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\title{A discussion of Aristotle's \titl{De Anima}}
\author{St John's College alumni unofficial email list}
\date{begun 2004.2.8} 

\begin{document}
\maketitle

  \begin{email}
    [L. A. Salas]
Is anyone interested in starting an online discussion on Aristotle's \titl{De
Anima}?

I would also be interested in discussing the \titl{Iliad} or Hesiod's
\titl{Theogony} and \titl{Works and Days.}

A final suggestion from Austin would be Plato's \titl{Parmenides,} on which I'm
currently having a seminar and which is ridiculously weird and insane about
halfway through the dialogue.  It also has a very rich dramatic setting.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]
    I would be willing to ask the first question.  Before we start,
    though, I
would like to see how many other listmembers are interested in \titl{De Anima}
and lay down some parameters for discussion.  For one thing, do we want to
begin with chapter \Gk A and work through page by page until \Gk G?  Should we
coordinate editions and such?  The easiest thing for non-Greek-readers would
probably be to use the Barnes collected works (they're good and common
enough that the local library should have a set if one doesn't want to
purchase a set).  We probably want to talk about commentaries and such.
Depending on the interest in \titl{De Anima,} I can post a general bibliography
on it (including commentaries, ancient and modern, and additional resources)
if that's desirable.  Also, since commentaries already begin to blur the
line between primary and secondary texts, to what extent, if any, do we want
to include secondary literature?
  \end{email}




  \begin{email}[S. Thomas]
    As Mr Salas knows, I am happy to read such things very slowly.  In the
case of the writings that have come down to us as writings of Aristotle, we
generally don't know precisely how and by whom the words were written,
neither do we know the purpose of the texts.  Accordingly, it may be less
important to start at the beginning and go to the end, as it is entirely
possible that the text we have known as \titl{De Anima} was not conceived as a
whole.  Nevertheless, as it has been decades since I've looked at the work,
I would say that we should start at the beginning and go to the end,
bearing in mind that these very concepts may be misleading with this
particular `book'.

I would say that coordinating English editions has its own set of
drawbacks, as the clash of translations is sometimes quite illuminating.  I
also would resist any attempt to eschew commentaries where helpful, bearing
in mind that a commentary lacks the authority of the text itself.  But in a
written seminar, there's no reason why W.D. Ross or the like can't serve as
a part of the written seminar as well as the likes of me.  And I would
welcome a bibliography.

When do we begin?
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[H. Peterson]
    All of the above sound good to me---especially Hesiod, which I've
always meant to read. But I'm fine with starting with \titl{De Anima.}
%However, see above about my preference for a forum.

On translations: I agree that it's helpful to use an edition with the
same numbering scheme and also that different translations can
illuminate one another. This being an imperfect world, we usually
can't have both at once, so I'd vote for the latter course. (Though a
discussion of which translations are best is always nice.)

I'm on digest, so I don't know whether anyone has posted this info
yet, but here's the only online translation I've been able to find:

J. A. Smith translation (three HTML pages, with Bekker page numbers)
\url{http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Aristotle/De-anima/}

Nothing at Perseus, alas. Anyone know anything about this translation?
(Gets ready to cover eyes.)

Mr Thomas wrote:
`As Mr Salas knows, I am happy to read
 such things very slowly.'
I don't know whether you meant your remark that way, sir, but a
hear-hear to our not going too quickly. I have to admit that the
swiftness of our discussion about this---I'm offline for twenty-four
hours, and already the opening question is about to be posted---is a
bit too quick for me. Can we have some accommodation for those of us
who aren't online every day?
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]
No worries, there's no opening question about to spring forth.  I don't know
what the others think about appropriate lag time but I think that we should
all contribute at our own pace.  The conversation should be, as our fancy
t-shirts say, asynchronous.  I doubt that we'll all be able to coordinate
our schedules.  Listmembers more experienced in this sort of thing will let
us know where the shoals are, though.

Although I would be interested in Hesiod, it looks like the \titl{De
  Anima}s have
it so far.  As Mr Thomas mentioned in an earlier post, most editions will
print Bekker paragraphs.  Bekker numbers make references fairly easy.  The
Bekker numbers refer to the Greek, though.  So, we shouldn't be surprised if
our translations don't match up perfectly.  I'll make a post on the
translations, commentaries, Greek editions, etc\dots  that I know, separately.
  \end{email}



  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]
    
I'll divide this post into editions of the text, then commentaries
(philosophical and grammatical).

\textbf{Greek and Greek/English:}
\nopagebreak

The standard Greek edition can be found in the Oxford Classical Texts series
(ed. W.D. Ross).  [somewhere in the \$30 range, I think]

The Loeb edition, published by Harvard University Press, contains Greek and
English facing pages (trans. Hett).  [\$20---and in most libraries] The Greek
text is inferior to the OCT text and the \fern{apparatus criticus} is
non-existent.
However, this edition is probably the best for a reading in English with
occasional reference to the Greek.

We may need to make reference to the \titl{Parva Naturalia} also.  The
Loeb edition of \titl{De Anima} contains \titl{PN} listed under \titl{Minor
  Works}---or so I think but it's
in there at any rate.  I don't know if there is an OCT of the \titl{Parva
Naturalia} but there is a good Greek text in the W.D. Ross commentary I will
mention below.

\textbf{English Translations}
\nopagebreak

The Oxford Clarendon series has a great translation (Hamlyn) but it only
covers books 2 \&\ 3 [(with selected passages from book 1)].  It also contains a superb commentary, mostly
philosophical.

Barnes' complete works that I already mentioned are great and include all of
Aristotle's extant works, but are admittedly a little expensive [around
\$50].

\textbf{Commentaries}
\nopagebreak

The standard Greek commentary on \titl{De Anima} is by W.D. Ross.  It exists in
many university libraries and as a reprint through Postscript
Books/Sandpiper Press.  If you want to wrestle with the Greek, this
commentary is probably a must.  It also has good philosophical commentary.

The commentary for the \titl{Parva Naturalia} is also by Ross, if I'm
not mistaken, and also rocks.

Both of these commentaries come with the Greek text included but with no
translations.


That's all I can think of right now.  The Loeb is probably one of the best
places to go, since it has both \titl{De Anima} and the \titl{Parva
  Naturalia} in it.  It
is also relatively inexpensive and allows the reader to refer to the Greek.
  \end{email}



  \begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
    Here's what I'd propose:  let's give ourselves until the end of February to
get texts and do whatever else.  (In my case, I'm thinking I'll read the
Barnes English version quickly, and the start on the Greek in Ross's
commentary, but that's just me.)

Then, starting in March we can begin discussing in small chunks, taking
whatever time we need until we are done.  Perhaps one of us can try to put
the seminar into a continuous form, as Mr Pierce did with the aborted Kant
discussion.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]
From the Aristotle bibliography of the joint program in ancient
philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin:

\textbf{Aristotle: Texts \&\ general studies}
\nopagebreak

OCT: standard modern editions for most works (esp. those ed. by W.D. Ross);
some major omissions supplied by Teubner and Bud\'e; most also in Loeb
collection (beware most translations). Also Ross' \fern{editiones
  maiores} (with
studies of mss.\ and English commentary) of \titl{Analytics},
\titl{Physics}, \titl{De Anima}, 
\titl{Parva Naturalia}, and \titl{Metaphysics}.

I. Bekker, ed. \titl{Aristotelis Opera} (l83l): Bekker's pagination is
standard for subsequent editions and citations.

H. Bonitz, ed. \titl{Index Aristotelicus} (1870) = vol.\ 5 suppl.\ to Bekker:
incomplete but useful guide to terminology.

O. Gigon, ed. \titl{Aristotelis Opera}, Vol. III: \titl{Librorum
Deperditorum Fragmenta} (1987) = new vol. 3 of Bekker.

V. Rose, ed. \titl{Fragmenta} (1886): standard but incomplete collection.

W.D. Ross, \titl{Fragmenta Selecta} (1955): widely cited selection (lacks
apparatus).

J. Barnes, ed., \titl{The Complete Works of Aristotle} (1984): revised Oxford
translation in 2 vols.

Clarendon Aristotle: exacting translations with philosophical commentary:\\
J.L. Ackrill, \titl{Categories} and \titl{De Interpretatione};\\
 J. Barnes, \titl{Posterior Analytics};\\
 R. Williams, \titl{Topics} 1 \&\ 8;\\
 W. Charlton, Physics 1--2;\\
 E. Hussey, \titl{Physics} 3--4;\\
 C. Williams, \titl{On Generation and Corruption};\\
 D.W. Hamlyn, \titl{De Anima} 2--3;\\
D. Balme, \titl{Parts of Animals} 1 and \titl{Generation of Animals} 1;\\
 C. Kirwan, \titl{Metaphysics} \Gk{G--E};\\
 D. Bostock, \titl{Metaphysics} Z \&\ H;\\
 J. Annas, \titl{Metaphysics M--N};\\
 M. Pakaluk, \titl{Nicomachean Ethics} 8--9;\\
 M.J. Woods, \titl{Eudemian Ethics} 1--2 \&\ 8;\\
 T. Saunders, \titl{Politics} 1--2;\\
 R. Robinson, \titl{Politics} 3--4;\\
 D. Keyt, \titl{Politics} 5--6;\\
 R. Kraut, \titl{Politics} 7--8.

J.L. Ackrill, \titl{Aristotle the Philosopher} (1981): incisive
introduction to his methods and ideas on central topics.

I. D\"uring, \titl{Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition} (1957):
collection of testimonia on life and activity.

W. Jaeger, \titl{Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His
  Development} (1923; tr. 1948): seminal but flawed study.

I. D\"uring, \titl{Aristoteles} (1966): comprehensive study in German; good
bibliography by topics.

H. Cherniss, \titl{Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy}
(l944): classic but severe critique of Aristotle.

T. Irwin, \titl{Aristotle's First Principles} (1989): comprehensive and complex
study; good bibliography.

G.E.R. Lloyd, \titl{Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought} (1968):
readable survey.

