care. 
But we cannot escape by taking refuge in materialism{\smc} 
for a materialistic universe could never give rise to the 
conflicts of which we complain. \hlt{A universe which was 
purely mechanical would be perfectly smooth and self-%
consistent in its behaviour{\smc} for machines only \enquote{go 
wrong} relatively to the purpose of their makers}. Nor 
do the other hypotheses improve matters{\smc} for they do 
not explain how the conflicting elements came into exist\-%
ence. If the universe had a \enquote{blind will,} it could not 
include in it my will which is not blind. If the Absolute 
were superior to moral distinctions, it would exclude 
instead of including the consciousness of a moral person. 

\begin{sloppypar}
And indeed \hlt{a \enquote{blind will} is a contradiction in 
terms}, for a will which did not know what it was doing 
would be not a will but an automaton, a mechanism. 
And \hlt{a \enquote{super-moral Absolute} is}, I think, \hlt{a no less 
contradictory idea}{\smc} for it implies that the Absolute is 
something which does not explain but merely contradicts 
the things we know{\smc} that reality is not richer or fuller 
than experience but simply different, so that experience 
is illusory and reality unknowable. 
\end{sloppypar}

Philosophy has, no doubt, some answer for these ques\-%
tions. But so, within its own system of ideas, has 
religion. For each, the problem is one of extreme diffi\-%
culty{\smc} for neither is it literally insoluble. \hlt{A philo}-
[\textbf{124}]
\hlt{sophical problem cannot be insoluble}, though it may be 
too hard for you or me to solve satisfactorily, and it 
may quite well be insoluble in terms of a certain theory 
which is so framed as to ignore or deny the facts on 
which the solution depends. But a theory which shows 
this kind of deficiency is, strictly speaking, incapable of 
solving not only that particular problem but all problems 
connected with it, that is to say, since all philosophical 
problems are interconnected, all problems whatever. A 
question is only unanswerable when the data for answer\-%
ing it are not in our possession{\smc} for instance, we may 
ask in vain for historical information about a fact of 
which there are no records. But in philosophical ques\-%
tions the data are ready to our hand, and only require 
analysis and description. \hlt{The same is true of theological 
problems}. In the language of orthodoxy, \hlt{God has re\-%
vealed his nature to man}, if man will receive the revela\-%
tion{\smc} in philosophical terms, the character of the perfect 
or ideal mind is implicit even in the imperfections of 
mind as we know it. We must assume then that the 
problem is soluble and see what we can do towards 
solving it. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Subordinate questions\cln---}

It is important to state as clearly as possible 
wherein the problem consists. I think we may dis\-%
tinguish three different questions, each of which may be 
asked about three different things{\smc} and all these ques\-%
tions are liable to be presented simultaneously as the 
Problem of Evil. Ultimately, no doubt, they cannot be 
separated{\smc} but it does not promote their solution if we 
fail to distinguish them at all. The three things are 
error, pain, and evil{\smc} understanding always by evil the 
badness of a will. The three questions are, first, How is 
the thing to be defined or described\qmk\ second, How does 
it come to exist\qmk\ and third, What does it prove\qmk\ what 
can be the character of the whole of which it forms 
a part{\qmk} 

\addsubsubsec{i. Pain.} 

I think, though not without great hesitation, that 
the problem of pain in general is not the same as the 
[\textbf{125}]
problem of the other two forms of evil. When people 
speak of the \enquote{problem of pain,} they seem generally to 
mean by it some question like this{\cln} \enquote{Why, if God is 
as you assert both omnipotent and benevolent, does he 
permit his creatures to suffer things which any kindly-%
disposed man would give his life to prevent{\qmk} Either 
God allows these things, in which case he is less bene\-%
volent than man, or else he, too, would like to stop 
them, in which case he is as impotent as ourselves.} 

Now it is not difficult to see that this question 
assumes as obvious a certain theory of God which may 
be described as purely transcendent theism. God is 
conceived as a ruler imposing his will on a passive 
creation by means of laws in whose effect he does not 
share. It seems to me that the sting of the problem 
entirely vanishes if the distinction between activity and 
passivity is removed{\smc} if, in other words, we conceive 
God not as imposing his will on the world from 
without, but as himself sharing in all the experiences of 
other minds. Some such view as this we are now assum\-%
ing as proved{\smc} for the result of the last two chapters 
will not permit us to regard the creator as severed 
from his creation, or the whole as external to its parts. 

It is sometimes said that all pain is due to an 
evil will, which inflicts it directly upon sufferers or, 
indirectly, upon the wrongdoer himself. All pain is 
thus either the natural consequence of sin, recoiling on 
the head of the sinner, or else the effect of his sin on 
others. If that were so, pain would be absent from a 
universe in which there was no evil, in the strict sense 
of that word{\smc} and the problem of pain would be 
identified with the problem of the bad will. 

This is a position which, as I suggested above, I do 
not feel able to accept. Evil wills are responsible for 
a vast proportion of existing pain\cln\ for much more, 
perhaps, than we generally imagine. And empirically, 
I suppose, the nearest approach to a painless life is 
to be found in the companionship of persons whose 
[\textbf{126}]
attitude towards one another most nearly approaches 
to perfect love and harmony. On the other hand---%
empirically once more---\hlt{the attainment of any fulness 
and depth of experience seems to be necessarily painful 
as well as pleasant}, even for the noblest minds.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I think Collingwood is describing the pain of \emph{growth,}
as in:
\settowidth{\versewidth}{What is this new thing, which consumes}%
\begin{myverse}[\versewidth]
Of course it hurts when buds burst.\\
Otherwise why would spring hesitate\qmk\\
Why would all our fervent longing\\
be bound in the frozen bitter haze\qmk\\
The bud was the casing all winter.\\
What is this new thing, which consumes and bursts\qmk\\
Of course it hurts when buds burst,\\
pain for that which grows\\
and for that which envelops.
\end{myverse}
\afterquote Thus Swedish poet Karin Boye,
in translation.%%%%%
\footnoteC{\url{http://www.karinboye.se/verk/dikter/dikter-engelska/of-course-it-hurts.shtml}}
But it could be that Collingwood{\apo}s esthetic pain is something else.}
%%%%%%%%%%%
{\AE}sthetic experiences like hearing music (or, again, 
seeing a play finely acted) involve a kind of pain 
which is very acute, and cannot be confused with the 
pain of hearing bad music or music badly played. 
There seems to be something of this nature---what we 
might call a tragic element---in all the highest forms 
of life. It does involve pain{\smc} but it also involves 
pleasure, which transfuses the pain while it does not 
for a moment disguise its painfulness. 

If this view of the matter is right, \hlt{the practical 
problem of pain is not how to avoid it but how to lift 
it to a heroic level}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Or is the \enquote{practical problem} 
at least to \emph{learn} from pain{\qmk}
One of the essays in the application for admission to St John{\apo}s College
concerned an experience that one had one had somehow learned, benefited, 
or profited from (I do not recall the wording exactly.
I wrote about an acute headache, 
brought on by a certain form of over-exertion.}%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and the presence of pain in the 
world is not a contradiction or an abatement of the 
world{\apo}s value and perfection. Pain may make the 
world difficult to live in{\smc} but do we really want an 
easier world{\qmk} And if we sometimes think we do, do 
we not recognise that the wish is unworthy{\qmk} 

At any rate, the wish is useless. I do not think it 
serves any purpose to imagine hypothetical worlds in 
which this or that element of the real would be absent. 
And it does seem to me that pain is such an element. 
Whether or no it is always due to our own imperfection 
or sin or the sin or imperfection of others, it cannot 
ever be eliminated, simply because a perfection of the 
type required can surely never exist in a world of free 
agents{\smc} because \hlt{even if no one did wrong, the effort 
of doing right would still be difficult and painful just 
so long as the practical problems offered by the world 
were worth solving}. Pain seems to involve imperfection 
only in the sense in which any one who has a thing to 
do and has not yet done it is imperfect{\smc} and in that 
sense imperfection is only another name for activity 
and perfection for death. 
[\textbf{127}]

\addsubsubsec{ii. How does evil arise\qmk} 

Error and evil are more difficult even than pain 
to assign, as they stand, to a place in the universe. It 
is sometimes taken as self-evident that a good world 
cannot contain pain. I have said that I think this 
assumption is mistaken. But I do think \hlt{it is self-%
evident that a good universe cannot contain either 
evil or error just as they stand}. This is the problem 
with which we shall deal in detail. The other two 
questions must be also raised\cln\ first, \hlt{What are these 
things, and secondly, How do they arise}{\qmk} 

\hlt{The latter question can be answered easily or not\label{arises}
at all}, according to its meaning. In one sense, the 
answer simply is, \enquote{Because people do them}{\smc} that is 
to say, there is nothing to prevent any one from doing 
wrong or from making a mistake, and it depends on 
himself whether he does so or not. A man does right 
not only because it is God{\apo}s will but because it is also 
his own will{\smc} God could not make him do right if he 
did not want to. And therefore God cannot prevent 
his doing wrong. In another sense, the question 
implies a desire to go behind this freedom of the 
individual, and to discover why he chooses to do this 
and not that. But in this sense the question is meaning\-%
less{\smc} for \hlt{there is nothing behind the will which makes 
it do one thing rather than the other}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This is logically true,
and it is why, as on page \pageref{compulsion},
another{\apo}s will cannot be compelled.
Insofar as it is indeed willed, an action is not made to be what it is
by anybody (or anything) but the actor.
The actor may of course have reasons for the action.
I believe it is argued that these reasons are \emph{ex post facto,}
calculated to justify what one has already made up one{\apo}s mind to do.
But this is to be expected{\smc}
why should we look for reasons to do what we are not interested in{\qmk}
There are also supposedly psychological experiments showing that
our actions are decided before we are even aware of the decision.
But one hardly needs an experiment for this, just life experience\cln\
it would seem to be common knowledge that most 
\enquote{New Year{\apo}s resolutions} fail.
Nonetheless, at any moment 
we may be faced with the decision of what to do next.
One can then ask, 
\enquote{What have I already unconsciously decided to do\qmk}
But then one can either do that, \emph{or} something else.} 

\addsubsubsec{iii. What is evil\qmk---Failure to answer this ques\-tion{\smc}
how far fatal to the inquiry.}

The other question would seem at first sight 
easy. An error is defined as thinking something that 
is not true{\smc} and a bad action as doing something wrong. 
But we have defined thinking as the consciousness of 
a reality{\smc} and therefore error is not thought, for if it 
were consciousness of reality it would not be error. 
But what can error be if it is not thought{\qmk} How can 
you make a mistake without thinking{\qmk} It might be 
ingeniously replied, when you make a mistake you are 
not \emph{really} thinking at all\cln\ you only think you are think\-%
ing. But alas\expt\label{expt}\ we are no further{\smc} for if all thinking 
is true, then in thinking that I thought I must really 
have thought. Nor is it any better to say that I 
[\textbf{128}]
imagined that I thought{\smc} for if so the point is that I 
mistook, on this occasion, imagining for thinking. Nor 
can we say that I felt as if I had done a piece of thinking 
when really I had not{\smc} granted that there is a peculiar 
flavour in real thinking, how does it come to be associ\-%
ated with something that is not thinking\qmk\ and if it is 
liable to be so associated, why, knowing this, should I 
let it mislead me{\qmk} 

We cannot avoid the difficulty by defining error as 
an act not of the intellect but of the will\cln\ for instance, 
the arbitrary assertion of a thing which the evidence 
does not warrant. If this were so, there would be no 
difference at all between making a mistake and telling a 
lie. A man may be blamed for his mistakes, and a 
mistake may be described as a moral offence, perhaps 
with justice{\smc} but that does nothing to clear up its nature. 

It may be replied, all this comes of committing 
yourself to a faulty theory of knowledge. First you 
propound a theory on which error cannot possibly exist, 
and then you are illogical enough to complain that you 
cannot understand error. It is a well-known fact that 
there are theories of knowledge of this sort{\smc} yours is 
one of them{\smc} and you had much better give it up.---I 
should be most willing to do so, if any other theory 
were more successful. But the critics who use the 
language I have just quoted have as a rule nothing 
better to offer in exchange than an empiricism which, 
while carefully designed to admit the possibility of 
error, omits to allow for the possibility of truth. 
Indeed a cynic might be tempted to divide theories of 
knowledge into those which admitted the possibility of 
truth but denied the existence of error, and those which 
admitted error but denied the existence of truth. 
Neither type of theory can be satisfactory{\smc} but it may 
be argued that a theory which at least admits the 
existence of truth is likely to contain more of it than 
the one which does not. The only third alternative is 
the refusal to admit a theory of knowledge at all. And 
[\textbf{129}]
this too I cannot accept{\smc} for we do talk about know\-%
ing, and our statements about it must mean something, 
and be either true or false. 

The same difficulty arises in connexion with the 
definition of wrongdoing. To put the dilemma briefly, 
a person doing wrong must know that it is wrong{\smc} for 
otherwise, though we may blame him for culpable negli\-%
gence or obtuseness, we do not blame him in the full 
moral sense as deliberately guilty. And yet it would 
seem that the essence of doing wrong is to persuade 
oneself somehow that it is really right, or excusable, or 
not so very wrong. The fact seems to combine two 
contradictory attitudes---the doing a thing although you 
know it is wrong, and the thinking that it is right when 
it is not. 

One is sometimes tempted to say that these things, 
evil and error, are really self-contradictory attitudes of 
mind, mental confusions{\smc} and that therefore it is no use 
trying to have a clear theory of them, since the facts 
themselves are not clear. But is it so{\qmk} If a state of 
mind were self-contradictory, how could it exist{\qmk} If it 
is coherent enough to exist, why should it not be 
coherent enough to be described{\qmk} Superficial thought, 
we must repeat, finds no difficulty in describing them 
because it does so, na\"ively, in self-contradictory terms{\smc} 
it is only analysis of the terms used that reveals the 
difficulty. 

Even if it is impossible to define them, need that 
hinder our inquiry{\qmk} No one has ever defined good\-%
ness, for instance, and yet moral philosophy exists. 
The parallel is comforting, but I fear misleading. The 
famous difficulty in defining goodness does not exclude 
the possibility of conceiving goodness. We know 
perfectly well what it is, and the only sense in which 
it is indefinable is that, being unique, it cannot be 
described in terms of anything else. But I do not think 
the same is true of error and evil. The difficulty here 
seems to be not that we know what they are but cannot 
[\textbf{130}]
give a formal definition of them, but rather that, though 
we recognise them when we see them---sometimes---we 
do not know what they are at all. 

Having no answer to offer to such a fundamental 
question, would it not be best to put up the shutters 
and go home{\qmk} Is it not mere trifling to offer theology 
the assistance of so impotent a metaphysic{\qmk} The 
criticism is perfectly Just. We cannot hope to solve, 
or even usefully to aiscuss, the problem of evil unless 
we know what evil is. But our real position is worse 
than the criticism suggests. It implies that there is a 
retreat open to us{\smc} that we can, and in fairness ought 
to, renounce our attempt to solve these problems ration\-%
ally and take refuge in a decent agnosticism. This we 
cannot do{\smc} for it is not unequivocally true even that 
we are ignorant of the nature of evil. We do recognise 
it when we see it{\smc} and we can make some statements 
about it, or at least show that some accounts of its 
nature are false. The only escape from our situation 
is to build on these facts, however slight they may 
appear. An agnostic withdrawal from the argument 
would, by denying their existence, commit itself to a 
falsehood no less than the dogmatic denial of the 
difficulties. 

This, then, must be our course. In the first place, 
we shall examine and criticise certain current concep\-%
tions of evil{\smc} secondly, we shall try to determine the 
relation of evil to good within the universe. Such a 
procedure, after the admission that we cannot define 
evil, is illogical, absurd, perhaps even dishonest{\smc} its 
only excuse is that the alternative is worse. 

\addsec{2. Some inadequate views of evil\cln---}

The theories of evil which I intend to criticise 
agree in treating evil as somehow illusory or non\-
existent. The universe, according to this type of view, 
is perfectly good, and everything is good just so far 
as it exists{\smc} evil is non-existence, deficiency, negativity, 
the past stage of a process, and so on. I shall treat 
these views in some detail because I believe that there 
[\textbf{131}]
is a certain amount of truth in them, and that they fail 
in general through not successfully defining what they 
mean by real and unreal{\smc} whereas their opposites, the 
pessimistic views, contain I think less truth and are 
sufficiently dealt with by the main argument in \S\ 3. 

It is perhaps worth remarking that \hlt{optimism and 
pessimism alike create a spurious unity by denying one 
side of the contra\-diction}{\smc} each is a symptom of exactly 
the same fault. It is often said that optimism results 
from a sentimental temper which refuses to face facts{\smc} 
and this is perfectly true. But it is equally true of 
pessimism. To deny the existence of facts simply 
because they are pleasant is no less sentimental than to 
deny their existence because they are unpleasant. It is 
one kind of sentimentality, and not an attractive kind, 
that refuses to see anything outside itself but one all-%
embracing \emph{Weltschmerz} and anything within but its own 
\enquote{spasms of helpless agony.}%%%%%
\footnoteA{W. James, \emph{Varieties of Religious Experience}, p.~163.} 

It ought also to be said that in criticising views of 
this type I am not criticising those philosophers such as 
Plato, Spinoza, or Hegel, to whom they often owe the 
language in which they are expressed, if no more. 
I am rather criticising tendencies of popular thought 
which have a certain superficial resemblance to their 
philosophies. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) As non-existent.} 

The simplest type of optimism is perhaps to be 
found in the not uncommon statement that evil does 
not exist at all{\smc} that there is no such thing. As stated, 
this is merely a paradox which has no meaning until it 
has been explained\cln\ and to explain it generally involves 
explaining it away. The only sense in which it is a 
serious theory is that it sometimes takes the form of 
asserting that no one ever really does wrong, and our 
beliefs to the contrary come from misinterpreting the 
actions of others, and indeed our own. That is to say, 
there is no evil{\smc} there is only error, the erroneous 
belief that evil exists. 
[\textbf{132}]

While granting fully that a completer knowledge 
would explain as good many actions which we imagine 
to be bad, I cannot think this view plausible. Led by 
the difficulty of conceiving how a bad action can exist, 
it suggests that none do exist, and that the apparent 
cases to the contrary are really cases of false judgment. 
It can only advance this conclusion because it has never 
realised that exactly the same difficulty attaches to the 
conception of the false judgment. If the moralist had 
by chance been a logician instead, he would have raised 
the question how people make mistakes\cln\ and he might 
have answered that they do not{\smc} they only tell lies. 
What appears to be an error, he might triumphantly 
say, is only a moral obliquity. 

If this seems a far-fetched objection, it may be simply 
expressed thus. Evil does exist. \hlt{People do wrong}. 
There is no reasonable doubt on that point. But as 
soon as we begin thinking about it, \hlt{we find it so difficult 
to understand that we are tempted to explain it by 
appeal to a parallel difficulty, that of error}. The two 
are, I think, parallel{\smc} but neither throws much light 
on the other because each is equally obscure.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Is making an \enquote{error,} a mistake,
really so obscure{\qmk}  
Surely young Collingwood was aware of things that just broke down.
They could be mechanical things,
or living things,
or just oneself in trying to do some arithmetical computations.
Maybe there is no explanation for these things{\smc}
but why should there be something \emph{else,} called \enquote{wrong-doing,}
that is also inexplicable\qmk}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
And if 
we deny the existence of the one, the same difficulties 
when we faced them would compel us to deny the 
existence of the other. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) As a finite point of view\cln---} 

An argument closely resembling this admits 
that bad actions are done, and does not flatly say that 
we are mistaken in calling them bad{\smc} but merely that in 
so doing we are expressing a limited point of view. 
From this finite point of view we are right, it is said, 
in calling them evil{\smc} but from a wider point of view 
either they would be seen as good or perhaps the 
difference between good and bad would disappear. 

We cannot, however, dispose of the distinction 
between right and wrong by saying that it is relative 
to particular points of view. The argument seems 
to confuse several different things{\smc} and it is perhaps 
worth while to distinguish at least some of these. 
[\textbf{133}]

\addsubsubsec{i. Morality relative to the social system.} 

\enquote{What is right for one society,} we are told, 
\enquote{is wrong for another. It would be sadly narrow-%
minded to wish that every portion of the human race 
could live under the same kind of social organisation. 
On the contrary, to confer the blessings of civilisation 
upon the savage often means nothing but to force 
him into a mould for which he is quite unfitted and 
in which he can never be either happy or prosperous. 
His institutions are the best for him, and ours are 
the best for us{\smc} and when we ask what is the right 
manner of life, the question always is, for whom{\qmk} 
Nothing is right in itself, in isolation from the 
circumstances which make it right.} 

Much of this is perfectly true. Not only is one 
people{\apo}s life not good for another people, but even 
one man{\apo}s meat is another man{\apo}s poison. Every race, 
every person, every situation is unique, presents unique 
problems and demands unique treatment. And if 
the argument means no more than that we must not 
impose the treatment proper to one case on another 
(as we frequently do), it is legitimate. But those who 
use it seem often to imply that, since every evil is 
relative to some situation, a perfectly free man who 
had no particular prejudices and no merely parochial 
interests would be superior to the distinction between 
good and bad. This of course is absurd{\smc} for \hlt{every 
man must be an individual and stand in some definite 
relation to other individuals{\smc} and these relations will 
determine what is---and really is---right and wrong 
for him}. 

\addsubsubsec{ii. \enquote{Goodness} not the only value.} 

The argument may also be taken to imply 
that there is a specifically moral way of looking at 
things, which is one out of a large number of possible 
ways, and not the truest. We may approach actions 
with the question on our lips, \enquote{are they right or
wrong\qmk}\ and in that attitude we shall understand 
less of their real nature and value than if we asked, 
\enquote{are they adequate, or fitting, or noble, or splendid{\smc} 
[\textbf{134}]
do they show a grasp of the situation, a penetrating 
intellect, a determined will, a subtle sense of beauty{\qmk}} 

We do certainly feel a sense of irritation with people 
who insist upon raising the moral issue to the exclusion 
of all others. They seem to think that it only matters 
if a person had good intentions, and makes no differ\-%
ence whether he is a competent man or a muddler. It 
does make a difference{\smc} and \hlt{either goodness is only real 
goodness when united with competence, or else there are 
other things to value a man by besides his goodness}. 

\hlt{But these other things do not outweigh goodness}, 
still less make it disappear. Whatever other things 
there may be, there is morality{\smc} but the argument 
seems to suggest that because there are other standards 
of value, therefore the moral standard cannot be 
maintained. If this is its meaning, it is no more 
than an attempt to distract attention from one question 
by raising others. 

\addsubsubsec{iii. Sceptical theory of knowledge.} 

Thirdly, it may mean that morality is a 
\enquote{category} of the human mind as such, which would 
be absent from a better or more highly-developed type 
of mind. It is a limitation, but a necessary limitation 
of humanity. We cannot deal fully with a contention 
of this kind without examining its presuppositions in 
a theory of knowledge derived more or less from 
Kant. But I think such an examination would bear 
out the plain man{\apo}s feeling that an argument like this 
is not playing the game{\smc} that \hlt{it is not fair to tell him 
that the construction of his mind is such that he cannot 
help having convictions which nevertheless are not 
really true}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Likewise to those who call free will an illusion\cln\
it is not fair{\expt}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

The philosopher who tells him so seems 
to imagine himself as behind the scenes, privileged to 
criticise and correct the workings of the mind which 
after all is just as much his mind as the plain man{\apo}s. 
If the conviction is inevitable, how is scepticism as to 
its truth possible{\qmk} The critic of the mind is doing 
something which looks very like playing fast and 
loose with his convictions. 
[\textbf{135}]

\addsubsec{(\emph c) As means to good.} 

Another appeal to ignorance is contained in 
the view that evil is justified by becoming a means 
to good. This argument is reinforced by the parallel 
of pain. The dentist inflicts pain{\smc} but he only does 
so to save us from a much greater amount of pain in 
the future. Our condemnation of the evil in the world 
is thus explained as the rebellion of ignorance against 
the surgery of an all-wise Creator. 

As applied to pain, the argument is not without 
great value. But even so, it should be observed that 
the pain of dentistry remains pain, and is not made 
pleasant by the fact that it absolves us from future 
pain. And the really skilful dentist can almost, if 
not entirely, banish pain by means of an{\ae}sthetics. 
Is God less skilful{\qmk}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Has Collingwood forgotten his comments about the acute pain
of fine esthetic experiences{\qmk}
These pains cannot or should not be banished.
One might argue then that \emph{all} pains are such.} 

In point of fact the parallel does not apply to evil 
at all. The evil consequences of an evil act might well 
be so thwarted by circumstance or overridden by 
omnipotence that they never affected the person whom 
they were, perhaps, intended to harm. But the 
\hlt{moral evil of the act lies not in its success but in the 
intention}, and no overruling can affect the intention or 
make it less evil. A bad action may be providentially 
a means to good{\smc} but that does not destroy the agent{\apo}s 
badness of will. The problem of moral evil remains 
untouched. 

