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\begin{document}
\title{Notes on\\R. G. Collingwood's\\\emph{Principles of Art}}
\author{David Pierce}
\date{December 6, 2010}
\publishers{Mimar Sinan G\"uzel Sanatlar \"Universitesi\\
Matematik B\"ol\"um\"u\\
\url{http://mat.msgsu.edu.tr/~dpierce/}}
\uppertitleback{\centering
Notes on R. G. Collingwood's \emph{Principles of Art}\\
\mbox{}\\
Errors corrected, May 30, 2011, and August 20, 2012\\
\mbox{}\\
This work is licensed under the\\
 Creative Commons Attribution--Noncommercial--Share-Alike
License.\\
 To view a copy of this license, visit\\
  \url{http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/}\\
\mbox{}\\
\cc \ccby David Pierce \ccnc \ccsa\\
\mbox{}\\
Mathematics Department\\
Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University\\
Istanbul, Turkey\\
\url{http://mat.msgsu.edu.tr/~dpierce/}\\
\url{dpierce@msgsu.edu.tr}
}
%\frontmatter

  \maketitle

\section*{Preface}

I first read R. G. Collingwood's \emph{Principles of
  Art}~\cite{Collingwood-PA} in 1987/8, when a former art teacher of
mine lent me his copy.  The book immediately suggested a new way to
read Plato's treatment of art in the \emph{Republic.}  I was drawn in.

I have read the book several times since.
I write these notes primarily as an aid to my own understanding of the
book.
Secondarily, the notes may encourage others to either read the book, or
else tell \emph{me} what to read instead.  The notes are a thorough
revision and expansion of a version dated November 7, 2003.  


Collingwood makes arguments about language and art.
As a mathematician, I am familiar with a certain kind of argument.  To
me, what makes mathematics \emph{possible} is that there are certain
kinds of propositions, which can be justified by arguments that will
be accepted by everybody who understands them.  It may be argued that
\emph{every} proposition is such: anybody who \emph{really}
understands it will feel the same way about it.  Indeed, Collingwood
seems to argue this.  But then it may be argued in response that `real
understanding' has been defined just to make the claim tautological.   

Disagreements about the truth of a piece of mathematics are not
\emph{emotional}; it is understood that such disagreements should and
\emph{can} be resolved dispassionately.  I do not speak here about
whether a piece of mathematics is worth studying; only about whether
it is correct.\footnote{I recently spent an hour arguing with a
  student over his loss of one point out of five on an exam problem in
  number theory.  The problem was to prove something, and the
  student's proof was littered with the arrow $\Rightarrow$, not used
  with any precise meaning except that of, `The argument flows this
  way.'  The student really resented losing the point.  He said his
  teachers had used the arrow as he did.  I said I had been taught the
  same way, by an otherwise-good teacher; but such use of the arrow is
  still bad style, unless one is writing $A\Rightarrow B$ to mean, not
  that $A$ and $B$ are true, and $B$ is true \emph{because} $A$ is
  true, but that \emph{if} $A$ should happen to be true, then $B$ will
  be true. 

The student was from Tajikistan, and told me, when I asked, that he
had attended an English-language high-school.  As I said, he didn't
like losing a point.  He seemed at times to be making an effort to
control his rage.  In the end he had to submit to my authority, though
he still said, `OK, I see I shouldn't use the arrow that way.  Can't
you give me the point now?'   

Mathematics is emotional.
That student and others were also disturbed to lose points on the
problem of finding a number $k$ such that $0\leqslant k<409$ and
$408!\equiv k\pmod n$, where $n=1+2+\cdots+408$.  What these students
did was to show that \emph{if} there was such a number $k$, then it
must be $408$.  But they did not explicitly verify that this number
did indeed meet the desired condition.  Such verification is easy, and
one student claimed it was implicit in what he had written; for he had
written somewhere in his solution $408!\equiv 408\pmod{409}$, and
elsewhere $408!\equiv408\pmod{204}$, and these two statements implied
$408!\equiv408\pmod n$, since $n=204\cdot409$ and the factors were
coprime.  I said this was not good enough: the verification had to be
explicit.  This student was good-natured about it; but I'm not sure he
didn't finally concede the point simply because I was the teacher, and
not because he agreed with me. 

So there are emotional disputes about the correctness of
\emph{written} mathematics!  But there was no dispute that $408$ was
in fact a number $k$ as desired.}   

This correctness is something that you can in principle work out for
yourself; and once you do that, you know that everybody else will come
to the same conclusion.  In practice, you know that you can make
mistakes, and you want others to check your work.  But the conviction
of others that an argument is true is no substitute for your
\emph{own} conviction. 

In all of this, mathematics is apparently like nothing else.  In
Chapter 3, `Proof', of his excellent book \emph{Mathematics: A Very
  Short Introduction}~\cite[p.~40]{MR2147526}, Timothy Gowers argues: 
\begin{quote}
\dots the fact that disputes can \emph{in principle} be resolved does
make mathematics unique.  There is no mathematical equivalent of
astronomers who still believe in the steady-state theory of the
universe, or of biologists who hold, with great conviction, very
different views about how much is explained by natural selection, or
of philosophers who disagree fundamentally about the relationship
between consciousness and the physical world, or of economists who
follow opposing schools of thought such as monetarism and
neo-keynesianism. 
\end{quote}
However, it is disappointing that Gowers here does not consider
mathematics with respect to the so-called fine arts.  Obviously there
are disagreements about the novelists that are worth reading.  My
enjoyment of Collingwood's contemporary Somerset Maugham is personal;
I don't expect others to get out of him what I do.  On the other hand,
when writers last, like Homer, there may be a reason. 