J. Lear, \titl{Aristotle: The Desire to Understand} (1988): stimulating
interpretive survey.

W.D. Ross, \titl{Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of His Work \&\
  Thought} (1930): comprehensive and judicious.

\textbf{Aristotle: Collections of Articles}
\nopagebreak

J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji, eds. \titl{Articles on Aristotle}, 4 vols.
(l975--79): classic papers on all areas of Aristotle's thought; extensive but
dated bibliographies arranged by topic.

J. Barnes, ed. \titl{Cambridge Companion to Aristotle} (1995): concise topical
studies, excellent recent bibliography.

J.M.E. Moravcsik, ed. \titl{Aristotle} (1967): classic papers on some central
issues, from analytic perspective.

A.O. Rorty, ed. \titl{Essays on Aristotle's Ethics} (l980): seminal papers.

A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox, eds. \titl{Philosophical Issues in
  Aristotle's Biology} (1987): influential papers.

A.O. Rorty and M. Nussbaum, eds. \titl{Essays on Aristotle's De Anima}, (1992):
influential papers.

L. Judson, ed. \titl{Aristotle's Physics} (1991): influential papers.

A.O. Rorty, ed. \titl{Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric} (1996): diverse
philosophical perspectives.

\titl{Symposium Aristotelicum}: papers from influential triennial
conference:\\
 I. D\"uring \&\ G. E. L. Owen, eds. \titl{Aristotle and Plato in the Mid
 Fourth Century} (1960);\\
 S. Mansion, ed. \titl{Aristote et les probl\`emes de m\'ethode} (1961);\\
 G.E.L. Owen, ed. \titl{Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics} (1968);\\
 I. D\"uring, \titl{Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles u. Theophrast} (1969);\\
 P. Moraux \&\ D. Harlfinger, eds. \titl{Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik} (1971);\\
 P. Aubenque, ed. \titl{\'Etudes sur la M\'etaphysique d'Aristote} (1979);\\
 G.E.R. Lloyd \&\ G.E.L. Owen, eds. \titl{Aristotle
on Mind and the Senses} (1978);\\
 E. Berti, ed. \titl{Aristotle on Science: The
Posterior Analytics} (1981);\\ P. Moraux \&\ J. Wiesner, ed. \titl{Zweifelhaftes im
Corpus Aristotelicum} (1983);\\ A. Graeser, ed. \titl{Mathematics und Metaphysik bei
Aristoteles} (1987);\\ G. Patzig, ed. \titl{Aristoteles Politik} (1990);\\
D. Furley \&\ A. Nehamas, ed. \titl{Aristotle's Rhetoric} (1994);\\ M. Frede \&\ D. Charles, ed. \titl{Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' Lambda} (2000);\\ ongoing.

\textbf{Greek Commentators on Aristotle}
\nopagebreak

\titl{Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca} (a.k.a.\ \titl{CAG}) 23
vols.\ \&\ 3 suppl.\
(l882--l909): most from 2d to 6th C \textsc{a.d.} Generally most
helpful or instructive
are those by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius, and John Philoponus; many
have been influential in modern study of ancient philosophy, both for
careful interpretations of Aristotle's texts and for rich testimony on other
ancient philosophers.

Large parts of many of these commentaries are being published in scholarly
English translations by various hands under the general ed.\ of Richard
Sorabji; about 25 volumes to date.
  \end{email}



  \begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
    In addition to the translation by Joe Sachs (\titl{Aristotle's on the Soul and on Memory and Recollection}, Green Lion Press, 2001), there are translations by
Hippocrates G. Apostle, the Loeb by one W.S. Hett and a translation in the
1907 edition of the work by R.D. Hicks.  (This edition was based on an
earlier one, and it is not clear to me what the provenance of the
translation is.)

To avoid confusion:  W.D. Ross is also sometimes referred to as Sir David
Ross.  They are (or rather were) the same person, however.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[D. Pierce]
    Mr Thomas hoped somebody could mark up the coming Aristotle discussion.
It would be nice.  If I end up being interested in the discussion, I \bem{may}
do the job---but I shall grumble if people do not edit their emails
carefully before sending.  On the other hand, making the emails into a
single document need not be done by a single person; there are ways to
share the burden.  Again, one way to share the burden is for all
email-writers to follow certain typographical conventions.  Beyond that,
well\dots when I save emails in a folder called
`\texttt{jlist/Aristotle}' for
example, they are really being added to the end of a single file.  When I
make this into a tex file, I have to delete all of the headers from the
emails (while making a note of the writers).  Anybody can do this---and
this yields a file that can be printed out and be studied, though it may
not look all that nice.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]\label{11}
    Dear soul brothers and sisters,
I'm very sorry to have been so long in posing an opening question, this past
month has been brutal in Austin academics.

Let me throw out two questions to start out with, if that's OK.  The first
question I have no opinion on, whereas the second niggles at me.

Question one: What does Aristotle mean in 402a by claiming that knowledge of
the soul is highest in virtue of its accuracy (\Gk{>akr'ibeia})?

Prolegomena to the second question: Aristotle begins \titl{De Anima}
by describing
the need for a methodology in studying the soul.  In order to find the
appropriate methodology, he considers three facets of the soul 402a7ff,
nature (\Gk{f'usis}), essence or being (\Gk{o>us'ia}), and its
attributes (\Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke}).  Regarding these attributes,
Aristotle makes a positive claim, 
that some of these attributes are peculiar to the soul (\Gk{>'idia}) and some
belong to animals also, on account of the soul.

Second question: What do we make of these attributes, which Hett unpacks as
$\langle$essential$\rangle$ attributes of the soul (does anyone see a
textual reason to
translate \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke} as essential attributes?), and what do we make of
Aristotle's claim, \fern{en passant,} that there are some attributes
peculiar to 
the soul and some that the animal shares?  Does Aristotle commit himself to
anything by claiming that some attributes are peculiar to the soul?
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[Mr Pierce]
Right now the only text I have is the translation at
\url{http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.1.i.html}, which doesn't give the
Bekker pages; but I think in your second question you allude to the
fifth paragraph there. 

In any case, Aristotle there seems to suggest that the soul could be like
straightness.  Straightness does not touch a bronze sphere at a point; a
straight object does.  Similarly, it seems, a soul does not have an
emotion; an animated (be-souled) body has an emotion.

But the analogy does not seem very apt.  A plane may touch a sphere at a
point; but a bronze sphere touches a flat board in a little patch, and
will probably make an indentation in the board if the sphere is on top.

Whereas, an emotion such as anger requires a body, because there is no
anger in the abstract; there is only this or that instance of anger, which
cannot be separated from telltale signs like raised blood pressure.

There is a mathematics of spheres and planes; there does not seem to be a
mathematics of `passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and
hating'.

Okay, so if not emotions, what attributes of an animal \bem{are} properly
attributes just of the soul?  Have I overlooked examples?
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]
    Dear Mr Pierce,
The second question refers to a line in the first paragraph of your text
(it's taken up in greater detail in the fifth).  Your text has the
line 
\oquo{Our
aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its
properties; of these some are taught to be affections proper to the soul
itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the
presence within it of soul.}
  The translation is a little blurry in the
first clause.  The Greek says that the nature (\Gk{f'usis}), the definition or
essence (\Gk{o>us'ia}), and then the attributes (\Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke}) of
the soul are the objects of the inquiry.

Since some attributes, according to Aristotle, are peculiar to the
soul and some
are imbued by the soul onto [\fern{sic}] the body.  I think that, in
your example,
straightness may be argued to be a property of the flat board
\fern{qu\^a} plane 
figure.  This instance of attribution would fall into the category of an
attribute that the body acquires in virtue of something else, in this case
the nature of the plane figure.  I don't know what a genuinely peculiar
(\Gk{>'idia}) property of the soul might be for Aristotle but part of the
motivation for my question lay in this puzzling `exclusive quality.'

What a property peculiar to the soul may be is obscure to me but it's
curious enough that I wonder where Aristotle is going with his distinction.

You had mentioned also,
\dquo{
Whereas, an emotion such as anger requires a body, because there is no
anger in the abstract; there is only this or that instance of anger, which
cannot be separated from telltale signs like raised blood pressure.
}
I think that this question's big.  I don't know what the etiquette is for
our discussion but I would suggest that we hold off on this for a little
bit.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[Mr Salas]\label{14}
    I'm not sure whether this caveat has cropped up yet.  If it hasn't, it's
important to keep in mind that translating \Gk{yuq'h} as soul is dangerous.  I
don't know that it's avoidable but the term soul brings with it baggage of
which we may want to be cautious.
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[B. Porter]\label{15}
I'm wondering why there has been so little response to Mr Salas's
opening questions.  Here's my effort to stir the pot, with hopes of
attracting appetites. 

I, too, wonder what Aristotle could possibly have been thinking when
he starts out asserting that the science of the [\Gk{yuq'h} or] psyche
(dare we call 
it `psychology'?) is to be respected because of its accuracy (or
`exactness' in my translation).  Is he setting expectations, that we
will come out the other end of the treatise with an exact and accurate
definition of what the soul is?  In our academic world, math and
physics do get a lot of respect for being `exact sciences,' where some
questions at least have exact and verifiable answers.  At the opposite
end of the spectrum of exactness is sociology, which tries hard to
gain respect by using statistics, but to little avail, in my opinion.
What we call psychology goes out there, too.  Though I personally have
found Jung's work to be very useful, I have no way of conclusively
demonstrating that it has done me or anyone else any good.  Whether
there is even such a thing as effective psychotherapy is questionable
in a way that calculus is not.  