\addsubsec{(\emph d) As merely negative.} 

\begin{sloppypar}
Another common account of evil appeals to the 
logical conception of negation, asserting that evil 
though real is merely negative. I do not think that 
this does much to clear it up. If two things are 
conceived as opposites, either indifferently may be 
described as the negation of the other{\smc} but neither is, 
so to speak, inherently negative. \hlt{The distinction 
between affirmative and negative is a distinction of 
words, not of things}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{And what we care about is things, not words.
A common theme.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
A \enquote{negative} reality would 
be quite as positive as an \enquote{affirmative} reality. I 
imagine that this theory really means that good is 
normal or natural or something of the sort, while evil 
[\textbf{136}]
is abnormal and only exists as an exception, and could 
never by itself make a world. This idea seems to me 
to be sound, and we shall meet it again{\smc} but I do not 
think that it is well expressed by saying that evil is 
merely negative. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph e) As a superseded phase of evolution.}

The last theory we shall examine defines evil by 
reference to the conception of evolution. Our sins, 
according to this theory, are the habits proper to a past 
stage in the evolutionary process, lingering on like 
rudimentary organs into our present life. Here again 
there is a fact at the bottom of the theory. It is true 
that the particular way in which we go wrong is often 
explicable by reference to past habits of which we 
have never entirely got rid. But the question still 
remains unanswered why we should go wrong at all. 
Nor is the theory fully true even so far as it goes{\smc} for 
\hlt{atavism is not a crime}, and just so far as our \enquote{crimes} 
are really cases of atavism they are not culpable{\smc} \hlt{unless 
indeed it is supposed that our evolution is entirely in 
our own hands. But if that is so, morality must be 
called in to account for evolution}, not \emph{vice versa.}

It is a striking fact that the biological conception of 
evolution has never yet produced anything but confusion 
when applied to philosophical questions. The reason 
seems to be that it gives, in the form in which it is 
commonly held, no answer to the one question with 
which philosophy is concerned. As we said in a former 
chapter, science (including the theory of evolution) is 
simply a description of behaviour, and advances no 
hypothesis as to why things behave as they do. The 
theory of evolution is a purely historical statement about 
the way in which life has developed{\smc} ethics is concerned 
with the force of will which lies behind all merely 
descriptive history.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{bio-eth}%
For Collingwood later,
history will be precisely the history of this \enquote{force of will}{\smc}
\enquote{natural} history is something else entirely\cln
\begin{quotation}
It was in my [1928] Die manuscript that I first drew the
distinction between history proper and what I called
pseudo-history. By that name I referred to such things
as the narratives of geology, palaeontology, astronomy,
and other natural sciences which in the late eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries had assumed a semblance
at least of historicity. Reflection on my experience as
an archaeologist enabled me to see that this was no
more than a semblance\lips

\lips If archaeology and palaeontology
worked according to the same principles, trilobites
would be as valueless to that palaeontologist as are to
the archaeologist those \senquote{iron implements of uncertain
use} which cause him so much embarrassment.

History and pseudo-history alike consisted of
narratives\cln\ but in history these were narratives of pur\-%
posive activity, and the evidence for them consisted
of relics they had left behind (books or potsherds,
the principle was the same) which became evidence
precisely to the extent to which the historian con-
ceived them in terms of purpose, that is, understood
what they were for{\smc} in pseudo-history there is no con\-%
ception of purpose, there are only relics of various
kinds, differing among themselves in such ways that
they have to be interpreted as relics of different pasts
which can be arranged on a time-scale.
\hfill\cite[pp.~107--9]{Collingwood-Auto}
\end{quotation}
\afterquote But this account in \emph{An Autobiography} seems to describe 
a refinement of language rather than a change of thinking.
Collingwood says his 1928 Die manuscript 
(written at \enquote{Le Martouret, that pleasant
country-house near Die,}
in the Dr\^ome department of France, near Switzerland and Italy)
resulted from
\enquote{writing down as shortly as I could
the lessons of my last nine years{\apo} work in historical
research and reflection upon it} \cite[pp.~107]{Collingwood-Auto}{\smc}
but even earlier he saw
that biology did not account for human affairs.
In Chapter II of \emph{New Leviathan,}
he will observe that the distinction between body and mind
is really the distinction between sciences like biology
and sciences like ethics{\smc}
but he has understood this implicitly all along.
This seems to confirm the account of philosophy quoted in
note \ref{philosophy}, page \pageref{philosophy}.
}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It makes little difference to the 
scientist whether he regards evolution as a purely 
mechanical process or as directed by the volition of 
conscious agents{\smc} but until this question is answered, 
evolution is simply irrelevant to ethics. 
[\textbf{137}]

In this case, for instance, there are three conceivable 
hypotheses, either of which might be adopted by science 
without greatly altering its particular problems{\smc} but for 
ethics they are poles asunder. (i.) If the process is 
really mechanical, the habits may be explained, but they 
are not sins. (ii.) If a central mind such as that of God 
directs the process, then the habits in question are not 
our sins but God{\apo}s. (iii.) If, as above suggested, the 
process is in the hands of the evolving species, the bad 
or superseded habits are sinful, but they are not explained. 
Thus the evolutionary view of the question only restates 
the problem in terms which conceal the fact that no 
solution is offered. 

\addsec{3. The main problem\cln---}

We can now proceed to the last and for our 
purpose the most important question, namely, how evil 
and error can coexist in the same universe side by side 
with truth and goodness, and how a universe so composed 
can be described{\smc} whether, that is, we can call it either 
good or evil. The answer to this question can only be 
reached by drawing out the implications of two state\-%
ments\cln\ (i.) that the universe contains good and evil 
side by side{\smc} (ii.) that everything in the universe stands 
in some relation to everything else. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The elimination of error by truth.}

Suppose I intend to write a complete account of 
any subject concerning which there is in existence a 
considerable body of scientific information and opinion. 
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which I can go 
to work. Either I can simply collect all the opinions, 
false and true, which have been held on the subject, and 
write them down side by side{\smc} or else I can sift them 
out, correcting the false by the true, and presenting a 
body of statements which is, so far as I can make it so, 
absolutely true. These two methods typify two senses 
in which we can speak of a totality\cln\ first, a mere juxta\-%
position of conflicting details, and secondly, an organised 
and coherent whole. Which of these is in the truest 
sense a totality, and in which sense do we speak of the 
totality of the universe{\qmk} 
[\textbf{138}]

The mere collection would be repugnant to the 
scientific mind. It is the work, a critic would say, not 
of a thinker but of a sciolist%%%%%
\footnoteB{The word \enquote{sciolist} shares its Latin root with 
\enquote{scientist}{\smc}
but the \enquote{-ol} is diminutive.}%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} the book that quotes 
infinite contradictory authorities and \enquote{leaves the reader 
to choose between them} is not history,%%%%%
\footnoteB{It does not even rise to the level of 
\enquote{scissors-and-paste} history---%
which involves \emph{choosing} which authorities to accept.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
but the 
gratification of a jackdaw{\apo}s collecting-mania. 

\begin{sloppypar}
It appears on examination that the scientist{\apo}s prejudice 
is well found\-ed. The mere collection misrepresents the 
facts which it pretends to describe. A{\apo}s opinion took 
its form through the detection of an error in B{\apo}s, and 
B{\apo}s by refuting C{\apo}s. Simply to quote A, B and C side 
by side is precisely to miss the historical development 
and continuity on which all three depend. The mere 
collection is not a totality{\smc} it is a number of different 
things whose relation to one another is denied, an 
abstract plurality which is not a unity. Unity can only 
be introduced into it in one way\cln\ by thinking out the 
relations of each opinion to the rest. When this is 
done, as it is done by the true historian of thought, it 
is found that even where one opinion contradicts another 
there is the closest of relations between them{\smc} that they 
are successive attempts to reach the truth on this subject, 
and that each statement sums up in itself the truth 
expressed by previous statements and is itself the 
starting-point for further research. This way of putting 
it is not affected by the breaks and discontinuities which 
there must be in any tradition. We are not arguing 
that there is a steady and continual progress towards 
truth, independent, as it were, of intellectual effort{\smc} but 
that every truth takes its form by correcting some error, 
and that therefore \hlt{in the totality of the science the error 
does not stand alongside the truth, but is corrected by 
it and disappears}. Consequently to the historian of 
thought these errors do not form part of the science 
at all. He knows and records the fact that they 
have been made{\smc} but as the science comes to him 
they have been eliminated by the thought which has 
supplied their correction. (It is not implied that at 
[\textbf{139}]
any given point of history \emph{all} the errors have been 
eliminated.) 
\end{sloppypar}

In brief, truth and error cannot coexist in relation 
with one another. If they are brought into contact, the 
error is abolished by the truth.  A truth and an error 
about one and the same subject can only exist so long 
as they are kept separate in water-tight compartments{\smc} 
that is, so long as the person who believes them both is 
unconscious, while believing one, that he also believes 
the other, or so long as the person who believes one 
does not come into contact with the person who believes 
the other.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This way of speaking reminds me of the \emph{Star Trek} episode
\enquote{The Alternative Factor.}
I suppose the latter was inspired by the physics of \enquote{antiparticles}{\smc}
but it appears from \emph{Wikipedia} that the first such,
the antielectron or positron,
was theorized only in 1928 (by Paul Dirac).
Was Collingwood{\apo}s language nonetheless inspired by physics\qmk}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

Our problem was something of the following kind. 
God is conceived as omniscient{\smc} all his beliefs are true. 
But there are also many false beliefs in existence. These 
are \emph{ex hypothesi} not shared by God. Therefore the 
totality of the universe, including as it does the false 
beliefs as well as the true, is more inclusive, larger, so 
to speak, than God who only includes the true ones. 
God therefore is not all-inclusive, not universal{\smc} he is 
only one among many minds. To a person who argued 
thus we might now answer, are you in earnest with the 
idea that the world is a totality{\qmk} Do you believe that 
it is a society of spirits in communication with one 
another{\qmk} If so, you are convicted out of your own 
mouth. For if the world is a totality it already shows 
the same perfection which is ascribed to God. The true 
opinions in it eliminate the false, leaving nothing but 
truth. And therefore the all-inclusive universe is not 
larger than, but identical with, the perfect God. 

According to this conception the universe includes 
all error and yet it includes no error. Every error is a 
fact that happens in history, and so is part of the 
universe{\smc} but the false opinion in which the error 
consists disappears from the universe when faced with 
the truth which contradicts it. 

\begin{sloppypar}
Two objections at once suggest themselves. First, 
why should it be assumed that truth must drive out error{\qmk} 
[\textbf{140}]
Why should not error drive out truth{\qmk} Certainly this 
may happen. But I do not think any one would believe 
that this is the way in which any science has actually 
progressed for long together. A mind which really 
grasps a truth is not shaken in its belief by denials, 
because it sees the point of view from which the denial 
proceeds and can formulate the truth so as to include 
that point of view. In doing this it would not become 
less true. But if error embarked on the process of 
including other points of view, even if these others 
were themselves erroneous, the error would gradually 
approach nearer to the truth, for to believe all the 
different errors about any subject may come very near 
to knowing the truth.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\enquote{If the fool would persist in his folly
he would become wise} \cite[pl.~7]{Blake}.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\end{sloppypar}

The second objection is this\cln\ Why assume that the 
universe is a unity at all\qmk\ how do you know that its 
parts are all in some relation to each other{\qmk} Indeed, 
are you not arguing in a circle by first assuming it to 
be a whole or system, and then arguing that it must on 
that account be systematic{\qmk} It may be that we are 
wrong in assuming that there is one universe. But I 
do not think that it is a mere assumption. The alterna\-%
tive hypothesis would be that there are within it elements 
entirely out of relation to one another{\smc} that is, in terms 
of our view, that there are minds which are concerned 
with objects so entirely disparate that they cannot either 
agree with or contradict one another. But in the nature 
of the case, \hlt{if there are minds which have no character\-%
istic and no object of thought in common with ours, 
we cannot possibly conceive them}, far less prove or 
disprove their existence.%%%%%
\footnoteB{But evidently we \emph{talk} about such minds.
What then are we doing{\qmk}
Where do we come up with the idea 
of minds having nothing in common with ours\qmk}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
And if we are right in thinking 
that our philosophy concerns the nature of mind as 
such, it must be a description, whether true or false, 
of any mind that exists. 

In one sense, it is perhaps true to say that the 
universe is not a totality. Taken at any given moment, 
it is incomplete. There are still undissolved errors, 
unfinished thought-processes. The world we see around 
[\textbf{141}]
us is not a stationary, already-existing, \emph{given} totality, 
but a totality in the making\cln\ its unity consists only in 
the striving towards unity on the part of the minds 
which constitute it. This does not mean that its com\-%
pletion lies at some point in the future{\smc} it is a completion 
that never is and never will be attained for good and 
all, but one which is always being attained.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{perfect}%
In what sense then was Jesus perfect,
as on page \pageref{Jes-perf}\qmk} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The life 
of the world, like the life of a man, consists in perpetual 
activity. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) The elimination of evil by good.}

As the new knowledge supplied by true judg\-%
ments eliminates from the mind and annihilates erroneous 
judgments, so, it would appear, a good motive arising 
in the will annihilates a bad. This conception is at 
first sight not so clear as the other. If I have acted 
upon a bad motive, how can I then entertain a good 
motive bearing on the same situation{\qmk} For I have 
already done the bad thing, and I cannot now do its 
good alternative. The bad act is a historical fact, and 
nothing can now change it. That is true, but the same 
is true of a false judgment. If I have made a mistake 
and published it, I cannot by discovering my error undo 
all the harm which my statement may have done. Nor 
can I even change the fact that I did believe it. The 
most I can do is to cease to believe it, and substitute a 
true belief. In the case of a wrong act this change of 
attitude is also possible. I may be what is known as a 
hardened sinner, that is to say I may refuse to admit 
that I was wrong to act as I did{\smc} but I may also change 
my attitude towards my own conduct from one of self-%
approval or excuse to one of condemnation. The evil 
with which we are concerned is, as we said above (\S\ 2, \emph c), 
not the consequence but the badness of the will itself{\smc} 
and this can only be overcome in one way, by the turn 
of the will from evil to good. This attitude of a will 
which in virtue of its own goodness condemns an evil 
act is called, when the evil act is a past act of its own, 
repentance{\smc} but it is essentially not different from the 
choosing of the good and rejection of the bad among 
[\textbf{142}]
two alternatives offered to the will as present possibilities. 
It is thus parallel to that judgment of the truth which 
either overthrows one{\apo}s own past mistake, or avoids a 
mistake in the present. 

The two cases seem to be parallel throughout.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In \emph{New Leviathan} (2.~23 to 2.~3), 
Collingwood will ridicule
\enquote{psycho-physical parallelism,} asking,
\enquote{What is the unvarying distance
between any mind-event and its corresponding body-event\qmk}}
Just 
as one cannot believe at once the truth and the error, 
so one cannot at once embrace the bad and the good 
motive{\smc} and just as the truth drives out the error, so 
the good motive expels the bad. If then we put once 
more the original problem, it will reappear in the 
following shape. God is the absolute good will\cln\ his 
will includes all good actions and nothing else. How 
then can we identify him with a universe which includes 
both good and bad{\qmk} The answer will be that within 
the same totality of will there cannot be both good and 
bad motives bearing on the same action or situation. 
Just so far as totality is attained, the good will must 
eliminate the bad, and therefore the universe conceived 
as a totality of will must be entirely good. Nor is this 
argument dependent on the hypothesis, if it is a hypo\-%
thesis, of a perfectly good God{\smc} for it follows from the 
conception of the universe as containing both good and 
evil, without any assumption except that the parts of 
the universe are in relation to one another. 

Here again, however, there are two points which 
must be emphasised. The first is that we have not, by 
a dialectical juggle, swept evil out of existence or proved 
that the universe is perfect just as it stands, and con\-%
sidered at any given moment. The perfection of the 
universe depends on its being a totality{\smc} and, as we 
have already said, it is only a totality \emph{in posse} not a 
totality \emph{in esse}. \hlt{The non-existence of evil, its destruc\-%
tion by goodness, is neither an accomplished fact nor an 
automatic and inevitable conclusion. It is a process, 
and yet not a process if that means something never 
actually fulfilled{\smc} rather an activity}, a process like that 
of seeing or thinking, which is complete at every 
moment and is not a sum of successive states. The 
[\textbf{143}]
triumph of good over evil is not a foregone conclusion 
but, as it were, a permanent miracle, held in position by 
the force of the good will. 

The other point relates to the possibility of an 
advance in the other direction{\smc} of the elimination not 
of evil by good but of good by evil. Is it not possible 
for all good to disappear and for the universe to become 
entirely bad{\qmk} It is certainly possible within limits for 
error to drive out truth and for vice to drive out virtue. 
A man may become worse and worse, and lapse into a 
quagmire of wickedness from which it is progressively 
harder to escape, just as he may become more and more 
deluded till he lapses into idiocy. But it would seem 
that his very delusions must be based on some lingering 
remnant of truth{\smc} that gone, there would be no more 
hallucination, for the mind would simply have vanished. 
A man who knew nothing at all could hardly be said 
to make mistakes. And so I think vice always exists 
in a will which is not only potentially but actually to 
some extent virtuous{\smc} that the impulses of which evil 
is made, the faculties which carry it into effect, are 
themselves virtues of a sort. It is often said, but I find 
it hard fully to believe it, that impulses and faculties 
are in themselves neither good nor bad, but indifferent\cln\ 
the mere material out of which goodness or badness is 
made. I may be wrong, but I cannot help feeling that 
the admiration with which we regard the skill, resource, 
and devotion of a great criminal is a partly moral 
admiration, and that the evil which fights against good 
is itself fighting in defence of a good. Can we call it 
a perverted good, or a right idea wrongly followed{\qmk} 
These may be meaningless phrases, but they seem to 
me to express something that is missed by the sharp 
dualistic distinction between good and evil. 

It seems clearer that evil can only exist in an 
environment of good. No society is ever utterly 
depraved, and crime owes its existence to the fact that 
it is exceptional. The success of a fraud lies in the 
[\textbf{144}]
victim{\apo}s being off his guard{\smc} if he was expecting it and 
trying to do it himself it would not be a fraud, any 
more than to deceive an opponent at chess is a fraud.%%%%%
\footnoteB{What is in some countries called corruption
is in others simply standard operating procedure.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The same applies to crimes not obviously social{\smc} they 
necessarily stand out against a background of normal 
life which is not criminal. Good acts, on the other 
hand, do most emphatically not require a background 
of evil. 

It seems then, if these arguments are justified, that 
there cannot be even a totally bad person, and \emph{a fortiori}
not a totally bad society or universe. If coherence and 
totality are to be attained at all, they must be attained 
by complete goodness. And, if we are right, they can 
be thus attained. A will may be absolutely good{\smc} not 
in the sense that it is ignorant of evil, but in the sense 
that it knows the evil and rejects it, just as a sound 
intellect is not ignorant of possible errors, but sees 
through them to the truth. This state is equally 
perfection, whether it has been won through error and 
sin, or without them{\smc} for the mind is not in bondage 
to its own past, but may use it as the means either of 
good or evil. 

There is much concerning the manner in which evil 
is overcome by good that belongs to a later chapter{\smc} 
but we can already give some kind of answer to the 
question with which we began. We asked, why does 
God permit evil{\qmk} He does not permit it. His\label{restricted} 
omnipotence is not restricted by it. He conquers it. 
But there is only one way in which it can be conquered\cln\ 
not by the sinner{\apo}s destruction, which would mean the 
triumph of evil over good, but by his repentance. 

\mypart{III}{From Metaphysics to Theology}

\mychap I{The Self-Expression of God in Man}
%THE SELF-EXPRESSION OF GOD IN MAN 

\textsc{In} this third part we shall attempt to use the results of 
the foregoing chapters as an approach to some of the 
more technical problems of theology. We shall take 
what I suppose to be the \hlt{central doctrine of the 
Christian faith}, and ask what light is thrown upon it 
by the conclusions we have reached as to the relation 
between God, man, and the world on the one hand, and 
between good and evil on the other. By the central 
doctrine of Christianity\label{central} 
\hlt{I mean that taking-up of 
humanity into God which is called the Incarnation 
or the Atonement}, according as the emphasis is laid 
on God{\apo}s self-expression through humanity or man{\apo}s 
redemption through the spirit of God.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I take this paragraph to be the reason 
why pages xiii and 147 are the only ones given under \enquote{Christianity} in the Index.}
%%%%%%%

It must be understood that I approach this subject 
from a single definite point of view. I shall make no 
attempt to state in detail the beliefs of the Church, or 
of any other body. Some initial statement is necessary, 
but this may be very brief and can perhaps be presented 
in a form to which no school of Christian thought 
would very strongly object. The details will then be 
developed by applying to these statements the general 
principles set forth in the second part. It follows that 
\hlt{these chapters aim} not at orthodoxy but \hlt{at the faithful 
translation into theological terms of the philosophy 
already expressed} in the preceding pages. I might, no 
doubt, have gone on to consider whether the ultimate 
theological results were in agreement with the beliefs of 
[\textbf{148}]
orthodox Christianity. But I have not done this{\smc} not 
through any indifference to the question, for it would 
be hypocritical to conceal my hope that the conclusions 
here advanced may really agree with the deepest inter\-%
pretation of the Christian creed,%%%%%
\footnoteB{Considering how Descartes suppressed
\emph{The World or Treatise on Light} \cite{Descartes-Eng},
so as not to be put on trial like Galileo \cite[p.\ viii]{Cress},
I would note that
the \emph{deepest} interpretation of the Christian creed
might be such as would cause one to be persecuted by shallower self-proclaimed Christians.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
but because the task 
involved in such a comparison would take me far 
beyond the limits of this volume. 

\addsec{1. The Person of the Christ in relation to God\cln---}

The doctrine of the Incarnation, in its most 
central characteristics, may perhaps be outlined in some 
such way as this. There was a certain historical person 
who was both divine and human. He was truly and 
actually divine with the full characteristics of Godhead, 
and fully and completely human in all the individuality 
of manhood. He was not, however, a compound of 
two different personalities, but one single personality. 

\begin{sloppypar}
\hlt{This statement of two natures in one person may 
be taken as our starting-point. It represents approxi\-%
mately the \enquote{formula of Chal\-ce\-don}}{\smc} and it must be 
noticed in passing that this formula is no more than a 
starting-point. As stated, it puts the problem without 
offering any solution at all. It is our task to discover 
how such a problem can be solved. The problem, 
more precisely, is not for us, \enquote{Was such and such a 
person both divine and human\qmk}\ but, \enquote{How is it 
possible for a person to be both{\qmk}} That is to say, 
we are setting aside all questions as to the \enquote{historical 
Jesus} and attending merely to the necessary implica\-%
tions of the doctrine. Our answer will be in the form, 
\enquote{if any man fulfilled such and such conditions, he was 
perfectly divine as well as perfectly human{\smc} but it is 
not our purpose to inquire whether the conditions have 
been fulfilled.} 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The two senses of identity\cln\
(i.)\ the abstract identity of every man with God{\smc}
(ii.)\ the concrete identity of thought and will in the Christ.}

\hlt{How can there be an identity between a human 
being and God{\qmk} There are two types of answer} to 
this question. The first type runs thus{\cln} Man, simply 
as man, is already divine. Man is spirit, and God is 
spirit, and between the two there is no sharp line of 
demarcation. This truth, the divinity of man, the 
[\textbf{149}]
fatherhood of God, is the message of Jesus and the 
creed of Christendom. 

The second type of answer lays stress not on the 
nature of mankind as a whole, but on the nature of 
the one man who alone is believed to have been truly 
and fully divine. He, and no other, has lived a perfect 
life{\smc} he and no other has set before the world in his 
own person an example of love and power which it 
cannot choose but worship. 

\begin{sloppypar}
These two answers seem not only different, but utterly 
and radically hostile{\smc} representative of points of view 
between which there can be no truce. \hlt{The first is the 
purest immanent Pan\-theism, the second an absolutely 
transcendent Theism}. If all men are equally divine by 
their very manhood, then the claim of one to be 
especially so is indefensible. The claim, then, must 
be explained away or boldly pronounced a mistake. 
Perhaps, it is sometimes suggested, \enquote{the divine man} 
means no more than \enquote{the man who first discovered the 
divinity of man.} On the other hand, if one man alone 
is divine, it cannot for a moment be admitted that the 
same is true of all other men{\smc} for that would be to 
sacrifice the whole value of the one unique life. 
\end{sloppypar}

It is clear that if the first type of answer is adopted, 
the original question falls to the ground. We need no 
longer ask, how is it possible for a man to be divine\qmk\ 
because no man is anything else. But we are left with 
two difficulties. In the first place, can such a view be 
made to square with the words or the spirit of the New 
Testament narratives\qmk\ and secondly, is the view itself 
a sound and reasonable one{\qmk} 

With the first difficulty we have nothing to do.%%%%%
\footnoteB{For present purposes at least,
we do not care what the Bible says.
See also the end of this section, and its note \ref{Recall-however},
page \pageref{Recall-however}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We have to ask whether it is reasonable to hold that all 
men are divine in such a way that no one is more divine 
than any other. And here we may recall%%%%%
\footnoteB{From Pt II, Ch. III, \S\ 3 (p.~\pageref{unity}).
Under \enquote{identity,} 
the Index refers to the page where that section begins
(as well as to the present page).
See especially the last paragraph of subsection (\emph a),
page \pageref{each-part}\cln
\begin{quote}
  each part is but an aspect of the whole 
and identical with the other parts\lips
This kind of identity, therefore, is to be sharply 
distinguished from the contingent unity, the unity of 
co-operation\lips
\hlt{Upon this distinction turns the whole 
argument of this and the succeeding chapters}.
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
the \hlt{two senses 
in which the word identity was found to be used}. 
There is, it will be remembered, \hlt{a purely abstract 
identity}, an identity \hlt{which cannot be diminished or}
[\textbf{150}]
\hlt{increased, which subsists merely in virtue of the con\-%
tinued existence}, in whatever relation, \hlt{of the things 
identified}. There is also another identity, not abstract 
but \hlt{concrete, subsisting in virtue of an identity of 
thought or purpose} between the persons concerned, and 
existing only so long as that identity is maintained. 