I am still trying to figure out what to make of philosophical
arguments like Collingwood's.  I get a lot of enjoyment out of
Collingwood.  Summarizing him (as I do in these notes) feels like
summarizing Plato (not to mention Maugham): it leaves out the
personality.  It leaves out the \emph{poetry.}  Like the characters of
the Dialogues, Collingwood follows an argument where it goes.  In his
\emph{Autobiography}~\cite[p.~57]{Collingwood-Auto} he writes: 
\begin{quote}
This habit of following and taking part in discussions where both
subject and method were other people's proved extremely valuable to
me.  I found it not only a delightful task, but a magnificent
exercise, to follow the work of contemporary philosophers whose views
differed widely from my own, to write essays developing their
positions and applying them to topics they had not dealt with, to
reconstruct their problems in my own mind, and to study, often with
the liveliest admiration, the way in which they had tried to solve
them. 
\end{quote} 
I think \emph{The Principles of Art}~\cite[p.~325]{Collingwood-PA} is
not one of Collingwood's exercises, but represents what he really
thinks.  Still, one can read it as the trying out of an argument to
see where it goes.  If one wants to see if the argument really does go
there, then perhaps nothing will do but to read Collingwood's argument
itself.  Summarizing another's argument can be done; Collingwood
himself does it in his book; but here and there he acknowledges that
he could be mistaken. 

At the beginning of the last chapter of \emph{The Principles of
  Art}~(p.~325), Collingwood writes: 
\begin{quote}
  My final question, then, is: how does the theory advanced in this
  book bear upon the present situation, and illuminate the path to be
  taken by artists in the immediate future?
\end{quote}
The first part of the answer is, `we must get rid of the conception of
artistic ownership.'  Indeed, Collingwood's own book has no
copyright. 

Beyond its Introduction, Collingwood's book comprises three Books: 
\begin{compactenum}[I.]
  \item
Art
and Not Art; 
\item
The Theory of Imagination;
\item
The Theory of Art.
\end{compactenum}
  The
purpose of the first book is to find out what we mean by the word
`art'---rather, what we are \emph{trying} to mean:  The word is to its
proper meaning as a seagull to the deck of the ship it is hovering
over.  We want to induce the bird to settle on deck (p.~7).

The numbered Parts below correspond to Collingwood's Books.  The
further subdivisions in Part~\ref{part:II} correspond to Collingwood's
chapters and sections, and they are numbered and named accordingly.
It is this part that I have covered in the most detail, because here
Collingwood himself most explicitly places his thought in a tradition
that begins with Descartes.  However, the last three sections of this
part especially contain passionate writing, with examples and
metaphors, to such an extent that summary seems especially
misleading. 

I do aim to speak in Collingwood's voice as I understand it, except
between square brackets and in footnotes.  Often Collingwood's own
words are the best summary of what he has to say; then I quote these
words. 

\newpage

{\smaller\tableofcontents}

\newpage
\part{Art and Not Art}

Art is expression of emotion, effected by creation of an imaginary
experience or activity.  The creation is for ourselves, but may also
be for others.  The imaginary is not make-believe.  

The artistic experience as such is not sensuous (p.~141):  For
example, the art
in a painting is not to be found in the exciting quality of certain
colors; the art in music is not to be found in the soothing timbre of
certain instruments.  In this way, listening to music as art is like
listening to a scientific lecture (p.~140), in which
the point is not the sound of 
the speaker's voice as such.\footnote{\label{n:Arch}However, in
  Book~II (p.~267), an admittedly fantastic possibility is proposed:
  that, had another scientist been present when Archimedes lept from
  his bath crying `Eureka', that scientist might have understood
  something about what Archimedes had found, without needing it
  explained.  See \S~\ref{subsect:logic} below.  (The story of
  Archimedes is told by Vitruvius, as quoted in the second of the two
  Loeb volumes of \emph{Greek Mathematical
    Works}~\cite[pp.~36--9]{MR13:419b}.)} 

Expression of emotion is not arousal of emotion, since emotions must
exist before they can be expressed.

Craft is to be distinguished from art.  Craft produces something to
serve a purpose.  It is also fulfilment of a plan.  The plan is not
the craft.  Also, by the way, the plan is not primarily something
written down: it is `in the head'.

Whereas art---for example, a poem---can exist entirely in the head,
being art nonetheless.

However, art may be joined with craft: craft is the making of a
physical object, but emotion may be expressed through this making.
For example (Book III, p.~309), the portrait-painter, hired to craft a
likeness, may in painting come to some insight about the sitter and
express this through painting.  (But the sitter may then find the
painting not to be what he had ordered.)

\part{The Theory of Imagination}\label{part:II}

\setcounter{section}{7}

\section{Thinking and Feeling}

\subsection{The Two Contrasted}\label{subsect:polar}

We analyse experience into \textbf{thinking} and \textbf{feeling.} 
\begin{compactenum}
\item
The act of feeling is `simple'; the act of thinking is
`bipolar', in that it can be done well or ill, successfully or unsuccessfully, and so on.
\item
What we feel (for example, coldness) is private; what we think (for example, that the temperature is $22^{\circ}$ F) is public.
\item
`[T]houghts can corroborate or contradict each other, but feelings cannot.'
\end{compactenum}
Feelings flow like a river; thoughts are more lasting, like the
river-bed.

`Words like thought, feeling, knowledge, experience have\dots a double-barrelled significance', referring both to an act and the object of the act.\footnote{I introduce the word \emph{object;} Collingwood just refers to the activity of thinking as opposed to what we think, and so on.}  The relation between act and object is not the same for thought and feeling.

\subsection{Feeling}

Feeling can be \textbf{sensation} or \textbf{emotion,} but the distinction is not that between two species of a genus (as it is between seeing and hearing, or anger and fear).
An experience combines sensuous and emotional elements, but `the sensation takes precedence of the emotion.'
This precedence is not
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
temporal, or
\item
causal, or
\item
logical,
\end{compactenum}
although a child may be frightened \emph{because of} a red curtain.
In a word, an emotion is the \textbf{`emotional charge'} on a sensation.  Sensation here is not the act, but what is felt: the \textbf{sensum.}   

Probably every sensum has an emotional charge; but we are in the habit of `sterilizing' sensa.  This was not always so: consider the color-symbolism of the Middle Ages.