Concerning Mr Salas' other question, about attributes that belong to
the psyche itself, as distinguished from those that belong to a
body-psyche composite animal, such as emotions.  I haven't read far
into the text---our initial reading assignment was just the part
before the review of previous thinkers, right?---so someone else with
a fresh memory of the whole treatise may come straighten me out, that
would be welcome---but I'm thinking of dividing our universe of
experience into two realms, an inner realm and an outer realm.  The
outer realm is experienced through the bodily senses.  The inner realm
is experienced independently of these senses.  Pure math and dreams
belong to the inner realm. We experience emotions in our bodies as
well as in our psyches, and so we consider them to be attributes of
the animal in virtue of its possessing a psyche.  `Recognizes a valid
syllogism' is an attribute of a psyche itself.  
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[Mr Pierce]\label{16}
Mr Porter suggests a distinction, which might be the distinction between
emotion and reason.  Emotion would require a physical body; reason would
not.  Perhaps Aristotle alludes to the distinction near the top of 403a,
when he mentions \bem{thinking}.  Whether this requires a body remains a
question for him.

Mr Salas is apparently worried about asking or at least trying to answer
big questions too soon.  Certainly we haven't got much text to go on yet.
Mr Salas asks about the first paragraph of the text.  A bit later, at the
end of 402a, Aristotle asks for the \fern{`summus genus'} of the soul
(if I have 
correctly rendered the singular of translator Smith's \fern{`summa genera'}).
Aristotle is alluding to the \titl{Categories}, I take it.  I should think that
one would want to say what kind of `category' or predicate soul was,
before one said much more.

One of the categories, as I recall, is \Gk{o>us'ia}, translated (perhaps
misleadingly) as `substance' or `essence'.  As Aristotle goes on, he seems
to treat soul as an \Gk{o>us'ia} with attributes or `affections'.  Does this
mean he has answered his categorical question?

At the end of the section, Aristotle says:
\oquo{
the affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of
animal life, to which we have seen that such affections, \fern{e.g.}\
passion and  
fear, attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.
}
So being fearful is not the same kind of thing as being straight.  Now, in
the previous paragraph (on 403a), Aristotle says that, if the soul is
\bem{not} capable of separate existence, then it will be like what is
straight.  Can we conclude then that, for Aristotle, the soul \bem{is} capable
of separate existence?

I am finding it frustrating not to have the Greek.  It turns out that
Blackwell's in the UK has the Ross edition of 1956, so I have ordered it.
What Greek phrase, for example, does Smith translate as `enmattered
formulable essences'?
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[L. Parson]
I'm not really following this thread, since I have yet to [get] my Ross
out of the box it lives in, but couldn't resist the opportunity for a
bit of pedantry:  the phrase you are looking for is \fern{`summum
genus'}---\fern{`genus'} is a neuter noun.  
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[P. Lewis]
We seem to have touched on this, but allow me reiterate the question in my
own humble, simple way\dots
Why does Aristotle use `straightness' to suggest that the soul is inseparable from
the body in 403a10--15, but says that these afflictions of soul that are
inseparable from body have not the same mode of being as a line in
403b18--20.
  \end{email}


  \begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Well, my first answer to Question one of \pref{11} is that Aristotle
didn't actually 
claim what the question claims he claimed.

One of the difficulties in reading Aristotle is that we don't quite know
what the words we have were intended for.  Aristotle did not publish the
works that we have, and a popular notion is that what we have as
\titl{The Works
of Aristotle} are mostly lecture notes, prepared either by him or by his students.
So let's assume that what we have as \titl{De Anima} is just such a
set of lecture
notes.  Accordingly, had we been around way back when we might have come to
the lecture series that begins with the sentence at 402a.  I guess it's
fair to assume that we would have known (by reading whatever 4th Century
flier had publicized the lecture) that we were going to hear a lecture
about \Gk{yuq'h} given by the distinguished Professor Aristotle.  What would
we have been expecting to hear?

Well, apparently one of Aristotle's published works (which we might have
either read or heard about) was a dialogue on the subject of the
immortality of a human being's \Gk{yuq'h}.  I'm not next to any reference
materials, so this is all based on hazy memory, but I think that the
scattered reports that survive of the dialogue seem to indicate that
Aristotle took a Platonic line in his dialogue; the dialogue was designed,
perhaps, to comfort people who were grieving over the death of a friend or
family member by giving them grounds for believing that their loved one was
not gone forever, but merely relocated someplace.

If we weren't familiar with Aristotle's published work discussing
\Gk{yuq'h}, we would probably be familiar, at least by hearsay, with some of
the discussions in Platonic dialogues.  In the \titl{Phaedo}, the \titl{Phaedrus} and
the \titl{Republic}, for example, the \Gk{yuqa'i} of men are discussed.  The
\titl{Phaedo} contains an argument for the immortality of human \Gk{yuqa'i} and
both the \titl{Phaedrus} and the \titl{Republic} contain elaborate reincarnation
myths.  So it is a beguiling speculation that at least some listeners were
expecting to hear more of the same.

So, what does Aristotle start with?  The first words out of his mouth are
`We take knowledge to be fine and worthy, but some knowledge more so than
other sorts'---fine and good, and not at all surprising or controversial.
But then Aristotle explains why we take some areas of learning to be better
than others:  `EITHER in virtue of its accuracy OR as being of better and
more wondrous stuff'---at this point, he has still not asserted anything
about whether the study of \Gk{yuq'h} is more highly prized than other studies for
any particular reason.  But it does seem to me that, at the beginning of a
lecture course on \Gk{yuq'h}, Aristotle is even by now implying that such a
study is more prized than many others.  So it occurs to me to wonder what
one should think at this point, one quarter of the way through the first
sentence.

A way to think about it is to posit\footnote{I say
`posit', because I do believe this proposition is implied by Aristotle's
words.} that Aristotle begins by asserting the
following proposition:  
\begin{quote}
  A field of study is more highly prized than others
for one of two reasons:  either that field allows for knowledge of
exceptional precision and accuracy or that field concerns itself with
things that are better and more marvelous than other fields.
\end{quote}
  If we had heard only that proposition, followed by an
acknowledgement that the study of \Gk{yuq'h} was one of those highly prized
studies, what would our expectation be (as educated members of Aristotle's
audience) as to the reason for the high status of the study of \Gk{yuq'h}?

I would expect that most of us would have thought that the most likely
reason to value the inquiry into \Gk{yuq'h} was because of its subject
matter being better and more marvelous than most other subject matters.  An
obvious example of a study highly prized for its precision, on the other hand, would be geometry.
Thus, one can easily imagine that the general preconception would be that
the study of \Gk{yuq'h} is highly prized because the \Gk{yuq'h} is itself a
thing of the better sort, and much to be wondered at.  (And I think that
this would have been true in 4th Century Athens, and is generally true
today.)

Accordingly, Aristotle's next move is designed to surprise us.  Rather than
choosing one of the two, he answers, in effect, `Both!'  Our modern day
surprise leads us to remember the accuracy claim, because it's the one that
doesn't appear to make sense initially.  But we may be wrong to be
surprised only at the one claim.

Before I say why this appears to me to be the case, let me advert to Mr
Salas' cryptic caveat in \pref{14}, sent subsequently to his opening questions.
When I read Mr Salas' caveat, I was struck by its cryptic nature.  It
seems utterly true to me, but one would have ordinarily supposed that such
a caveat would be issued in conjunction with an explanation of what the
term in fact means.  I toyed myself with trying to come up with some
discussion of what the term \Gk{yuq'h} means.  But when I tried to formulate
such an explication, I quickly ran into difficulties.  So while I feel
strongly that the English word `soul' is too encumbered with a whole
squadron of religious and other connotations to adequately translate the
Greek term, I don't have a recommendation as to an alternative (which is
why I use the wordlet \Gk{yuq'h}).

The problem can be made more concrete by fastening onto the second set of
Aristotle's alteration given above:  is the \Gk{yuq'h} `better and more
wondrous' than most other items furnishing the world?  Well, if we think
about \Gk{yuq'h} as the term is used in the Platonic dialogues we're
familiar with, it's pretty easy to assert a definitive `yes'---after all
we all appear to have a \Gk{yuq'h} and it appears to be quite important in
making us the human beings we are.  It appears to be the deathless part of
ourselves, and immortality is traditionally seen as both better and more
amazing than mortality.  So thinking in this way, it still appears as if
the accuracy claim is the weird claim, demanding explanation.

But wait a minute:  as we shall find out a little later, human beings are
not the only creatures with \Gk{yuqa'i}.  All animals and all plants will
turn out to have a \Gk{yuq'h} as well.   This seems to me to make the second
claim in Aristotle's alternation every bit as surprising as the accuracy
claim.  Is it really obvious that the \Gk{yuq'h} of a rutabaga (whatever
that would mean) is `better and more amazing' than most other entities in
the world?  Indeed, the claim that the \Gk{yuq'h} of a gnat is `better and
more wondrous' than, say, a trireme could easily be imagined placed as withering satire in the
mouth of the Socrates of Aristophanes' \titl{Clouds}.  Yet,
it appears that sober, scientific Aristotle implies just such a claim.

As a logical matter, one could imagine the position that the study of
\Gk{yuq'h} is of major importance because some of it falls under the first
alternative and the rest falls under the latter.  (Thus, one could claim
that the relatively simple and uncomplicated \Gk{yuqa'i} of plants are
capable of extreme accuracy, whereas the complex and mysterious human
\Gk{yuq'h} is marvelous indeed.)  But this position seems unnatural to me,
and the manner of Aristotle's expression of the situation would not
naturally lead to such an interpretation.  (It would have been easy enough
for Aristotle to say `one or the other' rather than `both'.)

Thus, I would reformulate Mr Salas' question to posit that both
alternatives seem mysterious.  I think we need to keep this mystery in mind
while we explore what Aristotle thinks \Gk{yuq'h} is.