Now in the first sense \hlt{every man must be, so far as 
he exists, identical with every other and with God}. 
There must be some relation between God and any man, 
even a man ignorant of God or hostile to him. And 
where there is some relation there is some identity. 
Not indeed a low degree or small amount of identity, 
for identity only exists absolutely\cln\ it is either complete 
or non-existent.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I contrast this (reasonable) language with such as Descartes\apo s
in the \enquote{Third Meditation} \cite[41, pp.~27--8]{Cress},
\cite{Descartes-T}:
\begin{quote}
That this idea 
[\emph{idea}]
contains this or that objective reality 
[\emph{realitas objectiva}]
rather than some other one
results from the fact that the idea gets its objective reality
from a cause 
[\emph{causa}]
in which there is at least as much formal reality
[\emph{realitas formalis}]
as there is objective reality contained in the idea.
\end{quote}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
According to this kind of identity, 
then, every man is already and fully divine, and it is 
not possible that any one man should be more so than 
any other. 

But the other kind of identity depends not on bare 
existence but on the kind of existence which a free being 
chooses to have.%%%%%
\footnoteB{How is this distinction to be distinguished from the illusory mind-matter distinction\qmk}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
According to this kind of identity, 
it is clear that \hlt{any man who fully knew the mind of 
God, and whose will was bent on the same ends as the 
divine will, would be himself both man and God in one}, 
completely human and completely divine. In this sense 
not every man is divine{\smc} indeed it is rather to be 
doubted whether any man ever has been or ever could 
be. This question we shall raise later. 

The position which we described as Pantheism, then, 
namely that every man is necessarily and unchangeably 
divine, is very far from being false{\smc} but is equally far 
from being the whole truth, and to represent it as the 
whole truth is to make a serious mistake. The divinity 
of every man, simply as man, is no more than an abstract 
divinity, the guarantee of a fuller and more concrete 
union. And this concrete union is only to be attained 
in and by the identification of the self in all its aspects 
with the perfect mind of God. 

The kind of identity which we are to consider is the 
[\textbf{151}]
latter kind only. Of the former, there is indeed nothing 
more to say{\smc} it is a pure abstraction, and of an abstraction 
we can say no more than that---in its own abstract way%
---it exists. The divinity for the possession of which 
we reverence the Founder of Christianity, the union 
with God which we ourselves desire to attain, is no 
abstraction{\smc} it is a concrete and living activity, and 
therefore it depends on, or rather consists in, not the 
bare unchangeable nature of man as man, but the positive 
character of his life, his individual thoughts and actions. 

God and man are identified in one person, concretely 
identified, that is identified not only fully but also in the 
highest possible sense, when a human being has an 
individuality of his own, identified with that of God in 
the unity of all his thought and action with the divine 
knowledge and the divine purpose. \hlt{This ideal person,\label{Christ}
in whom Godhead and manhood not only coexist but 
coincide, I shall call the Christ{\smc} but without}, for the 
purposes of this chapter, assuming his identity with the 
Jesus of history, or indeed \hlt{assuming that such a person 
has ever lived at all}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{Recall-however}
Recall however from Pt I, Ch.~III, \S\ 5,
\enquote{The whole value of an example is lost unless it is historical} 
(p.~\pageref{whole-value}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Objection, that the infinite cannot be completely manifested in the finite.  Criticism.}

It may be objected to such a conception, that the 
supposed union is impossible because no one man---no 
single individual\discretionary{}{}{}---can comprehend completely the 
nature, and identify himself with the purpose, of God 
the absolute mind. \hlt{The knowledge and manifestation 
of God are, it may be said, attained little by little, 
through an infinite process of historical growth and 
development}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{infinity}%
What is to be criticized in this objection
is apparently the \emph{infinity} of the proposed process.  See below.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%
Not one man, but the whole of humanity 
is necessary to reveal God{\smc} and not humanity only, 
since in any one class of facts God can only reveal as 
much of his nature as that kind of fact will express. A 
single man can only express one very limited side of the 
divine character, which is too large to be confined within 
the circle of a finite personality. 

This objection carries great weight and seems very 
convinc\-ing{\smc} and it has often led to the adoption of a 
view according to which the revelation in Jesus is only 
[\textbf{152}]
one of an infinite number of revelations, each and all 
contributing something to the total knowledge of the 
infinite God. And yet \hlt{if God is infinite and each 
manifestation of him is finite, how can any number of 
manifestations come any nearer to expressing his full 
nature}{\qmk} A large number of units is no nearer infinity 
than a single one.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{In mathematics it is!}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Again, \hlt{is it really justifiable to 
describe a human personality as finite at all}{\qmk}%%%%% 
\footnoteB{If God is infinite, while man is finite,
then even collectively man cannot reach God.
If a man can be infinite, then a man can be God.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We saw 
reason to maintain in a former chapter%%%%%
\footnoteB{Probably Pt II, Ch.~III, \S\ 1 (\emph a)\cln\
the mind is \emph{thinking} (of this or that thing) itself 
(p.~\pageref{thinking}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
that a mind was 
only definable in terms of the object of which it was 
conscious{\smc} and if God is infinite and man is really 
conscious of God, it seems to follow that man thereby 
becomes infinite. It is sometimes said that for this very 
reason man can never know God{\smc} but to lay down 
\emph{a priori} what a given mind can and what it cannot know 
in virtue of its own constitution is to begin at the wrong 
end. \hlt{The mind is what it makes itself}{\smc} and its finitude 
or infinity (if the words mean anything) consists merely 
in its failure or success in the attainment of its desire. 

The objection in fact is precisely an instance of the 
materialistic type of thought which we criticised in a 
former chapter. It represents God as a whole composed 
of separate and mutually-exclusive parts, one of which 
is handled at a time{\smc} when humanity has examined one 
part, it goes on to another{\smc} and so on.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{eye-ref}Trying to see God part by part
is perhaps only a step above the seeing of uniformity
that comes from not having the \enquote{eye of perfect insight}
mentioned near the end of the book, page \pageref{eye}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Whereas God 
is not subdivisible{\smc} he is a true whole, with no separ\-%
able parts{\smc} each part is an aspect of the whole, and to 
know one \enquote{part} is to know implicitly all. \hlt{The idea 
of progressive revelation is only a new materialism}. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) Objection, that such a person would be like God only, not divine.  Criticism.}

Another objection of the same kind asserts that 
a man whose knowledge and will were divine in content 
would be himself only God-like, not actually one with 
God. He would be not identical but similar. This 
again depends on principles which we have already criti\-%
cised.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Again in Pt II, Ch.~III, \S\ 1 (\emph a){\cln}
\enquote{Nor 
can it be argued that this partial communication, which 
is all we can attain, is satisfied by the theory that my 
knowledge may resemble yours without being identical 
with it} (p.~\pageref{Nor-can}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It is based on abstracting the personality of a 
mind from its content{\smc} I am I, whatever I do and say 
and think, and on the same terms you are you. The 
individual self-identity of the particular mind is un- 
[\textbf{153}]
changeable and underlies all changes of activity{\smc} and 
therefore since A{\apo}s ideas happen in A{\apo}s mind and B{\apo}s 
ideas in B{\apo}s mind, A and B cannot have the same con\-%
sciousness but only a similar one. 

We have, as I said, already considered this view in 
detail. Our objection to it may be put shortly by saying 
that it admits at once too much and too little. If 
A{\apo}s consciousness is only very like B{\apo}s instead of being 
identical, there is no real communion between them{\smc} 
for that requires an identity. But \hlt{even this inadequate 
similarity cannot be maintained{\smc} the same argument 
which destroyed the identity is fatal to it also. In fact 
this view is a compromise with materialism} (in the form 
of psychological individualism or abstract pluralism), 
and any such compromise must be fatal to the whole 
truth. 

\addsubsec{(\emph d) Objection, that to appear as human, 
God must undergo \enquote{self-limitation.} Criticism.  
Omnipotence and omniscience{\smc} their nature.}

We must maintain, then, that it is possible for a 
human being to be identified with God in the concrete 
sense, as having a full and real intuition of the divine 
nature in its completeness, not of one side of it only, 
and a full harmony and agreement with the divine will{\smc} 
not abandoning his own will and adopting the false 
negativity of quietism, but acting in complete union 
with God, so that where there might be two wills there 
is one, not by the annihilation of one but by the activity 
of both at once in a single purpose. Such a man would 
be rightly described as perfect God and perfect man, 
for the distinction would in his personality have no 
further meaning. He would therefore show in comple\-%
tion the powers of God in thought and in action. 

This last statement may cause difficulty. It seems 
that the very fact of human life limits and circumscribes 
the man, and makes it impossible for him to exercise 
the full powers of the infinite mind of God{\cln} A par\-%
ticular man, it appears, cannot be omnipotent or omni\-%
scient, though he might be entirely sinless{\smc} and there\-%
fore theories have arisen to the effect that in becoming 
man God would find it necessary to abandon certain of 
[\textbf{154}]
his attributes. Such a self-sacrifice seems to be an 
additional and very strong proof of the love of God 
towards humanity. 

But it is not easy to see what can be meant by the 
renunciation of some of the divine attributes. The life 
of the mind is whole, without seam, woven from the top 
throughout{\smc} the only sense in which we can separate 
one attribute from the others is that we may abstract it, 
that is, have a false theory that is separate{\smc} we can 
never actually employ one faculty alone. The concep\-%
tion of the self-limitation of a will may in fact mean 
two things{\smc} either volition itself, which by accepting 
one end involves renunciation of another, or a volition 
in which it is determined not to will at all. Now \hlt{in 
the former sense, self-limitation or self-sacrifice is the 
negative side of all acting}{\smc} nothing can be done at all 
without the sacrifice of something else. Thus the 
temptation of Jesus, for instance, represents a true self-%
limitation{\smc} he decides not to adopt certain courses of 
action, not as a mere act of abstract self-sacrifice but 
because he is determined on a course with which these 
others are incompatible. \hlt{In the second sense, self-%
limitation cannot exist at all{\smc} for every act of will is 
the will to do something}, and a will, whose sole end was 
the abstract decision not to will, cannot be imagined. 
We never, strictly speaking, decide \enquote{not to do any\-%
thing}{\smc} when we use that phrase we always mean that 
we decide not to do some definite thing A or B, but to 
go on doing C. 

The self-limitation of God, then, cannot be inter\-%
preted in this abstract way as the mere renunciation of 
certain faculties. And \hlt{it is not true that such things as 
omniscience and omnipotence are \enquote{faculties}} at all, 
distinguishable from the faculties of knowing and acting 
in general. The question is whether human life as such 
is incompatible with the exercise of the divine attributes, 
wisdom and goodness, at all. No impassable gulf 
separates divine knowledge from human{\smc} God has not, 
[\textbf{155}]
in addition to his power of knowing, another power 
denied to man and called omniscience. \hlt{Omniscience 
is merely the name for the complete and unremitting 
employment of the faculty of knowing}. This faculty 
man certainly possesses.%%%%%
\footnoteB{We have the faculty of knowing\cln\
in simpler terms, we can know things.
But can we know them completely and unremittingly{\qmk}
Complete and unremitting knowledge\cln\
is this the kind of thing achieved by the best research and scholarship,
or is it simply consciousness of and \emph{attention to}
what we already happen to know{\qmk}
What does it mean to \emph{employ} one{\apo}s knowledge, in the sense below\qmk}
If it were not so, the possi\-%
bility of a divine-human life would doubtless be at an 
end. Man could neither know God nor obey his will{\smc} 
and the divine spirit could only operate in man by losing 
all its essential character. All human thought would 
be illusion, and all human activity sin, and to make it 
otherwise would be beyond the power of God himself. 
Rather than accept such conclusions, we shall do right 
in maintaining that all God{\apo}s nature, without any reser\-%
vation or abatement, is expressible in human form. 

The human being in whom God is fully manifested, 
then, must have God{\apo}s powers and faculties fully 
developed, and if fully developed then fully employed, 
since \hlt{an unemployed faculty has no real existence at all}. 
He must be omnipotent and omniscient. Whatever 
God can know and do, he also can know and do. This 
is a grave difficulty if we think of omnipotence and 
omniscience in an utterly abstract way, involving such 
things as the power to make twice two into five or the 
knowledge of an action which has not yet been decided 
upon. But \hlt{omnipotence does not mean power to do\label{compulsion} 
absurdities. The compulsion of another{\apo}s will is such 
an absurdity}%%%%%
\footnoteB{This is why the question of how evil arises
\enquote{can be answered easily or not at all}
(p.~\pageref{arises}).}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and therefore no real omnipotence could 
force such a compulsion. Omnipotence is spiritual, and 
spirit acts not by brute compulsion but by knowledge 
and inspiration. The omnipotence of God, his kingdom 
over men{\apo}s minds, consists in their allegiance to his 
purposes, their answer to his love, their repentance and 
return from sin to his side. And this omnipotence---
the universal kingdom which is planted in the hearts of 
men---can indeed be wielded by God in human form. 
To say that God cannot compel is not to deny him 
omnipotence{\smc} it is to assert his positive nature as spirit. 
But since spirit is self-creative and makes its own nature, 
[\textbf{156}]
this absence of compulsion is in one sense a self-limita\-%
tion of the will of God. But (i.)\ it is a self-limitation 
of God as God, not of God as incarnate in man{\smc} (ii.)\ it 
is only self-limitation in the sense in which any deter\-%
mination, \emph{e.g.}\ of a good man to abstain from taking 
mean advantages, is a self-limitation. 

In the category of knowledge we must also hold that 
the omniscience of God is shared by the Christ in whom 
his nature is manifested. It might be thought that 
this was unnecessary{\smc} that the divine man would know 
God as he is, but would not know the things God 
knows. But such a plea is based on the false distinction 
between the mind and its content, the individual 
consciousness and the knowledge of which it is conscious. 
To know some one{\apo}s mind is nothing more nor less than 
to see eye to eye with him, to look at reality as he looks 
at it, to know what he knows. His mind is not an 
object in itself{\smc} it is an attitude towards the real world, 
and to know his mind is to know and share that 
attitude. The Christ, then, must be omniscient as 
God is. 

This again is a serious difficulty. How can an 
individual man, whose consciousness is bounded by his 
age and time, be omniscient or even approximate to 
such a state{\qmk} Is not that a fallacy now happily ex\-%
ploded and consigned to the theological rubbish-heap{\qmk} 
Omniscient in a quite abstract sense the Christ cannot 
be, just as he cannot be in the same sense omnipotent. 
That is to say, looking at history as a succession of 
detached events temporally distinct, he cannot know 
the future{\smc} future history, actions, and events gener\-%
ally he cannot foretell. But this is simply because, 
taking history in this abstract way, the future is 
positively undetermined, non-existent as yet, unknow\-%
able{\smc} God himself cannot know it. On the other hand, 
if history means the discovery of absolute truth and the 
development of God{\apo}s purposes, the divine man will 
stand at the centre of it and know it, past and future, 
[\textbf{157}]
from within, not as a process but as a whole. This means 
not that he will be acquainted with details of scholarship 
and history, but that he will know as from its source 
the essential truth at which wise men have aimed, so 
that whatever is of permanent value in knowledge, 
ancient or modern, is already summed up in his view 
of the world. 

If God{\apo}s purposes can be---as we have said---really 
hindered and blocked by evil wills, then God himself 
cannot know in advance their detailed history. He 
knows their ultimate fate{\smc} he sees them as a composer 
sees his symphony complete and perfect{\smc} but he 
cannot know beforehand every mistake of the per\-%
formers. Those irruptions of the evil will into God{\apo}s 
plans are no part of the unity of the world, no part of 
the plan{\smc} it is only by destroying them, wiping them 
out of existence, that God{\apo}s purposes can be fulfilled. 
God himself strives against evil, does not merely look 
down from heaven upon our conflict{\smc} and if he does 
not blast the wicked with the breath of his mouth, 
neither does he set them up as mere puppets, targets 
for virtue{\apo}s archery. The existence of evil, if it can be 
called a real abatement of God{\apo}s omnipotence, is equally 
so of his omniscience{\smc} not merely of that of his human 
manifestation. But as we said in a former chapter%%%%%
\footnoteB{Page \pageref{restricted}
(\emph{the} previous chapter).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
that 
evil does not truly limit God{\apo}s omnipotence, because he 
conquers it in his own way, so the freedom of the 
future is not truly a detriment to his omniscience. 

So far, then, it seems that the expression of deity in 
a human being is definitely possible, because in whatever 
sense we can conceive God to be omnipotent and omni\-%
scient, in the same sense it is conceivable that his human 
incarnation should be so. There will be no failure to 
express in bodily form the whole fulness of God{\apo}s 
nature{\smc} every aspect, every potentiality of his being 
will be included in the life of the perfect man who is 
also perfect God. 

\addsec{2. The Christ in relation to Man\cln---}

But if these are the relations of the Christ to 
[\textbf{158}]
God, how shall we describe his relations with humanity{\qmk} 
In what sense can he be called perfect man, and what is 
the relation of his life and consciousness to those of the 
human race in general{\qmk} 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The complete reality of his manhood, \emph{i.e.}\ his personal human individuality.}

The first point is the reality of his manhood. 
There is a real difficulty in this point owing to the 
vagueness of the term \enquote{manhood.} Many Christo\-%
logical discussions suffer from lack of reflexion on this 
point. The conception of deity is thought to be a 
difficult and abstruse one, to elucidate which no pains 
are sufficient{\smc} that of humanity, on the other hand, is 
often passed over as too simple to need investigation. 
Yet if we ask, Does a man who is identical with God 
thereby cease to be a man\qmk\ it is clear that he does or 
does not according to different senses of the word. 
Many people are ready to say that the notion of finitude, 
fallibility, sinfulness, is \enquote{contained in the very idea of 
manhood.} If that is really so, then the perfect man 
cannot be called a man{\smc} and any man becomes less and 
less human as he becomes better and better. If, on the 
other hand, we mean by man nothing more than a person 
living in human relations, then the perfect man is clearly 
a man among his fellow-men{\smc} a better man, but a man. 
The question is what name we give to manhood purged 
of its imperfections{\smc} and so far, it is a merely verbal 
question. 

But the point at issue is not entirely verbal. Granted 
his divinity, his perfection and absoluteness, it may be 
said, he cannot be the member of a society in which 
every part is limited by and dovetailed into every other. 
He will burst the bonds of any society into which he is 
put{\smc} and inasmuch as he is anti-social in this way he 
cannot be called a man among men. After what we 
have already said, this argument need not detain us 
long. It is true that he will certainly burst the bonds 
of any society, that his appearance heralds the overthrow 
of the world{\apo}s powers, that he comes to bring a sword. 
But it is society that is anti-social, and not he{\smc} he 
[\textbf{159}]
destroys it because of his humanity and its inhuman 
mechanisms and deadnesses. \hlt{Destruction must always 
be the effect of any new truth or new impulse{\smc} but 
what it destroys is man{\apo}s idolatries, not man himself}. 

The most important difficulty in the way of con\-%
ceiving the Christ as truly human is in the last resort 
identical with that which formed the subject of our last 
section (\S1, \emph d). \hlt{As long as human and divine nature are 
regarded simply as different sets or groups of qualities, 
to assert their inherence in one individual is really 
meaningless}, as if we should assert the existence of a 
geometrical figure which was both a square and a circle. 
This does not mean that those who asserted \enquote{two 
natures in one person} were wrong{\smc} but it does mean 
that they were trying to express a truth in terms that 
simply would not express it. If any one said that he did 
not see how such a union of natures could take place, 
he was necessarily told that it was a mystery past under\-%
standing. But the mystery, the element which baffles 
the intellect, lies not at all in the truth to be expressed, 
but solely in its expression by improper language{\smc} that 
is to say, the combination with it of presuppositions 
which contradict it. We start by assuming human 
nature to be one definite thing and divine nature 
another{\smc} and the language which is framed on such 
a basis can never serve to express intelligibly the fact 
which it implicitly denies, namely the union of the two. 
This assumption we have by now criticised and found 
to be inadequate{\smc} we have rejected the idea of a mind 
as having a \enquote{nature} of its own in distinction from 
what it does{\smc} and by doing so we have removed in 
advance the abstract argument that a divine person, by 
his very nature, cannot be truly and completely human. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) His complete unification with his disciples.}

But the impulse of the divine spirit is not 
exhausted by any one man. His followers, so far as 
they attain discipleship, share his spirit and his life{\smc} his 
knowledge of God becomes theirs, and his identification 
of God{\apo}s will with his own is also theirs. To this extent 
[\textbf{160}]
they have precisely the relation to him which he has to 
God{\smc} and through him they attain the same relation to 
God in which he lives. That is to say, their mind actually 
becomes one with his mind, his mind lives in them and 
they in him. This must be true of every one who 
learns from him and follows him. The union with 
God which he enjoys is imparted to them{\smc} they become 
he,%%%%
\footnoteB{I just note the clear use of \enquote{become} as a copula.} 
and in so doing they equally with him become God. 

Here again, we do not ask whether anybody has 
ever attained discipleship in this absolute degree{\smc} we 
merely say that if any one did truly follow the light 
given by the divine incarnation he would live literally 
in God and God in him{\smc} there would be no more 
\enquote{division of substance} than there is between the 
Father and the Son. \hlt{Thus the Christ appears as 
Mediator of the divine life{\smc} he enjoys that life to the 
full himself, and imparts it fully to his disciples}. 
Through learning of him and following him it is possible 
to attain, by his mediation, the same divine life which 
we see in him. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) His union with fellow-workers not nominally disciples.}

But such a union of life with life can hardly be 
confined to the definite disciples of any historical person. 
Among the countless numbers who know nothing of 
his life as a historic fact, to whom his words and example 
have never penetrated, are certainly many who have 
true knowledge of reality and the real attainment of a 
good life. What is the relation of these to the divine 
incarnation{\qmk} 

The spirit of truth is not circumscribed by the limits 
of space and time. If a real community of life is 
possible between two men who share each other{\apo}s out\-%
ward presence and inward thoughts, it is possible no 
less between two who have never met{\smc} between the 
ancient poet and his modern reader, or the dead 
scientist and the living man who continues his work. 
\hlt{The earlier in point of time lives on in the life of the 
later{\smc} each deriving the benefit from such intercourse}. 
Even if we did not suppose the individual conscious- 
[\textbf{161}] 
ness of the dead to remain with us, we should at least 
admit that all that was left of them---their work---profits 
by our carrying it on{\smc} and we profit by using it as our 
starting-point. In this sense there is a real community 
between the Christ and the predecessors whose lives 
have, historically speaking, led up to and made possible 
his own. 

Again, there is a union of mind between persons 
who are in the order of history unaware of each other{\apo}s 
existence{\smc} between Hebrew prophet and Greek philo\-%
sopher{\smc} between two scientists who cannot read each 
other{\apo}s language. This union consists in the fact that 
both are dealing with the same problems{\smc} for in so far 
as any two minds are conscious of the same reality, they 
are the same mind. Thus there is a certain spiritual 
intercourse between men who have no outward point of 
contact whatever{\smc} and even if it is true, as Aristotle 
says, that bodily presence is the fulfilment of friendship, 
men may still be friends when neither knows the 
other{\apo}s name. 

The life of the Christ then is shared not only by his 
professed disciples but by all who know truth and lead 
a good life{\smc} all such participate in the life of God and 
in that of his human incarnation. But whereas we say 
that his disciples enjoy the divine life through his 
mediation, it seems at first sight that we cannot speak 
of mediation in this other case. If mediation means 
simply example and instruction of one historical person 
by another, that is true. But there is no ultimate 
difference between the two cases. In each case the 
spirit of God, whose presence in the heart is truth, is 
shared by men as it was shared by the Christ{\smc} and to 
speak of reaching him through God or God through 
him is to introduce a conception of process or transition 
which is really indefensible. As the disciple finds God 
in the Christ, so the non-disciple finds the Christ in God{\smc} 
in the fact that he knows God he is already one with the 
Christ whom, \enquote{according to the flesh,} he does not know. 
[\textbf{162}]

The conception of mediation, then, does not stand 
in the last resort. The experience which it designates 
is perfectly real{\smc} but the word itself implies a division 
of the indivisible. We speak of reaching God through 
Christ when we rather mean that we find him in Christ. 
And therefore the relation of the Christ to those who 
do not know him as a historical man is as intimate, 
granted that in their ignorance they do lead a life of 
truth and endeavour, as his union with those who call 
themselves his followers. In the language of religion, 
he saves not only his disciples but those who lived 
before his birth and those who never knew his name. 

\addsec{3. The Christ as unique, universal and all-inclusive\cln---}

Whether such an incarnation has ever happened 
at all is, we repeat, a question for history. And if 
so, it is equally for history to decide whether it has 
happened once or many times. But on this question 
certain \emph{a priori} points must be considered. There are 
certain arguments which seem to prove the plurality of 
incarnations. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Objection from pantheism, that there are infinite sides to God{\apo}s nature.  Criticism.}

The first is the pantheistic argument. God is 
exemplified not simply in one man but in everything. 
There is no fact which does not reveal God to any one 
who is able to see him there. And consequently it is 
idle to talk of one final revelation. There are countless 
revelations. 