`Feeling appears to arise in us independently of all thinking, \dots it is a foundation upon which the rational part of our nature is built'.
  Thus we
may speak of `levels of experience'.  The level of mere feeling will
be called the \textbf{psychic} level.  This alludes to a
distinction between psyche (or soul) and spirit, corresponding to that
between feeling and thinking.\footnote{Collingwood seems never to
  refer to spirit again.}  `[T]hought\dots brings with it new orders
of emotions', but these will not be called feelings.\footnote{Under
  \emph{Psyche} and \emph{Psychic,} the OED~\cite{OED} suggests that
  the distinction 
between psyche and spirit is developed by Paul from a distinction in
Jewish thought.  Collingwood is presumably aware of this (he gives
hints here and there of being a serious Christian).  The reference is
to I~Cor.~2:14: 
\begin{quote}
\Gk{yuqik`os d`e >'anjrwpos o>u d'eqetai t`a to~u pne'umatos to~u
  jeo~u\dots <'oti pneumatik~ws >anakr'inetai.}~\cite{GNT}  

  But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of
  God\dots because they are spiritually discerned (KJV~\cite{KJV-Oxford}),
\end{quote}
where `natural' translates \Gk{yuqik'oc} (and `spirit', \Gk{pne~uma});
in the RSV~\cite{RSV-Oxford}, `natural'
becomes a footnote to the main translation, `unspiritual'.  See also
15:44--5:
\begin{quote}\Gk{spe'iretai s~wma yuqik'on, >ege'iretai s~wma
    pneumatik'on.  e>i >'estin s~wma yuqik'on, >'estin ka`i
    peumatik'on.  o<'utws ka'i g'egraptai, \textbf{>Eg'eneto <o}
    pr~wtos \textbf{>'anjrwpos} >Ad`am \textbf{e'is yuq`hn z~wsan}, <o
    >'esqatos >Ad`am e>is pne~uma zw|opoio~un.} 

It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body.  There is a
natural body, and there is a spiritual body.  And so it is written,
The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam \emph{was
  made} a quickening spirit. [KJV] 

It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body.  If there
is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body.   
Thus it is written, ``The first man Adam became a living being''; the
last Adam became a life-giving spirit. [RSV] 
\end{quote}

According to Collingwood (p.~171 n.), the word
`psychology' was created in the sixteenth century to designate an
empirical science of
feeling.  In the nineteenth century, some people tried to expand the
meaning to include an empirical science of thought.  But there is no
such science---there is only a pseudo-science---because of the
bipolarity of thought mentioned above.  Sciences of thought must be
normative or `criteriological'; examples include logic and ethics.

The OED at \emph{Psychology} is more or less consistent with Collingwood's
dates.  It says that creation of the word `psychologia' is attributed to
Melanchthon in sixteenth-century Germany, but that the word is not
much used in modern languages until the 19th century.  In 1682, one
Thomas Govan, in Latin, makes the following classification of \emph{physica} (natural science):
\begin{compactitem}
  \item
\emph{somatologia} or \emph{physiologia}
\item
\emph{pneumatologia}
\begin{compactitem}
  \item
\emph{theologia}
\item
\emph{angelographia} (including \emph{demonologia})
\item
\emph{psychologia}
\end{compactitem}
\end{compactitem}
In \emph{The Idea of History}~\cite[pp.~1 f.]{Collingwood-IH}, Collingwood calls
psychology the `science of mind' and says that it `treats mind in just the
same way that biology treats life.'}

\subsection{Thinking}

`In its primary form, thought seems to be exclusively concerned with' feeling.  In thinking, `we are becoming aware, by an act of attention, of certain feelings which at the moment we have; and we are going on to think of these as standing in certain relations to other feelings, remembered as past or imagined as possible.'  This is true for both `It is hot' and `That is my hat.'

In its secondary form, thought is about thoughts.\footnote{Again in \emph{The Idea of History}~\cite[p.~2]{Collingwood-IH},
Collingwood refers to psychology as `thought of the first degree'.}
Some standard terms referring:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
to primary or first-order thought are
\emph{understanding} and \emph{science}; 
\item
to secondary or second-order thought,
\emph{reason} and \emph{philosophy.}  
\end{compactenum}

All knowledge is derived from experience, `as anybody can see'
(p.~167).  Here experience includes experience of thinking.
It is `philosophical jargon' to restrict the meaning of experience to
sensuous experience.  When one makes this restriction, then two
mystifications may arise:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
  \item
Kant's, that thoughts of the second order are known independently of
experience;
\item
that of `some modern philosophers', that thoughts of the
second order are about nothing but words.
\end{compactenum}
In short, a paralogism arises:\footnote{I introduce the term \emph{paralogism,} taking it from Kant, who gives his own example in the \emph{Critique of Pure Reason}~\cite[B 410--11]{Kant}:
\begin{quote}
  The procedure of rational psychology is governed by a
  paralogism, which is exhibited through the following syllogism:

\textbf{What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not
  exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.}

\textbf{Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought
  otherwise than as subject.}

\textbf{Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance.}

The major premise talks about a being that can be thought of in every
respect, and consequently even as it might be given in intuition.  But
the minor premise talks about this being only insofar as it is
considered as subject, relative only to thinking and the unity of
consciousness, but not at the same time in relation to the intuition
through which it is given as an object for thinking.  Thus the
conclusion is drawn \emph{per Sophisma figurae dictionis,} hence by
means of a deceptive inference. 
\end{quote}}
\begin{compactenum}
  \item
Knowledge is derived from experience [in the broad sense].
\item
A thought is not an experience [in the narrow sense].
\item
Second-order thought is knowledge, if at all, only `in a different and mysterious sense of the word'.
\end{compactenum}