As to the question of what \Gk{>akr'ibeia} means, Hicks cites to a number of
other uses of the term in the other writings of Aristotle, and comments
that the term often means `abstract' or `involving the first things' for
Aristotle.  I haven't had time to check out the passages Hicks cites, and
`abstraction' does seem like a plausible gloss in this passage (although
it's a meaning not given in LSJ\footnote{`LSJ' is the standard
  abbreviation for the standard Greek-English Lexicon:  \titl{A
    Greek-English Lexicon, With A Revised Supplement}, 1996 (Ninth
  Revised Edition), compiled by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, revised
  and augmented throughout by Henry Stuart Jones, with the assistance
  of Roderick McKenzie and with the co-operation of many scholars,
  Supplement edited by P. G. W. Glare and A. A. Thompson, Oxford
  University Press.}).  `Concerning first things' does not seem 
plausible, because it would then make of the first sentence a circularity,
since Aristotle claims that on the basis of both alternative criteria the
inquiry into \Gk{yuq'h} is `of the first importance' (as Hett's translation
has it).  The Greek has \Gk{>en pr'wtois} which (I'm away from any reference
sources, so the real classicists should correct me here) I would say
literally means `among the first'.  If \Gk{>akr'ibeia} was taken to mean
`involving the first things' then the sentence would be rendered
tautological, and somewhat pointless to say.

Well, I suppose that's enough for now.  I'll try to move on to the next
sentence.
%(A word about transliteration of Greek:  I indicated omega and eta by
%placing a carat after the Latin alphabet versions of the short letters,
%thus:  o^ an e^.  I also transliterate upsilon with the Latin letter `y'
%even though upsilon is pronounced like `u'.  Why do I do the latter?
%Because it's traditional, even if it doesn't make sense.  I don't indicate
%accentuation.  I will use an `h' before a rough breathing.)
  \end{email}

  \begin{email}[M. Billington]
Mr Porter wrote [in \pref{15}]:
\dquo{
I, too, wonder what Aristotle could possibly have been thinking when he starts
out asserting that the science of the psyche (dare we call it `psychology'?) is
to be respected because of its accuracy (or `exactness' in my translation).
}
(I wouldn't call it psychology.)  I think an answer is in your last line:
`{}``Recognizes a valid syllogism'' is an attribute of a psyche itself.'
A syllogism is exact.  Thinking \fern{qu\^a} reasoning strives for
exactness.  So maybe
the edifice constructed by speculative reasoning, \fern{i.e.}, all of
his life's work, is what Aristotle is thinking of.

Mr Pierce seems to have had the same thought [in \pref{16}]:
\dquo{
Mr Porter suggests a distinction, which might be the distinction between
emotion and reason.  Emotion would require a physical body; reason would
not.  Perhaps Aristotle alludes to the distinction near the top of 403a,
when he mentions \bem{thinking}.  Whether this requires a body remains a
question for him.
}
At 413b25 and again at 430a20 Aristotle has arrived at the position that
thinking is separable.

`Can we conclude then that, for Aristotle, the soul \bem{is} capable
of separate existence?'
It sounds like most parts or powers of the \Gk{yuq\'h}, the nutritive,
appetitive,
sensory, and locomotive, are not capable of separate existence.  Being fearful
needs a body.  Only one part, the thinking part, is capable of separate (and
immortal and eternal) existence.  Thinking has a mode of being like that of
straightness.

Mr Salas began by asking:
`what do we make of
Aristotle's claim, \fern{en passant,} that there are some attributes
peculiar to the soul and some that the animal shares?'

Here's a first-paragraph guess, which may or may not stand up:  that thinking
alone is peculiar to the \Gk{yuq'h} and that the other powers of the
\Gk{yuq'h} are imbued into, and shared by, the living body.

`Does Aristotle commit himself to
anything by claiming that some attributes are peculiar to the soul?'
No commitment, just a foreshadow of thought thinking itself.
  \end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
  Mr Pierce writes in \pref{16}:
`A bit later, at the end of 402a, Aristotle asks for the
\fern{`summu[m] genus'} of 
the soul.  Aristotle is alluding to the \titl{Categories}, I take it.'

One should be careful in treating such apparent cross-references.  It does
appear that the \bem{text} is referring to the work we know as the
\titl{Categories}, but it is quite possible that the original text by Aristotle
(or perhaps a student of his) did not include such a reference.  Copies of
these texts were most likely sometimes annotated in the margins, and modern
editors sometimes conclude that bits of such annotations were mistakenly
inserted into the text itself in one of the many copies made.  (Our
evidence for the texts consists of manually copied texts many generations
removed from the original, and each generation represents an opportunity for more error to creep in.)

The \titl{Categories} itself presents a number of puzzles about what it was
intended to be.  As a result, it may be misleading to import purported
doctrine from that text into this discussion.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
On \Gk{>akr'ibeia}: Ross says `It is not very clear why Aristotle
assigns a high degree of \Gk{>akr'ibeia} to psychology; Philoponus is
probably right in thinking that it is because soul is a pure form, not
a complex of form and matter.'
\end{email}



\begin{email}[S. Whitehill]
Aristotle is saying in his first line that the soul is worthy of study
because being able to accurately describe something is a worthwhile
activity in itself with the suggestion that there is a method of
looking within, \fern{i.e.}\ introspection, that is capable of
producing real \Gk{>akr'ibeia} knowledge.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Introspection?  I've just read the whole work and don't see introspection
as a method Aristotle uses at all.  Maybe I've missed it, but most of what
Aristotle discusses are faculties common to all animals, and introspection
does not yield insight into what sensation might be for a gopher.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]\label{25}
Is it introspection to assume that there is a soul in the first place? Not
to assume that these passions are merely emanations of the body?  Aristotle seems
to come to this discourse with some assumptions already made.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
`Is it introspection to assume that there is a soul in the first place?'
I assume you didn't mean this statement literally, as one can assume all
sorts of things without the benefit of introspection.

But you seem to be maintaining, for instance, that it is \bem{by means of}
introspection that Aristotle concludes that mosquitos have \Gk{yuqa'i}.  I
just don't see what sort of introspection could possibly yield such a
result.

`Not to assume that these passions are merely emanations of the body?'
I think you will find that Aristotle's theory doesn't have the Cartesian
mind/body duality that this question seems to assume.  For Aristotle, the
passions did seem to be physiologically based, but we are not far enough
along in the text to really consider the question.

`Aristotle seems to come to this discourse with some assumptions already made.'
Of course he does.  On the other hand, Aristotle tries to lay out his own
presuppositions, not always with complete success, of course.  But I
haven't even come to the second sentence.

The real danger, as Mr Salas pointed out in his caveat, is that \bem{we} will
bring our own assumptions about `soul' into this discussion of \Gk{yuq\'h}.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]\label{27}
`{}``Is it introspection to assume that there is a soul in the first
  place?''{}' 
Alright, I realize this is silly but, Aristotle didn't say that emotive
qualities were caused by the gods or the wind or any such thing. He lays it
on the soul. I don't care who wrote this, student or teacher, but in saying
that this particular study is of a higher type of knowledge suggests that he
has thought about the potential for other causes and that he has ruled them
out, or to be lesser, this takes a certain degree of inward looking that I
define as introspection.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{28}
Mr Lewis, can a dog be angry?  How can you tell?  Must it be by
introspection that you deduce a dog is angry?  Or perhaps by observation?

More to the point, can you tell us where in the text you are gleaning
this?
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]
  I was just looking at the first lines[.]
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{30}
  Here is your original message:
`Is it introspection to assume that there is a soul in the first place?
Not to assume that these passions are merely emanations of the body?'
You seem to be asserting several things here.

1.  That Aristotle assumes that there is `a soul'.  Since he's starting
some sort of lecture course, probably, called `Concerning \Gk{yuq\'h}', I'll
readily grant that he is assuming that the word is meaningful.  Of course,
at 402a23 he says that the first thing to do is to figure out what sort of
thing \Gk{yuq\'h} is, and he mentions possible kinds of things that it might
be that don't actually include what we would think of as thinghood, such as
the possibility that it is a how or a how much or another sort of
insubstantial thing.  He mentions the possibility that it might be a sort
of possibility rather than an actuality (although I think pretty much each
English word I've used in this sentence is seriously misleading).  So in
some sense Aristotle does assume the existence of \Gk{yuq\'h}, but the mode
of existence is not yet specified.  I wonder if you think that Aristotle is
assuming the existence of \Gk{yuq\'h} in some determinate manner?  I don't
think he is here.  (Of course, later on he will offer his definition, which
he thinks does specify the mode of existence.  But that's not in the
beginning.)

2.  Second, you seem to be asserting that Aristotle can only come up with
this assumption about the existence of \Gk{yuq\'h} by means of introspection.
This I don't follow at all.  To repeat yet again, Aristotle is not talking
only about human \Gk{yuqa'i}.  He purports to investigate \Gk{yuq\'h} in an
unrestricted sense.  Please do tell me how one can determine \bem{by
introspection} the existence of something that insects have.  How does one
go about introspecting about mosquitos?  Or dogs?  Or even other human
beings?

3.  Where in the first lines of the book are `the passions' mentioned?  The
word \Gk{p'ajh} is used in 402a9, to be sure, but this word does not mean
`passions' in the sense we think of them in English.  I think we will
discover that one of the `passions of the soul' (\Gk{p'ajh t\~hs yuq\~hs})
is, for example, sight.  If by `passions' you mean to include, for example,
seeing a blue ball, then you have to explain what introspection has to
teach us about that.  If you don't mean to include sensation as among the
`passions', then you are misunderstanding Aristotle.  (Or reading a bad
translation---a better translation of \Gk{p'ajh} is `affection'---not in
the sense of the emotion but in the sense of being affected by something.)