This is almost a restatement of the view in \S\ 1, \emph b,
which required an infinite number of revelations to 
express the infinite aspects of God{\apo}s character. It 
springs from the thought that since God is all, every 
individual reality has an equal right to stand as a revela\-%
tion of him. This is the view which we define as 
Pantheism. Our answer to that general position is that 
\hlt{God is not every isolated thing, but only that which is 
good and true}{\smc} or, which comes, as we have seen, to 
the same thing, \hlt{reality as a whole, in an ordered and 
coherent system}. That which is good reveals God 
directly{\smc} that which is evil reveals him indeed no less, 
but only indirectly, through its relations with the good. 
[\textbf{163}]
A wicked man does not, by his wickedness, reveal the 
nature of God{\smc} but if we understood the whole history, 
the beginning and end, of his sins, we should realise 
that he, no less than the good, stands as an example 
of God{\apo}s dealings with the world. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Objection from logic, that every particular equally displays the universal.  Criticism.}

Secondly, there is a logical argument. \hlt{God is 
regarded from this point of view as the universal, and 
man as the particu\-lar. Now every particular expresses 
the universal, and each expresses it completely}. The 
whole universal is expressed in each particular, and the 
whole of the particular expresses the universal and 
nothing else. Every particular number is equally an 
example of number, and nothing but number. Therefore 
every man really expresses the universal, God, equally 
well. \hlt{It may be that one particular expresses it to us 
more clearly than another} by reason of certain con\-%
ventionalities and habits of our mind{\smc} as for instance a 
schoolboy might be unable to prove of a cardboard 
triangle what he can perfectly well prove of one in chalk 
on the blackboard. But this is a fault of the schoolboy, 
and no merit in the chalk triangle. One particular may 
seem to represent the universal in so uniquely perfect 
a way that it and it alone may be taken as the full 
representation of it{\smc} but this is never really a justifiable 
proceeding. It is a prejudice and an error. 

On the other hand, \hlt{the universal itself, which as a 
matter of fact exists only in various particulars, is 
sometimes falsely conceived as if it were itself another 
particular}{\smc} and thus arises the notion of an archetype 
or ideal specimen of a class, to which every less perfect 
member is an approximation. These two tendencies of 
false logic, the tendency to elevate one particular into the 
standard and only real instance of a universal, and the 
tendency to hypostasise the universal into a perfect and 
ideal particular, together give (it is supposed) the \emph{rationale}
of the process by which one man has been elevated into 
the sole and perfect revelation of the divine. The 
truth rather is (according to this view) that every man, 
[\textbf{164}]
as a particular instance of the nature of spirit, whose 
universal is God, is equally an instance of that nature 
and a manifestation of the essence of God. 

This view is based on assuming that God is the 
universal of which man is the particular. But this can 
hardly be the case{\smc} for God and man would then be as 
inseparable as triangularity from a given triangle. The 
fact of evil, that is to say, the alienation of man from 
God, becomes on such a view mere nonsense, as if one 
should talk of the de-triangularising of triangles. \hlt{The 
assumption involved, that every man as such is completely 
and in the fullest sense divine, begs the question at issue}. 
Indeed it is an unwarranted assumption that because we 
call a given set of individuals men therefore they equally 
well manifest even the nature of men. If human 
nature means virtues---what man ought to be---it is 
not common to every man equally. Some men in that 
sense are human and others inhuman. And if it merely 
means the bare qualities which every man has in 
common, such qualities considered in abstraction are 
nothing definite at all{\smc} for the quality which one man 
makes a means to crime another may use as a means to 
virtue{\smc} and the crime or the virtue are the really 
important things, the character of the individual men. 
But these are not common to all men, and therefore not 
\enquote{human nature} in this sense. In fact \hlt{there is no 
such thing as human nature in the sense of a definite 
body of characteristics common to every one}, and if 
there were it would not be by any means the same thing 
as God. 

If the universal is a quality or attribute exemplified 
by individuals which are called its particulars, according 
to the doctrine of logic, then the relation between God 
and men is not one of universal and particular. If God 
were considered as simply the quality goodness instead 
of being a person, then he would be the universal of all 
good actions{\smc} but on that account he would not be the 
universal of bad ones, and since bad actions are real acts 
[\textbf{165}]
of will, God would not be the universal of minds as 
such. The ordinary logical conception of the universal, 
the one quality of many things, is in fact inapplicable 
to the relation between God and other minds. And 
therefore we cannot argue that any particular mind 
shows the nature of God as well as any other. \hlt{The 
question to be asked about mind is not what it is, but 
what it does}{\smc} a question with which the logic of things 
and qualities does not deal. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) The historical uniqueness of Christ.}\label{unique}

Beyond these objections the question of Christ{\apo}s 
uniqueness passes into the region of history. It is only 
necessary to add one warning\cln\ that if he is the means 
of communicating the divine life to man and raising 
man into union with God, \hlt{the very success of his mission 
will in one sense destroy his unique\-ness}.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{%%
What has been the success of the mission of the historical Jesus{\qmk}
In Pt I, Ch.~III, \S~5 
(\enquote{\lips doctrine cannot be severed from its historical setting}),
Collingwood suggests that the example of the Good Samaritan is
\enquote{the kind 
of thing that any good man might do{\smc} it is typical of 
a kind of conduct which we see around us and know 
to be both admirable and possible.}
It might be said that Jesus{\apo}s self-sacrifice is also typical.
\emph{Now} it may be typical, or well recognized.
But is this only because Jesus set the example{\qmk}
There \emph{are} earlier sacrifices\cln\
that of Socrates for example \cite{Plato-Loeb-I}, 
and (in myth at least) 
that of Cleobis and Biton as described by Herodotus \cite[I.31]{Herodotus-Loeb},
or of Alcestis as described by Euripides \cite{7Plays}.
How is Jesus different{\qmk}
One might say that earlier sacrifices had to happen
so that Jesus{\apo}s could be understood properly.
Such things \emph{are} said by at least one Anglican (Episcopal) priest
\cite[pp.~6-9]{Spencer}{\smc}
more precisely that a particular people---the Jews---%
had to have the right notion of God
before God could become human.
It is not clear then why Jesus himself
may not in future be understood to have prepared the way
for yet another prophet.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Any one who 
fully learns his teacher{\apo}s lesson has become spiritually 
one with his teacher{\smc} and therefore the teacher{\apo}s 
experience of the truth is no longer unique. The 
teacher remains unique only as the first discoverer of 
the truth in the order of time, or as the mediator of it 
in the order of education{\smc} in the completion of his life 
this uniqueness disappears into absolute unity with his 
disciples. If therefore we try to define the uniqueness 
of the Christ in such a way as to make his experience 
incapable of real communication to man, we shall be 
preserving his divinity at the expense of his humanity, 
and making the supposed manifestation of God to man 
an illusion. The revelation---any revelation---sets 
before us an ideal{\smc} if the ideal is not literally and com\-%
pletely capable of attainment, it is not an ideal at all. 
It is an \emph{ignis fatuus.} 

But if this is so, it will be asked, why does 
history tell us of one and only one life in which it has 
been fully attained{\qmk} Does not the isolated position of 
Jesus Christ in history, his infinite moral superiority to 
all the saints, prove that there was in his nature some 
element that is denied to us{\smc} and are we not driven by 
the facts to suppose that his uniqueness lay not so much 
[\textbf{166}]
in the use he made of human faculties as in the possession 
of superhuman{\qmk} 

To this we must reply that the possession by any 
person of faculties inherently different, whether in nature 
or integrity, from our own, makes our attempts to live 
his life not merely vain but unreasonable{\smc} as if a man 
should emulate the strength of an elephant or a hereditary 
consumptive the physique of his untainted ancestors. 
If it is answered that these higher faculties can indeed 
be possessed by man, but only as bestowed by divine 
grace, we shall reply that this is exactly the position we 
have been maintaining\cln\ for we believe that a man{\apo}s 
human nature consists in no definite and circumscribed 
group of qualities, but precisely in those achievements 
to which the divine grace may lead him, or those sins 
into which he may fall by the rejection of such guidance. 
But to explain why one man attains and another fails is 
no part of our task. 

\addsubsec{(\emph d) As the absolute experience he summarises all reality and all history.  The problem of immortality.}

The Christ has absolute experience of the 
nature of God and lives in absolute free obedience to 
his will. So far as anybody attains these ideals in the 
pursuit of truth and duty, he shares the experience 
with Christ in absolute union with him, that is, with 
God. Such moments of attainment, in even the 
greatest men, are no doubt rare{\smc} but they are the 
metal of life which, when the reckoning is made, is 
separated from the dross and is alone worth calling life 
at all. Separate out from the total of experience all 
errors, all failures, all sins{\smc} and the gold that is left 
will be entirely one with the Christ-life. We thus see 
from a new point of view the absolute unity of Christ 
and God{\smc} for, as we said earlier, God is the reality of 
the world conceived as a whole which in its self-realisa\-%
tion and impulse towards unity purges out of itself all 
evil and error. History regarded in that way---not as 
a mere bundle of events but as a process of the solution 
of problems and the overcoming of difficulties---is 
altogether summed up in the infinite personality of 
[\textbf{167}]
God{\smc} and we can now see that it is equally summed 
up in the infinite personality of the God-Man. 

\hlt{If Christ is thus the epitome, the summary and 
ordered whole, of history, the same is true of every 
man in his degree}. The attainment of any real truth 
is an event, doubtless, in time, and capable of being 
catalogued in the chronologies of abstract history{\smc} but 
the truth itself is not historically circumscribed. A 
man may come to know God through a sudden 
\enquote{revelation} or \enquote{conversion}{\smc} but God is the same 
now and for ever. \hlt{In the knowledge of God, then, 
which means in all true knowledge, man comes into 
touch with something out of time}, something to which 
time makes no difference. And since knowledge of 
God is union with God, he does not merely see an 
extra-temporal reality{\smc} he does not merely glance 
through breaking mists at the battlements of eternity, 
as Moses saw the promised land from the hill of re\-%
nunciation. By his knowledge of eternity he is one 
with eternity{\smc} he has set himself in the centre of all 
time and all existence, free from the changes and 
the flux of things. He has entered into the life of 
God, and in becoming one with God he is already 
beyond the shadow of changing and the bitterness 
of death. 

There is a faint analogue to this immortality in the 
work by which a man leaves something of himself 
visibly present on earth. The workman in a cathedral 
sets his own mark upon the whole and leaves his 
monument in the work of his hands. He passes away, 
but his work---his expressed thought, his testimony to 
the glory of God---remains enshrined in stone. Even 
that is liable to decay, and in time such earthly immor\-%
tality is as if it had never been. But if a man has 
won his union with the mind of God, has known God{\apo}s 
thought and served God{\apo}s purpose in any of the count\-%
less ways in which it can be served, his monument is 
not something that stands for an age when he is dead. 
[\textbf{168}]
It is his own new and perfected life{\smc} something that in 
its very nature cannot pass away, except by desertion of 
the achieved ideal. This is the statue of the perfect 
man, more perennial than bronze{\smc} the life in a house 
not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. 

\mychap{II}{God{\apo}s Redemption of Man}

\addsec{1. The contradictory duties of Punishment and Forgive\-ness\cln---}

\textsc{Whatever} else is involved in \hlt{the doctrine of 
the Atonement}, it \hlt{in\-cludes at least this\cln\ that the sins 
of man are forgiven by God}. And here at the very 
outset a difficulty arises which must be faced before the 
doctrine can be further developed. \hlt{Forgiveness and 
punishment are generally conceived as two alternative 
ways of treating a wrongdoer}. We may punish any 
particular criminal, or we may forgive him{\smc} and the 
question always is, which is the right course of action. 
On the one hand, however, \hlt{punishment seems to be} not 
a conditional but \hlt{an absolute duty}{\smc} and to neglect it is 
definitely wrong. Justice in man consists at least in 
punishing the guilty, and the conception of a just God 
similarly emphasises his righteous infliction of penalties 
upon those who break his laws. The very idea of 
punishment is not that it is sometimes right and some\-%
times wrong or indifferent, but that its infliction is an 
inexorable demand of duty. 

On the other hand, \hlt{forgiveness is presented as an 
equally vital duty} for man and an equally definite 
characteristic of God. This, again, is not conditional. 
The ideal of forgiveness is subject to no restrictions. 
The divine precept does not require us to forgive, say, 
seven times and then turn on the offender for reprisals. 
Forgiveness must be applied unequivocally to every 
offence alike.\footnoteB{One webpage
(\url{www.gotquestions.org/sin-God-not-forgive.html}, 
accessed July 19, 2015)
interprets 1 John 5:12 as meaning,
\enquote{for those who reject the Lord Jesus
there is no forgiveness or remission of sin,}
but the Bible passage itself reads merely,
\enquote{He that hath the Son hath life{\smc}
\emph{and} he that hath not the Son of God
hath not life.}
The page, and Collingwood, 
seem to ignore Matthew 12:31--2:
\enquote{\lips the blasphemy \emph{against the Holy} Ghost
shall not be forgiven unto men\lips
whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost,
it shall not be forgiven him,
neither in this world,
neither in the world to come.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

\hlt{Here, then, we have an absolute contradiction}
[\textbf{170}]
between two opposing ideals of conduct. And the 
result of applying the antithesis to the doctrine of 
atonement is equally fatal whichever horn of the 
dilemma is accepted. Either punishment is right and 
forgiveness wrong, or forgiveness is right and punish\-%
ment wrong. If punishment is right, then the doctrine 
that God forgives our sins is illusory and immoral{\smc} 
it ascribes to God the weakness of a doting father who 
spares the rod and spoils the child. If punishment is 
wrong, then the conception of a punishing God is a 
mere barbarism of primitive theology, and atonement is 
no mystery, no divine grace, but simply the belated 
recognition by theology that its God is a moral being. 
\hlt{Thus regarded, the Atonement becomes either a fallacy 
or a truism}. 

And it is common enough, in the abstract and hasty 
thought which in every age passes for modern, to find 
the conception of atonement dismissed in this way. 
But \hlt{such thought} generally breaks down in two different 
directions. In its cavalier treatment of a doctrine, it 
\hlt{ignores the real weight of thought and experience} that 
has gone to the development of the theory, or broadly 
condemns it as illusion and dreams{\smc} and \hlt{secondly, it 
proceeds without sufficient speculative analysis of its 
own conceptions}, with a confidence based in the last 
resort upon ignorance. \hlt{The historian of thought will 
develop the first of these objections{\smc} our aim is to 
consider the second}. 

The dilemma which has been applied to theology 
must, of course, equally apply to moral or political philo\-%
sophy. In order to observe it at work, we must see 
what results it produces there. Punishment and for\-%
giveness are things we find in our own human society{\smc} 
and unless we are to make an end of theology, religion, 
and philosophy by asserting that there is no relation 
between the human and the divine, we must try to 
explain each by what we know of the other. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Forgiveness cannot be dismissed as an illusion.}

\hlt{The first solution of the dilemma}, then, \hlt{might be}
[\textbf{171}]
\hlt{to maintain that punishment is an absolute duty and 
forgiveness positively wrong}. We cannot escape the 
rigour of this conclusion by supposing forgiveness to be 
\enquote{non-moral,} for we cannot evade moral issues{\smc} the 
possibility of forgiveness only arises in cases where 
punishment is also an alternative, and if punishment is 
always right, then forgiveness must always be a crime. 

Forgiveness, on this view, is a sentimental weakness, 
a mere neglect of the duty to punish. It is due to 
misguided partiality towards an offender{\smc} and instead 
of cancelling or wiping out his crime, endorses it by 
committing another. Now \hlt{this is a view which might 
conceivably be held}{\smc} and if consistently held would be 
difficult to refute, without such a further examination 
of the conceptions involved as we shall undertake later. 
At this stage we can only point out that \hlt{it does not 
deserve the name of an ethical theory}{\smc} because it em\-%
phasises one fact in the moral consciousness and arbit\-%
rarily ignores others. \hlt{The fact is that people do forgive, 
and feel that they are acting morally in so doing}. They 
distinguish quite clearly in their own minds between 
forgiving a crime and sentimentally overlooking or con\-%
doning it. Now \hlt{the theory does not merely ignore this 
fact, but it implicitly or even, if pressed, explicitly 
denies it}. To a person who protested \enquote{But I am con\-%
vinced that it is a duty to forgive,} it would reply, 
\enquote{Then you are wrong{\smc} it is a crime.} And if asked why 
it is a crime, the theory would explain, \enquote{Because it is 
inconsistent with the duty to punish.} But \hlt{the duty to 
punish rests on the same basis as the duty to forgive}{\smc} 
it is a pronouncement of the moral consciousness. All 
the theory does is to assume quite uncritically that the 
moral consciousness is right in the one case and wrong 
in the other{\smc} whereas the reverse is equally possible. 
The two duties may be contradictory, but they rest on 
the same basis{\smc} and the argument which discredits one 
discredits the other too.%%%%%
\footnoteB{We perceive both a duty to punish and a duty to forgive.
We perceive moreover that forgiveness is not just sentimentality.
Any theory of morality must account for these perceptions\cln\
such accounting is merely part of what it means to be a theory of morality.
As such, a theory of morality must \emph{also} establish what is moral\cln\
it must be not only descriptive, but also prescriptive,
for otherwise the theory would not have been able to recognize
the object of its theorizing in the first place.
If you know what morality is,
you must know that you yourself have a duty,
as for example to establish a \emph{correct} theory of morality,
if theorizing is what you are doing.
If it is possible for us to be \emph{simply} mistaken
in believing forgiveness to be a duty,
then we have no basis for asserting that punishment is a duty\cln\
for we could then be simply mistaken about this too.
The theory of morality must identify what is correct
in every aspect of our \enquote{moral consciousness.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Neither can punishment\cln---}

\hlt{The same difficulty applies to the other horn of}
[\textbf{172}]
\hlt{the dilemma, according to which forgiveness is always 
right and punishment always wrong}. Just as we cannot 
say that forgiveness is a crime because punishment is 
a duty, so we cannot say that punishment is a crime 
because forgiveness is a duty. But the theory of the 
immorality of punishment has been worked out rather 
more fully than is (I believe) the case with the theory 
of the immorality of forgiveness.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In the next two subsubsections,
Collingwood will show 
(presumably in summarizing theories already worked out by unnamed others)
that both (i) revenge and 
(ii) deterrence (\emph{i.e.}\ doing harm to the criminal
as a negative example to others)
are immoral.
But then he will also claim to show that punishment as such 
is intended neither as revenge nor as deterrence,
and thus, like forgiveness, cannot be dismissed as an illusion.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

\addsubsubsec{i.  Breakdown of revenge theory.}

Just as forgiveness was identified with sentimental 
condoning of an offence, so \hlt{punishment has been equated 
with personal revenge. This view has been plausibly 
expressed in terms of evolution} by the hypothesis that 
revenge for injuries has been gradually, in the progress 
of civilisation, organised and centralised by state con\-%
trol{\smc} so that instead of a vendetta we nowadays have 
recourse to a lawsuit as our means of reprisal on those 
who have done us wrong. But such a statement over\-%
looks the fact that punishment is not revenge in the 
simple and natural sense of that word. The difference 
is as plain as that between forgiveness and the neglect of 
the duty to punish. \hlt{Revenge is a second crime which 
does nothing to mitigate the first}{\smc} punishment is not a 
crime but something which we feel to be a duty.%%%%%
\footnoteB{There must be plenty of people 
who still feel that revenge \emph{is} a duty
(a duty to the family honor, for example).
The point is that, even if you do perceive revenge as such to be a crime,
you may still recognize punishment as a duty.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The 
\enquote{state organisation of revenge} really means the annihi\-%
lation or supersession of revenge and the substitution for 
it of equitable punishment. And if we ask how this 
miracle has happened, the only answer is that \hlt{people 
have come to see that revenge is wrong and so have 
given it up}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{It sounds like begging the question,
if not simple contradiction.
There is an argument that punishment is wrong,
because punishment is only revenge, 
and as we all know, revenge is wrong.
The proposed refutation is that punishment is \emph{not} revenge,
and we all know this too.
However,
according to \emph{Guardian} article \cite{Guardian-guilty}
from 2012 based on the work of Sam Harris,
\enquote{a belief in free will
forms the foundation and underpinning of our enduring commitment
to retributive justice}{\smc}
but retribution would seem to be revenge.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\addsubsubsec{ii. Breakdown of deterrent theory.}

\hlt{A less crude theory of punishment as merely 
selfish is the view which describes it as deterrent}, as a 
means of self-preservation on the part of society. We 
are told that crime in general is detrimental to social 
well-being (or, according to more thor\-ough-going forms 
of the conception, what is found to be detrimental is 
arbitrarily called crime), and therefore society inflicts 
certain penalties on criminals in order to deter them and 
others from further anti-social acts. It is the function 
[\textbf{173}]
of \enquote{justice} to determine what amount of terror is 
necessary in order to prevent the crime. 

\hlt{Punishment so explained is not moral}. We punish 
not because it is a duty but because it preserves us 
against certain dangers. A person has done us an injury, 
and we maltreat him, not out of a spirit of revenge, far 
from it, but in order to frighten others who may wish 
to imitate him. The condemned criminal is regarded 
as a marauder nailed \emph{in terrorem} to the barn-door. One 
feels inclined to ask how such a combination of cruelty 
and selfishness can possibly be justified in civilised 
societies{\smc} and if the theory is still possessed by a linger\-%
ing desire to justify punishment, it will perhaps reply 
that the criminal has \enquote{forfeited his right} to considerate 
treatment. Which means either that he has cut himself 
off from our society altogether (which he plainly has not) 
or that there is nothing wrong in being cruel to a 
criminal{\smc} which is monstrous. \hlt{If society is trying to 
be moral at all, it has duties towards a criminal} as much 
as towards any one else. It may deny the duties, and 
have its criminals eaten by wild beasts for its amuse\-%
ment, or tortured for its increased security{\smc} perhaps the 
former is the less revolting practice{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Is Collingwood here suggesting a kind of defense of ancient Rome 
against Moderns who point out how barbaric it was?
Yes it was barbaric, but so are we today.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
but in either case 
society is demonstrating its own corruption. 

\hlt{The deterrent theory}, then, must not be used as a 
justification, but only as an impeachment, of punishment. 
But even if punishment is, as the theory maintains, a 
purely selfish activity, it \hlt{must still be justified in a sense{\smc} 
not by its rightness but by its success}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{By \enquote{must,}
did Collingwood mean \enquote{might}{\qmk}
Or does he mean that if the theory is to be justified at all,
it must be by its success{\qmk}
He might moreover mean that since the theory \emph{is} heald,
we can conclude that it is justified in some sense.
I suppose \enquote{justification} here means justification
as a \emph{prescriptive} theory.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The question 
therefore is whether as a matter of fact punishment does 
deter. Now a \enquote{just} penalty, on this theory, is defined 
as one which is precisely sufficient to deter. If it does 
not deter, it is condemned as giving insufficient protection 
to society, and therefore unjust. Society will accordingly 
increase it, and this increase will continue till a balance 
is established and the crime is stamped out. Those 
crimes therefore happen oftenest whose statutable penalties 
are most in defect of this ideal balance. The fact that 
[\textbf{174}]
they happen proves that the penalty is inadequate. 
Therefore, if the deterrent view is correct, society must 
be anxious to increase these penalties. But we do not 
find that this is the case. \hlt{If criminal statistics show an 
increase, we do not immediately increase the penalties}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Doesn\apo t it depend on how you strictly you construe \enquote{immediately}{\qmk}
It takes time recognize the increase
and to pass legislation in response.
In fact, in the US we do not decrease the penalties when crime goes down,
not because criminals still deserve their prison sentences,
and not merely for the barbaric reason that we like to torture people,
but for the more barbaric reason that the \enquote{justice} system
allows private interests to \emph{profit} from imprisoning people
\cite{Harpers-prison-reform}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Still less do we go on increasing them further and further 
until the crime is no longer attractive. If we may argue 
from empirical evidence, such as the infliction of the 
death-penalty for petty thefts, it is simply not the case 
that increased severity necessarily diminishes crime{\smc} and 
yet on the theory it ought to do so. On the contrary, it 
sometimes appears that higher penalties go with greater 
frequency. To reply to this that the frequency of 
crime is the cause, not the effect, of the greater severity, 
would be to confess the failure of punishment as deter\-%
rent{\smc} for, on that view, severity ought to be the \emph{cause} of 
\emph{infrequency}, not the \emph{effect} of \emph{frequency}. The plea would 
amount to a confession that we cannot, as is supposed, con\-%
trol the amount of crime by the degree of punishment. 

Thus the view that punishment is a selfish act of 
society to secure its own safety against crime breaks 
down. Its plausibility depends on the truth that the 
severity of punishments is somehow commensurate with 
the badness of the crime{\smc} that there is a connexion of 
degree between the two. If we ask how this equation 
is brought about, the theory disappears at once. In 
punishment we do not try to hurt a man as much as he 
has hurt us{\smc} or even as much as may induce him not 
to hurt us. \hlt{The \enquote{amount} of punishment is fixed by 
one standard only{\smc} what we suppose him to deserve}. 
This is difficult to define exactly, and common practice 
represents only a very rough approximation to it{\smc} but 
it is that, not anything else, at which the approximation 
aims. And the conception of desert reintroduces into 
punishment the moral criterion which the theory tried 
to banish from it. To aim at giving a man the punish\-%
ment he deserves implies that he does deserve it, and 
therefore that it is our duty to give it him. 
[\textbf{175}] 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) The contradiction is absolute.}

Both these escapes, therefore, have failed. We 
cannot say that either punishment or forgiveness is 
wrong, and thus vindicate the necessity of the other. 
Though contradictory they are both imperative. Nor 
can we make them apply to different cases{\smc} maintaining 
for instance that we should forgive the repentant and 
punish the obdurate. \hlt{If we only forgive a man after 
he has repented}, that is to say, put away his guilt 
and become good once more, \hlt{the idea of forgiveness 
is a mockery}. The very conception of forgiveness 
is that it should be our treatment of the guilty as 
guilty. 