\subsection{The Problem of Imagination}\label{subsect:P-of-I}

Thought establishes relations amongst feelings.  But this point will
need further investigation, because feelings, as such, flow; they need
to be retained to be related to one another.  `The difficulty is concealed, in current philosophical works\dots by the adoption of' terms like
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
`sense-data' for sensa,
\item
`acquaintance' for our relation to our sensa,
\item
`appealing' to sense-data for how we test the truth of an empirical proposition. 
\end{compactenum}
The terminology must refer to something different from sensa, namely what Hume called \textbf{ideas} as distinct from \textbf{impressions.}\footnote{\label{n:Hume}Here \emph{impression} appears to be a feeling at stage~\ref{stage1} as described in \S~\ref{subsect:CI} below.  The present passage is Collingwood's first reference to Hume.  As Collingwood will refer to Hume often, I quote the relevant passage, from the beginning of \emph{A Treatise of Human Nature}~\cite{Hume} (in fact I take the text from \url{http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/hume treatise ToC.htm} November 30, 2010, but I correct the typography according to the print version):
\begin{quote}
\textsc{All} the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call \textsc{Impressions} and \textsc{Ideas}. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name \emph{impressions}; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By \emph{ideas} I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; tho' it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.
\end{quote}
}  The activity of mind correlative to ideas in this sense is \textbf{imagination:} this is Aristotle's \Gk{fantas'ia}, Kant's `blind but indispensible faculty' linking sensation and understanding.  Imagination `deserves\dots a more thorough study than it has yet received'.


\section{Sensation and Imagination}

\subsection{Terminology}

There is a common-sense distinction---albeit an obscure one---between
\textbf{really sensing} and \textbf{imagining.}   Here `real' is not
as opposed to unreal, but is as used in the phrase `real property'. 

\subsection{History of the Problem: Descartes to Locke}

Medieval philosophers assumed `sensation in general gives us real acquaintance with the real world;' this was undermined by 16th-century sceptics.

Descartes `did not deny that there was such a thing as real sensation; what he denied was that we could distinguish it by any test short of mathematical reasoning from imagination.'

Hobbes denied the distinction between real sensation and imagination.  

Spinoza agrees, saying `that all sensation is imagination'.  For him, \emph{imaginatio} is not a mode of thought; imaginations contain no truth or error.

For Leibniz, sensa are ideas, but `essentially confused' ideas.

`It is only with Locke (\emph{Essay} \textsc{ii.~xxx}) that an attempt is made to distinguish ``real ideas'' from ``fantastical''\;'---but not to distinguish real from imaginary sensa; for him they are all real.  Only `certain complex ideas' are fantastical, namely those `which the mind ``makes to itself''.'  Locke could have developed from this, but did not develop, the theory whereby \textbf{introspection} serves to distinguish real from imaginary sensa.

\subsection{Berkeley: the Introspection Theory}\label{subsect:B-I}

Berkeley distinguishes \textbf{ideas of sense} from \textbf{ideas of imagination,} borrowing the terms from Malebranche.  But Malebranche explains the distinction through physiology, while ordinary people are aware of the distinction without physiology or any other theory.  

Berkeley says `the ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those those of the Imagination.'  This could be a distinction
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
between real and imaginary sensa---in which case real sounds would be louder than imaginary---or
\item
between the act of real sensation and the act of imagination---in which case `a real sound is heard whether we will or no, whereas an imaginary one can be summoned up, banished, or replaced by another at will\dots it is a difference appreciable not by the ear, but by the reflective or introspective consciousness'.
\end{compactenum}
The latter position is Berkeley's, but is not tenable, because there is `the hallucination of mental disease', and even healthy people sometimes cannot control imaginary sights and sounds (as after a horrible accident).\footnote{See also \S~\ref{subsect:I-as-A} and note~\ref{n:earworm} there.}

\subsection{Berkeley: the Relation Theory}

Berkeley's alternative theory is that real sensa are related to one another by the laws of nature, while ideas of imagination are \textbf{wild.}  But they are not.  One might say they obey the laws of psychology; but then how do we distinguish laws of nature (that is, physics) from laws of psychology, unless we can already distinguish real sensation from imagination?

\subsection{Hume}

Hume sees the problem, so he reverts to the introspection theory.  In
particular, \textbf{ideas} differ from \textbf{impressions} only in
degree, not in nature.\footnote{Hume refers to `degrees' twice in the
  passage quoted in note~\ref{n:Hume}.}  So the difference is between,
not sensa, but sensations. 

Hume recognizes that there are exceptional cases when `our ideas
conform to the definition he has given of impressions'.  But to
recognize exceptions is to appeal to the (rejected) relation theory. 

`It was Kant who first showed that progress in the science of human
nature must come, like progress in any other science, by taking
exceptions seriously'. 

\subsection{Kant}

For Kant, reality is a category of the
understanding \cite[B~106]{Kant}---of primary 
thought.  

`According to Berkeley, the ``laws of nature'' are without exception
learned from ``experience''; that is, they are all empirical laws, laws
of the first order\dots Hume tentatively, and Kant more explicitly,
attacked this doctrine, and showed that these first-order laws implied
second-order laws, which Kant called ``principles of the
understanding''.'  Some sensa may be wild, relatively to first-order
laws; but they cannot be so, relatively to the second-order laws,
since `It is a principle of the understanding that every event must
have a cause.' 
A real sensum is therefore one that has been interpreted by
the understanding.

\subsection{`Illusory Sensa'}

We should still consider whether the common-sense distinction between real and imaginary sensa.  There is no \textbf{class} of illusory sensa, but any sensum is illusory if we make a mistake in relating it with other sensa.