I fail to see introspection \bem{anywhere} in the treatise, but I utterly fail
to see how it appears in the first paragraph.  I wonder if you're not
thinking that Aristotle is engaging in a discussion that would be
recognizable to the participants in the \titl{Phaedo} as the same topic.  I
don't think he is.  In particular, I don't think that the question of the
immortality of the `soul' is a question that Aristotle even considers for a
nanosecond in \titl{De Anima}.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]\label{31}
[Concerning \pref{28}]: Another way of saying my `silly little point'
is to ask why you assume a dog gets angry in the first place? That, to
me, would require a degree of anthropomorphizing that borders on
intuition. That isn't to say that a dog does feel angry, but that my
positing it seems to require some `6th sense'[.]  Aristotle argues
that the senses must be separate, for, if it were not like this our
perception of the common qualities would always be incidental,
\fern{i.e.}\ as is the perception of Cleon's son, where we perceive
him not as Cleon's son but as white, and the white thing which we
really perceive happens to be Cleon's son. But then, what sorts out
the white thing from the son thing, and what places this at an order
of knowledge that is higher that the perception of white or son?
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]
I guess I
might have been [`thinking that
Aristotle is engaging in a discussion' on the topic of the
\titl{Phaedo} \pref{30}], thank you Mr Thomas for taking so much time to
indulge me on a point, which, in all honesty, I hadn't even given a
thought until Mr Whitehill mentioned it, and am not sure was worth the
energy I made you put forth. Your efforts are quite convincing however
and I will gladly put my speculations aside for more `worthy'
endeavors to knowledge.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Porter]\label{33}
  It would be useful, wouldn't it, if we all read the whole thing
  through, at least a quick, superficial read for awareness of
  content, as preparation for our intended slow reading? 

I was going to say, maybe we originally arrived at the concept of a
psyche through introspection, and then applied the concept to animals
through observation of them.  But, I have browsed ahead a little bit,
and I want to ask, is it roughly correct to say that the \Gk{yuq'h}
Aristotle and his fellow Greeks discussed was supposed to be the thing
that imparts life to otherwise inanimate matter?  This would be a
concept that could arise out of observation of the world around us,
independently of what we observe `within ourselves.' 
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Concerning \pref{31}:
I don't think that I \bem{assume} that a dog gets angry.  I have seen a number
of dogs who act quite angrily.  This is called observation, and does not
rely upon introspection.  Introspection does not even always access \bem{my
own} anger, as I can get angry without realizing it.  It has happened on
occasion that I required a friend to point out that I was acting from anger
to realize that this had happened.  But heightened alertness and
aggression, together with raised hackles and the other physiological
attributes of anger can be observed in dogs with quite relative frequency.
So can the anger that arises out of meanness, when you see one dog
purposefully making another dog's life miserable, out of apparent spite.
(This is what's going on in my sister's household, with a new, retarded
adolescent dog being $\langle$ahem$\rangle$ hounded by a long
established, and much more clever, terrier.)

You are the one making the apparent assumption that anger is exclusively an
internal feeling.  Of course, I can't know exactly how a dog \bem{feels} as he
is snarling, with hackles raised and an elevated heart rate.  But I can't
know how \bem{you} exactly feel when you exhibit the signs of anger.  So I
don't think that I need introspection to recognize anger either in you or
in Fido.  And I don't think I need to ascribe to every sentient being the
`inner experience' I access through introspection in order to recognize
their anger, for example.

Does a mosquito get angry?  I don't know.  Perhaps if I had more experience
with observing them I could form an opinion.  We do say that bees get
angry on occasion, but again, I have too little experience with observing
them to make a judgment.

I fully recognize that there are all sorts of puzzles about how one can
know things.  And you seem somewhat enamored of the Cartesian puzzles.  But
you also seem to insist that Aristotle is by some sort of necessity a
Cartesian thinker, worried about solipsism and trying to bridge the chasm
between his personal introspection and the mysterious external world.  If
you want to insist on this, fine---I'll just shut up.  But you won't be
understanding Aristotle, in my opinion.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
I think that Mr Porter's formulation in \pref{33}, of \Gk{yuq'h},
is indeed `roughly correct', at least as far
as Aristotle is concerned.  Plato's discussions of \Gk{yuq\'h} don't seem to
conform to this rough correctness, though.  But then Plato is not trying to
give a scientific account of the world, whereas Aristotle probably is.  I
forget in which dialogue Plato propounds the notion that the \Gk{yuq\'h} is
the principle of self-motion, a feature of \Gk{yuq\'h} that Aristotle also
discusses, and a feature that is not peculiar to the human \Gk{yuq\'h}.  I
don't know enough about how the word was used in other contexts to be very
helpful about what Aristotle's `fellow Greeks' may have understood about
the term.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]\label{36}
  [Mr Thomas writes:] `I'll just shut up.  But you won't be
understanding Aristotle, in my opinion.'
I am simply trying to understand the agency with which one arrives at the
conclusion that certain types of knowledge are `superior.' I do not believe
in such a thing, nor do I believe that one can know a dog gets `angry'
without anthropomorphizing. If that prevents me from understanding
Aristotle, alas, I will read on.
%Thank you again for your thoughts.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
`I do not believe
in such a thing\dots'
Do you really mean this?  Do you think that knowledge of quantum physics
and knowledge of the names of the Spice Girls are equivalent in value?
Really?

`\dots nor do I believe that one can know a dog gets `angry' without
anthropomorphizing.'
I expect that you mean something different by anger than I do.  Or maybe
you just don't know dogs.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]
  That is true. Most dogs that I know have a terrible time with English.

`Do you really mean this?'
Yes. On a lighter note, if a crazed fan were holding a gun to my head and
were going to kill me if I didn't profess my love of [C]innamon [S]pice, then I
would hold that particular piece of knowledge in the highest regard.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Whitehill]
  Mr Lewis wrote [in \pref{36}]:
`I am simply trying to understand the agency with which one arrives at the 
conclusion that certain types of knowledge are ``superior.''{}'
     But Aristotle is not denoting a \bem{type} of knowledge but an
     \bem{object} of knowledge.

     The study of the soul is at the front rank of possible enquiries because 
either it has greater exactitude and a worthwhile object or is `more 
honorable and precious' than another.   Whatever one brings to the \titl{De Anima} 
in terms of belief about the soul, its study fits either of these categories 
and so we should put it among the first rank of the things into which we 
enquire.

     I mentioned `introspection' because it is puzzling how Aristotle will 
complete his errand by denotation and description alone.  And there is the 
tantalizing question of `exactitude' which opens the door for a discussion of 
methodology in conjunction with this study.  The first question Aristotle 
asks is how do we study something like `the soul', something which we talk 
about frequently, a concept that Socrates and Plato denoted in a very 
thinglike manner.  One method of enquiry may not be sufficient to cover all 
questions.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]
  `But Aristotle is not denoting a \bem{type} of knowledge but an \bem{object}
  of knowledge.'
That helps considerably! Thank you.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{42}
  One more comment on the first sentence:  Aristotle does not literally
assert that the study of \Gk{yuq\'h} is among the first in importance among
sciences.  He actually says that it would be `reasonable' (\Gk{e>ul'ogos}) to
place it among the first (or `highest') sciences.  This may seem like a
legalistic quibble, but I think it does emphasize that for Aristotle, these
beginnings are still somewhat provisional.  His statements about this study
being more accurate and better and more awesome are not to be seen as
utterly assertoric, but as promissory notes to be redeemed by the end of
the course.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Billington]
  Mr Pierce wrote [\pref{16}]: `I am finding it frustrating not to have the
  Greek.'
Here it is in Greek, with a commentary in Greek:
\url{http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/psyxhs/contents.html}
On my browser, I had to click to agree to install the Greek fonts.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{44}
Concerning the Second question of \pref{11}:
First, Mr Salas should have put quotation marks around the phrase
`$\langle$essential$\rangle$ attributes', for this, including the
angled braces around the
word `essential' is what Hett gives in his translation.

Such angled braces are used in classical texts to indicate that the editor
believes a word is missing and must be supplied even though there is no
textual evidence for the reading.  Since Hett's translation is in the Loeb
volume, with a facing Greek text, I took Hett's use of angled brackets in
his translation to indicate that he believes the word should be there
(presumably for consistency with Aristotelian doctrine given elsewhere),
even though there is no textual reason to include it.

So, Hett at any rate will answer Mr Salas' parenthetical question:  no.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Again concerning the Second question of \pref{11}:
First, Aristotle does not in fact \bem{claim} that there are attributes
peculiar to the soul.  He uses the word \Gk{doke\~i}:  `it seems'.  Aristotle
could, in a later stage of the investigation, conclude that there weren't
any such private attributes after all.

Second, in response to this question people have lept straight into the
vexed question of the soul's separation, and implied immortality.  Mr
Salas urged caution before tackling these questions, a counsel I approve.
Nevertheless, an apparently analogous structure occurred to me that might be
helpful in sorting out what Aristotle might mean by \Gk{>'idia} attributes:

  Suppose that we are studying kings.  What could it mean to say that some of
the attributes of kings are peculiar to a king, while others seem to belong
to kingdoms as well, by virtue of the king.

We'll suppose that the kings we are discussing are absolute monarchs.  One
of the attributes of such a king is the power to issue binding commands.
This is not an attribute of a kingdom, which is a kingdom precisely because
it and its parts are subject to the commands of its sovereign.
Accordingly, the power of command is an attribute private to the king.

On the other hand, if the king is quick to anger and quick to go to war,
this attribute is an attribute both of the king and of his kingdom, by
virtue of the king.  (A king slow to anger and chary of war will accordingly cause his
kingdom to have those opposite characters.)

Note that this says nothing about the independence or `separate existence'
of the ruler and his domain.  Indeed, a king is only a king so long as he
has a kingdom, as Lear learned (to his regret).

I hope that this little story illustrates how it would be possible to have
a situation where an entity (here, a king \fern{qu\^a} king) dependant upon a
larger structure for existence can have an attribute not shared by the
larger structure.

By the way, this thought was inspired by the word \Gk{>arq`h} in the second
sentence, which I still hope to get around to discussing.  (As a result,
this post should perhaps have been postponed until after discussing that
sentence.)

I conclude that, both because Aristotle uses the verb `seems' and because
the relation he mentions can apply to a variety of states of affairs,
Aristotle is not committing himself to any particular consequences when he
speaks of \Gk{>'idia} attributes.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]\label{46}
I take Mr Thomas's (henceforth, Mr Th., if it's OK; I toyed with dubbing
you `Mr T' but decided against it) point, that we don't really know much
about what exactly has come down to us in the name of Aristotle.  I also
subscribe to the lecture-notes hypothesis but can't say that I'm wedded to
it.