\hlt{Nor can we escape by an abstraction distinguishing 
the sin\-ner from the sin}. We punish not the sin, but 
the sinner for his sin{\smc} and we forgive not the sinner 
distinguished from his sin, but identified with it and 
manifested in it. If we punish the sin, we must forgive 
the sin too\cln\ if we forgive the sinner, we must equally 
punish him. 

\addsec{2. The solution of the contradiction\cln---}

This absolute contradiction between the two 
duties can only be soluble in one way. A contradiction 
of any kind is soluble either by discovering one member 
of it to be false, an expedient which has already been 
tried, or by showing that the two are not really, as 
wc had supposed, incompatible. This is true, whether 
the contradiction is between two judgments of fact or 
between two duties or so-called \enquote{judgments of value}{\smc} 
for if it is axiomatic that two contradictory judgments 
cannot both be true, \hlt{it is} equally \hlt{axiomatic that two 
incompatible courses of action cannot both be obligatory}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\enquote{Paraconsistent} logic rejects such axioms,
but allows contradictions,
in the sense of not requiring \emph{everything} 
to follow logically from a contradiction.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
This fact may be obscured by saying that on certain 
occasions we are faced with two alternatives of which 
each is a duty, but the question is which is the greater 
duty. But the \hlt{\enquote{greater duty} is a phrase without 
meaning}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\emph{New Leviathan} \textbf{17.\ 51\cln}\
\enquote{Duty admits of no alternatives.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
In the supposed case the distinction is 
between this which we ought to do, and that which we 
ought not{\smc} the distinction between \emph{ought} and \emph{ought not} 
is not a matter of degree. 
[\textbf{176}] 

Granted, then, that in any given situation there can 
be only one duty, it follows necessarily that \hlt{if of two 
actions each is really obligatory the two actions must be 
the same}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The actions may be the same,
but they are the same through the convergence of a dialectic,
as in \emph{New Leviathan}\cln\
there is a \enquote{conservative} side 
wanting nobody to get away with crime,
and a \enquote{liberal} side wanting no harm to be done.
As Collingwood will say below (page \pageref{err}),
the distinction between punishment and forgiveness
is only the distinction between two ways of \emph{failing}
to properly punish and forgive.}
%%%%%%
We are therefore compelled to hold that 
punishment and forgiveness, so far from being incom\-%
patible duties, are really when properly understood 
identical. This may seem impossible{\smc} but as yet we 
have defined neither conception, and this we must now 
proceed to do. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Further analysis of punishment.}

Punishment consists in the infliction of deserved 
suffering on an offender. But it is not yet clear what 
suffering is inflicted, and how it is fixed, beyond the 
bare fact that it must be deserved. If we ask, Why is 
that particular sort and amount of pain inflicted on this 
particular man\qmk\ the answer, \enquote{That is what he deserves,} 
no doubt conveys the truth, but it does not fully explain 
it. It is not immediately clear without further thought 
that this must be the right punishment. \hlt{Punish\-ment}%%%%%
\footnoteB{That is, the punishment appropriate to a particular crime.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
\hlt{is 
fixed not by a self-evident and inexplicable intu\-ition, 
but by some motive or process of thought which we 
must try to analyse}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The process of thought should involve the thinker 
as well as the criminal.
I recall the distinction made somewhere by Haidt
\cite{Haidt}
between morality as solving puzzles 
(should one person be killed to save ten\qmk)\
and morality as working out how to be the right kind of person.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The conception of desert proves 
that this motive is moral{\smc} and it remains to ask what 
is the moral attitude towards a crime or criminal.%%%%%
\footnoteB{That wrongdoing should be punished
\emph{is} apparently known by intuition{\smc}
but what exactly the punishment should be is not so clear.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

If we take the case of a misdeed of our own and 
consider the attitude of our better moments towards it, 
we see that this attitude is one of condemnation.%%%%%
\footnoteB{To condemn is to damn,
etymologically and otherwise.
It may involve not only disapproval, 
but also physical pain, as from fasting or flagellation.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It is 
the act of a good will declaring its hostility to a bad one. 
This feeling of rejection, condemnation, or hostility is 
in fact the necessary attitude of all good wills towards 
all evil acts. The moral action of the person who 
punishes, therefore, consists primarily in this condemna\-%
tion. Further, the condemnation, in our own case, is 
the act in and through which we effect our liberation or 
alienation from the evil, and our adherence to the good. 
If a person is in a state of sin, that he should feel hostility 
towards his own sin is necessary to his moral salvation{\smc} 
he cannot become good except by condemning his own 
crime. The condemnation of the crime is not the 
[\textbf{177}]
means to goodness{\smc} it \emph{is} the manifestation of the new 
good will. 

The condemnation of evil is the necessary manifesta\-%
tion of all good wills. If A has committed a crime, B, 
if he is a moral person, condemns it. And this con\-%
demnation he will express to A if he is in social relations 
with him{\smc} for social relations consist of sharing thoughts 
and activities so far as possible. If B is successful in 
communicating his condemnation to A, A will thereupon 
share it{\smc} for A{\apo}s knowledge that B condemns him, 
apart from his agreement in the condemnation, is not 
really a case of communication. But if A shares the 
condemnation he substitutes in that act a good will for 
an evil. The process is now complete{\smc} A{\apo}s sin, B{\apo}s 
condemnation, B{\apo}s expression to A of his feelings, A{\apo}s 
conversion and repentance. This is the inevitable result 
of social relations between the two persons, granting that 
A{\apo}s will is good and that the relations are maintained. 

Now \hlt{this self-expression of a good will towards a 
bad is, I think, what we mean by the duty of punish\-%
ment}. It is no doubt the case that we describe many 
things as punishment in which we can hardly recognise 
these features at all. But examination of such cases 
shows that precisely so far as these facts are not present, 
so far as the punishment does not express moral feelings, 
and does not aim in some degree at the self-conviction 
of the criminal---so far, we are inclined to doubt whether 
it is a duty at all, and not a convention, a farce, or a 
crime. We conclude, therefore, that \hlt{punishment}---the 
only punishment we can attribute to God or to a good 
man---\hlt{is the expression to a criminal of the punisher{\apo}s 
moral attitude towards him. Hence}%%%%
\footnoteB{From the recognition of what punishment is,
its being an absolute duty logically follows.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
\hlt{punishment is an 
absolute duty}{\smc}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Thus arises the compulsion to correct every error on the internet{\expt}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
since not to feel that attitude would be 
to share his crime, and not to express it would be a 
denial of social relations, an act of hypocrisy. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Identity of punishment and forgiveness.}

\hlt{The pain inflicted on the criminal, then, is not 
the pain of evil con\-sequences}, recoiling from his action 
in the course of nature or by the design of God or man 
[\textbf{178}]
upon his own head%%%%%
\footnoteB{Collingwood may allude here to the notion of \emph{karma.}
In any case, as judges, we may decide that the 
\enquote{natural} (or karmic, or divine) 
consequences of a crime will be sufficient punishment.
But this judgment is our responsibility.
It is our responsibility to condemn the crime in this way.}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} \hlt{still less is it} the \hlt{mere regret} for 
having done something which involves himself or others 
in such consequences. These things are not punishment 
at all, and ought never to be confused with it, though 
they may well be incidental to it. \hlt{The pain of punish\-%
ment is simply the pain of self-condemnation or moral 
repentance}{\smc} the renunciation of one aim and the turning 
of the will to another. That is what we try to inflict 
upon him{\smc} and any other, incidental pains are merely 
the means by which we express to him our attitude and 
will. But why, it may be asked, should these inci\-%
dental pains be necessary{\qmk} Why should they be the 
only means of communicating such feelings{\qmk} The 
answer is that they are not. \hlt{The most perfect punish\-%
ments involve no \enquote{incidental} pains at all. The 
condem\-nation is expressed simply and quietly in words, 
and goes straight home}. The punishment consists in 
expression of condemnation and that alone{\smc} and to 
punish with a word instead of a blow is still punishment. 
It is, perhaps, a better and more civilised form of 
punishment{\smc} it indicates a higher degree of intelligence 
and a more delicate social organisation. \hlt{If a criminal 
is extremely coarsened and brutalised, we have to 
express our feelings in a crude way} by cutting him off 
from the privileges of a society to whose moral aims he 
has shown himself hostile{\smc} but if we are punishing a 
child, the tongue is a much more efficient weapon than 
the stick. 

Nor does the refinement of the penalty end there. 
\hlt{It is possible to punish without the word of rebuke{\smc} to 
punish by saying nothing at all, or by an act of kind\-%
ness}. Here again, we cannot refuse the name of 
punishment because no \enquote{physical suffering} is inflicted. 
The expression of moral feelings, or the attitude of the 
good will to the bad, may take any form which the 
wrongdoer can understand. In fact, it is possible to 
hold that we often use \enquote{strong measures} when a word 
or a kind action would do just as well, or better. \enquote{If 
[\textbf{179}]
thine enemy hunger, feed him{\smc} for in so doing thou 
shalt heap coals of fire on his head.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{An abridgement of Romans 12:20, 
which is a paraphrase of Proverbs 25:21--2{\smc}
the Aland New Testamant \cite{GNT}
also refers here to Matthew 5:44:
\enquote{Love your enemies, bless them that curse you,
do good to them that hate you.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
Sentimentalists 
have recoiled in horror from such a refinement of 
brutality,%%%%%
\footnoteB{Just as, I suppose, they reject punishment itself
as being a refinement of vengeance.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
not realising that to heap coals of fire, the 
fires of repentance, upon the head of the wrongdoer is 
the desire of all who wish to save his soul, not to 
perpetuate and endorse his crime. 

But at this stage of the conception we should find it 
hard to discriminate between punishment and forgive\-%
ness.%%%%%
\footnoteB{\emph I find it hard to distinguish between Collingwood{\apo}s ideas
and those of Socrates as suggested in Plato.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
If punishment is to express condemnation, it 
must be the condemnation of a bad will by a good one. 
That is to say, it is the self-expression of a good will, 
and that good will is expressed as truly in the act of 
kindness as in the block and gallows. But if the 
punisher{\apo}s will really is good, he continues, however 
severe his measures, to wish for the welfare and regenera\-%
tion of the criminal. He punishes him not wholly with 
a view to \enquote{his good,} because the punishment is not 
consciously undertaken as a means to an end, but as the 
spontaneous expression of a moral will{\smc} yet the aim of 
that will is not the criminal{\apo}s mutilation or suffering as 
such but the awakening of his moral consciousness. And 
\hlt{to treat the criminal as a fellow-man capable of reforma\-%
tion, to feel still one{\apo}s social relation and duty towards 
him, is surely the attitude which we call forgiveness}. 

\hlt{If forgiveness means remission of the penalty, it is 
impossible to a moral will}.  For the penalty is simply 
the judgment{\smc} it is the expression of the moral will{\apo}s 
own nature.%%%%% 
\footnoteB{\label{amnesty}%
Thus the amnesties occasionally granted to large classes of prisoners in Turkey are immoral,
unless the previous incarcerations were themselves immoral.
Possibly such amnesties are a tradition associated with Islam.
However, though the Greek \grneo{>amnhst\gracute ia} originally meant forgetfulness,
it also took on the modern sense of amnesty.
The Latin \emph{obl\={\i}vi\=o} seems to have had a similar development.
Christians seem to believe that, through the death of Jesus,
we are all granted a general amnesty.
The problem with this view is illustrated in
Anne Perry{\apo}s historical novel 
\emph{The Sheen on the Silk} \cite{Perry}
set in Byzantium\cln\
forgiveness without penitance breeds only cynicism.
It so happens that Anne Perry served time in prison 
for the murder of her friend\apo s mother.
See page \pageref{amnesty2} and note \ref{amnesty2}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
If forgiveness means the remission of the 
more violent forms of self-expression on the part of 
the good will, then such restraint is not only still 
punishment but may be the most acute and effective 
form of it. But \hlt{if forgiveness means}---as it properly 
does---\hlt{the wise and patient care for the criminal{\apo}s 
welfare, for his regeneration and recovery into the life 
of a good society, then there is no distinction whatever 
between forgiveness and punishment}. 

\addsubsec{(\emph c) Empirical distinction between them.}

Punishment and forgiveness are thus not only 
[\textbf{180}]
compatible but identical{\smc} each is a name for the one 
and only right attitude of a good will towards a man 
of evil will. The details of the self-expression vary 
according to circumstances{\smc} and when we ask, \enquote{Shall 
we punish this man or forgive him\qmk}\ we are really 
considering whether we shall use this or that method of 
expressing what is in either case equally punishment 
and forgiveness. \hlt{The only important distinction we\label{err}
make be\-tween the two words is this\cln\ they refer to the 
same attitude of mind, but they serve to distinguish it 
from different ways of erring}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In \emph{The Principles of Art} 
\cite[pp.~256, 260]{Collingwood-PA},
Collingwood will ridicule the notion that two different words
(or even two instances of the \enquote{same} word) can be synonymous,
or that one sentence can be the \enquote{homolingual translation}
of another.
Even though punishment and forgiveness are the same thing,
the two words are not synonyms,
but refer to different ways of failing to understand the same thing.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
When we describe an 
attitude as one of forgiveness, we mean to distinguish 
it, as right, from that brutality or unintelligent severity 
(punishment falsely so called) which inflicts pain either 
in mere wantonness or without considering the possi\-%
bility of a milder expression. When we call it punish\-%
ment, we distinguish it as right from that weakness or 
sentimentality (forgiveness falsely so called) which 
by shrinking from the infliction of pain amounts to 
condonation of the original offence. 

\addsec{3. The conception of redemption\cln---}

\hlt{The identity of punishment and forgiveness 
removes the pre\-liminary difficulty} in the way of any 
doctrine of atonement. So far as we can now under\-%
stand God{\apo}s attitude towards sin, it may be expressed 
thus. 

\hlt{God{\apo}s attitude towards the sins of men must be one 
which combines condemnation of the sinful will with 
love and hope for it}{\smc} these two being combined not as 
externally connected and internally inconsistent elements 
of a state of mind, but as being the single necessary 
expression of his perfect nature towards natures less 
perfect, but regarded as capable of perfection. \hlt{This 
attitude on the part of God is, further, the means of 
man{\apo}s redemption}{\smc} for by understanding God{\apo}s attitude 
towards sin man comes himself to share in that attitude, 
and is thus converted to a new life in harmony with 
God{\apo}s good will. 

Here \hlt{we seem to have a relation involving two} 
[\textbf{181}]
\hlt{separate activi\-ties, the divine and the human}. On the 
one hand there is the initiation of the repentance, the 
act of punishment or forgiveness on the part of God{\smc} 
and on the other, the response to God{\apo}s act, the repent\-%
ance of man in virtue of the original self-expression of 
God. 

These are two inseparable aspects of one and the 
same pro\-cess{\smc} the \hlt{tendency to lay exclusive emphasis 
on one or the other leads to two main types of theory, 
each equally unsatis\-factory} because each, while really 
one-sided, claims to be an account of the whole truth. 
These views I call \hlt{the objective and subjective theories 
respectively}. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Objectively as grace of God.}

\hlt{The objective theory of atonement points out 
that whatever change takes place in the human will is 
due to the free gift of the Spirit of God}. Man can do 
nothing good except by virtue of God{\apo}s grace, and 
therefore if the evil will of a man is converted into a 
good will, the whole process is an act of God. The 
Atonement, the redemption of man, is a fact entirely 
on the side of God, not at all on the side of man{\smc} for 
without God{\apo}s help and inspiration there would be 
nothing good in man at all. 

\hlt{This view} lays the emphasis on God{\apo}s attitude to 
the world{\smc} and \hlt{concerns itself chiefly with the question, 
What change did the Incar\-nation mark in the develop\-%
ment of God{\apo}s plans}{\qmk} We cannot suppose that there 
was no change at all, that it merely put a new ideal 
before man, because man always had high ideals{\smc} he 
had Moses and the prophets, and had not listened to 
them. The divine grace of the Atonement consists in 
the imparting not of a new ideal but of a new power 
and energy to live up to the ideal. \hlt{Man, in a word, 
cannot redeem himself{\smc} his redemption comes from 
God and is God{\apo}s alone}. 

Now \hlt{this \enquote{objective} view is exposed to the danger 
of for\-getting that redemption must be the redemption 
of a will}, the change of a will{\smc} and that in the last 
[\textbf{182}]
resort a will can only be changed by itself. If this is 
forgotten, the objective theory lapses into an abstract 
legalism%%%%%
\footnoteB{\label{amnesty2}%
Like the amnesty of note \ref{amnesty}, page \pageref{amnesty}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
according to which grace becomes a fictitious 
and conventional restoration to favour without any 
corresponding renovation of character. These two 
things must never be allowed to fall apart in such a way 
that the Atonement consists in one to the exclusion of 
the other{\smc} for unless the grace of God awakes a 
response in the will of man there is no true atonement. 
But this response is just the fact which this type of 
theory tends either to overlook or at least to describe 
with insufficient accuracy. 

In examining actual theories of the Atonement, 
however, we must bear in mind that \hlt{a verbal statement 
which appears to be one-sided does not necessarily either 
neglect or exclude the other side}. The objective view 
is perfectly true so far as it goes{\smc} and the criticism 
often directed against it, on the ground that redemption 
is a matter of the individual will alone and must arise 
entirely from within, is due to a fallacious theory of 
personality. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Subjectively as effort of man.}

\hlt{The \enquote{subjective} theory} insists on the attitude 
of man to God, and \hlt{lays down that} since \hlt{redemption}
involves an attitude or state of the subject{\apo}s will it 
\hlt{cannot without violence to his freedom be brought 
about by the act of another person}, even if that other 
person be God. Grace as something merely proceed\-%
ing from God is not only a hypothesis, but a useless 
hypothesis{\smc} the fact to be explained is the change, 
repentance, reformation of the individual, and this fact 
cannot be explained by reference to another{\apo}s actions. 
Nobody can change my mind for me except myself. 
The question in short is not, What change has occurred 
in God\qmk---since God is and always was long-suffering 
and merciful. It is rather, What difference has the life 
of Christ made in me{\qmk} How has his example fired me 
to imitate him, his life challenged me to new effort, his 
love called forth love in me{\qmk} 
[\textbf{183}] 

This view is attended by a parallel danger. It 
insists on the reality and inviolability of the individual{\smc} 
and the least over-emphasis on this truth leads to the 
theory that no real help, no real stimulus, can pass over 
from one individual to another. In short, it brings us 
to the exclusive or \hlt{individualistic theory of personality 
for which every person is a law to himself, supplies 
himself with his own standards of right and wrong},%%%%%
\footnoteB{This is my theory,
except that obviously one may accept the standards proposed by another.
This acceptance is however immoral
unless one finds that the proposed standards are already part of oneself,
at least \enquote{implicitly,}
as Socrates found knowledge of geometry implicitly in Meno{\apo}s slave.
But see Pt~II, Ch.~III, \S~2 (\emph a), p.~\pageref{already}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
and 
draws upon his own resources in order to live up to 
them{\smc} for which the influence of one person on another 
is either impossible or---inconsistently with the theory---%
possible, but an \enquote{infringement of the rights} of the 
individual. From such a point of view it might be 
replied to one who spoke of Christ{\apo}s life on earth, 
\enquote{What good can it do{\qmk} He lived nobly, you say, and 
died a martyr{\smc} but why should you tell me these 
things{\qmk} I can only do what lies in my power{\smc} I 
cannot behave like a hero, being the man I am. It is 
useless for you to set up an ideal before me unless you 
can give me strength to live up to it. And the strength 
that I do not possess nobody can give me.}%%%%% 
\footnoteB{This makes sense if strength is like fuel in a tank{\smc}
but it is not, as will is not an engine (p.\ \pageref{will-engine}).
The example of another can inspire us to persevere
and find strength that we never knew we had.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
And if 
the instructor goes on to expound the doctrine of grace 
and the indwelling of the Spirit of the Lord in his 
Church, the reply will be that these things are dreams{\smc} 
impossible from the very nature of personality, which 
is such that \enquote{one consciousness}---that of the Holy 
Spirit---\enquote{cannot include another}---that of an individual 
human being{\smc} or else that if these things are possible 
they involve an intolerable swamping of one{\apo}s own 
personality, a surrender of one{\apo}s freedom and individu\-%
ality which can only be a morbid and unhealthy state 
of mind. 

\begin{sloppypar}
We have dealt with this individualistic theory else\-%
where,%%%%%
\footnoteB{Pt II, Ch.~III (p.~\pageref{Personality}).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and shall now only repeat that it implies the 
negation not merely of atonement in the sense of 
redemption of man whether by man, Christ, or God, 
but also of social life as a whole{\smc} and therefore destroys 
by implication the very individual whose reality it hoped 
[\textbf{184}]
to vindicate. It presents us with the portrait of an ideal 
man who stands in no need of any external stimulus or 
assistance in working out his own salvation. If such a 
person existed, he would be independent of God and 
man alike, and would justly feel insulted by the offer of 
an atonement. But the portrait is untrue, not simply 
because no actual man ever attains this complete self-%
dependence, but rather because it is a false ideal{\smc} \hlt{the 
perfect life for man is a life not of absolute isolation but 
of absolute communion}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Which does not mean loss of individuality,
because the individual most keep working to maintain the communion.
See again Pt~II, Ch.~III, \S~2 (\emph a), p.~\pageref{already}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
A man shows his greatness 
not in ignoring his surroundings but in understanding 
and assimilating them{\smc} and his debt to his environment 
is no loss to his individuality but a gain. 
\end{sloppypar}

\addsubsec{(\emph c) Identity of the two sides.}

It must be obvious by now that \hlt{of the two 
theories sketched above}, each is an abstraction{\smc} \hlt{each 
emphasises one side of a reality in which} both sides are 
present and in which, as a matter of fact, \hlt{both sides are 
one}. The two sides must be united{\smc} but \hlt{this cannot 
be effected by a compromise}. A compromise is a 
middle path between two extremes, and includes neither. 
The combination at which we must aim will assert both 
theories to the full while avoiding the errors which alone 
keep them apart. As often happens in such cases, \hlt{the 
two opposing theories are based on the same error}, and 
a little further analysis will show wherein this error 
consists. 

The danger of objectivism was to assume that grace 
could pass from God to man leaving man{\apo}s inmost will 
untouched. The legalistic conception of grace depended 
on the separation of the human personality from the 
divine as two vessels, one of which might receive \enquote{con\-%
tent} from the other while its nature remained unaltered. 
The theory clings to the omnipotence of God and the 
fact that from him comes man{\apo}s salvation, but conceives 
this omnipotence as God{\apo}s power of imposing his own 
good will upon man. But this is no true redemption{\smc} 
the man{\apo}s own will is merely superseded by, not unified 
with, the will of God. That is to say the good will 
[\textbf{185}]
which is manifested is solely God{\apo}s and not in any sense 
man{\apo}s. The human will is not redeemed but annihilated. 

In order to avoid this conclusion subjectivism lays 
stress on the point which the above theory was led to 
deny, namely the fact that redemption is a free state of 
man{\apo}s own will. It rightly asserts that whatever reform 
takes place in the character must be the work of the 
character itself, and cannot be thrust upon it by the 
operation of another. But it goes on to deny that 
redemption is in any sense the work of God, and to 
maintain that no act of God can have any influence on 
the moral destiny of man. Thus, the conception of a 
divine will disappears altogether from the world of 
human morality. 

The implication in each case seems to be the same{\smc} 
for to assert the will of God and deny man{\apo}s inner 
redemption, or to assert man{\apo}s redemption and deny the 
will of God, equally implies conceiving God{\apo}s power and 
man{\apo}s freedom to be inconsistent. This is the fallacy 
common to the two views. \hlt{Each alike holds that a 
given action may be done either by God or by man, in 
either case the other being inactive}. This separation of 
the will of God from that of man is fatal to any theory 
of the Atonement, where the fact to be explained is that 
man is redeemed not merely by his own act but also and 
essentially by God{\apo}s. 

\hlt{A satisfactory theory of the Atonement seems to 
demand that the infusion of grace from God does not 
forcibly and artificially bring about but actually is a 
change of mind in man.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{The verbs \enquote{bring about} and \enquote{is}
should be emphasized, though in fact they are not italicized in the original.
The clause that is the object of \enquote{demand}
illustrates how far English has lost the old accusative case.
The noun phrase \enquote{a change of mind in man}
is both the \emph{object} of the verb \enquote{bring about}
and the \emph{complement} of the subject of the clause 
(that subject being \enquote{the infusion of grace from God}).
According to an old grammar like House \&\ Harman \cite[pp.\ 28--33]{Harman},
the noun \enquote{change} should be in the accusative (or objective) case, \emph{qu\^a} object,
and the nominative case, \emph{qu\^a} complement,
even though the two cases are spelled the same.
On this theory, perhaps the sentence should be something like,
\enquote{A satisfactory theory of the Atonement seems to demand
that the infusion of grace from God
does not forcibly and artificially \emph{bring about}
a change of mind in man\cln\
it actually \emph{is} this change.}} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\hlt{It is an event which only co-%
operation of the various wills involved can effect at all}. 
The error of the objective theory (or rather the error 
into which that way of stating the truth is most liable 
to fall) is to regard God as wholly active, man as wholly 
passive{\smc} and to forget that God{\apo}s purpose of redemp\-%
tion is powerless apart from man{\apo}s will to be redeemed. 