\subsection{`Appearances' and `Images'}

Using words like \textbf{appearance} and \textbf{image} (as in, parallel railway lines appear [look] convergent, or they converge in the image) is just an attempt to project our mistakes in interpretation onto sensa themselves.

The use of the word \emph{image} suggests the analogy
\begin{equation*}
\text{sensum} : \text{body} :: \text{photograph} : \text{object}.
\end{equation*}
But both the photograph (or drawing) and the object are present to us as two things; the image of the railway lines, and the lines themselves, are not.

\subsection{Conclusion}\label{subsect:conclusion}

Sensa are:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
  \item
real, if correctly interpreted;
\item
illusory, if wrongly interpreted;
\item
imaginary, if not interpreted at all.
\end{compactenum}

\section{Imagination and Consciousness}

\subsection{Imagination as Active}\label{subsect:I-as-A}

The introspection theory---having germs in Locke, clearly stated by Berkeley, used fundamentally by Hume---was rejected only because of hallucinations and \emph{id\'ees fixes.}  Still it does appear that `imagination contrasts with sensation as something active with something passive'.  That this is often taken for granted is shown by the popularity of the term \emph{sense-datum,} for something \emph{given} in sensation.  But the meaning of \textbf{give} here is not one of the usual meanings:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
transfer ownership of,
\item
allow in an argument.
\end{compactenum}
The distinction between imagination and sensation seems to be like that between making something for oneself and receiving it as a present.  It is not:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
`a distinction between activity and passivity as such.  Sensation itself is an activity';
\item
`a distinction among passivities\dots according as they are done to us by external bodies impinging on our own, or by changes arising in our own organism, as Malebranche maintained', since sensation too involves changes in our organism;
\item
`a distinction among activities\dots between those we do of our own choice and those we cannot help doing', since some imaginations are harder to stop than sensations.\footnote{\label{n:earworm}Collingwood's example, mentioned earlier (\S~\ref{subsect:B-I}), is `the frightful accident which one saw yesterday'; but another example might be the \emph{earworm.}}
\end{compactenum}
Still, `In some sense or other, imagination is more free than sensation.'  But `even imagination is not free in the way in which the conscious carrying-out of an intention is free; the freedom it possesses is not the freedom of choice'.  With respect to freedom, there is a sequence:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
feeling,
\item
imagination,
\item
thought.
\end{compactenum}

\subsection{The Traditional Confusion of Sense with Imagination}

`As soon as the act [of sensing it] is over, the sensum has vanished, never to return.  Its \emph{esse} is \emph{sentire.} 

`Objection may easily be raised to this last phrase as an overstatement\dots ``what could be more absurd than to argue that, because we have stopped seeing it, the colour has ceased to exist?''\dots The objection is an excellent example of ``metaphysics'' in the sense in which that word has at various times become a term of merited abuse\dots

`The error dates back to Locke\dots ``Let us suppose the Mind to be, as we say, White Paper, void of all characters, without any Ideas; how comes it to be furnished?''\dots The answer is given by stating the doctrine of ideas, with their two classes, ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection\dots [However,] sensation ``furnishes'' the mind with nothing whatever\dots

`It was Hume who first perceived the problem, and tried to solve it by distinguishing ideas from impressions\dots But because he was not able\dots to give a satisfactory account of this difference\dots philosophers\dots lose sight of his partial but very real achievement'.

\subsection{Impressions and Ideas}

There must be a distinction between `real' colors (for example) and `imaginary' colors, the latter including colors that \emph{would be} or \emph{have been} perceived. Otherwise nobody could talk about relations between sensa.  `There must\dots be a form of experience other than sensation, but closely related to it\dots\P\ This\dots is what we ordinarily call imagination.'  It remains to be seen how this relates to imagination in the sense of \S~\ref{subsect:conclusion}.

`It was in order to distinguish [imagination] from sensation that Hume distinguished ideas from impressions'.

\subsection{Attention}

In order to think about sensa, we first must \emph{attend} to them: we
must apply \textbf{attention}---also called \textbf{consciousness} or \textbf{awareness} (p.~206).  `Seeing and hearing are species of sensation; looking and listening are the corresponding species of attention.'  Attention to a red patch \textbf{divides} this from the rest of the visual field; but to \textbf{abstract} the redness is done not by attention but by \emph{thinking.}

`At the merely psychical level, the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not exist.'  Consciousness changes the character of our psychical activities (which are called by Descartes `using his senses', and by Professor Alexander\footnote{In Collingwood's index he is S. Alexander, that is, Samuel Alexander, author of \emph{Beauty and other Forms of Value,} which Collingwood refers to elsewhere in the book.} `enjoying ourselves').  Therefore we cannot study psychical experience by enquiring of consciousness.  

Behaviorism identifies the psychical with the physiological, but this implies that we must already have independent knowledge of psychical experience.

We have this knowledge by analysing the object of
consciousness into sensum \emph{and} sensation.  The \emph{con-} of
\emph{consciousness} may be taken as implying this dual object.

\subsection{The Modification of Feeling by Consciousness}

`Colour or anger, which is  no longer merely seen or felt but attended to, is still colour or anger\dots But the total experience of seeing or feeling it has undergone a change\dots This is the change which Hume describes by speaking of the difference between an impression and an idea.'

Consciousness is not a response to a stimulus; it is absolutely autonomous.  But the conscious being, as such, \emph{must} decide which feeling to attend to.  This is \emph{not} a choosing between alternatives (this would imply having already attended to the feelings to be chosen among).  

Consciousness is a
domination of feelings by a self that was formerly dominated by them.
Thus consciousness causes feelings to become domesticated, less violent.  Feelings (including sensa) can then be perpetuated at will.  `Memory\dots is perhaps only fresh attention to the traces of a sensuous-emotional experience which has not entirely passed away.'