The reason that I asked about \Gk{>akr'ibeia} in the first couple of
lines is that 
I wonder about the assumption that this kind of knowledge will be both more
wonderous and more \Gk{>akrib'h[s]} than other kinds of knowledge.  Since
we have not
yet read a definition of the soul, claims for the kinds of knowledge one can
have about it are mysterious to me.

Mostly, and in agreement with Mr Th., I think we should keep \Gk{>akr'ibeia} in
our minds while we begin to read Aristotle's definitions of \Gk{yuq\'h}.
Regarding my caveat, I mentioned it because I think we should be mindful of
our translation of \Gk{yuq\'h} in order to avoid importing any baggage we may
have regarding `souls' into this unusual word.  Originally, \Gk{yuq\'h} meant
`breath of life.'  As far as I know, in Greek it can vascillate between
mind, heart, and animating principle.  In 402a, it seems that we get a
definition of the lattermost sort.  \Gk{Yuq\'h}, in 402a, is the \Gk{>arq`h t\~wn
z'w|wn} (starting point/principle of animals).  As Mr Th.\ points out, we will
shortly read about the various instantiations of the \Gk{yuq\'h}.  Plants may
have them.  In general, any living thing may have a \Gk{yuq\'h}.  Given this
rough sketch of \Gk{yuq\'h} so far, I have been translating it for myself as
`animating force' or `animating principle.'  I'll toss that out as a
possible answer to what \Gk{yuq\'h}, as a term, may safely mean.

As sheer speculation, I'd say that one thing Aristotle may think is
particularly wonderful about \Gk{yuqa'i} is that they seem to be connected with
motion.  I'm not jumping ahead here but just observing that \Gk{yuqa'i} are
associated with animals or living things and motive agency seems peculiar to
those living things.  At any rate, that's one of the reasons \bem{I}
think that 
living things are so amazing.

Mr Th., I haven't yet read through the entire thread but if you haven't
talked more about \Gk{>akr'ibeia} as abstract, could you?  It's not
something that 
would have come out of the Greek to me but I'd be interested in what you've
found.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Mr Lewis, 
[concerning \pref{25}:]
I think that we should keep in mind that \Gk{yuq\'h} has, as of yet, only been
defined as some sort of principle for animal life.  Doubtless,
Aristotle has come
to his treatise with baggage but I don't think that observing that some
objects possess animate qualities and that we can assume that there is a
cause for that animation is unfair or unempirical.

[Concerning \pref{27}:]
We haven't gotten that far yet.  Before we get to \Gk{p'ajh}, I think we should
deal with book 1.  However, it is empirically observable that we have \Gk{p'ajh}
since we observe each other undergoing things all the time.  I don't think
introspection is necessary here.

I think that Ross' suggestion, quoted by Mr Thomas earlier in the thread is
quite reasonable.  Insofar as we'll find that the soul is not a matter/form
composite, knowledge of it will be \Gk{>akrib'esteron} (keener/sharper)
than things 
that are composites for him.  Why it is most keen and most wonderous is
something about which I'm still wondering.


[Concerning \pref{31}:]
Whoa there!!

Sensation isn't for another book.  Hold your horses Mr Lewis!  We'll talk
about separation a lot, I'm sure, later.  One thing that may tide you over
until then, though, is that \Gk{qwrism'os}, the adjective translated as
separable 
may suggest logical rather than ontological separation.

  Mr Porter,
[concerning \pref{33}:]
I think that's what we talked about doing.  If we hadn't, I agree with you.
We should read the whole but then discuss each part
sloo\-oo\-oo\-oo\-ooowly.  I
think we should also try not to jump to parts of the treatise way off in the
distance.

`[I]s it roughly correct to say that the \Gk{yuq\'h} Aristotle and his fellow
Greeks discussed was supposed to be the thing that imparts life to otherwise
inanimate matter?' I think so.



Mr Lewis,
[concerning \pref{36}:]
Aristotle will later trot out a definition of anger that may satisfy your
concern.  The definition will have two parts.  Let's call one dialectical or
formal and the other material.  The material part of `anger' would be blood
heating up around the heart.  So, this aspect of anger would be defined by
physical phenomena.  The former aspect of anger, the dialectical one, is
(from memory so forgive me if I don't get it quite right) the response to a
perceived slight.  So, if I strike a dog and it snarls at me while its blood
is boiling Aristotle would claim it [was] angry.

I don't mean to give you a brief and not-too-engaging response but I know
we'll come to these issues later and don't want us to lose our way as we
move there.

[Mr Thomas, concerning \pref{42}:]
Good point.


[Concerning \pref{44}:]
Sorry about being misleading.  Since I work with the angled braces all time
I didn't think about it.  Thanks for the clarification Mr Th.

That having been said, what do you all think about \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke}?
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
  Mr Salas writes in \pref{46}:
`I take Mr Thomas's (henceforth, Mr Th., if it's OK; I toyed with dubbing
you ``Mr T'' but decided against it).'

Is that pronounced `theta'?
\end{email}


\begin{email}[J. Tourtelott]
`{}``I toyed with dubbing you `Mr T' but decided against it).''{}'
I pity the fool who do  that.

---James B. A. Barracus Tourtelott  (check the gold chains)
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{49}
  Mr Salas writes in \pref{46}:
\dquo{
Originally, \Gk{yuq\'h}
meant `breath of life.'  As far as I know, in Greek it can vascillate
between mind, heart, and animating principle.
}
I don't think this is accurate.  LSJ \fern{s.v.}\ \Gk{yuq\'h} states
`Hom.\ usage 
gives little support to the derivation from \Gk{y'uqw} ``blow, breathe''{}'.
Readers interested in a capsule version of the standard account of
\Gk{yuq\'h} can look at the short aticle in the \titl{Oxford Classical Dictionary}
(3rd ed.).  Because of the reading reported below, I'm not sure the short
article is itself entirely accurate.

I myself am engaged in a diversion from reading the text of \titl{De Anima}
because I became interested in understanding what baggage Aristotle's
contemporaries would have brought to the lecture hall.  Accordingly I am
reading \titl{Toward the Soul:  An Inquiry into the Meaning of \Gk{yuq\'h} before
Plato} by David B. Claus (Yale University Press, 1981).  When I'm finished
with it I will try to give a brief report.

Mr Salas asks:
\dquo{
Mr Th., I haven't yet read through the entire thread but if you haven't
talked more about akribeia as abstract, could you?  It's not something that
would have come out of the Greek to me but I'd be interested in what you've
found.
}
I haven't found anything other than Hicks' words.  I'm wondering, though,
if by `abstract' Hicks means more or less what Ross said, that is, form
alone has more \Gk{>akr'ibeia} than form with matter.

(Note re:  baggage---the `form/matter' distinction in Aristotle is in no
way the same as the `mind/body' duality we moderns are stuck with.)



Mr Salas writes:
`That having been said, what do you all think about \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke}?'
It's been a while since I looked \Gk{sumba'inw} up.  I had forgotten that it's
first meaning was `stand with the feet together'.

More to our point, it means to meet, to come together, to make an
agreement, to happen, to occur, to result, and a zillion other more or less
related meanings.  LSJ has a separate section for philosophical meanings,
and cites Aristotle for the following two opposing notions:

1. `a contingent attribute or ``accident'' (in the modern sense)'.

2. `an attribute necessarily resulting from the notion of a thing, but not
entering into the definition thereof'---Aristotle's example is the fact
that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.

While most would say that this is one of Aristotle's technical terms, I'm
inclined to say that in opposition to \Gk{f'usis} and \Gk{>ous'ia}, \Gk{<'osa
sumb'ebhke per`i a>ut'hn} means `whatever else happens to come with it'.  The
term `attributes' probably says this as well as anything, except to the
extent that it appears to be definite about what sort of being an attribute
has; I think Aristotle uses it here primarily as a place-holder.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  \Gk{Sumba'inw} has an impersonal use, which is the use I take this instance of
the verb to be.  In conjunction with \Gk{<'osa}, I think the phrase \Gk{<'osa
sumb'ebhke} amounts to `such things as happen to be.'  The \Gk{per`i a>ut'hn}
amounts to `around' or `near' it.  A smoother translation, with
\Gk{per`i a>ut'hn},
would be `attributes.'  What I wonder at is whether we're talking about
essential or incidental attributes here.

The lack of specificity makes me think that we're either talking about
incidental attributes or Aristotle is not making a sharp distinction at the moment.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
  Mr Salas would apparently translate \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke per`i a>ut'hn} as `such
things as happen to be around it' (`it' = \Gk{yuq'h}).  I like the notion of
`being around' here (it's the major sense of \Gk{per`i}, at least with the
accusative).

Since this phrase announces a secondary search after the ones for \Gk{f'usis}
and \Gk{o>us'ia}, the notion is that these `attributes' are at the periphery,
whereas \Gk{f'usis} (derived from the verb for blooming) and \Gk{o>us'ia} are
almost certainly at the center.

This suggests that the answer to Mr Salas' question: `What I wonder
at is whether we're talking about essential or incidental attributes here'
cannot be Hett's answer.  That is, these attributes are either accidental
(or incidental) or ambiguously either accidental or essential.  One
concludes that Hett's `$\langle$es\-sen\-tial$\rangle$' is simply wrong.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Porter]
  I suppose this question is mainly for Mr Salas, who proposed \titl{De
  Anima,} but any good thoughts from others are also welcome. 

Why are we reading this, not another of Aristotle's works?
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{53}
I can't tell you why Mr Salas suggested this reading, but I can tell you
why I joined in.

As unlikely as it seems, Aristotle was the Greek philosopher known to the
scholastic era, not Plato.  (Only the \titl{Timaeus} was translated into Latin,
so all most scholastic scholars knew only what Aristotle claimed were
Platonic doctrines, not his actual work.)

This has led to certain oddities, since Aristotle is a relatively secular
personality, whose universe and `god' are both uncreated and eternal on
both sides of the time line.  Plato's apparent mystical turn is almost gone
in Aristotle.  But nevertheless, Aristotle's works formed the
basis of scholastic learning.