The tendency of subjectivism on the other hand is to 
assume that the righteousness of man is independent of 
[\textbf{186}]
his relation to God{\smc} that man{\apo}s will is sanctified by his 
own effort whether he is justified in the eyes of God or 
not. Here again the fault lies in the absolute separation 
of man from God. God is not realised as the one and 
only source of goodness{\smc} it is not understood that to 
will the right is to unify one{\apo}s will with God{\apo}s. \hlt{The 
two things---righteousness and reconciliation with God%
---are really one and the same},%%%%%
\footnoteB{The objective theory denies that grace \emph{is} conversion{\smc}
the subjective, that conversion \emph{is} grace.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
and to represent one as 
means to the other or \emph{vice versa}, or to insist on one and 
neglect the other, implies forgetting their identity and 
making an arbitrary and false separation of the two. 

Neither is it enough merely to combine the two sides 
which the foregoing theories have separated. That 
would be to make the Atonement a combination of two 
different acts---God{\apo}s forgiveness and man{\apo}s repentance% 
---of which each is peculiar to its own agent{\smc} it would 
fail to account for the essential unity of the whole pro\-%
cess, and, taking the two sides as co-ordinate and equally 
vital, would substitute an unintelligible dualism for what 
is really one fact. In other words, any theory must 
show exactly how the forgiveness of God is related to 
the repentance of man{\smc} how it is possible for the one to 
bring about the other{\smc} and the dualistic view would be 
nothing more than a restatement of this central difficulty. 

The failure of the theories hitherto examined has 
been in every case due to this distinction within the 
Atonement of two sides, God{\apo}s and man{\apo}s. Each agent, 
it is supposed, makes his own individual contribution to 
the whole process{\smc} God{\apo}s contribution being the act of 
forgiveness, man{\apo}s that of repentance. Now our pre\-%
vious analysis of the idea of co-operation suggests that 
this distinction needs revising. We found in a former 
chapter that in the co-operation of two wills we could 
only disentangle the respective contribution to the whole 
of each separate personality by an act of forcible and 
arbitrary abstraction{\smc} that in point of fact the two 
minds became identified in a common experience of 
which each willed the whole and neither a mere part. 
[\textbf{187}]
If we mean to apply this principle to the present diffi\-%
culty, \hlt{we must find a statement of the case which will 
no longer distinguish God{\apo}s contribution from man{\apo}s}{\smc} 
which will enable us to say that God{\apo}s punishment of 
man is man{\apo}s own self-punishment, and that man{\apo}s 
repentance is God{\apo}s repentance too. If we can hold 
such a view we shall have identified the part played by 
God in redemption with that played by man{\smc} and we 
shall be able to define the Atonement, in terms con\-%
sistent with our general theory, as the re-indwelling of 
the divine spirit in a man who has previously been 
alienated from it. 

\addsec{4. The principle of vicarious penitence\cln---}

\hlt{We have to make two identifications}{\smc} first to 
show that God{\apo}s punishment of man is man{\apo}s punishment 
of himself, and second that man{\apo}s repentance is God{\apo}s 
repentance also. 

The first point causes little difficulty after our 
examination of the meaning of punishment.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Thus the point is dealt with
in the present paragraph.
The second point is dealt with in the remainder of the section.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
We have 
already seen that the essence of punishment is the com\-%
munication to the offender of our condemnation of his 
act{\smc} and that therefore all punishment consists in trying 
to make a criminal punish himself, that is inflict on 
himself the pain of remorse and conversion from his 
evil past to a better present. It is clear therefore without 
further explanation that \hlt{in God{\apo}s punishment of sin the 
sinner, through repentance, punishes his own sin}. God{\apo}s 
activity is shared by man too{\smc} man co-operates with 
God in punishing himself. And \hlt{just as he punishes 
himself, he forgives himself}, for he displays in repentance 
just that combination of severity towards the past and 
hope towards the future in which true forgiveness 
consists. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Its reality in the mind of God.}

The conception of divine repentance is at first 
sight less easy to grasp{\smc} but this is because we have 
not yet asked what is the precise nature of the experience 
to which we attach the name. \hlt{We are in the habit of 
defining repentance as the conversion of an evil will to 
good}{\smc} a condition only possible to one who has been 
[\textbf{188}]
sinful and is in process of renouncing his own sin. And 
if we accept this definition as final, we can only say that 
the conception of divine penitence is self-contradictory. 
Repentance is peculiar to a sinner{\smc} God is not a sinner, 
therefore he cannot feel repentance. 

But we must ask whether the account offered of 
repentance is really satisfactory. \hlt{Repentance is a 
particular state of mind}, a feeling of a quite individual 
kind{\smc} and \hlt{it is notoriously difficult to define a feeling 
in so many words}. In point of fact, we generally give 
up the attempt, and substitute for a definition of the 
thing itself a description of the circumstances in which 
we feel it. If we are asked what we mean by the 
feelings of triumph, sorrow, indignation and so on, we 
reply as a rule by explaining the kind of occasion which 
excites them\cln\ \enquote{triumph is what you feel when you 
have succeeded in spite of opposition.} But this is 
quite a different thing from stating what triumph feels 
like. This method of description is very common. 
We apply it for instance to such things as smells, for 
which we have practically no descriptive vocabulary. 
We generally define a scent not by its individual nature 
but by its associations{\smc} we state not what sort of smell 
it is but what it is the smell of. 

\hlt{Definition by circumstances (as we may call it) is apt 
to mislead us seriously in any attempt to describe our 
feelings}. We think we have described the feeling when 
we have only described the occasions on which it arises{\smc} 
and since in consequence of this habit we apply names to 
feelings rather in virtue of their occasions than because 
of their own characters, we are often ready to assert 
\emph{a priori} who can and who cannot experience a given 
emotion, merely on the ground that if such and such a 
person felt it we should call it something else. 

In the case of repentance we are being misled by 
words if we argue that repentance is the conversion of a 
sinful will and therefore impossible to God. \hlt{Repentance 
is a perfectly definite feeling} with a perfectly definite 
[\textbf{189}]
character of its own\cln\ when we experience it, we recognise 
it as we recognise a smell, not because of any external 
circumstances but simply because of something which 
we may call its own peculiar flavour. In asking whether 
a sinless person feels repentance \hlt{we must try to fix our 
minds on this flavour, not on its external associations}. 

We must notice that \hlt{even the occasion of repentance 
has not been very well described}. Its occasion is not 
the mere abstract point of junction, so to speak, between 
two states, a bad state and a good state. We do not 
cease to repent when our will becomes good. Indeed 
if that were the case we should never repent at all{\smc} for 
the moment of transition from a bad will to a good is 
not a positive experience{\smc} it is the mere chink or joint 
between two experiences. Conversion is not a neutral 
moment between being bad and being good{\smc} it is a 
feeling set up by the inrush of positive goodness. 
\hlt{Repentance}, then, \hlt{must be re-defined by its circumstances 
as the peculiar feeling of a converted person towards 
his own evil past}. A person only repents in so far as 
he is now good{\smc} repentance is necessarily the attitude 
of a good will. It does not precede conversion{\smc} it is 
the spirit of conversion. 

If repentance is the feeling with which a person 
contemplates the evil past he has left behind him, the 
problem is to distinguish it from the feeling with which 
he, or any good person, contemplates the misdeeds of 
another. If we can maintain such a distinction, we 
cannot admit the reality of divine penitence. 

Now if we look at the matter solely from the psycho\-%
logical point of view{\smc} if we simply reflect on the feeling 
with which we look at the sins we have ourselves com\-%
mitted, and compare it with our feeling towards the 
sins of others, we shall, I think, only find a difference in 
so far as one or other of these feelings is vitiated by our 
own limitations of knowledge or errors of attitude. \hlt{In 
an ideal case, when we have struck the true balance 
between harshness and laxity of judgment, we feel to} 
[\textbf{190}]
\hlt{our own sins exactly as we feel to those of any other 
person}. We do not feel sorry for our own sins and 
indignant at other people{\apo}s{\smc} the sorrow and the indigna\-%
tion are both present in each case. A good man{\apo}s 
feeling towards the sins of others is exactly the same 
kind of emotion as that which he feels towards his own. 
The fact that we call this feeling one of penitence when 
it regards himself and one of forgiveness (or punishment) 
when it regards others must not mislead us{\smc} for this 
is merely an example of the distinction according to 
circumstances of two emotions which when considered 
in themselves are seen to be one and the same. 

But, it may be asked, can we really abstract emotions 
in this way from their circumstances{\qmk} Is not any 
emotion simply the attitude of a will towards a particular 
event or reality{\qmk} And if this is so, we are right in 
defining emotions by reference to their circumstances{\smc} 
because where circumstances differ there must be some 
difference in the state of mind which they evoke. The 
objection is perfectly sound{\smc} and \hlt{our merely psycho\-%
logical argument must be reinforced by asking whether 
the circumstances in the two cases really are different}. 
In the one case we have a good man{\apo}s attitude towards 
the actions of his own evil past{\smc} in the other, his 
attitude towards another man who is doing evil now. 
\hlt{The difference of time is plainly unimportant}{\smc} we 
do not think differently of an action merely as it is 
present or past. The real question is the difference of 
person. 

We must remember that, \hlt{since a will is what it does, 
we cannot maintain that this good man is in every sense 
the same man who was bad}. The bad will has been 
swept out of existence and its place taken by a good 
will{\smc} the man is, as we say, a new man{\smc} a new motive 
force lives in him and directs his actions. This does 
not mean that he is not \enquote{responsible} in his present 
state for the actions of his past. \hlt{It means, if we must 
press the conclusion, not that he can shirk the responsi}- 
[\textbf{191}] 
\hlt{bility for his own actions, but that he is bound to accept 
the responsibility for those of others}{\smc} and this is no 
paradox if we rid the word of its legal associations and 
ask what moral meaning it can have. For to call a 
man responsible means that he ought to be punished, 
and the punishment, the sorrow, that a good man 
undergoes for his own sins he does certainly undergo 
for the sins of other men. 

\hlt{Thus God, who is perfectly good, must feel repent\-%
ance for the sins of men}{\smc} he bears in his own person the 
punishment which is their due, and by the communica\-%
tion to them of the spirit of his own penitence he leads 
them to repent, and so in self-punishment to work their 
own redemption. The divine and human sides, the 
objective and subjective, completely coincide. What 
God does man also does, and what man feels, God feels 
also. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) Its mediation through man.}

All human redemption thus comes from God, 
and is the re-birth in man{\apo}s will of the original divine 
penitence. But in this immediate communication to 
man of the spirit of God, mediation is not excluded. 
In one sense, all right acting and true knowing involves 
utterly unmediated communion of the soul with God. 
As Elisha lay upon the dead child, his mouth upon his 
mouth, and his eyes upon his eyes, and his hands upon 
his hands, till the child came to life again,%%%%%
\footnoteB{2 Kings 4:34.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
so the soul is 
quickened by complete, immediate contact with God, 
every part at once with every part. But though we 
know God directly or not at all, we yet know him only 
as revealed to us through various channels of illumina\-%
tion and means of grace. The mystic who dwells alone 
with God is only a mystic through social influences and 
the stimulus of his surroundings,%%%%%
\footnoteB{Yet those surroundings may be an empty desert,
or a Carthusian monastery in which even one\apo s fellow monks are avoided.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
and in his union with 
the divine mind he is united no less with all the 
community of living spirits. 

So repentance comes not only from God but through 
paths which in a sense we distinguish from the activity 
of God. Every truth is reached through some stimulus 
[\textbf{192}]
or instruction which comes from a source in the world 
around us{\smc} and in the same way \hlt{repentance reaches us 
through human channels, and we repent of our sins 
because we see others repent of them}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I believe as a child I saw my mother repenting of my sins,
as opposed to lashing out at them in anger,
though this must have happened too sometimes.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
This is human 
vicarious penitence{\smc} others suffer for our sins, the 
suffering being not a mere \enquote{natural consequence} of 
the sin but specifically sorrow, penitence, that is, 
punishment for it{\smc} and their suffering is literally the 
means of grace for us, the influence by which we come 
to our own repentance. 

\begin{sloppypar}
But \hlt{this universal fact of human life is, like all others, 
summed up and expressed most completely in the 
divine manhood of the Christ}. He alone is always and 
perfectly penitent{\smc} for a sinful man cannot, while 
sinful, repent for his own sins or any others{\smc} permanent 
penitence is only possible for a permanently sinless mind. 
And this repentance of Christ is not only subjectively 
complete, that is, unbroken by sins of his own, but 
objectively perfect also{\smc} it is incapable of supplement 
or addition, sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole 
world, to convert all sinners by the spectacle of God{\apo}s 
suffering. No further example could add anything to 
its force. There is only one way of destroying sin{\smc} 
namely, to convert the sinner. And there is only one 
way of converting the sinner{\smc} namely, to express to 
him, in such a way that he cannot but realise it, the 
attitude towards himself of a good will{\smc} the attitude 
which unites condemnation and forgiveness in the 
concrete reality of vicarious repentance. 
\end{sloppypar}

Thus \hlt{the supreme example of sinless suffering is} the 
salvation of the world{\smc} \hlt{final in the sense that nothing 
can be added to it}, that every new repentance is identical 
with it{\smc} not final, but \hlt{only initial, in the sense that by 
itself it is nothing without the response it should awake}, 
the infinite reproduction of itself in the consciousness 
of all mankind.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I just note that the talk of the final and the initial
reminds me of category theory{\expt}
An initial object of a category is final (or terminal)
in the co-category.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
It is not merely an example set up 
for our imitation{\smc} not merely a guarantee of the 
possibilities of human life. It is an unfailing source 
[\textbf{193}]
and fountain of spiritual energy{\smc} it gives to those who 
would imitate it the strength to work miracles, to cast 
aside their old selves and to enter upon a new life 
prepared from the beginning of the world{\smc} for out of 
it power goes forth to draw all men to itself. 

\mychap{III}{Miracle}
%MIRACLE 

\textsc{There} are three questions which may be asked about 
any supposed miraculous event. Did it happen{\qmk} Why 
did it happen\qmk\ and, \hlt{Was it a miracle{\qmk}}

The first question is a matter for history to decide. 
No event can be proved or disproved to have happened 
except on historical grounds. The second question is 
also historical{\smc} for it lies with history to determine not 
only the actions of persons in the past, but also their 
motives. The remaining question, whether such and 
such an event was miraculous or not, is also in a 
sense historical, but (it might be said) less purely 
historical than the others. \hlt{The philosophical assump\-%
tion which under\-lies it is more evident than in the 
other cases. Every historical question involves such 
assumptions}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Ultimately, absolute presuppositions,
as in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
The question \enquote{Did it happen\qmk}\ implies 
the assumption that past facts are ascertainable{\smc} a 
technical point in the theory of knowledge. The 
question \enquote{Why was it done\qmk}\ involves in the same 
way the ethical implication that people have motives 
for their actions. But \hlt{these philosophical implications 
do not strike us when the historical questions are asked, 
because they are generally admitted and are not as a 
rule called in question}. 

But when we are asked, \enquote{Was it miraculous\qmk}\ we 
at once feel the necessity for a philosophical inquiry 
before the question can be answered. Do miracles 
[\textbf{195}] 
happen\qmk\ we ask in turn{\smc} and what do you mean by 
a miracle{\qmk} These questions form the starting-point of 
the present chapter. We shall offer no opinion on the 
historicity of any particular miracle, or on the motive 
which may have underlain it{\smc} \hlt{we shall confine our\-%
selves strictly to the problem of defining the conception 
of miracle as such. If this can be done, it will perhaps 
be of some service to the historical theologian}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I compare Collingwood\apo s contention
in \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics}
that metaphysics proper is of service to the scientist,
and in \emph{The Principles of Art} 
that \emph{that} work will be useful to the artist.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
At 
present his work is much impeded by metaphysical 
difficulties{\smc} by doubt as to what kind of evidence and 
how much of it is necessary to establish the fact of a 
miracle{\smc} by fear that if he pronounces against the 
truth of a miraculous story he may be accused of 
joining hands with the party which denies \emph{a priori} the 
existence of miracle, and that if he accepts such stories 
at their face value, as he accepts other historical matter, 
enlightened persons will denounce him for an obscur\-%
antist believer in the impossible. 

\addsec{1. The common definition, God{\apo}s interference with Nature.
General objections to such a dualism, philosophical and theological\cln---}

These difficulties are due to the prevalence of a 
theory, or definition, of miracle which it is our first 
business to examine. It is certainly possible to define 
miracle in such a way that the whole difficulty is 
evaded. If we merely say \enquote{a miracle is something 
striking, wonderful, awe-inspiring}---then no problem 
arises{\smc} but such definitions will probably be suggested 
only by persons to whom controversy has imparted the 
wisdom of the serpent. And, covering as they do such 
things as a Homeric simile or dawn on the Alps, they 
are not accurate representations of the common 
theological use of the word. They are rather criti\-%
cisms of that usage, or confessions that it cannot be 
maintained. 

\hlt{The definition which gives rise to our problem is to 
the effect that a miraculous event is one caused by 
God{\apo}s interference with the course of nature}. This is 
the definition which we shall first examine{\smc} and we 
shall then proceed to deal with the two bye-forms of it, 
one, that a miracle is an event due to the intervention 
[\textbf{196}]
of a higher natural law negating a lower one{\smc} the 
other, that it represents God{\apo}s departure from his 
normal modes of action. We shall treat these two 
later, because they are in essence modifications of the 
first definition, and only arise when the dualism 
inherent in the first has proved fatal to its defence. 

This dualism may be expressed as follows. If we 
ask what is meant by \enquote{nature} in the above formula, 
we are told that it consists of a series of events such 
that any given event is the effect of that which went 
before it and the cause of that which follows. In the 
\enquote{order of nature} the precise character and occasion 
of every event is rigidly determined, A producing 
B{\smc} B, C{\smc} C, D-E-F. Now when a miracle happens, 
this series is broken. Instead of C leading to D, the 
divine will substitutes for D a new state of things, \gr d, 
which becomes the cause of subsequent events{\smc} so that 
the sequence now runs ABC/\gr{dez}. The new factor \gr d 
might, it is true, appear alongside of D, not instead of 
it{\smc} but we generally regard a miracle as the cancelling 
of what was going to happen and the positive sub\-%
stitution of something else. Now \gr d is an event, a 
\enquote{physical} event just as C is{\smc} and \hlt{the dualism there\-%
fore consists in this, that a given physical event may be 
caused either naturally or miraculously}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Where again \enquote{miraculously} means
\enquote{owing to God\apo s interference.}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
There are 
two different principles by which events are originated, 
existing side by side in complete independence. 

The dislike of dualism as such is sometimes repre\-%
sented as nothing more than a curious idiosyncrasy of 
the philosophic mind{\smc} either as a matter of taste, or as 
a weakness due to a desire to make the world look 
simpler than it really is. \enquote{Cheap and easy} are almost 
permanent epithets for the type of theory called 
monism, which explains reality as issuing from a single 
principle. And doubtless many monistic theories 
deserve such names{\smc} for to construct a view of the 
universe by leaving out all the facts except one is both 
easy and cheap. But \hlt{monism prop\-erly understood is}
[\textbf{197}]
\hlt{only another word for the fundamental\label{fund-ax} axiom of all 
thinking, namely that whatever exists stands in some 
definite relation to the other things that exist}. And 
the essence of dualism or pluralism is that it catalogues 
the things that exist without sufficiently determining 
these inter-relations. 

Suppose, for instance, we discover the existence of 
two principles A and B, and then go on to ask what is 
the relation between them. \hlt{We may begin by saying 
\enquote{I don{\apo}t know}}{\smc} and that might be called provisional 
pluralism, a necessary stage in the development of 
any theory. \hlt{But we must add \enquote{I mean to find out if 
I can}{\smc} and that is to profess our faith in a monistic 
solution}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{I note the (conscious\qmk)\ choice of religious language
(\enquote{profess our faith})
to describe a philosophical conviction
(even an absolute presupposition).}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
For the principles A and B, connected by 
the principle C, really form one principle ABC. The 
true pluralist, when asked for the relation between A 
and B, would reply boldly \enquote{There isn{\apo}t any}{\smc} and that 
is as meaningless as if we should describe two points 
in space between which there was no distance. This 
could only mean that they were the same point{\smc} and 
similarly to say that there was no relation between A 
and B is only sense if it means that there is no 
difference between them, that they are the same 
principle. 

\hlt{Thus our objection to the bare dualism of God and 
nature is that it is not yet a theory at all}{\smc} it simply 
sets the two principles before us without attempting 
to show how they are related. We want to know 
the difference between them, and the nature of a whole 
in which they can exist side by side. This simply 
amounts to saying that the dualism is a provisional one{\smc} 
and people who deal in such dualisms are often quite 
ready to admit that the dualism is \enquote{not absolute.} It 
might be thought hypercritical to reply that by such 
an admission they confessed that they were trying to 
secure the advantage of maintaining a theory while 
knowing it to be unsound{\smc} and \hlt{we shall} rather \hlt{ask
whether, regarded simply as provisional, the dualism}
[\textbf{198}]
\hlt{does what it claims to do, and finds room for the 
complete reality of each side}. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) The common definition denies God by implication.}

On examination, it appears that justice is done 
to neither side by the attempt to regard them dualisti\-%
cally as parallel realities. \hlt{A God who is not the source 
of all being is no true God}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Thus is disproved the theory that God is the source
(the \enquote{cause}) of miracles,
and nature is the source of all other events.
It is possible to raise objections at this point,
and this may represent a rhetorical error on Collingwood\apo s part.
One may object for example that God is in turn the source of nature.
Such objections will be dealt with.}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and this defect is not 
removed by saying that God created and can interfere 
with nature. Even if this were so, \hlt{even if every event 
in the present were the outcome of an original creative 
purpose, nature would still be something alien to, 
something essentially different from, the activity of 
God}%%%%%
\footnoteB{I don\apo t think this makes sense without an explanation
(as the one given in the next subsection)
of what nature means.}%%
%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} for the events by which God{\apo}s original creation 
became the world as we now see it would be, by 
definition, naturally and not divinely caused. God, on 
this theory, created the world in the beginning{\smc} once 
created, it continued to develop by its own impetus, 
which impetus cannot be called a divine law because it 
is precisely nature, the principle which the theory 
distinguished from God{\apo}s activity. And therefore the 
world only expresses God{\apo}s purpose remotely and 
obscurely{\smc} his first act has been so overlaid by natural 
causation that the present world is in fact purely natural, 
not in itself divine at all. 

The same defect appears in any given miracle{\smc} for 
any such event is only a reproduction in miniature of 
the original miracle of creation. God{\apo}s activity ceases 
the moment it is put forth{\smc} at once it is seized upon 
and petrified by natural law into a part of the causal 
system. Nothing is God{\apo}s but the bare abstract point 
of departure, his own subjective volition. He may 
interfere with nature as he likes, but nature remains 
essentially uninfluenced, for every interference is no 
sooner accomplished than the divinity vanishes from it 
and it becomes mere nature. God therefore is absolutely 
unexpressed in the world, however frequent his miracles 
may be{\smc} for by the time they reach our senses they 
have lost all their miraculous character. He is reduced 
to an abstractly transcendent being, aloof from reality 
[\textbf{199}]
and eternally impotent either to influence it or to use it 
as the expression of his own nature. He is thus shorn 
of all true Godhead, and becomes little more than the 
spectator of an automatic world. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) It also denies Nature.}

But if God{\apo}s reality is sacrificed by the dualistic 
conception, that of nature is preserved no better. 
Granting that God can suspend for a moment the 
operation of natural law, and substitute a different 
conclusion to a causal process, what are we to think of 
such laws{\qmk} \hlt{A miracle is described as an exception to 
a law of nature. But a law that admits exceptions is 
not a law at all}. It explains nothing because it does 
not express a necessary connexion. A connexion that 
is at the mercy of any one, even of omnipotence, is 
simply not necessary, not a connexion, not an explana\-%
tion. We are told, rightly or wrongly, that no law is 
certain, no rule free from exceptions{\smc} but if we could 
accept that doctrine the only inference would be that 
the \enquote{natural order,} the system of universal law, was 
non-existent. But this theory of miracle is based on 
assuming that a great proportion of events is really 
accounted for by laws of this kind. It assumes that 
there are events of which we can say{\cln} \enquote{It must be so 
because there is a universal law that it is so.} If the 
supposed law is subject to exceptions, its position as 
a law is forfeited. It is not entitled to plead \enquote{an 
omnipotent will overrode my arbitrament}{\smc} that would 
be merely a confession that it was not a law at all as 
the scientist understands laws. 