\subsection{Consciousness and Imagination}\label{subsect:CI}

Philosophers want `not only to recall sensa which are vanishing, but to envisage others which have never been present to them'.  This is done not by consciousness alone, but also intellect; how this is done is beyond the scope of the book.

We have to account for the two different ways (in this chapter and the last) of distinguishing impressions and ideas.
A feeling may pass through three stages:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
  \item\label{stage1}
as bare feeling, below the level of consciousness;
\item\label{stage2}
as a feeling of which we are conscious;
\item\label{stage3}
as a feeling placed in relation to others. 
\end{compactenum}
Here, stage \ref{stage2} corresponds to Hume's \emph{idea,} while Hume's
\emph{impression} is either \ref{stage1} or \ref{stage3}, depending on
whether we consider it as in this chapter or the previous
one.\footnote{But see \S~\ref{subsect:P-of-I} and note~\ref{n:Hume}
  there.}  Hume failed to see the difference. 

\subsection{Consciousness and Truth}\label{subsect:C-and-T}

`The activity of consciousness, we have seen, converts impression into
idea, that is, crude sensation into imagination.'  What effects the
conversion is \textbf{consciousness;} what undergoes it,
\textbf{imagination.} 

Consciousness is thought; it is just not yet \textbf{intellect}.  As
thought, it has the properties described in [\S~\ref{subsect:polar}].
In particular, it can err,\footnote{Collingwood does not here consider
  the other distinguishing features of thought in
  \S~\ref{subsect:polar}: the `publicity' of thought and the
  possibility of corroboration or contradiction.} not `by referring
things to the wrong concepts', but by disowning the feeling attended
to.  `We cannot see our way to dominate it, and shrink from
persevering in the attempt.'  This is \textbf{corruption of
  consciousness.}  We may attribute the disowned experience (perhaps
crossness, a being out of temper) to other people.  The psychologists
have the term \textbf{repression} for the disowning, and
\textbf{projection} for the ascription to others. 

`Spinoza\dots expounded better than any other man the conception of a
truthful consciousness and its importance as a foundation for a
healthy mental life\dots As soon as we form a clear and distinct idea
of a passion, it ceases to be a passion.' 

The untruth of a corrupt consciousness is not an error or a lie (this
distinction lies at the intellectual level).  It is an \textbf{evil,}
but not differentiated into disease or wrong-doing. 


\subsection{Summary}

`All thought presupposes feeling; and all the propositions which
express the results of our thoughts belong to one of two types: they
are either statements about feelings, in which case they are called
empirical, or statements about the procedure of thought itself, in
which case the are called \emph{a priori}\dots 

`Feeling proper, or psychical experience, has a double character: it
is sensation and emotion\dots feeling proper is an experience in which
what we now feel monopolizes the whole field of our view.' 

To relate a feeling to others, to even tell what I feel now, requires
the feeling to `cease to be mere feeling and enter upon a new stage of
its existence. 

`This new stage is reached not by some process antecedent to the act
of attention, but by that act itself.'  Attention, theoretically,
enlarges our field of view to include the act of feeling; practically,
it is how we dominate our feelings.  Impressions of sense become ideas
of imagination. 

`That which tames [imagination] is the activity of consciousness, and
this is a kind of thought. 

`Specifically, it is the kind of thought which stands closest to
sensation or mere feeling.  Every further development of thought is
based upon it'.  Such developments include 
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
`consider[ing] likenesses and differences between feelings,
\item
`classify[ing] them
\item
`or group[ing] them in other kinds of arrangements than classes,
\item
`envisag[ing] them as arranged in a time-series'.
\end{compactenum}

However, `Consciousness itself does not do any of these things.'  If
two ideas are summoned up, they fuse into one. 

`To form an idea of a feeling is already to feel it in imagination.
Thus imagination is ``blind''\dots The freedom which it enjoys is not
the freedom to carry out a plan, or to choose between alternative
possible plans.  These are developments belonging to a later stage. 

`To the same later stage belongs the distinction between truth and
error, regarded as the distinction between true and false accounts of
the relations between things.'  But consciousness can err by being
\textbf{corrupt.} 

\section{Language}

\subsection{Language and expression}

`\textbf{Language} comes into existence with imagination, as a feature of
experience at the conscious level\dots 

`\dots It is an imaginative activity whose function is to express
emotion.  Intellectual language is this same thing intellectualized,
or modified so as to express thought.' 

A \textbf{symbol} is established by agreement; but this agreement is
established in a language that already exists.  In this way,
intellectualized language `presupposes imaginative language or
language proper\dots in the traditional theory of language these
relations are reversed, with disastrous results.' 

Children do \emph{not} learn to speak by being shown things while
their names are uttered; or if they do, it is because (unlike, say,
cats) they already understand the language of pointing and naming.
The child may be accustomed to hearing `Hatty off!' when its bonnet is
removed; then the child may exclaim `Hattiaw!' when it removes its own
bonnet and throws it out of the perambulator.  The exclamation is not
a symbol, but an expression of satisfaction at removing the bonnet. 

\subsection{Psychical Expression}\label{subsect:P-E}

More primitive than linguistic expression is \textbf{psychical
  expression:} `the doing of involuntary and perhaps even wholly
unconscious bodily acts [such as grimacing], related in a peculiar way
to the emotions [such as pain] they are said to express.'  A single
experience can be analyzed: 
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
sensum (as an abdominal gripe), or the field of sensation containing this;
\item
the emotional charge on the sensum (as visceral pain);
\item
the psychical expression (as the grimace).
\end{compactenum}
We can observe and interpret psychical expressions intellectually.
But there is the possibility of \textbf{emotional contagion,} or
\textbf{sympathy,} whereby expressions can also be sensa for others,
with their own emotional charges.  Examples are the spread of panic
through a crowd, or a dog's urge to attack the person who is afraid of
it (or the cat that runs from it). 