As a result, even the best translations tend to preserve the technical Latin
vocabulary used by the schoolmen.  As Michael Frede told me
once, we won't really understand Aristotle until his works are re-edited
from scratch, and the scholastic encrustations are eliminated.

I had that conversation with Frede a quarter century ago, right after
taking a seminar with him in which he came up with a brilliant
interpretation of the \titl{Categories} in which that work was an early ontological
treatise, subsequently bent out of shape to appear as a logical work.  (I'm told
Frede no longer interprets the work thus.)

I concluded that to read Aristotle well would be almost impossible, and
subequent life left me without rereading any for that quarter of a century.

In part, this was because I was engaged (fitfully) with trying to figure
out Plato, a difficult enough task on its own.




\titl{De Anima} is one of Aristotle's most difficult works, and it involves the
very difficult notion of \Gk{>entel'eqeia}.  It also has been claimed
by the schoolmen for a proof of the soul's immortality (a proof far from
Aristotle's purpose, in my opinion), and more recently by phenomenologists
as a precursor.  In other words, it is a text which has for at least a
millenium been subjected to special pleading in its interpretation.

I think it would be a worthwhile project to try to figure out what it says.

I note in conclusion, that Mr Salas proposed this as a text for a `close
reading'---by which both he and I, I think, mean (as he put it) sloooooww.
It is possible to loose sight of the forest when examining the trees, to be
sure.  But the forest is in fact \bem{made up of} trees, and thus to figure out
the forest one must examine the trees.  This is why so many electrons have
been spilled on the question of what the phrase translated as `attributes'
means.
\end{email}


\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]
  Where should we be in the reading at this point in the discussion? 
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]\label{55}
  Well, I'm not to the second sentence yet.

The portion we were assigned to discuss was the first two chapters of the
first book.  (My text is in checked luggage, but I think this means through
405b30, although that could be a wayward memory.)

I think that the opening part needs very slow consideration.  I would
expect the pace would pick up a bit during Aristotle's discussion of his
predecessors' views, and slow down again when we reach book 2.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Whitehill]
  Mr Porter wrote:
`Why are we reading this, not another of Aristotle's works?'
 
        I don't know why Mr Salas picked it but I remember \titl{De Anima} is 
where Aristotle's ontology from the \titl{Metaphysics} is applied, making
\titl{De Anima} 
the reading of recourse to aid in one's understanding of the vital concepts 
in the \titl{Metaphysics}.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[G. Squires]\label{57}
  Mr Thomas:
Thanks for your response [\pref{53}] to Mr Porter's question, `Why \titl{De
  Anima}?'  It is 
helpful to know that we're going to tackle the most difficult of 
Aristotle's works!
Would you mind elaborating a bit on this word [\Gk{>entel'eqeia}]?
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  I don't know that \titl{De Anima} is the most difficult of all
  Aristotle's works.
I'll explain my own interests in it in another email, addressing Mr
Porter's question.

As for \Gk{>entel'eqeia}, the term is usually translated `actuality.'  Often
`actuality' will also be given as a translation for \Gk{t'elos}.  I'm interested
in seeing if there is any consistent use of each in the \titl{De Anima}.  As far
as I know the distinction is a tough one, if it's there.  `Actuality' is
normally paired with `potentiality' \Gk{d'unamis} in Aristotle.  We will
doubtless discuss Aristotle's use of these terms as we move through the
text.  An \fern{ad hoc} example may just be the potential/actual
energy distinction
many of us were taught in middle school.  I don't know if this example works
as well as I'd like but that's the rough idea.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Dear Mr Porter, 
I prefer \titl{De Anima} in part because it's very short.  I would
have also been
interested in the \titl{Metaphysics} but that's gargantuan.  I also would have
liked both \titl{Analytics} but I don't know that I'm able to helpfully guide us
through them.  Actually, I know I can't.  At the time, someone, who
incidentally is not in this thread at all, complained that we don't have
sustained discussions on texts.  I suggested some possibilities and people
voted up \titl{De Anima}.

Less practically, I'm interested in so called Aristotelian psychology.
We'll have to pull in various minor works and passages from other
Aristotelian works to explain a lot of what's going on in \titl{De Anima} and I
thought that would be neat.  As an addendum to Mr Th.'s great explantion, I
would add that the Aristotelian notion of perception is central to his
epistemological commitments since he can be very empirically oriented when
he approaches understanding.  \titl{De Anima}, along with some minor works[,] has
the most extended account of perception in the corpus.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Dear Mr Lewis,
I think we're still on the first few sentences.  The way I envisioned this,
although I don't see myself as the exclusive architect of our plan, was to
discuss until such time as a couple of people voiced a desire to move along
and everyone's concerns were addressed.

Since I have a tough time devoting tons of attention to the list for swathes
of a normal week, I will probably post most in fits and starts.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
  Ms. Squires writes:
\dquo{
Thanks for your response to Mr Porter's question, `Why \titl{De
  Anima}?'  It is 
helpful to know that we're going to tackle the most difficult of
Aristotle's works!
}
It's probably not the \bem{most} difficult.  Some chapters of the \titl{Metaphysics}
probably are.  I only claimed it was among the most difficult.
\dquo{
Would you mind elaborating a bit on [\Gk{>entel'eqeia}]?
}
I don't think we are in the right place to do so.  \Gk{>Entel'eqeia} is
regarded as one of the crucial Aristotelian terms, and it is apparently a
word that Aristotle made up.  When we get there we'll have to spend a lot
of time puzzling out what it means.

I'm willing now only to assert that it can't be `actuality' (the
traditional translation), since Aristotle would not have had to make up a
word for such a concept.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Dear Mr Thomas, [Concerning \pref{55}:]
I would have thought so too but I had a seminar on \titl{De Anima}
where a lot of
interesting progress was made by examining what Aristotle retains from his
predecessors and tosses out.

We may not want to take even that dry section for granted!
\end{email}

\begin{email}[E. B.]
  Mr Salas suggests:
\dquo{
 An \fern{ad hoc} example may just be the potential/actual energy distinction
 many of us were taught in middle school.  I don't know if this example
 works as well as I'd like but that's the rough idea.
}
Perhaps, but the distinction is between potential and kinetic. Both are 
`actual' in a manner of speaking, though perhaps not in the sense in which 
Aristotle means `actual'.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[P. Goldsmith]
  In my innocence, I always thought of \Gk{>entel'eqeia} as the property a thing may
have of containing within itself the thing's own purposes.  Now that it's
rolling around in the brain, I see this is not a simple notion at all.

Back to lurking on this thread.  I haven't read \titl{De Anima} since 1973 so I'm
in grave peril of making a fool of myself.
 \end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Ms B.,
I thought I had it down once and have since discovered that the distinction 
in Aristotle can be difficult for me to grasp.  At any rate, in Aristotle a thing that 
exists potentially still has a form of existence.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Indeed, at 412a6-11, Aristotle reveals that matter (a) exists, (b) is not
an individual thing, and (c) is potential.  And then we find out that
\Gk{>entel'eqeia} has two senses.

But let's wait until we get there to figure out what the hell he could mean
by that.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Ms Squires]
  Ms B. wrote:
`\dots the distinction is between potential and kinetic'.

Mr Salas wrote:
\dquo{
I thought I had it down once and have since discovered that the 
distinction in Aristotle can be difficult for me to grasp.  At any rate, in Aristotle a 
thing that exists potentially still has a form of existence.
}
In bringing this concept discussion back to question one,
`What does Aristotle mean\dots knowledge of the soul is highest in virtue of its 
accuracy\dots'

Is potential existence accurate, exact, precise?  Or does it become so only 
when it is actual, realized, kinetic?  We use the expression that `thoughts 
form and take shape' in our minds.  We write books that are potential books 
until they are complete and printed.  So, how can the study of the soul be 
accurate?

Is the suggestion that the soul is potential rather than actual?  Or is Aristotle 
setting out to prove that the soul is actual?

Aristotle proposes that knowledge of any kind is valuable.
Some kinds of knowledge are more valuable than others.
What makes the knowledge of greater value can be one or both of two things, 
\begin{itemize}
  \item
accuracy/exactness or
\item
dignity/wonderfulness of the object.
\end{itemize}

On both accounts:
\begin{enumerate}
  \item
all knowledge is good
\item
some kinds of knowledge are better than others
\end{enumerate}

I'm still thinking that it is not the exactness and accuracy of the study 
of the soul which makes it a better subject for study, but the 
wonderfulness and dignity of the subject itself.

I think I'm waiting to be shown that the study of the soul can be an exact 
science.---But then there's the 21 grams measurement\dots that's pretty 
exact, isn't it?
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Ms B.]
  Mr Salas writes:
\dquo{
 I thought I had it down once and have since discovered that the distinction 
 in Aristotle can be difficult for me to grasp.  At any rate, in Aristotle a thing that 
 exists potentially still has a form of existence.
} 
I have enough trouble with energy, so I won't venture too far into
Aristotle. It might be interesting if energy were a good analogy for what
he is talking about, but I would be wary of importing something very
specific, also called 'potential', into a discussion of Aristotle's terms.
   
   In a side note, I am currently having conversation practice with
   someone who is just learning English. The other day she wanted to
   know what `actually' meant, because she hears it used so often and
   couldn't figure out what it means. It was extremely difficult to
   explain, once I started realizing in how many different senses we
   use it.
   \end{email}

   \begin{email}[Mr Tourtelott]
     `Actually,' in conversational English, almost always does not
   mean  `actually,' and `literally' virtually never means
   `literally.'
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Ms B.,
not to get into it too deeply but I think, in fact, that kinetic and
potential distinctions derive from Aristotle. I wonder if that's an old
classicist's tale, though.
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Ms B.]
 Mr Salas,
I suspect you are right, at least partially. `\fern{Vis viva}' probably comes
into it somewhere. 
\end{email}



\begin{email}[L. Travis]
 I have been trying to answer this question for myself; `Why \titl{De
 Anima}?'