There is a great deal of loose talking and vague 
thinking on this point. People speak of laws exactly 
as if they were individual persons{\smc} we hear of the 
reign of law, the compulsion of law, the decree of law, 
or even sometimes of disobedience and defiance of the 
laws of nature. Such wild mythology obscures the 
true conception of law so hopelessly in the popular mind, 
that people can entertain the idea of two laws conflicting, 
or of a law being suspended or abrogated, as if these 
[\textbf{200}]
laws of nature were rival legislators or the arbitrary acts 
of a sovereign. \hlt{We must try to remember that a law 
of nature is a statement of a universal fact, not a 
command}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{In \emph{An Essay on Metaphysics,}
what we must try to remember is the historical sense of words like 
\enquote{cause.}
According to the \emph{Oxford English Dictionary} \cite{OED},
laws of nature were originally so called precisely because they
\enquote{were viewed as commands imposed by the Deity upon matter.}
This view is now presumably obsolete.
On the other hand, if it were not,
an instance of breaking a law of nature
would have to be explained as disobedience to God on the part of nature{\smc}
it would not be a miracle as defined above.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
It cannot be \enquote{disobeyed,} because it does 
not tell any one to do anything{\smc} it can only be \enquote{broken} 
in the sense that we can find instances in which it does 
not hold good. But if such instances do arise, the 
universal statement is no longer a true one, it no longer 
represents a fact{\smc} and we have to say, not \enquote{In this case 
such and such a law is broken,} but \enquote{This case proves 
that such and such a statement or theory is not 
universally true, and that the supposed law does not 
exist, or requires modification so as to exclude cases of 
this sort.} The kind of thought which imagines 
natural law as subject to exceptions is precisely that of 
the most unscientific and inadequate type{\smc} as if Newton 
after observing the fall of the apple had written, 
\enquote{Everything has a natural property of falling to the 
earth{\smc} this is why the apple falls. Exceptions to this 
law may be seen in smoke, kites, and the heavenly 
bodies.} 

The reader may remember how we showed in a 
former chapter that matter and mind cannot exist side 
by side, since if any matter exists everything must be 
material and therefore if any mind exists all must be 
spiritual (Part II. Ch.\ II. \S\ 1).%%%%%
\footnoteB{Starting on page \pageref{mm}.
I wonder how the precise references were inserted,
since often it did not happen,
and the vague reference to \enquote{an earlier chapter}
was left unqualified.} 
We have now discovered 
a parallel or rather an identical truth{\smc} natural laws 
admitting exceptions are not natural laws at all, and 
divine acts subject to natural conditions are not divine. 
The fusion of God and nature which we called miracle 
is a monstrosity, because the two principles are by their 
very definition mutually exclusive, and neither can exist 
if compelled to share the universe with the other. We 
must follow up the argument, taking each in turn as 
the absolute principle, since it is now clear that we can 
no longer defend our original dualism. 

\addsec{2. Two possible methods of escape from the dualism\cln---}

\hlt{We must therefore posit either nature or God as 
the sole reality}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{This is on the assumption that miracles occur{\expt}
For it is a miracle that shows that God or nature
does not meet the criteria for being that.} 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We are seeking only for a basis for 
[\textbf{201}]
the conception of miracle{\smc} the general metaphysical 
question was worked out at length in Part II. Ch.\ II., 
and we need not repeat the arguments there employed. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) Nature the sole reality.  
Miracle now defined as emergence of a higher law.  
This conception inconsistent with the idea of Nature and Law.}

If we try to maintain that nature is the sole 
reality, and rebuild our conception of miracle on that 
basis, we shall have to define the miraculous as the case 
where one law of nature is overridden by another{\smc} the 
\enquote{emergence of a higher law} or some such phrase is 
used to cover theories of this kind. It is not difficult 
to see where the fallacy lies. In inductive logic we 
are told that a higher law explains a lower, the lower 
being an instance of the operation of a higher. In this 
sense of lower and higher, the higher is the more 
universal{\smc} the laws of the conic section explain those of 
the circle because they are higher in the sense that the 
circle is one kind, and only one kind, of conic section. 
Now if in this sense of the word we were told that a 
higher law overrode a lower, we should reply that the 
phrase is a contradiction in terms{\smc} the lower law is 
simply one instance of the higher, and to talk of a law 
overriding one of its own instances is meaningless. 
The fact that two men and two women are four people 
is an instance of the more general fact that twice two is 
four{\smc} it is inconceivable that the higher or more general 
fact, twice two is four, should \enquote{override} the lower or 
less general so as to make two men and two women into 
three people. 

\hlt{There is only one sense in which one law can conflict 
with or override another{\smc} that is, when the \enquote{laws} 
involved are not laws of nature but acts of will}. If nurse 
makes a law that baby goes to bed at six, that law may 
be overridden by superior authority{\smc} there may be a 
parental law that baby stays up later on birthdays. 
\enquote{Higher} in this case has quite a difierent sense{\smc} it 
means \enquote{promulgated by a higher authority.} And 
\enquote{law} in this case means not a law of nature, the state\-%
ment of a universal fact, but a conmiand given by one 
will to another. 
[\textbf{202}] 

The overridden law, in short, cannot be a natural 
law, because such laws, being simply general truths, 
cannot be over\-ridden{\smc} nor can the higher law be a law 
of nature miraculously overriding the decision of a will, 
because a real law of nature in conflict with a will would 
win every time, not in miraculous cases only. Therefore 
if we define miracle as the outcome of a conflict between 
two laws, neither law can be regarded as a law of nature{\smc} 
each is an act of will, and the higher law is the act of 
the more potent will. 

The result of defining miracle by reference to the 
conception of natural law is that it compels us to 
describe nature in terms only applicable to spirit. The 
attempt to combine the two conceptions, miracle and 
nature, leads to the explicit reversal of the very 
definition of nature. 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) God the sole reality.
Miracle now defined as one special type of divine activity\cln---}

We have now to examine the third of our original 
definitions, namely that which escapes the dualism of 
God and nature by resting on the single conception of 
God. We shall then regard miracle as one kind of divine 
operation, distinguished from another kind, the non-%
miraculous, by some criterion to be further determined. 
Two such criteria may be suggested\cln\ (i.)\ that of normal 
and abnormal, (ii.)\ that of mediate and immediate. 

\addsubsubsec{i. \emph{e.g.}\ abnormal as opposed to normal.
Criticism of the ideas of normality and of a normative code of conduct.
Rules of conduct either empty or not true{\smc}
valueless in proportion to agent{\apo}s perfec\-tion.}

The distinction between normal and abnormal 
action presupposes the idea of \hlt{a norm, a principle or 
rule generally followed, but not invariably adhered to}{\smc} 
admitting of exceptions but only in exceptional circum\-%
stances. Such rules are conceived as made by mind for 
mind{\smc} they are not necessities to which the will is 
subject, but forms of its own activity. They are familiar 
enough in our own life{\smc} and it is assumed that they 
exist no less in that of God. Now when man makes 
himself rules, he breaks them in one of two ways. 
Either his original purpose fails him through weakness, 
caprice, or sinfulness{\smc} or else he abandons it because 
unforeseen circumstances have arisen which make it 
impossible or wrong to pursue his intention. These are 
[\textbf{203}]
the causes of human abnormality{\smc} defect in the man or 
defect in the rule. Neither cause can be operative in 
the case of God. He is not vacillating and infirm of 
purpose{\smc} and he is not subject to the occurrence of 
events whose possibility he had overlooked. No reason, 
in fact, can ever arise why God should ever depart from 
his own rules of conduct. 

The conception of a rule or norm thus leads not to 
the explanation but to the denial of miracle. \hlt{Abnor\-%
mality implies that either the rule or the exception was 
wrong}{\smc} alternatives equally impossible to the divine 
wisdom. 

And this argument is often used against those who 
uphold the possibility of miracles. But we are not 
concerned to prove their possibility or impossibility{\smc} we 
are seeking only for a definition of what the word means. 
Consequently we cannot end our inquiry here{\smc} if it is 
said that the abnormal never happens in God we must 
ask whether the conception of normality is sound{\smc} 
whether it is true to say that God always acts in perfect 
conformity to perfect principles. The doctrine as stated 
appears simple and unobjectionable, but it is in fact 
either tautologous or misleading. In the first place, 
principles of conduct as known to ourselves are, if 
perfectly universal, always perfectly empty. They give 
no information as to what you are to do on any particular 
occasion. \enquote{Always do right}{\smc} \enquote{Always treat others 
as ends in themselves}{\smc} \enquote{Render to every man his 
due}{\smc} these are absolutely universal{\smc} they apply to 
every case of conduct you can imagine. But they are 
also alike in not prescribing any definite course of action 
whatever. No doubt in a certain case the maxim 
\enquote{Always do right} acquires a content from the fact that 
there is only one right thing to do{\smc} therefore, the 
principle \enquote{Always do right} appears in this given case 
to mean \enquote{Confess your fault and take your punishment,} 
or the like. But this content is not supplied by the 
general principle itself{\smc} it is supplied by the answer to 
[\textbf{204}]
the question stimulated by that principle{\cln} \enquote{What is 
right{\qmk}} A person who did not know how to behave 
on a given occasion would not be helped by the principle 
unless he intended to act capriciously{\smc} in that case it 
might remind him that he had duties. But one may 
safely say that a conscientious person never thinks of the 
principle as a principle{\smc} and if his attention was called 
to it, he would say that it told him nothing he wanted 
to know. In a sense, he acts on it\cln\ but it does not 
explain why he did \emph{this} and not \emph{that.}

\hlt{The truly universal rule}, then, \hlt{is absolutely empty}. 
It is doubtless true to say God always acts on it, but to 
say that adds nothing to our knowledge of God. It 
does not let us into the secret of his will. It merely 
staves off our inquiry with a truism{\smc} as if one should 
say that the secret of good painting was always to put 
the right colour in the right place. True, no doubt{\smc} 
but not very helpful. 

\hlt{There is another type of rule which represents an 
attempt to over\-come this difficulty by supplying a 
content}. It definitely tells you what you are to do 
and what you are not to do{\smc} whether simply because 
agreement on such points is convenient for social 
purposes (keep to the right, or, last boy in bed put out 
the gas) or because every case of the rule represents 
a definite and binding moral duty (thou shalt do no 
murder{\smc} \emph{audi alteram partem}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Listen to the other side in a dispute.}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} always protect a lady). 
Since the first type, the absolutely universal, has proved 
useless, this must be the kind of rule which the theory 
has in mind{\smc} and the doctrine must be that there is (if 
only we could formulate it) a complete body of such 
rules which, taken altogether, cover the whole of life 
and provide for every case{\smc} that a breach of one is 
either a crime or the sign of the law{\apo}s imperfection{\smc} 
and that therefore the rules of conduct laid down for 
himself by God are never broken at all. Such a body 
of rules constitutes what is generally called \hlt{a casuistry}{\smc} 
not using the word in a bad sense, but \hlt{in the strict and}
[\textbf{205}]
\hlt{accurate sense in which it signifies the normative science 
of conduct, the complex of rules defining one{\apo}s duty in 
any given situation}. For man, according to the doctrine 
we are examining, casuistry is always imperfect because 
of his deficient imagination of possible emergencies, and 
on account of the differences between man and man 
which make it impossible for all to be guided by quite 
the same principles. \hlt{For God} these difficulties disappear 
and \hlt{the science would be perfect}. 

Now there are two points about the essential nature 
of this science which must be observed. \textbf{(\grneo a)}%%%%%
\footnoteB{This alpha and the ensuing beta
are plainface in the copy-text,
and the alpha does not begin a new paragraph,
though the beta does.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
First, 
obeying its rules is not the same thing as doing a moral 
action. If I am asked \enquote{Why did you do that\qmk}\ I may 
reply either \enquote{Because the rule says I must,} or else 
\enquote{Because I felt I ought.} (I do not assert that there 
are no other possible answers.) But these are quite 
different answers and represent two different points of 
view. The first answer does no doubt suggest the 
question \enquote{But why obey the rules\qmk}\ and to that the 
reply may be \enquote{Well, I suppose one \emph{ought} to obey them}{\smc} 
but as a matter of fact this ulterior question has, in most 
cases, not been raised at all, and obeying the rule as 
such has no further moral implication, or at most a vague 
and distant one. The two answers may coincide{\smc} but 
in that case the first is not felt to be of any importance. 
\enquote{I ought} stands by itself and gains nothing by the 
addition \enquote{I am told to.} \hlt{In conduct the only thing 
that confers moral value is motive{\smc} and if one is 
conscious of no motive except obedience to a rule, one 
cannot claim the action as a moral one}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{How is \emph{mere} obedience to rule 
different from dutiful obedience{\qmk}
Obeying a rule, merely to avoid punishment, may not be moral.
But doing what you are told, simply because you are told\cln\
this might be more moral 
than insisting on understanding the reason for the rule before obeying it.
For it may be more moral to acknowledge one\apo s inadequacy.
See the next note.}
Whereas if 
one is conscious of the action as a duty, its legality no 
longer makes any difference. To obey a rule may be 
socially indispensable{\smc} it may be educative{\smc} it may be 
prudent{\smc} but it is not a free, morally initiated action. 
Morality knows no rules{\smc} and the same is the case with 
art, and all spiritual activity. 

But, it may be asked, are we to abolish all rules of 
conduct{\qmk} What would become of the world if we did{\qmk} 
[\textbf{206}]
That is exactly the point. The world, taken at any 
given moment, requires education, it requires discipline{\smc} 
it is not by any means perfect or moral or self-dependent. 
\hlt{We were not proposing to abolish laws and empirical 
maxims from our makeshift society. We merely assert 
that for a perfectly moral being, one who really appre\-%
hended duty as such, these maxims and laws would 
recede into the background and disappear}{\smc} such a 
being simply ignores and does not act on them at all, 
but acts merely on his intuition of duty.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The perfectly moral being
should then be a perfectly \emph{knowledgeable} being.
Rules exist to compensate for inadequate knowledge.
\enquote{Stay off the ice because we do not know how thick it is.}
Or, \enquote{Stay off the ice
because you are too young and inexperienced to understand the danger,
and it is not possible to give you that experience right away.}
Collingwood seems to agree with Blake\apo s Devil,
at least as far as rules are concerned{\cln}
\enquote{Jesus was all virtue, and acted from impulse,
not from rules} \cite[pll.~23--4]{Blake}.
But then in the context of morally imperfect individuals,
perhaps the perfect being must obey rules,
if only to set an example.
Cannot God make a covenant binding on himself{\qmk}
Such concerns do not necessarily contradict Collingwood though.
He does speak of the \emph{recession} of maxims and laws{\smc}
their disappearance would seem to be \emph{ultimate,}
not immediate.
Still, there is a feel of individualism{\cln}
\enquote{Insofar as \emph{I myself} am perfect,
\emph I do not obey rules.}} 

\textbf{(\grneo b)} The second point is that \hlt{such rules} contain an 
element of approximation and vagueness which can 
never be eliminated and therefore makes them unfit 
to serve as guides for a perfect intelligence. They \hlt{are 
based on the supposition that cases and actions can be 
classified in such a way that the classification will 
provide the basis for a distinction between right and 
wrong\cln\ and this supposition is fallacious}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{The point is made in \emph{New Leviathan.}
One might say that \emph{human} rules are only approximate,
but God\apo s are perfect.
In this case, what is the purpose of calling them rules{\qmk}
Collingwood will develop this idea below.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

These rules are always general, by their very nature{\smc} 
they lay down that an action of the type A is always 
right, an action of the type B always wrong. On 
inspection, however, it proves impossible to find any 
class of actions of which we can say that it is always 
right or always wrong, unless we have defined it in such 
a way as to beg the question. Thus, \enquote{never tell a lie} 
is a good rule{\smc} but telling a lie is by no means always 
wrong. The least imaginative person could think of a 
situation in which it was a positive duty. On the other 
hand, \enquote{commit no murder} is absolutely valid only 
because murder means \emph{wrongful} killing{\smc} so that the 
rule is a tautology. 

But further\cln\ actions cannot strictly be classified at 
all. What is a lie{\qmk} Intentional deceit{\qmk} Then it covers 
such cases as ambiguous answers, refusals to answer, 
evasions{\smc} or even the mere withholding of information 
when none has been demanded{\smc} and we cannot easily 
say when such concealment of the truth is intentional. 
To lay a trap for an opponent in controversy would 
[\textbf{207}]
probably have to be called lying, as well as countless 
other cases in which we do not use the word. A 
classification of actions, in short, can only exist so long 
as we refrain from asking the precise meaning of the 
terms employed. 

Therefore a system of casuistry is not only useless 
but actually impossible for a really moral mind{\smc} it is 
essentially a makeshift, vanishing with the advance in 
spiritual life. This is not because our rules are bad 
rules{\smc} it follows from their mere nature as rules. 
The nearer we come to true living, the more we leave 
behind not bad rules merely, but all rules. Thus 
\hlt{Beethoven said that the rules were all his very humble 
servants}%%%%%
\footnoteB{God as analogous to Beethoven{\cln}
that is one way of thinking about it{\expt}}%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} and it is true that the rules formulated by 
his masters met with little respect at his hands. But 
that (it may be argued) was because they were bad, 
imperfect, inadequate rules{\smc} he created rules of his own, 
and those he did obey. For instance, he altered sonata-%
form a great deal{\smc} but he did write sonatas. Musical 
scholars tell us that John Sebastian Bach did not write 
fugues{\smc} and that is true if by fugues you mean com\-%
positions of an arbitrarily rigid and academic type. 
But he did write Bachesque fugues, or whatever you 
please to call them{\smc} he did write one definite type of 
composition, and Beethoven wrote another type. Thus 
each made his own rules. They were not the rules his 
masters taught him{\smc} \hlt{but the rules he made he kept}. 

\hlt{No}, we must reply, \hlt{he did not}. The form of the 
Beethoven sonata varies between Op.\ 2 and Op.\ 111 so 
vastly that we cannot lay down any one set of regula\-%
tions and say \enquote{These are Beethoven{\apo}s sonata-rules.} 
No doubt if we take few enough rules and sufficiently 
abstract ones, we can arrive at some that Beethoven 
never broke{\smc} but if you had pointed out the fact to 
him, he would probably have taken care to break them 
all in his next sonata. The fact is that the conception 
of rule to which we are now appealing is a fluid con\-%
ception{\smc} a Beethoven can abandon his old rules at 
[\textbf{208}]
pleasure and take a leap into a new world, guided only 
by the spirit of music itself. What then are Beethoven{\apo}s 
rules of composition{\qmk} Here is the secret\cln\ they are 
recast for every new work. The \enquote{rule} is nothing 
but another name for the ground-plan of the new work 
itself. He simply invents new rules as he goes along, 
to meet his requirements. And that means that in the 
sense of the word with which we started he has no rules 
at all.

Thus \hlt{in a sense every action obeys a law. But the 
law is newly shaped for every fresh action}{\smc} in fact, it 
simply is the action. Therefore the original theory, 
that there were certain rules established by himself 
eternally which God in virtue of his own consistency 
was bound to obey, is seen to be a delusion. We cannot 
escape the analogy by saying that Beethoven{\apo}s develop\-%
ment was a continual improvement of existing laws, and 
that such an improvement is inconceivable in God{\smc} for 
Haydn{\apo}s rules were quite as good as Beethoven{\apo}s for the 
work they had to do, and \hlt{Beethoven{\apo}s early rules are no 
worse in themselves than his later ones}. Then why 
did he change them{\qmk} Simply because one rule is only 
applicable to one case{\smc} and to apply it to another case 
is pedantry. 

If we cannot speak of a rule fixing the normal treat\-%
ment of every case, neither can we speak of a single 
dominant purpose which determines how every action 
shall be done. This would be only another form of the 
same fallacy. I may, owing to my obsession by a 
dominant purpose, be led to treat people in the lump, 
abstractly, and not as real individuals{\smc} I may ignore 
the finer shades of difference and lose my sense of pro\-%
portion. But in such a case the purpose is a bad one, 
in that it has a bad effect on my conduct{\smc} or at least I 
am the wrong person to carry it out. To suppose that 
God acts on immutable rules because he has an immutable 
purpose is a mere confusion of terms. His immutable 
purpose might surely be to do justice in every separate 
[\textbf{209}]
case and to avoid all the abstract mechanism of 
immutable rules. 

We cannot base miracle on the distinction between 
normal and abnormal cases{\smc} because the distinction is 
not to be found in God. Where everything is perfectly 
individual, the class or norm no longer has a meaning{\smc} 
the individual is a law to itself. Relatively, this is 
true for man in proportion as he approximates to 
perfection{\smc} it is absolutely true of God. 

\addsubsubsec{ii.  Immediate as opposed to mediate.
This is neither a tenable distinction
nor a relevant one.}

The second attempt to reintroduce the notion 
of miracle on the basis of God{\apo}s sole reality was the 
distinction between mediate and immediate action on the 
part of God. This again---I hope the subdivision is not 
becoming wearisome---will take two forms according as 
God{\apo}s \enquote{medium} is man (including other spirits) or 
nature.%%%%%
\footnoteB{As before, 
the ensuing alpha and beta are plainface in the copy-text.} 

\textbf{(\grneo a)} That God acts either directly or through natural 
processes is precisely the dualistic conception which we 
found wanting at the outset{\smc} so we can pass on at once. 

\textbf{(\grneo b)} God{\apo}s action is now considered as either direct, 
or mediated through the agency of man. I do not wish 
to spend time over the conception of mediacy{\smc} we have 
already examined it in another chapter, and the only 
question here is whether it fits the notion of miracle. 
Plainly it does not. If God delegates power to a 
creature, and that creature then operates of itself, the 
action is mediate{\smc} whereas God{\apo}s delegation itself or 
his subsequent interference is immediate. But the 
distinction is too arbitrary to require serious refutation. 
In the Gospels, Jesus works miracles{\smc} in the Acts, the 
Apostles. No doubt the power comes from God, often 
in answer to direct prayer. But \hlt{if God{\apo}s power is not 
mediate when it is seen in the person of Peter or Paul,
what does the word mean{\qmk}}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Again the emphasis is not on words as such,
but their meaning.} 
It must surely be held that 
the power to work miracles is no less mediate than the 
other powers which God bestows upon his creatures. 

\addsec{3. The conception of miracle as a separate category\\abandoned\cln---}

Of all these forms in which the definition of 
miracle appears we have discovered that every one is 
[\textbf{210}]
based upon some error, some dualism which is a mere 
metaphysical fiction and has no existence in reality. 
No dualism is ultimate, and no dualism that is not 
ultimate is a suitable basis for a theological system. It 
stands self-confessed a foundation of sand. We must 
declare frankly that \hlt{the common conception of miracle 
is untenable. It is a hybrid conception, compounded 
of two conflicting and absolutely irreconcilable views}{\smc} 
one atheistic, the other theistic{\smc} one material, the 
other spiritual{\smc} one false, the other true. 

\addsubsec{(\emph a) This agrees with the religious view of life and is necessitated by the fact of human freedom.}

But we must maintain that we have not forfeited 
anything of value. Instead of finding the operation of 
God in isolated and controvertible tacts, we are now 
free to find it universalised in everything that is true 
or good or beautiful. And so far from admitting, as 
some persons pretend, that between \hlt{elevating all these 
things to the rank of God} and depressing them all to 
the rank of matter there is little to choose, we must 
assert that the former view \hlt{alone does justice to the 
facts of common consciousness as well as to the truths 
of philosophy}. 

For up to now we have refrained from asking for a 
working limitation of the use of the term miracle. If 
now we ask what is and what is not called miraculous, 
the difficulty of making a distinction will be very evident. 
Thus, excluding merely superstitious interpretations of 
Transubstantiation, would a normal Christian describe 
the Real Presence in the Eucharist as miraculous{\qmk} If 
so, then is not the equally real presence in prayer a 
miracle{\qmk} And then what of the real presence which 
surrounds the religious man in every moment of his 
life{\qmk} To a religious person it is surely true to say that 
\hlt{nothing exists that is not miraculous}. And if by 
miracle he means an act of God realised as such, he is 
surely justified in finding miracles everywhere. If the 
Real Presence is not a miracle, then what is{\qmk} An act 
of healing{\qmk} But are we really prepared to maintain 
that healing done by non-medical means is miraculous, 
[\textbf{211}]
as distinguished from medical healing which is not{\qmk} \hlt{If 
miraculous means mysterious (as in common speech it 
often does) we can draw no such distinction}. We are 
not in a position to say that while a headache cured by 
prayer is a mystery and therefore presumably miraculous, 
a headache cured by drugs is scientifically understood 
and therefore not mysterious nor miraculous. For our 
criticism of causation has shown us that we do not 
\enquote{understand} the operation of the drug in the least,%%%%%
\footnoteB{To understand this operation is perhaps a
\enquote{problem of consciousness}
such as some scientists and philosophers today seem to be concerned with.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
and are therefore not entitled to call it either miraculous 
or the reverse, whereas we must for ever call it 
mysterious. \hlt{Every cure is equally a miracle, and every 
doctor (like every other active and creative mind) a 
miracle-worker}, in the only sense which can reasonably 
be attached to the word. 

For again, if the miraculous and the non-miraculous 
must be distinguished, into which category does human 
life and activity fall{\qmk} That again cannot be answered. 
It is not nature in the sense required{\smc} it must be 
miracle, and yet we do not call it so. And if our 
scheme of reality is such that we can find no place in it 
for man, what is to become of it as a philosophy{\qmk} 

\addsubsec{(\emph b) It does not conflict with the uniformity of Nature 
as rightly understood\cln\ for}

But, even after reconciling ourselves to \hlt{the fact 
that all events are volitions} and that the mechanically 
controlled \enquote{order of nature} is non-existent, we may 
still ask. \hlt{Does not this view overthrow all we have 
believed about the uniformity of nature}{\qmk} And if we 
give up the uniformity of nature, where is our boasted 
volition\qmk\ for without a reliable and steadygoing nature 
to ride upon, Will would never be able to get to the 
end of its journey. 

\addsubsubsec{i. Mind shows the same uniformity as nature,
and uniformity does not prove determinism.}

Whether it overthrows our beliefs depends, 
perhaps, on how far they are true. What do we mean 
by uniformity{\qmk} That A always produces \gr a. But A 
and \gr a, definite events, only happen once each{\smc} uniformity 
has no place there. Very well{\smc} we mean that events 
of the class A always produce (or rather precede) events 
of the class \gr a. The class A consists of B, C, D, all 
[\textbf{212}]
alike{\smc} the class \gr a of \gr{b, g, d,} all similarly alike. Then 
an event in the first class will always precede one in the 
second. Produce, we cannot say{\smc} that would be to 
claim a knowledge of their inner connexion which we do 
not possess. Then all it comes to is this, that there are 
resemblances between events, and that if events B, C, D, 
are like one another, their contexts \gr{b, g, d,} will also 
show resemblances. That is what we describe as the 
uniformity of nature. The so-called classes are only 
our way of recording these resemblances. But \hlt{in 
resemblance there is nothing alien to mind as such}. 
Beethoven{\apo}s sonatas resemble one another{\smc} so do 
Napoleon{\apo}s battles and Shakspere{\apo}s sonnets. Uniformity 
is a perfectly obvious characteristic of the products of 
mind. To argue from resemblance to determinism is 
not uncommon{\smc} but it is totally fallacious. 