Psychical emotions can be expressed only psychically.  But there are
\textbf{emotions of consciousness} (as hatred, love, anger, shame):
these are the emotional charges, not on sensa, but on modes of
consciousness, which can be expressed in language \emph{or}
psychically.  Expressed psychically, they have the same analysis as
psychical emotions; for example, 
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
`consciousness of our own inferiority,
\item
`shame,
\item
`blushing.'
\end{compactenum}
Shame is \emph{not} the emotional charge on the sensa associated with
blushing. 
`The common-sense view [that we blush because we are ashamed] is
right, and the James--Lange theory is wrong.'\footnote{From Wikipedia
  \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James-Lange_theory}, November 30,
  2010: 
\begin{quote}
The theory states that within human beings, as a response to
experiences in the world, the autonomic nervous system creates
physiological events such as muscular tension, a rise in heart rate,
perspiration, and dryness of the mouth. Emotions, then, are feelings
which come about as a result of these physiological changes, rather
than being their cause.  
\end{quote}
}

Emotions of consciousness can be expressed in two different ways because,
more generally, a `higher level [of experience] differs from the lower
in having a new principle of organization; this does not supersede the
old, it is superimposed on it.  The lower type of experience is
perpetuated in the higher type' somewhat as matter is perpetuated,
even with a new form. 

`A mode of consciousness like shame is thus, formally, a mode of
consciousness and nothing else; materially, it is a constellation or
synthesis of psychical experiences.'  But consciousness is `an
activity by which those elements are combined in this particular way.'
It is not just a new arrangement of those elements---otherwise the
sensa of which shame is the emotional charge would have been obvious,
and the James--Lange theory would not have needed to arise. 

`[E]ach new level [of experience] must organize itself according to
its own principles before a transition can be made to the next'.
Therefore, to move beyond consciousness to intellect, `emotions of
consciousness must be formally or linguistically expressed, not only
materially or psychically expressed'. 

\subsection{Imaginative Expression}

Psychical expression is uncontrollable.  At the level of awareness,
expressions are experienced `as activities belonging to ourselves and
controlled in the same sense as the emotions they express. 

`Bodily actions expressing certain emotions, insofar as they come
under our control and are conceived by us in our awareness of
controlling them, as our way of expressing these emotions, are
language.' 

`[A]ny theory of language must begin here.'

The controlled act of expression is materially the same as psychical
expression; the difference is just that it is done `on purpose'. 

`[T]he conversion of impression into idea by the work of consciousness
immensely multiplies the emotions that demand expression.' 

`There are no unexpressed emotions.'  What are so called are emotions,
already expressed at one level, of which somebody is trying to become
conscious. 

Corresponding to the series of sensum, emotional charge, psychical
expression (as in red color, fear, start), we have, say,  
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
bonnet removal,
\item
feeling of triumph,
\item
cry of `Hattiaw!'
\end{compactenum}
The child \emph{imitates} the speech of others only when it realizes
that they are speaking. 

\subsection{Language and Languages}

Language need not be spoken by the tongue.  

`[T]here is no way of
expressing the same feeling in two different media.'  

However, `each
one of us, whenever he expresses himself, is doing so with his whole
body', in the `original language of total bodily gesture'---this is
the `motor side' of the `total imaginative experience' identified as
art proper in Book I.  

\subsection{Speaker and Hearer}

A child's first utterances are not addressed to anybody.  But a
speaker is always conscious of himself as speaking, so he is a also a
listener.\footnote{Collingwood's footnote to the section title is `In
  this section, whatever is said of speech is meant of language in
  general.'}

The \emph{origin} of self-consciousness will not be discussed.  However,
`Consciousness does not begin as a mere self-consciousness\dots
the consciousness of our own existence is also consciousness of the
existence of' other persons.  These persons could be cats or trees or
shadows: as a form of thought, consciousness can make mistakes
[\S~\ref{subsect:C-and-T}]. 

In speaking, we do not exactly \emph{communicate} an emotion to a listener.
To do this would be to cause the listener to have a similar emotion;
but to compare the emotions, we would need language.

The single experience of expressing emotion has two parts: the
emotion, and the controlled bodily action expressing it.  This union
of idea with expression can be considered from two points of view: 
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
  \item
we can express what we feel only because we know it;
\item
we know what we feel because we can express it.
\end{compactenum}
`The person to whom speech is addressed is already familiar with this
double situation'.  He `takes what he hears exactly as if it were
speech of his own\dots and this constructs in himself the idea which
those words express.'  But he attributes the idea to the speaker.

This does not \emph{presuppose} community of language; it \emph{is} community
of language.  If the hearer is to understand the speaker though, he
must have enough experience to have the impressions from which the
ideas of the speaker are derived.  However, \emph{mis}understanding
may be the fault of the speaker, if his consciousness is corrupt.

\subsection{Language and Thought}

Language is an activity of thought; but if thought is taken in the narrower sense of \textbf{intellect,} then language expresses not thought, but emotions.  However, these may be the emotions of a thinker.

`Everything which \emph{imagination} presents to itself is a here, a now'.  This might be the song of a thrush in May.  One may imagine, alongside this, the January song of the thrush; but at the level of imagination, the two songs coalesce into one.   By \emph{thinking,} one may analyze the song into parts---notes; or one may relate it to things not imagined, such as the January thrush song that one remembers having heard four months ago at dawn (though one may not remember the song itself).\footnote{Bird songs are wonderful to hear; but I am not sufficiently familiar with them, or I live in the wrong place, to be able to recognize seasonal variations in them.  Looking for my own examples, I can remember that, last summer, I became drenched in sweat from walking at midday in the hills above the Aegean coast, before giving a mathematics lecture; but I need not remember the \emph{feeling} of the heat.}

Analyzing and relating are not the only kinds of thought.  The point is that, to express any kind of thought (again, in the narrower sense), language must be adapted.