I loved Aristotle in SJC expressly because the readings did not
involve poetry and seemed to fit the way I examine problems.
Mathematical steps rather than a more holistic or artsy method.

To me, \titl{De Anima} was/is important because I have wondered since
this reading `Why postulate a soul?' when attempting to understand the
`way things are in the world'.  The reading seems to me to be related
to the other more clinical examination of things `animal'.  \titl{De
  Anima} discusses something about which [I] remained facinated,
including discussions in Pascal, and later Germans concerning
potential and actualization.

Of course, now that we are in the reading and I am reminded of the
difficulty of the text\dots I wonder if I am up to the task.
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Porter]
 The reality of the line by line analysis occurring here is starting
 to sink in for me, and I'm pleased to think I'll have a chance to
 actually understand a lot of the treatise.  Are we ready to proceed
 to the next passage?

`To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most
 difficult things in the world\dots'
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Salas]\label{74}
Mr. Porter urges us onwards and upwards!

Before we move on, though, I have another question about the status of
our `attributes' in line 402a9.

I noticed, this evening, something that might inform our translation
of \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke per`i aut'hn}.  The following line, 402a9,
glosses these attributes as `[Attributes], some of which seem to be
affections (\Gk{p'ajh}) of the \Gk{yuq'h} exclusive to it, while
others seem to belong also to animals on account of that \Gk{yuq'h}.
Hett translates our \Gk{<'osa sumb'ebhke per`i aut'hn} as $\langle$essential$\rangle$
attributes.

Mr.\ Th.\ and I haven't seen any textual basis for that translation so
far.  I wonder, though, whether line 402a9 requires that \Gk{<'osa
  sumb'ebhke per`i aut'hn} be essential attributes?

I think that attributes that belong exclusively to a thing will be
essential attributes (or defining attributes) of a thing.  I suspect
that's where Aristotle  is going here but I also have serious doubts about
my suspicion.  For example, if I happen to be the only creature in
existence with this particular color of green in my eyes, should I be
defined by that attribute? I don't think so and I think that Aristotle would
call the color of my eyes an incidental attribute.  On the other hand,
Aristotle might argue that the particular shade of green my eyes possess is
not \Gk{'>idia} to them, except incidentally. What I mean is that I just
happen to have this color of green but am not required to have it.  If
that's his tack here, then the `\Gk{p'ajh >'idia}' would seem to be
essential attributes.

The \Gk{p'ajh} that belong to the body also but on account of the soul
are also interesting.  I think it might work in a way analogous to
this:  one can say my hand is moving as I walk down Waggener hall.
One can also say that my hand, although moving, is only doing so on
account of my whole body (or to whatever you want to ultimately
ascribe my motion).  These \Gk{p'ajh}, although shared with the animal
(as a whole), arise on account of the soul.  I'm not clear on what
their status, as incidental or essential, is[,] but Hett may well be
taking these two clauses to suggest that Aristotle is talking about
essential attributes in the preceding line.   What do you guys think?

I'm also not sure, though, of what \Gk{p'ajh} means in line 402a9 and
whether or not that would affect my above example (of the eyes).
Clearly, these attributes are some sort of thing that the soul
undergoes or experiences but I'm a little unclear about what exactly
A.\ is talking, while attributes that are shares with other things.
Perhaps we can move a little by trying to elucidate this issue: what
exactly is A.\ looking for in regards to the soul?

In 402a7-9, we have the soul's  \Gk{f'usis} (nature), its \Gk{o>us'ia}
(being/definition), and its attributes as objects of investigation.
Shall we consider, in addition to the questions above, what a thing's
\Gk{f'usis}, \Gk{o>us'ia}, and attributes are? Caveat: we may have to
jump about in other Aristotelian texts to nail down his precise usage
but it may be worthwhile considering this laundry list forms the goal
of A's investigation as stated.

Mr. Porter, the translation you're using, `To attain any assured
knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the
world', includes `assured' in regards to belief (\Gk{p'istis}).  I
don't see that in the Greek, do any of you?
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Mr. Salas writes:  `I think that attributes that belong exclusively to a
thing will be essential attributes (or defining attributes) of a
thing.'

Why?  Take the example of an army.  The army includes its general, of
course, both as a part and as the ruler of the whole.  Some attributes
of the general will be attributes of the army as a whole
(decisiveness, say, or spiritedness).  Other attributes of the general
may be exclusive to the general -- suppose the general has a delicate
stomach, and must carefully watch what he eats.  This attribute is by
no means an essential attribute of a general, even though our
particular general has it.  Other generals may have robust digestive
systems, and be just as much generals as the first.  And despite the
adage that an army travels on its stomach, armies don't in fact have
stomachs, even though each member of it does.  So the attribute of
digestive disposition is one that structurally cannot be held by an
army.
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
Because the digestive example is not exclusive to the general.  By
\Gk{>'idia} I think that A.\ means necessarily exclusive.

I'm running off to class right now but is the rest of your example
aimed at the attributes that exist on account of the soul?
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
This seems to beg the question.  If you think \Gk{>'idia} means
`necessarily exclusive', then the question is answered.  But clearly
this is not the ordinary meaning of the Greek word.  So if Aristotle
uses it in a (pun intended) idiosyncratic way, one would have to
demonstrate that.

My example was intended to show a way in which one could say that an
attribute could be private to a part of a composite entity without
being essential to the part.  It was not intended to be a perfect
analogue to the \Gk{yuq'h} as a part of an animal.  (Although I
suspect it will turn out to be a pretty good analogue.)
\end{email}



\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
Mr. Salas writes:
\dquo{
Mr. Porter, the translation you're using, `To attain any assured
knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the
world', includes `assured' in regards to belief (\Gk{p'istis}).  I
don't see that in the Greek, do any of you?
}
Hett has `sure belief', which is better than `assured knowledge'.
\Gk{P'istis} is much stronger than the English word `belief'.  English
`belief' is generally agnostic about the truth of the matter believed,
whereas \Gk{p'istis} seems to imply a greater degree of confidence in
the assurance in the matter concerned.  LSJ does not give `belief' as
a meaning of \Gk{p'istis}, using terms like `trust', `faith',
`confidence', `guarantee' and `assurance'.  \Gk{D'oxa} is the term that
would be used for `mere belief'.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Lewis]\label{79}
Has anyone read the Thomas Aquinas commentary on De Anima? Is it worth a
peek?
  


Third Sentence:
\begin{enumerate}
  \item
The soul is a substance (\Gk{o>us'ia}) that has its own particularity or
Distinctiveness but as such can it be suited to any body or just to a
specific one?
\item
By connecting the soul's principles to `animal life' is Aristotle
necessitating an empirical approach to derive the generic concepts from the
individuals, which came first?
\end{enumerate}
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Thomas]
  Mr Salas in \pref{74} writes two sentences in the same paragraph:
\dquo{
The \Gk{p'ajh} that belong to the body also but on account of the soul are
also interesting\dots
These \Gk{p'ajh}, although shared with the animal (as a whole), arise on
account of the soul.
}
These two statements may illuminate one of the pitfalls that we will be
facing.  It is natural to us post-Cartesians to think of a soul/body
duality.  Thus, the two sentences I have quoted above may appear to be
making the same distinction.  It is important to note, however, that
Aristotle does not claim that some of the affections of the \Gk{yuq'h}
`belong to the body also'.  When he talks about affections not peculiar to
the \Gk{yuq'h}, he talks about how they belong to the \bem{animal} on
account of
the soul.  Thus, the second of Mr Salas' sentences quoted above is a
correct paraphrase of Aristotle's words, whereas the first sentence is
incorrect.

I expect that Mr Salas wrote the first quoted sentence without thinking
through the difference between an animal and its body, because that is a
distinction that is not at all alive to us.  But it may in fact be a
distinction that is alive to Aristotle, and we should be careful not to
confuse the two.
\end{email}

\begin{email}[Mr Salas]
  Mr Thomas wisely cautions us against falling into the Cartesian mind/body
trap.  In the case that I had mentioned, of movement, I do think it's useful
to talk about a distinction between \Gk{yuq'h} and body (\Gk{s\~wma})
% there should be a tilde on the omega, but typing \Gk{s\~wma} causes
% the initial sigma to be treated as terminal; it's an incompatibility
% between LaTeX and GreeK-TeX
but I should
have been more careful in my choice of examples.  I didn't intend to
separate the body from the soul ontologically or to suggest that Aristotle would
be doing that.  I think, however, that movement will belong to the body
incidentally as well as to the animal as a whole.  I don't think that
implies the animal's constituent parts are ontologically separable, although
it doesn't rule it out either.

Perhaps a better example is life.  Life is clearly a \Gk{p'ajos} of the whole
animal on account of the soul.  If we accept that the soul is the life
principle, this example may be a paradigm one.

Incidentally, I've been thinking about \Gk{'>idia p'ajh} this past week and
think I've come to largely agree with Mr. Th.'s correction of me.  I don't
think that these \Gk{p'ajh} are essential any longer but there is something
peculiar, no pun intended, going on with them.  First of all, they suggest
that Aristotle does have some kind of \Gk{yuq'h}/body distinction in mind, although
the sort of distinction he's got in mind is wide open.  Second of all, they
suggest that the whole animal and its soul may not correlate at all points.
I think we should keep an eye out for what Aristotle does with these
\Gk{'>idia p'ajh} in the upcoming pages.

Again, what do you all think about setting up \Gk{f'usis, o>us'ia,} and
\Gk{'<osa
sumb'ebhke} up as objects of inquiry?  Do we all agree on what these three
terms mean?  Should we talk about it?

Mr. Lewis,
I'm not sure what you mean [in \pref{79}] by the third sentence.  Do
you mean `The soul is 
a (or {the}---unclear) principle of animals'?

Regarding your question, Aristotle will give a straight answer on that one later
on when he starts trashing his predecessors.

I'd watch out for the principles `of' the soul.  The soul \bem{is} the
principle 
of animals.  It is unclear to me whether the soul could have a principle
since it seems to be one.  The remainder of your question is what confused
me.  Could you elaborate?
\end{email}

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