{If recurrence or resemblance proved determinism, 
the same conclu\-sion is equally proved by any single 
event}. There is nothing in recurrence that is not already 
present in the single instance. Indeed some determinists 
have argued that because a certain man once did a certain 
action, therefore he was bound to do it. This seems a 
\emph{reductio ad absurdum}{\smc} and yet if we can argue from 
frequency to necessity, the question \enquote{How often must a 
thing happen before you know it was bound to happen\qmk}\ 
can have only one answer{\cln}---\enquote{Once is enough.} All 
the arguments, therefore, by which we prove that matter 
is mechanical in its behaviour will prove the same of 
mind{\smc} and the uniformity of nature differs not at all 
in character from the uniformity of spirit. 

\addsubsubsec{ii. Uniformity is relative to the point of view{\smc}
where superficial knowledge sees identity and monotony only,
deeper knowledge sees differentiation and freedom.}

Granted---and by now we seem bound to grant% 
---that a ball, let drop, falls in virtue not of an inexorable 
law but of a volition, and that the volition might will 
otherwise, we may still say that the possibility of a ball{\apo}s 
thus changing its habits need not seriously disturb our 
practical calculations. We have to deal not only with 
things, but with men{\smc} and if the engineer feels justified 
in calculating the strength of his materials on a basis of 
[\textbf{213}]
absolute uniformity, the organiser of labour is no less 
ready to calculate the average output of a workman and 
to act on his calculations. \hlt{If we try to carry the 
principle of uniformity too far, it will fail us whether 
our assumption is that any man will write an equally 
good epic or that any steel will make an equally good 
razor. In practice, we learn to discriminate}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Practice is the key.
Theoretically, nature is uniform.
Steel is steel.
In practice, one is never faced with theoretical nature as such.}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} we dis\-%
tinguish between the things that any man can do and 
the things for which an exceptional man is needed{\smc} and 
in exactly the same way we learn how far it is safe to 
reckon on the uniformity of matter and at what point 
we must begin to look for diversity. 

Uniformity, in a word, is relative to our needs{\smc} and 
to suggest that a game of cricket, for instance, would 
be impossible if we supposed that the ball might suddenly 
decide to fly to the moon, is no less and no more 
sensible than to suggest that it is impossible because the 
bowler might put it in his pocket and walk off the field. 
\hlt{We know that the friend we trust is abstractly capable, 
if he wished, of betraying us, but that does not prevent 
our trusting him. It may be that our faith in the 
uniformity of matter is less removed from such a trust 
than we sometimes imagine. Whether we describe it 
as faith in matter or faith in God makes, after all we 
have said, little difference}.%%%%%
\footnoteB{Faith in matter is faith in God{\expt}
The ultimate rejection of dualism.} 

But if we mean by uniformity the mere statement 
that things behave alike and that we can rely on them to 
do so, it is only one side of the truth and, perhaps, not 
the most important side. To see uniformities is the 
mark of a superficial observer%%%%%
\footnoteB{Was Newton a superficial observer{\qmk}
Are systematizing mathematicians{\qmk}}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} to demand uniformities 
is characteristic of all the less vital and more mechanical 
activities. \hlt{What we call uniformity in people, in society 
and history, is generally a name for our own lack of 
insight}%%%%%
\footnoteB{But uniformity in nature, including mathematics,
is something else{\expt}}%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
{\smc} everything looks alike to the person who 
cannot see differences. What we demand of a friend is 
not constancy alone{\smc} it is resourcefulness, adaptability, 
variety{\smc} a continual readjustment to the new demands 
of an always new intercourse. To the eye of perfect\label{eye} 
[\textbf{214}]
insight,%%%%%
\footnoteB{See note \ref{eye-ref}.} 
nothing is merely uniform{\smc} everything is unique. 
For such a consciousness there are no classes, there are 
only individuals{\smc} not in chaos, for every individual is 
related to every other{\cln}---
\settowidth{\versewidth}{That thou canst not stir a flower}
\begin{myverse}[\versewidth]
  All things, by immortal power,\\
Near or far,\\
Hiddenly\\
To each other link\`ed are,\\
That thou canst not stir a flower\\
Without troubling of a star.%%%%%
\footnoteA{F. Thompson, \emph{The Mistress of Vision}.}%%%%%
\footnoteB{Francis Thompson (1859--1907)
was an English poet.
\emph{Wikipedia} classifies him also as an ascetic.
He was homeless for a time, but also an opium addict.} 
\end{myverse}
The true relation between individuals is not the 
resemblance which connects members of a class, but 
the co-operation which unites parts of a whole. Such 
parts are not bound by abstract rules. They are free, 
but their freedom is not caprice, for they act in and 
through the whole and each other, so that the whole 
perpetually re-creates itself in their actions. 

\hlt{If materialism only means the mood in which we 
have tired of the infinity and intimacy of the real}, and 
lapse wearily into a ghost-land of our own, peopled by 
abstractions which we can command if we cannot enjoy 
them,%%%%%
\footnoteB{It sounds as if Collingwood has not enjoyed mathematics.}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
\hlt{the only hope is in some sudden inrush of life}, 
something to startle us into consciousness once more and 
to scatter the ghosts by the blaze of its own light. 
\hlt{This is the function of those events which we call, \emph{par 
excellence}, Miracles}{\smc} they force themselves upon our 
eyes as a standing testimony to the deadness and falsity 
of our materialistic dogmas, and compel us to face 
reality as it is, free, infinite, self-creative in unpredicted 
ways. But the very meaning and purpose of miracle is 
lost if we regard it as unique and exclusive{\smc} if we set 
up for our superstitious worship, side by side with the 
true God, an idol of man{\apo}s making, adored under the 
name of Nature.%%%%%
\footnoteB{For rhetorical or poetic reasons,
this last sentence could have been dispensed with.} 

\addchap{Index}\label{index}
\ifoot{}\mychead{Index}
%INDEX 

\begin{multicols}2
%\relscale{0.9}
\smaller
\sloppy
\setlength{\parindent}{0pt}
Absolute, 18, 115, 120 

\nen
Action, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ II. \emph{pass.}\nl 
presupposes knowledge, 30\nl
and thought, popular distinction, 32{\smc}
breakdown of the distinction, 34\nl
its relation to materialism, 80\nl
\emph{See also} Conduct 

\nen
\enquote{Active life} as much intellectual as 
active, 31 

\AE tiological myth, 5-7 

Agnosticism, 130 

Altruism, 46 

Anselm, 66 

Anthropology, 4, 24 

Anti-historical scepticism, 44-46 

Anti-moral theories of religion, 22-29 

Antinomianism, 25 

Aristotelian science, 17, 83 

Aristotle, 66, 161 

\nen
Art and religion, xvi\nl
rules in, 207-8 

Atavism, 136 

Atheism, 18-19 

Atheists, 8, 66 

Atomic theory, ancient, 81 

\nen
Atonement, 70, 147, Pt.\ III. Ch. II. 
\emph{pass.}\nl
\enquote{objective} view, 181 \emph{seqq.}\nl
\enquote{subjective} view, 182 \emph{seqq.}

Authority in religion and elsewhere, 67 

Autonomy, moral and political, 26 

\mbox{}

Bach, J. S., 207 

Balfour, Mr. A. J., 82 

Beethoven, 207, 212 

Bio-chemistry, 75 

Biology, 75 

Bio-physics, 75 

\enquote{Blind will,} 31, 123 

Bradley, Mr.\ F. H., 40 \emph n. 

Buddhism, xiii, 18 

\mbox{}

C\ae sar, Julius, 59 

Carritt, Mr.\ E. F., vi, 101 \emph n. 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{215 c.~2}]

Casuistry, 204 

\enquote{Categories,} 134 

Causal sequence, 196 

Causation, 83 \emph{seqq.}

Chalcedon, 28 \emph n., 148 

Change, 117 

Character, 107 

\nen
Christ, 151 \emph{seqq.}, 183, 192\nl
two wills of, 28 \emph n.\nl
divinity of 151-158\nl
omniscient and omnipotent, 155-156\nl
humanity of, 158-162\nl
the disciples of, their relation to his 
personality, 160\nl
uniqueness of, 162-166\nl
repentance of, 192 

\enquote{Christ-myth,} 53 

\nen
Christianity, xiii, 147\nl
falsely identified with Christian 
morality, 8\nl
its opposition to materialism and 
atheism, 20\nl
as \enquote{law of Faith,} 26\nl
its view of God, 70 

Christology, 28 

Church, authority of, 12, 65 

Circumstances, definition by, 188 

Clerk Maxwell, 64

Cockin, Rev.\ F. A., vi 

Coherence, 144 

Coleridge, 37 

Communication, 97 \emph{seqq.}, 177 

\nen
Comparative religion, 37 \emph{seqq.}\nl
its anthropological and psychological 
character, 39\nl

\nen
Compulsion or externality, falsely 
ascribed to the moral and civil 
law, 26

Comte, 18, 38 

\nen
Condemnation the essence of punish\-% 
ment, 176 

\nen
Conduct, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ II. \emph{pass.}\nl
in relation to thought, 7-8 
and religion, xv, 7 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{216}]

Conduct, rules of, 203 \emph{seqq.} 

\nen
Consequences of actions, not punish\-%
ment, 177-178 

\nen
\enquote{Contemplative life} as much practical 
as theoretical, 31 

Contingent, necessary and, 50 

Contradiction, 118 

Conversion, 189 

Co-operation, 102 \emph{seqq.}, 186 

\nen
Cosmological proof (\emph{a contingentia mundi}), 
66 

Cosmology, 18, 21 

\nen
Creed, as prior to ritual, 6-7\nl
as means to morality, 9\nl
= theology, 12\nl
its necessity to all religion, Pt.\ I. 
Ch.\ I. \emph{pass.} 

Crimes of religion, 22 

Criminals, treatment of, 171 \emph{seqq.} 

Crusoe, Robinson, 111 

\mbox{}

\nen
Definition, 3, 62, 111\nl 
of evil and error, 127\nl
by circumstances, 188 

Democritus, 64 

Descartes, 66 

Desert, conception of, 176 

Design, argument from, 66 

Determinism, 25, 104, 107 \emph n. 

Deterrent, punishment as, 172 

Differentiation, implies comparison, 79 

\nen
Disciples of Christ, their relation to his 
personality, 160 

Dragons, 62 

Drama, 126 

Dualism, 50, 73 \emph{seqq.}, 196-197 

\nen
Duet in music, as example of whole and 
part, 112 

Duty, no degrees in, 175 

\mbox{}

Efficient cause, 83 \emph{seqq.} 

Electrons, 82 

Elimination of error and evil, 138 \emph{seqq.} 

Elisha, 191 

Emotion, 10, 190 

Empiricism, 48 

Energy, 82 

Enoch, Apocalypse of, 37 

\nen
Error, 127\nl
not apparently definable, 129\nl
elimination of, 138 \emph{seqq.} 

\nen
Ethics, 15, 39, 118, 136, 171\nl
and evolution, 136

Eucharist, 210 

\nen
Evil, Pt.\ II. Ch.\ IV. \emph{pass.}, 71, I21, 157\nl
apparently not definable, 129\nl
false theories of, 130 \emph{seqq.}\nl
and negativity, 135\nl
elimination of, 138 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{216 c.\ 2}]

\nen
Evil, how overcome by good, 141, 144\nl
as perverted good, 143\nl
as exceptional, 143 

Evil eye, 5 

\nen
Evolution, 24, 136\nl
and ethics, 136 

Externality. \emph{See} Compulsion 

\mbox{}

\enquote{Facts} necessary to religion, 37 

\nen
Feeling, view that it is the chief content 
of religion, 10-11\nl
various meanings of, 11

Fictions as a means to morality, 9 

Final causes, 83 

\nen
Finitude, alleged, of human personality,
97, 152

Fluxions, 61 

\nen
Forgiveness, 169\nl
a crime{\qmk} 171\nl
an absolute duty, 175\nl
= punishment, 179\nl 
= self-expression of the good will, 179\nl
empirically distinct from punishment, 
180\nl
relation to repentance, 186\nl
self-, 187 

\nen
Freedom, 105, 127, 182-183\nl
not chaotic, 91

Friendship, 161 

Fugue, 207 

Future, as unknowable, 156 

\mbox{}

Gassendi, 64 

\nen
Generalisations, not dependent for
validity on quantity of facts ac\-% 
cumulated, 49 

\nen
God, love of, 10\nl
belief about, indispensable to religion, 
12\nl
in what sense do all religions require 
one{\qmk} 18\nl
justice of, 23\nl
omnipotence of, 25, 70, 120, 122, 155\nl
union with, 27\nl
his nature historically revealed, 50\nl
prooft of the existence of, Pt.\ II. 
Ch.\ I. \emph{pass.}\nl
as spirit, 70\nl
as creator, 70\nl
as personal, 70\nl
as good yet omnipotent, 70\nl
as purely immanent (rejected by re\-%
ligion), 114\nl
meaning of \enquote{personal,} 115\nl
immanent and transcendent, 119\nl
not a hypothesis, 119-120\nl
a limited (not a God), 121\nl
how at once omnipotent and good{\qmk} 
122 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{217}]

\nen
God, benevolence of, 125\nl
as perfectly good, 142\nl
fatherhood of, 149\nl
how omnipotent, 155\nl
how omniscient, 157\nl
falsely conceived as a universal, 163-% 
165\nl
as forgiving sins, 169, 180\nl
as punishing sins, 169, 180\nl 
repentance of, 187\nl
his relation to Nature, 195 \emph{seqq.} 

Gods of paganism, 20 

Good Samaritan, 52 

\nen
Good, self-consistency of, 118\nl
as normal, 136, 144 

Grace, 182, 184 

Gravitation, 77 \emph n. 

\mbox{}

Hamlet, 113 

Haydn, 208 

Healing, 211 

Hegel, 48, 80, 116, 131 

Herakles, 53 

Heresies, 28 and \emph n. 

Heteronomy, 26 

\nen
Historical fact, falsely described as irrele\-% 
vant to philosophical (theological) 
truth, 45 

\enquote{Historical Jesus,} 43, 148 

\nen
Historical theology, 38\nl
its philosophical character, 52 

Historicity of Jesus, 52, 54 

\nen
History, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ III. \emph{pass.}\nl
and religion, xv\nl
presupposes philosophy, 46\nl
as objectivity, 49\nl
= philosophy, 51\nl
in what sense capable of distinction 
from philosophy, 51 

Homer, 18, 52 

\mbox{}

\nen
\enquote{Idea} falsely distinguished from 
\enquote{object,} 98 

\nen
Idealism, 73, 94, 101 \emph n., 120\nl
two senses of the word, 73 

Ideals of life, their variety, 35 

\nen
Identity, concrete and abstract, 106 \emph{seqq.}
149 \emph{seqq.} 

Immanence, 114-120 

Impact, 77 and \emph n. 

\nen
Incarnation, 70, 107, Pt.\ III. Ch.\ I. 
\emph{pass.}\nl
in what sense a mystery, 159 

Individualism, 183 

Individuals, distinction between, 100 

Inductive logic, 201 

\nen
Intellect, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ I. \emph{pass.}\nl
falsely distinguished from reason,
intuition, etc., 12 \emph n. 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{217~c.~2}]

\nen
Intellect = reason, 12 \emph n.\nl
= intuition, 12 \emph n. 

Intuition = intellect, 12 \emph n. 

\mbox{}

James, Professor W., 131 \emph n. 

\nen
Jesus, 37, 43, 149, 151, 165, 209\nl
historicity of, 52-54\nl
one aspect of his death, 54\nl
temptation of, 154 

Joachim, Mr. H. H., 101 \emph n. 

John, S., 32 

Judaism, 26, 37, 43 

\nen
Judgment, logical, 40\nl
moral, 179 

Julius C{\ae}sar, 59 

\mbox{}

Kant, 48, 134 

\enquote{Kingdom of ends,} 26 

Knowability, argument from, 108 

\nen
Knowledge, theory of, 15\nl
presupposes action, 31\nl
not peculiar to individuals, 98\nl
alleged ambiguity of the term, 102 

\mbox{}

\nen
Law, 199 \emph{seqq.}\nl
of works, 26 

\nen
Layman and priest, in what sense dif\-%
ferent, 35 

Legalism, 182, 184 

Liberal Protestants, 39 

Logic, 13, 15, 39, 49, 118, 163, 201 

\nen
Love, synthesis of thought and action, 
32

Lucretius, 20 

\mbox{}

Man, nature of, 148, 158, 164, 166 

\nen
Materialism, 19, 79 \emph{seqq.}, 153\nl
the truths for which it stands, 91\nl
higher, 95 

Mathematical proof, character of, 66 

\nen
Matter, 59 \emph{seqq.}, Pt.\ II. Ch.\ II. \emph{pass.}\nl
ambiguity of the term, 89 

Meaning of words, 62 

Mechanists, 75 

Mediacy, 209 

Mediation, 160-162 

Medi{\ae}val science, 17 

Metaphysics, bad sense of the word, 61 

Middle Ages, 65 

\nen
Mind, falsely compared to a machine, 
34, 100\nl
and matter, popular distinction be\-%
tween, 72 \emph{seqq.}\nl
breakdown of the distinction, 78-79\nl
and object, distinction between, 99 
\emph{seqq.}

Miracle, 70, Pt.\ III. Ch.\ III. \emph{pass.}

Mohammed, xv 

Mohammedanism, xiii 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{218}]

Monism, 96, 196 

Monothelitism, 28 and \emph n. 

\nen
\enquote{Moralisation} of religion, true and 
false, 24 

Moralistic view of religion, 7-10 

\nen
Morality, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ II. \emph{pass.}\nl
autonomy of, 26\nl
relative to society, 133 

Moses, 167 

Motion, its causes, 77 and \emph n. 

Music, 112, 126, 207 

\nen
Mystery, 159\nl
true and false, 64 

Mystic, 191 

Mysticism, 27, 41 

Myth, {\ae}tiological, 5-7 

Mythology, 19 

\mbox{}

Napoleon, 212 

Natural law, 199 \emph{seqq.} 

\nen
Nature, as object of worship, 20, 214\nl
and miracle, 195 \emph{seqq.} 

Necessary and contingent, 50 

New Testament, 149 

Newton, 61, 200 

\nen
Non-contradiction of truth, 118\nl
of good, 118 

Normality, 202 \emph{seqq.} 

\mbox{}

\nen
Omnipotence, 120\nl
what it is, 155\nl
misconceived, 184 

\nen
Omniscience, 117, 139\nl
what it is, 156 

Ontological proof, 66 

Opera, 113 

Optimism, 121, 131 

\mbox{}

Pagan gods, 20 

Pantheism, 149, 162 

\enquote{Paradox,} the religious, 42 

Part. \emph{See} Whole 

Paul, S., 26, 209 

Penalty = judgment, 179 

Penitence. \emph{See} Repentance 

Persecution, 22 

\nen
Personality, 19, Pt.\ II. Ch.\ III. \emph{pass.}, 
183-184 

Pessimism, 121, 131 

Peter, S., 209 

\nen
Philosophical problems, in what sense 
insoluble, 124 

\nen
Philosophy and religion, xiii \emph{seqq.}\nl
of religion, non-existence of, 15-16\nl
= theology = religion, 16-19\nl
its distinction from science, 16-17\nl
presupposes history, in true and false 
senses, 47\nl
cannot admit hypothesis, 60 

\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{218~c.~2}]

Philosophy and scientists, 17, 90 

\nen
Physical suffering, its relation to punish\-%
ment, 178 

Physics, 59 \emph{seqq.} 

Plato, 131 

Pluralism, 96, 196 

Polonius, 113 

Positivism, 38 \emph{seqq.}, 109 

\nen
Practical side of religion, Pt.\ I. Ch.\ II. 
\emph{pass.} 

Prichard, Mr.\ H. A., 101 \emph n. 

\nen
Proofs of God{\apo}s existence, their abstract 
nature, 65\nl
their supposed dishonest character, 65\nl
not typically medi{\ae}val, 66 

\nen
Psychology, its nature, 39\nl
method of, 40\nl
limitations of, 41-42\nl
its relation to the problem of mind 
and matter, 76 

\nen
Punishment, 169\nl
a crime{\qmk} 172\nl
as deterrent, 172\nl
an absolute duty, 175\nl
its essence, 176 \emph{seqq.}\nl 
in what sense a duty, 177\nl
does not consist of physical pain, 178\nl
= forgiveness, 179\nl
empirically distinct from forgiveness, 
180\nl
self-, 187 

Puritanism, 25 

\mbox{}

Qualities = relations, 112 

Quietism, 27-29 

\mbox{}

Real Presence, 210 

\nen
Realism, 101 \emph n.\nl
\enquote{new,} 101 \emph n. 

Reason = intellect, 12 \emph n. 

Regress, infinite, 86 

\nen
Relations, their alleged \enquote{externality,}
111%%%%%
\footnoteB{The text file from Google 
continues from here with Chinese characters.}\nl
= qualities, 112

\nen
Religion, and philosophy, xiii\nl
conduct and, xv\nl
history and, xv\nl
art and, xvi\nl
universality of, xvii\nl
usage of word, xvii\nl
of savages, 4-7, 18, 24\nl
moralistic view of, 7-10\nl
non-existence of philosophy of, 15-16\nl
= theology = philosophy, 16-19

\nen
Religious wars, 22\nl
life, its elements, 32\nl
\enquote{paradox,} 42

Renaissance, 66, 83

Repentance, 141, 144, 178 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{219}]

\nen
Repentance, its relation to forgiveness,
186\nl
divine, 187\nl
its nature, 188 \emph{seqq.}\nl
of God, 189\nl
of Christ, 192

Responsibility, 190-191

Revenge, 172

Rigorism, 25

\nen
Ritual, view that it is the true content 
of religion, 4-7\nl
depends on creed, 7

Robinson Crusoe, 111

\nen
Rules, of conduct, 203 \emph{seqq.}\nl
in art, 207-208

\mbox{}

Samaritan, Good, 52

Savages, religion of, 4-7, 18, 24

Scents, difficulty of defining, 188

\nen
Scepticism, 8, 18, 99\nl
true and false, 69

Science and religion, 19

Scientists and philosophy, 17, 90

Scott, Mr.\ S. G., vi

Secular, falsely opposed to religious, 35

Self-condemnation, 178-189

Self-consciousness, 101

Self-dependence, 184

\nen
Self-expression of the good will = punish\-%
ment, 177,\footnoteB{A new line does \emph{not} start here.} = forgiveness, 179

Self-identity, 97 \emph{seqq.}, 152

Selfishness, 46

Self-limitation of God, 154

Self-preservation, 172

Self-surrender, 27-29

Series, infinite, 87

Sextus Empiricus, 66

Shakspere, 113, 212

\nen
Society, 172-173\nl
morality relative to, 133

Socrates, 49, 66

Son of Man, 37

Sonata, 207

Spinoza, 104, 131

\nen
Spirit, Holy, 183\nl
God as, 70

Subjective idealism, 120

\enquote{Super-moral Absolute,} 123

\mbox{}

Teleology, 83

Temperament, xiv

Temptation of Jesus, 154

Testament, New, 149

Theism, transcendent, 125, 149

\nen
Theology, xiii\nl
attempts to distinguish it from creed-%
element in religion, 12-15\nl
= creed, 12 
\mbox{}\hfill[\textbf{219 c.~2}]

\nen
Theology = philosophy = religion, 16-19\nl
historical, 38, 42 \emph{seqq.}\nl
philosophical character of historical\footnoteB{There is a line break here in the copy-text, but no comma.} 52\nl
not an empirical science, 59

\nen
Theory of knowledge, 15\nl
and fact, false antithesis, 17 \emph n.
anti-moral, of religion, 22-29\nl
atomic, ancient, 81

Things and thought, 101

Thinking, ambiguity of the term, 93

Thompson, Francis, 214

\nen
Thought, conduct in relation to, 7-8, 30\nl
and action, popular distinction, 33\nl
breakdown of the distinction, 34\nl
and things, 101

\nen
Timelessness as characteristic of all 
truth, 50

\nen
Totality, two senses of, 137\nl
must be good, 139, 144

Transcendence, 119, 198

Treatment of criminals, 171 \emph{seqq.}

Triangle, 163-164

Triumph, 188

\nen
Truth, ultimate, 64\nl
involving differences in unity, 106\nl
involving non-contradiction, 118

\mbox{}

\nen
Ultimate truths not incapable as such of
proof, 64

Uniformity, 92, 211-214

Union with God, 27

\nen
Uniqueness, 92, 102\nl
of Christ, 163-166

\nen
Unity, of minds, 101, 104-105\nl
and truth, 106\nl
and identity, 108

Universal and particular, 49, 163

Universality of religion, xvii

\nen
Universe, in what sense a totality,
140

Unknowable, the future as, 156

\mbox{}

Vendetta, 172

Vitalists, 75

\mbox{}

Wars, religious, 22

Watson, Prof.\ J., 101 \emph n.

\nen
Whole and part, 20, 88, 104, 108 \emph{seqq.},
152

\enquote{Will, blind,} 31, 123

\nen
Will falsely distinguished from faculties,
103

\enquote{Will not to will,} 154

\enquote{Will to power,} 31

Words, meaning of, 62

Works, law of, 26

Worship, Nature as an object of, 20, 214
\end{multicols}
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