\subsection{The Grammatical Analysis of Language}

This adaptation of language to the expression of thought is the function or business of the grammarian.  `I do not call it purpose, because he does not propose it to himself as a conscious aim'.
\begin{asparaenum}
\item
The grammarian analyzes, not the activity of language, but `speech' or `discourse', the supposed product of speech.  But this product `is a metaphysical fiction.  It is supposed to exist only because the theory of language is approached from the standpoint of the philosophy of craft\dots what the grammarian is really doing is to think, not about a product of the activity of speaking, but about the activity itself, distorted in his thoughts about it by the assumption that it is not an activity, but a product or ``thing''.
\item
`Next, this ``thing'' must be scientifically studied; and this involves a double process.  The first stage of this process is to cut the ``thing'' up into parts.  Some readers will object to this phrase on the ground that I have used a verb of acting when I ought to have used a verb of thinking\dots[but] philosophical controversies are not to be settled by a sort of police-regulation governing people's choice of words\dots I meant cut\dots
\item
`The final process is to devise a scheme of relations between the parts thus
 divided\dots
 \begin{compactenum}
 \item
 `\emph{Lexicography.} Every word, as it actually occurs in discourse, occurs once and once only\dots Thus we get a new fiction: the recurring word'.  `Meanings' of words are established in words, so we get another fiction: synonymity.
 \item
 \emph{Accidence.}  The rules whereby a single word is modified into \emph{dominus, domine, dominum} are also `palpable fictions; for it is notorious that exceptions to them occur'.
 \item
 \emph{Syntax.}
 \end{compactenum}
\end{asparaenum}
`A grammarian is not a kind of scientist studying the actual structure of language; he is a kind of butcher'.  \emph{Idioms} are another example of how language resists the grammarian's efforts.

\subsection{The Logical Analysis of Language}\label{subsect:logic}

Logical technique aims `to make language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of thought.'  It asssumes `that the grammatical transformation of language has been successfully accomplished.'  It makes three further assumptions:
\begin{compactenum}[1)]
\item
the \textbf{propositional assumption} that some `sentences' make statements;
\item
the principle of \textbf{homolingual translation} whereby one sentence can mean exactly the same as another (or group of others) in the same language;
\item
\textbf{logical preferability:} one sentence may be preferred to another that has the same meaning.  The criterion is not ease of understanding (this is the stylist's concern), but ease of manipulation by the logician's technique to suit his aims.
\end{compactenum}
The logician's modification of language can to some extent be carried out; but it tries to pull language apart into two things: language proper, and symbolism.

`No serious writer or speaker ever utters a thought unless he thinks
it worth uttering\dots Nor does he ever utter it except with a choice
of words, and in a tone of voice, that express his sense of this
importance.'  The problem is that written words do not show tone of
voice.\footnote{Collingwood imaginatively describes Dr.~Richards, who
  writes of Tolstoy's view of art, `This is plainly untrue', as if he
  were a cat shaking a drop of water from its paw.  Dr.~Richards is Ivor
    Armstrong Richards, to whose \emph{Principles of Literary
      Criticism} Collingwood refers; according to
    \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I._A._Richards} (accessed
    December 3, 2010), `Richards is regularly considered one of the
    founders of the contemporary study of literature in English'.}
One is tempted to
believe that scientific discourse is what is written; what is spoken
is this \emph{and} something else, emotional expression. \emph{Good
  logic} would show that the logical structure of a proposition is not
clear from its written form.\footnote{In a footnote, Collingwood
  mentions an example of Cook Wilson:  `That building is the Bodleian'
  could mean `\emph{That} building is the Bodleian' or `That building
  is the \emph{Bodleian.}'}  \emph{Good literature} is written so that
the reader cannot help but read it with the right tempo and
tone.\footnote{Collingwood says good literature, like good logic,
  would save the reader from thinking the discourse was in the
  writing.  But it seems to me that experience with \emph{bad}
  literature would remind one that writing can fail to tell its story.
  Possibly the point is that if scientific writers have experience
  with good literature, they will try to write good literature
  themselves, and thus they will learn that what they are trying to
  say is not automatically to be found in the written word.} 

The proposition, as a form of words expressing thought and not emotion, is a fictitious entity.  But `a second and more difficult thesis' is that words do not express thought at all directly; they express the emotional charge on a thought, allowing the hearer to rediscover the thought `whose peculiar emotional tone the speaker has expressed.'\footnote{It is here that Collingwood talks of Archimedes's cry of Eureka; see note~\ref{n:Arch} above.  Collingwood does not revert explicitly to the idea of \S~\ref{subsect:polar} that thoughts can be public.  But language can be made public.  I suppose the emotions of language are private to each speaker or hearer, but allow the recovery of something shared.  See the next section on \emph{pointing} to a thought.}

\subsection{Language and Symbolism}

Symbols and technical terms are invented for unemotional scientific purposes, but they always acquire emotional expressiveness.  `Every mathematician knows this.'\footnote{I'll agree!}  Intellectualized language,
\begin{compactitem}
\item
as language, expresses \emph{emotion,}
\item
as symbolism, has \emph{meaning}; it points beyond emotion to a thought.
\end{compactitem}
`The progressive intellectualization of language, its progressive conversion by the work of grammar and logic into a scientific symbolism, thus represents not a progressive drying-up of emotion, but its progressive articulation and specialization.  We are not getting away from an emotional atmosphere into a dry, rational atmosphere; we are acquiring new emotions and new means of expressing them.'

\part{The Theory of Art}

Collingwood ends his book by saying:
\begin{quote}
  Art is the community's medicine for the worst disease of mind, the
  corruption of consciousness.
\end{quote}
  He has been talking about \emph{The
  Waste Land} of T. S. Eliot, having earlier (p.~295) referred to it
  as `the one great English poem of this century'.

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\end{document}

